Re-reading the “Liberation Trilogy”. Army at Dawn, Day of Battle, and The Guns at Last Light, Rick Atkinson. My favorite narrative.
Just purchased The Chamberlain Hitler collusion by Finkel and Leibovitz from Lorimer Press. Has some new view on what really happened in september 1938. They claim that Chamberlain colluded to make a pact between UK and Germany against commi Russia. But something went horrible wrong and the rest is history. I dont know if this book is facts or fiction. its just bizzare more than anything, man
Just purchased The Chamberlain Hitler collusion by Finkel and Leibovitz from Lorimer Press. Has some new view on what really happened in september 1938. They claim that Chamberlain colluded to make a pact between UK and Germany against commi Russia. But something went horrible wrong and the rest is history. I dont know if this book is facts or fiction. its just bizzare more than anything, man
It’s hard to tell from your brief description, but it sounds as if the book’s “something went horribly wrong” component amounts to the authors saying that “it’s unfortunate that Britain didn’t get into bed with Nazi Germany,” which would be a very debatable premise. In any case, the “anti-USSR alliance with Nazi Germany” scenario which is described strikes me as being out of character with Chamberlain, whose primary motivation was to keep Britain out of international conflicts as much as possible. The Hitler-Chamberlain discussions at Munich in September 1938 can arguably be seen as a form of collusion…but it was a collusion which kept Britain out of a potential war with Germany in exchange for selling out Czechoslovakia, not a collusion to oppose communism. So I concur with you that this sounds bizarre.
@CWO:
The Hitler-Chamberlain discussions at Munich in September 1938 can arguably be seen as a form of collusion…but it was a collusion which kept Britain out of a potential war with Germany in exchange for selling out Czechoslovakia, not a collusion to oppose communism.
That’s all that needs to be said right there and is spot-on. Chamberlain sold-out the Czechs, who weren’t even invited to the discussion.
Operation Barbarossa. (B.I. Fugate)
Biggest revelation for me was that the Soviets had been removing their best units from the front line since May, placing them in rear echelons for the counter-attack. This was suppressed after the war because they didn’t want people to know that they effectively sacrificed their units left at the front leaving them with obsolete tanks and low levels of supplies.
But the Germans really didn’t comprehend the scale of what they were taking on.
Operation Barbarossa. (B.I. Fugate)
Biggest revelation for me was that the Soviets had been removing their best units from the front line since May, placing them in rear echelons for the counter-attack. This was suppressed after the war
To be perfectly honest, it sounds like you’re reading current Russian propaganda to make it look like the Soviets had everything under control.
I’m very well read on Barbarrossa from multiple sources… The Soviet Army was a mess in 1941… I’m not buying Stalin knew all along the Germans were invading that summer and smartly moved all their best units to the back for a counterattack… reality smacks that theory down in the dirt really hard…
The Soviet Army was REELING backwards at an alarming rate all the way to the gates of Moscow… there was no serious coordinated counterattack against the Germans until the winter when reinforcements FROM SIBERIA (which were released after a treaty with Japan) were made available… so I really can’t believe there was some massive great well trained formation of troops the Russians smartly put in the rear (apparently behind Moscow) and let the Germans destroy, capture or route millions of Russian soldiers before the mud and winter (not super troopers) slowed the German advance.
Sorry to say, whoever wrote what you’re reading sounds like a revisionist plant from Putin (talk about Russian conspiracies).
It was suppressed by Soviet propaganda because they didn’t want people to know they used the front line units for cannon fodder.
The Germans got a real shock when they eventually ran into the new Soviet tanks (KV1 & T34) because in the first months of the invasion they’d only encountered obsolete models they could easily destroy. Similarly the vast numbers of Soviet fighters destroyed on the ground were outdated units they could afford to lose.
It was suppressed by Soviet propaganda.
Man, that excuse is getting milked a lot… I just read a report that Poland is suing Germany over war debts this year, and they too used the excuse that they couldn’t sue because the Soviet Union kept them from suing…
I think people keep forgetting the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991… for anyone not wanting to do the math, that’s 26 years ago. We’re getting to the point of “well ya, but it was suppressed by the Roman Empire, so we didn’t know till recently”.
There are grown men on this forum that weren’t even born yet when the Soviet Union collapsed and have never known a world where the Soviet Union was a thing.
KV-1s (man, I love those) and T-34s were a shock to the Germans… that’s not new… but the Soviets had limited numbers of them (at least by Soviet standards) and it was just common sense not to stack them 5 feet from the border. Soviet strategies of sending waves of poorly equipped divisions, and sacrificing them is not some secret conspiracy and has been known for decades (really, since the 1940s at least)… simply put, I’ve been reading books and watching documentaries long before the collapse of the Soviet Union that talked about the Soviets sacrificing poor quality units to buy time… it’s not some secret revelation that was unlocked 26 years ago when the Soviet Union collapsed (well maybe if you live in Russia, you might have first heard of it 26 years ago)… but it was well known in the west well before 1991.
That the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany would eventually come to blows was no secret to the Russians either, before the war… however, Barbarossa itself was pretty much a shock to many in the Soviet Union (Stalin included), even despite warnings from the Western Allies it was looming… the Soviets were caught by surprise when Barbarossa launched, as they were thinking war was at least another year or two from happening. That they tried to position units smartly (by Soviet standards) prior to the war is just positioning of forces in what makes sense to their tactics… but poor units in front and better equipped units further back isn’t exactly shocking revelations that needed the Soviet Union to collapse (26 years ago) for anyone to understand that’s more just typical Soviet strategy.
It should also be noted that concentrating one’s troops and equipment – including one’s best troops and equipment – on the border is actually the worst possible way for a defender to deal with an armoured attack by a large enemy force. The correct approach is to set up a defense in depth which gradually erodes the advancing enemy forces. The sheer size of the Soviet Union meant that it was ideally suited for the application of such a defense. To me, the real question is whether the Soviets in 1941 consciously implemented a carefully planned defense in depth or whether they ended up fighting an unplanned one (and doing a bad job of it) due to faulty strategic thinking. The latter scenario sounds plausible, given that the Soviet Army reforms which followed the Winter War were still incomplete in 1941. And as Wolfshanze has pointed out, it wasn’t exactly a secret that Stalin had a cavalier attitude towards spending the lives of his troops throughout WWII, not just in 1941.
That’s all that needs to be said right there and is spot-on. Chamberlain sold-out the Czechs, who weren’t even invited to the discussion.
Among the many lies Woodrow Wilson told, one was his claim that the Entente was fighting for self-determination. That idea was of course abandoned at Versailles, as was every other lofty promise Wilson had made.
The people in the Sudetenland were German, and wanted to be part of Germany. The Czech government had been treating them like second-class citizens, with an apparent long-term plan of replacing them with Czechs. (After WWII the Sudetenland was ethnically cleansed of Germans, thus fulfilling the apparent long-term plan.)
In January 1938, millions of Sudeten Germans were under hostile Czech occupation. By the end of the year millions of Czechs were under hostile German occupation. Neither situation was consistent with self-determination. But the British government had not supported self-determination as a value at Versailles or at any point after WWI, making it difficult for them to convincingly argue the latter situation was worse than the former.
At Versailles, one of the reasons for giving Germany’s neighbors land which rightfully belonged to Germany was to ensure that there would always be a significant bone of contention between Germany and her immediate neighbors. This would cause diplomatic isolation for Germany. The strategy worked. In 1935 the Czech government signed a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union. That alliance created fear within Germany: fear of what could happen if the Soviets invaded Germany with soldiers stationed on Czech soil. The Versailles policy of giving German land to Germany’s neighbors also drove a wedge between Germany and Poland; with the latter nation embracing an ill-conceived, disastrous alliance with Britain and France as an alternative to restoring West Prussia to German control.
Starting apparently in 1938, Germany had adopted a carrot and stick policy towards those nations east of itself, west of the Soviet Union. Any nation in that region which adopted an anti-German foreign policy would typically be annexed. Whereas, Germany would extend favorable treatment to those Eastern European nations which embraced pro-German, anti-Soviet foreign policies. That strategy paid off. By the time Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, every nation in Eastern Europe was either an ally of Germany (such as Romania), was neutral in Germany’s favor, or was under German occupation. (Except of course for those Eastern European nations under Soviet occupation.)
Among the many lies Herbert Hoover told was a false narrative of anything Historical relating to the period of 1939-45. He did however know how to prepare Chicken. If Herman were alive, he possibly could feed him well enough it seems. He may have prepared enough Chicken to feed the Germans who started countless wars and were starving due to Churchill and Herman who either denied foodstuffs because of the wars Germany caused or in Herman’s case ate the food supplies.
Germany never had a “carrot and stick” policy. Only a policy of conquest and invasion that might have led to a future food embargo and general war. Germany choose this course. Stop posting false narratives of reality. The Czechs weren’t treated well , but UK could do nothing… they were a sea power.
@wittmann:
Evening Worsham.
Nothing at the moment, as I am (happily) in a Civil War rut at the moment.
My wife did buy me: Ardennes 1944, by Antony Beevor. I might read it once I have finished: Five Tragic Hours, the Battle of Franklin, by McDonough and Connelly.The Ardennes offensive has always been a favourite of mine. Panthers, (King) Tigers and the best armoured reserves Germany had at the time; well, you know me!
Enjoy your read.
Hi Wittman,
Antony Beevor’s “Stalingrad” book is a fun read. I didn’t know that author produced one on the Ardennes. I’d have to check it out.
I used to read lots of American Civil War history and participate in re-enactments. Now I’m mostly into WW2 non-fiction.
Dr. Robert Citino is my current favorite author for WW2. Considered amongst the academic community to be a leading historian on German Operations during WW2. He gets great reviews from the US Military officer community. He has fun lectures on youtube from speaking engagements at the War College and the US Army Department of Heraldry.
@Imperious:
Among the many lies Herbert Hoover told was a false narrative of anything Historical relating to the period of 1939-45. He did however know how to prepare Chicken. If Herman were alive, he possibly could feed him well enough it seems. He may have prepared enough Chicken to feed the Germans who started countless wars and were starving due to Churchill and Herman who either denied foodstuffs because of the wars Germany caused or in Herman’s case ate the food supplies.
Germany never had a “carrot and stick” policy. Only a policy of conquest and invasion that might have led to a future food embargo and general war. Germany choose this course. Stop posting false narratives of reality. The Czechs weren’t treated well , but UK could do nothing… they were a sea power.
Every word you’ve written is false, and at this point I’m fairly sure you know these words are false.
Every post you’ve written is false, and at this point I’m fairly sure you know your posts are of a false narrative. How was Virginia?
No more of this, please.
I have a fave used bookstore here in Toronto that from time to time has some real gems, for $9.99 I scored a mint copy of a table top book/biography, ‘German U-Boat Ace Adalbert Schnee . The Patrols Of U-201 In World War II’ -
fantastic book about one of Germanys finest U-Boat commanders to survive the war. its filled with a lot of informative photogaphs of his u-boat service and his time serving besides Donitz before being given a Type XXI at the end of the war, and his life after the war. a nice big book, as informative as a large picture book can be and a must for anyone with a love for all things U-Boat.
its written by Luc Braeuer
@BIG:
I have a fave used bookstore here in Toronto that from time to time has some real gems, for $9.99 I scored a mint copy of a table top book/biography, ‘German U-Boat Ace Adalbert Schnee . The Patrols Of U-201 In World War II’ -
fantastic book about one of Germanys finest U-Boat commanders to survive the war. its filled with a lot of informative photogaphs of his u-boat service and his time serving besides Donitz before being given a Type XXI at the end of the war, and his life after the war. a nice big book, as informative as a large picture book can be and a must for anyone with a love for all things U-Boat.
its written by Luc Braeuer
Imagine how the Battle for the Atlantic would have been if Germany had Type-XXI’s a few years earlier…
Just started The First Total War, by David A. Bell…Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as We Know It.
Sounds like a good book, Worsham.
I put down Beevor’s Stalingrad, before Christmas amd have not picked it up again. Trying to rea the rules of Pendragon’s Waterloo. Is designed by an Italian and is hard going.
I’ve been fascinated by WWII since childhood (a long time ago) and have read too many great books on the subject to offer a complete list. Here are a few standouts, though:
The Last Flight of Bomber 31 by Ralph Wetterhahn–If you’ve never read anything about the war in the Bering Sea/Aleutians, start here.
Jimmy Stewart: Bomber Pilot by Starr Smith–Jimmy Stewart wasn’t just a great actor; he was a great American. This book details his military service. Great stuff.
The Last Lion by William Manchester with Paul Reid–A hefty, three-volume bio of Winston Churchill. Volume III covers 1940-65, but Vol.II, 1932-40, is an absolutely fascinating look at Churchill’s battle with short-sighted British politicians who, in their desperate quest to prevent another world war, steadfastly refused to take steps to stop Hitler before he became a grave threat.
The Mantle of Command: FDR at War, 1941-1942 by Nigel Hamilton–I’d always been told that FDR was a successful CinC because he maintained a largely hands-off approach to his generals and admirals, allowing the warfighters to develop strategy and carry it out. I was lied to. This book was an eye-opener. Haven’t read the sequel yet, but it’s high on my list.
Torpedo Junction: U-Boat War off America’s East Coast, 1942 by Homer Hickam–Another aspect of WWII often glossed over in public school is the war which took place along America’s shoreline. This book works for me on a couple of levels. First, it details the role played by the US Coast Guard early in the war. Second, it’s a classic case of command failure: on the US side, a failure to comprehend the magnitude of the U-boat threat, and on the German side, a failure to comprehend the magnitude of the opportunity.
Next on my list is Engineers of Victory by Paul Kennedy, followed by David Faber’s Munich, 1938. I’ll post my thoughts on each when I’m done.
