Strategy Guide Global 1940

@jonathan-rost Yes, although I may just have found a bunch in Mechanicsville.

@MM1940

Well done!

ROCKET luck

I have a house rule every country get a free tech first round
so the game is different every time.

but if germany gets rocket is uk then done as my strategy then don’t attack russia J1 rocket Londen airbase if it’s disabled what is a 50/50 chance you can come in with all the bombers you want if you want of course to bomb and you can do easily 25+ damage in IPC first the IC you can with only 2 strategic bomber max 16 damage and average 10 damage that is enough for to set it disabled to produce
and with my testing go with 2 tactical bomber for the naval base and 2 strategic and 1 tactical bomber for the IC and economic they are broke then can’t place units and you can still attack with ships
let me know you thought about this

I edited the Tacs in list.
Is there still a bid ?
BB & CR shore shot at 11 and 9 ?
How many table top games have you played ?

The downfall is that this will be heavily in favor for the Allies.

@CWO:

@taamvan:

I am not sure what the British government’s back up plan was anyways if Sea Lion was successful.

The British government may not have had an actual “backup plan”, in terms of something serious and concrete and specific.  My impression is that Britain’s civilian and military leaders were focussed on preventing an invasion in the first place, and on defeating it if it did actually occur, and that they were sufficiently confident that they could accomplish one or the other of those goals that they didn’t need to give any detailed consideration to what to do if Britain ended up facing defeat.  Hitler, similarly, didn’t give serious consideration to invading Britain until he was forced to admit that Britain wasn’t going to come to terms with him after the defeat of France.

It’s quite possible that British government considered the possibility of setting up a government-in-exile in Canada (or elsewhere), but “considering the possibility” isn’t the same thing as preparing a functional contingency plan.  And in fact, there would have been two good reasons NOT to work on such a functional plan.  First, it would have taken up time and resources that could have been better used elsewhere, even if it only amounted to a small number of staff.  More importantly, preparing such a plan – even in secret – would have been politically very dangerous.  Churchill had famously been proclaiming in the House of Commons that “We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.”  If word had somewhow reached the public that the same Churchill was secretly preparing plans to decamp to Canada, it would have had two very serious negative effects: it would have told the public that Churchill believed that Britain genuinely risked being conquered by Nazi Germany (which would have been very bad for morale) and it would have convinced people that Churchill was hypocritical on a monumental scale (which would have ended his political career).  It would also have destabilized the British government, which was the last thing Britain needed at that time.

No, I completely understand why Churchhill did that, he was a very ballsy man and someone who was needed for UK but you’d still think you want some kind of back up just in case. I am sure his staff and the Royal Family would AT LEAST retreat to Ireland if need be.

I have to put this post in it because it is also related to the actual topic:
@CWO:

Many of the island territories in the Central Pacific which Japan and the US fought to control were little more than coral atolls, volcanic formations or overgrown sandheaps, many of them small in size and some of them barely above water at high tide.  They had few (or no) natural resources, little (or no) arable land, few (or no) indigenous inhabitants, and no industries; the military bases located there had to be supplied from outside with virtually everything they used.  They were for most practical purposes 100% consumers and 0% producers.

The value which these islands had wasn’t as industrial production facilities or as sources of income or of goods or of raw materials.  Their value was to serve as airbases (and in the case of suitable anchorages like Truk as naval bases) which allowed the domination of the airspace and ocean around them, and to serve as the jumping-off point from which to capture the next island group down the line. So if the rules provide no incentive to capture and hold these territories, the historically realistic solution isn’t to give them an IPC value.  The solution is to create a house rule through which possession of an island gives some sort of bonus to a player who uses the island to attack enemy forces around it or as a springboard for an island-hopping advance.

That SHOULD A US bonus. They need more offensive oriented bonuses.
It feels like they are too reactionary (take back X, don’t lose Y) and all in the pacific.

They should have a homeland bonus for 20
and 2 Pacific bonuses and 2 Atlantic bonuses.

Atlantic:
5 IPCs if the Axis controls no territory in the middle east or Africa
5 IPCs for allied Co-occupation of either of the following: Normandy/Bordeaux, Holland/Belgium

Pacific
5 IPCs for control of the Philippines
5 IPCs if the Allies control Hawaii, Midway, and any three Japanese islands