@allweneedislove:
if you are a proponent of removing the victory conditions what would you suggest to encourage the allies to fight in both europe and pacific?
That’s an interesting thought. In a way, the general idea of finding a way to encourage the Allies to fight both in Europe and the Pacific would be a bit like the Combined Arms unit-pairing rules, in which a mix of unit types activates enhanced unit abilities. The Allies would need some kind of multiplier effect (either military or economic) as an incentive to fight in both theatres. I don’t know how it could be done, but it’s an intriguing concept for a house rule.
Historically, once the US, the UK, the USSR, Germany and Japan were all at war, the basic strategy of the Allies was supposed to be “Hitler first”. The Allies did, in one sense, stick to that strategy, but the plan got diluted to some extent by the sheer size and diversity of America’s production of war materials. US industry cranked out vast quantities of land-based weapons and aircraft (which could be used in both theatres), but it also cranked out vast numbers of warships, which arguably were far more useful for fighting the primarily oceanic war in the Pacific than the primarily land-based war in Europe. The European war did require sea power, but this was primarily in the form of transport ships, escort vessels, a few shore-bombardment vessels, and lots of landing craft / amphibious assault ships. The top-of-the line combat vessels – the fleet carriers and the fast battleships – were arguably “in excess of requirements” in Europe but were vitally important in the Pacific, so the US could commit them against Japan without greatly hindering the overall “Hitler first” strategy. This is also true for the US submarine forces: there wasn’t much work for them to do in the Atlantic or in the Mediterranean, but they could (and did) wreak economic havoc on Japan by attacking its vital (and surprisingly ill-defended) convoy routes.