Could Germany have won WWII?

I’m about 1/3 of the way Lost Victories, written by Erich von Manstein. Von Manstein was Germany’s best general during WWII; and one of the best generals in human history. Lost Victories is highly informative; and one of the most intellectually honest WWII history books I’ve read.

Von Manstein was a brilliant man frustrated by the less-than-stellar decisions made by his intellectual inferiors (just about everyone else). He also had the ability to think strategically; and to see the big picture. Most of those with whom he interacted thought purely in terms of tactics.

Others in the German military had come up with an invasion plan for France–an invasion plan intended to capture some ports along the English Channel; to be used in a subsequent naval war against Britain. France as a major power would be left intact.

Von Manstein pointed out that in attempting to limit Germany’s tactical risks, the generals had devised this plan had accepted an enormous level of strategic risk. Time was on the side of Britain and France. Also, the likelihood of Soviet intervention increased in proportion to German weakness. Trench warfare against France would gradually bleed Germany of its strength; increasing the risk of Soviet intervention.

The only way to reduce Germany’s exposure to strategic risk was to accept the tactical risks associated with conquering France. Von Manstein therefore devised a plan intended to accomplish exactly this. German senior brass opposed the plan; and were initially successful in their efforts to keep it from Hitler’s ears. But they were unable to keep it from Hitler’s ears forever. Hitler ordered the plan adopted after hearing von Manstein describe it. However, the German brass shuffled von Manstein off to an irrelevant command to punish him.

Because von Manstein wasn’t the one implementing the plan, some of its features were discarded. The Dunkirk evacuation would have been avoided had the original plan been left intact. Phase 2 of the plan–the elimination of the Allied forces near Paris–would also have been faster and far less costly.

Von Manstein pointed out that Germany had only three military options for resolving a war against Britain: 1) an air and sea war against British shipping, 2) controlling the Mediterranean and British colonies bordering the Mediterranean, 3) invasion of Britain itself. He pointed out that option 1 would have required aircraft carriers Germany lacked; as well as a much larger sub force than the one Germany had. Option 2 would not have ended the war against Britain. Therefore, the only practical choice was option 3.

He felt a plan should have been made to invade Britain before Germany had invaded France. And that physical preparations for this invasion should have started as soon as physically possible.

He pointed out that after the fall of France, Britain was temporarily helpless, at least on land. And would have been even more helpless had the Dunkirk evacuation been avoided. A much smaller invasion fleet would have been required in 1940 than the Allies needed in 1944.

In von Manstein’s view, the Luftwaffe squandered its strength on air battles deep inside Britain. The Luftwaffe was at a disadvantage in these battles–especially those which took place outside the range of escorting fighters. In his opinion, the Luftwaffe should have avoided significant action against the RAF until shortly before the invasion. At that point, it would impose a strong presence over the English Channel or areas near the invasion beachheads–places where the RAF’s range advantage would be at a minimum. Had the invasion of Britain unfolded according to von Manstein’s intentions, it’s quite possible the island would have fallen.

Stalin wanted to create a situation in which the Western democracies paid most of the price of defeating the German military; after which he himself would occupy the bulk of German-held territory. His long-term goal was to conquer both Germany and the Western democratic portion of Europe. He therefore wanted Germany and the Western democracies to bleed each other white before the Soviet Union became involved in any major war. But if Britain fell, the Western democracies would be physically prevented from doing what Stalin wanted. Germany would not be bled white; making a Soviet invasion much less likely. Under those circumstances, Nazi Germany might never have fallen.

@CWO:

Could Germany have won WWII?  Yes.  Could it have done so simply by letting Mannstein have his way?  Probably not.  The factors that ultimately produced the Allied victory (which was in no way inevitable) were complex, and an Allied defeat would have required fundamental changes to those factors.  To quote from the final paragraph of Richard Overy’s book “Why the Allies Won,” in which he sums up his thesis: “The Allies won the Second World War because they turned their economic strength into effective fighting power, and turned the moral energies of their people into an effective will to win. […] Materially rich, but divided, demoralized, and poorly led, the Allied coalition would have lost the war, however exaggerated Axis ambitions, however flawed their moral outlook.”

Could it have done so simply by letting Mannstein have his way?  Probably not.

Before I’d started reading Manstein’s book, I would have agreed with you. Now, I’m beginning to think that Germany had a legitimate chance to invade Britain in 1940; and that this chance was squandered because people other than Manstein were running the German military. A successful invasion of the British home islands would not alone be sufficient to guarantee Germany safety against foreign invasion. But it would have significantly altered the strategic equation.

an Allied defeat would have required fundamental changes to those factors.

The two main factors were that the Allies had an overwhelming advantage in military production; and an overwhelming advantage in manpower. One possible way of addressing that would have been to invade the Soviet Union in the spring of '41 (after having successfully invaded Britain in 1940). Von Manstein would, of course, have been in charge of this Operation Barbarossa. With Britain largely neutralized, fewer German troops would need to be tied down in places like France or Norway; thereby freeing up more soldiers for the invasion. Had von Manstein planned the invasion, the primary target would have been Moscow. That city would likely have fallen in '41. The fall of Moscow would have meant the defeat of a large portion of the Red Army. In addition, the Soviet Union would have lost a considerable portion of its civilian population, industrial base, and transportation network. This last point is especially important; because without that transportation network the Red Army’s ability to launch unified offensives would have been greatly hampered.

It is quite possible that, after having conquered a significant portion of the Soviet Union, Hitler could have made peace with Stalin. From Stalin’s perspective, that would have given him time to complete the process of getting America into the war against Germany. From Hitler’s perspective, this peace would have prevented the loss of additional German strength against the Soviet Union; thereby leaving it available to defend against an American invasion. An invasion which would be far more difficult, owing to the lack of a Britain-like base from which to launch it.

Below are military aircraft production numbers. The first number listed is for '42; the second for '44.

Germany: 15,000    41,000
Britain: 24,000    26,000
USSR: 25,000      40,000
US: 48,000      96,000

Even with Britain knocked out, Germany’s production in '44 would have been only 1/3 the combined Soviet-American total. This is why it would have been so important for Germany to fight the USSR and the US sequentially; rather than both at once. If by mid '43 Germany could obtain a favorable peace with the Soviet Union, it could then focus on securing itself against American invasion.

In 1944, Germany began manufacturing small numbers of jets. Imagine a Nazi Germany of 1946; possessing Britain, France, and the western Soviet Union. This Germany would have had a significant technological lead over America in jets, rockets, handheld anti-tank weapons, tank design, assault rifles, land war tactics, advanced submarine design, and other areas. America would have had the edge in nuclear weapons technology, heavy bomber design, artillery, computer technology, and electronics. There is no guarantee of an American victory in a war such as that. In particular, Germany’s qualitative advantage in jet design could have compensated for both the Americans’ larger numbers of aircraft and their nuclear weapons technology. A nuclear bomb is useless if the plane carrying it gets shot down before reaching its target.

I am now about 60% of the way through von Manstein’s book. I’ve read many books, but off the top of my head I can think of few or none written by someone so intellectually disciplined. For those familiar with the Myers-Briggs personality system, von Manstein comes across as an INTJ. He clearly had the ability to think deeply about big picture strategy; when many of his fellow generals could not see beyond tactics. (Von Manstein was also a master tactician, but that is another story.)

I also sensed a deep undertone of morality in his book. He had a military man’s honor–a soldier’s honor. Courage, self-sacrifice, patriotism, frank honesty, and concern for his men.

He does not paint a picture in which some people are all good or others all bad. When a person whose military judgement he didn’t respect made a good military decision, he acknowledges it as such. When someone he liked or respected made what he felt was an error, he frankly pointed out the error.

To address some of the specific issues which had been raised: victory for Germany would have meant security against foreign invasion. This security could not have been achieved by simply waiting on events. To the east, the long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest. The FDR administration was strongly pro-Soviet; as was the government of France. There were many influential people in Britain who wanted that nation to adopt a pro-Soviet foreign policy; and by 1939 they’d become much more effective in influencing British policy than they’d been in '38.

In such an environment, it would have been highly risky for Germany to rely on the good intentions of its neighbors for its own security. The diplomatic situation was unstable; and all that was needed was some spark to give the pro-war/pro-Soviet faction in the West an excuse to intervene.

But if seeking a diplomatic solution was fraught with risk, the same could also be said about seeking a military and industrial means of securing Germany against foreign invasion. However, if this latter goal could be achieved, the solution would be more permanent. No one had ever imposed a Versailles Treaty on the United States. If Germany could achieve the same strength relative to Europe that the United States had in North America, her future would be assured regardless of unpredictable changes in the diplomatic equation.

In the spring of 1940, Germany did not have a plan to invade Britain. After the fall of France, the German military was confused about what action to take next. They–including Hitler–hoped for a diplomatic resolution. But such hopes were completely unrealistic, as the British political leadership simply had no interest in any sort of negotiated settlement. In light of the diplomatic situation, Germany’s best, most straightforward way of resolving that war was to invade Britain.

Von Manstein had a disciplined, cool-headed way of assessing risk. (This way of thinking goes far beyond just military decision-making.) The risks he took generally paid off; because they were calculated risks. If he thought he could take Britain–which he did–I would not want to bet against him.

A successful invasion of Britain alone would not have secured Germany against foreign invasion. The second stage would have been to fight the Soviet Union. The Red Army was not ready for war in '41. That being the case, the primary aim of Barbarossa should have been to take Moscow in '41. Had that been the objective from the beginning, then with sufficiently good generalship it might well have been achieved. The objective would have been the city itself, as well as a large portion of the Red Army. With additional victories over the Soviet Union in '42, Germany could then negotiate a peace which would guarantee the future of the Reich for many decades to come.

@Narvik:

If this is what AH wrote in Mein Kampf he could have fooled me. So you tell me it was necessary to kill and ethnical clean all German Jews to achieve domestic security, and to invade Russia, kill and ethnical clean 30 million Slaves and make Lebensraum to achieve security against communism, then kill and ethical clean all people in the rest of the world that was not Arian, just to achieve security to the German nation ? It sounds to me AH was building an empire, not securing a country, but as I said, he could have fooled me.

Lets look at your other facts. It is true that Lenin wanted world domination, but you tell me Stalin wanted it too ? Stalin is not the man who said - Lets build socialism in Russia, and let the other people manage themselves, after the failure in the Spanish civil war ? And you tell me that the capitalist nations USA & UK did not help Germany build up its military forces as a buffer to the communist Sovjet Union ? The only time USA & UK did help Sovjet Union was after AH had start a world war and attacked both UK, Russia and USA, and forced them to be allies. You sir, read the wrong books.

IMHO I figure the best way for Germany to achieve security would have been to build a strong defensive military force, that would deterrent any attack because of the high cost, and then make trade agreements with as many nations as possible, maybe even join alliances with democratic nations like UK and France, and most important of all, quit racist hate speeches against Jews and non-Arians. But as I said, my intellect is less compared to Manstein, so I may be wrong, man

It is true that Lenin wanted world domination, but you tell me Stalin wanted it too ?

Yes. There is absolutely no question Stalin wanted world domination. I’m very surprised to hear anyone suggest otherwise.

And you tell me that the capitalist nations USA & UK did not help Germany build up its military forces as a buffer to the communist Sovjet Union ?

The United States government adopted anti-communist foreign policies in 1948. But I’ve found no evidence to suggest that any major Western democracy cared about containing the communist threat prior to that year.

To give a specific example: in the Polish-Soviet War, which occurred from 1919-'20, no major Western democracy sent soldiers to Poland’s aid. France did, however, send a few military advisors. On the other hand, the British government, under pressure from left-leaning trades unions, agreed to sell weapons to the U.S.S.R., but not to Poland.

In 1920, the existence of the entire Polish state was in jeopardy. Poland asked the Western democracies for help. Instead of offering to send meaningful aid or exert significant diplomatic pressure on the USSR, the Western democracies advised Poland to make the best peace (surrender terms) it could. It was at that point that the Polish, alone and unaided, surprised the world by winning a victory near Warsaw. That victory was enabled in part by the courage and self-sacrifice of Polish servicemen, and in part due to the fact that Soviet communists were still in a state of civil war against the czarists.

Is there reason to suppose that the Western democracies were more anti-communist in the '30s than they’d been in the '20s? In '35, France and the Soviet Union signed a defensive alliance. Czechoslovakia had also signed a defensive alliance with the U.S.S.R. that same year.

For a period in 1935, France was governed by the Popular Front. The Popular Front consisted of the French Communist Party, the French Section of the Workers International, and the Radical Party. Daladier (Radical Party) served as Minister of War under this Popular Front government; because he was seen as having the correct anti-fascist, pro-communist attitude toward French foreign policy. Dalaider served as France’s prime minister during the crucial period April 1938 - March 1940.

FDR’s administration was also strongly pro-communist. FDR’s first major foreign policy decision was to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. To justify this decision, his administration concealed and lied about the millions of Ukrainians who had been murdered in the Ukrainian famine. His administration later helped conceal other acts of Soviet mass murder. He sold Stalin to the American people as a benign figure: “Uncle Joe.” He even took a hand in distributing blatantly dishonest material; such as the pro-Soviet propaganda film Mission to Moscow.

Stalin regarded Nazi Germany and the Western democracies as both equally enemies. His objective was to promote “anti-fascism” among Western democracies; thereby causing war between the democracies and Germany. The Soviet Union would initially stay neutral in this hoped-for war. Only after both sides had bled themselves white would the Soviets take a hand. First, they would seize large quantities of German and Eastern European territory, after having let the democracies do the hard work of destroying most of Germany’s military strength. Then, they would invade western Germany, France, and whichever other nations in mainland Europe were still under Western democratic control. By the time the Soviet invasion came, the democracies of Western Europe would have expended most of their soldiers in the “anti-fascist” war against Germany. FDR’s administration would have done nothing to prevent the Soviet invasion either of Germany, or later of France and Western Europe.