WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

Oh, that’s right. Now I remember. I don’t care what other people say, but Israel has by far one of the great intelligence branches especially considering the size of the country.

@HortenFlyingWing:

A very nice guy once emailed me a while back, seeing my name in achtungpanzer.com’s guest book.  I used the name “HortenFlyingWing” and he asked me to proofread an article about it. (remainder snipped)

Very good post–and definitely worthy of a bump. I encourage anyone who hasn’t yet read the first post in this thread to go ahead and do so! Definitely bump-worthy. (It’s been a few days since the last time someone posted in this thread.)

(It’s been a few days since the last time someone posted in this thread.)

its been a decade

A couple of comments on the original article:

“Although It is obvious that The first operational A-bomb was dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima, the U.S. found it desirable to imply that the Germans were far from being close to having an atomic weapon at the end of the war in 1945. Recently revealed information shows that this was not true and helps to explain why the Reich ordered the fighting to continue even into the streets of Berlin when it seemed obvious to everyone there simply was no hope.  Its not a stretch to say that the top-secret project was actually only weeks away from completion, and even a casual study of Hitler shows he would not have hesitated to use it.”

The three links posted in that part of the article don’t work, so I couldn’t check the sources, but I wonder abour the statement that “its not a stretch to say that the top-secret project [to have an atomic weapon at the end of the war in 1945] was actually only weeks away from completion.”  As far as I know, Germany never even got as far as having an operational nuclear reactor, let alone manufacturing enough fissionable material for an atomic bomb.  The U.S. devoted massive resources to its Manhattan Project (whereas Germany did not), and even then it took America about two-and-a-half years to get from the first operational reactor to the first operational atomic bomb.

“For example, the battleship Bismark was sunk by a torpedo dropped by a biplane left over from WW I.”

The Bismarck had its rudder damaged by a Swordfish biplane.  The damaged rudder delivered the Bismarck to the British fleet, but it didn’t sink the Bismarck.  It took gunfire from the British battleships KGV and Rodney and some torpedoes from the British cruiser Dorsetshire to sink her…and even today, there is some dispute about whether it was battle damage or scuttling which ultimately finished her off. The Swordfish, by the way, was designed in the 1930s; it was not a WWI leftover.

@CWO:

A couple of comments on the original article:

“Although It is obvious that The first operational A-bomb was dropped by the U.S. on Hiroshima, the U.S. found it desirable to imply that the Germans were far from being close to having an atomic weapon at the end of the war in 1945. Recently revealed information shows that this was not true and helps to explain why the Reich ordered the fighting to continue even into the streets of Berlin when it seemed obvious to everyone there simply was no hope.  Its not a stretch to say that the top-secret project was actually only weeks away from completion, and even a casual study of Hitler shows he would not have hesitated to use it.”

The three links posted in that part of the article don’t work, so I couldn’t check the sources, but I wonder abour the statement that “its not a stretch to say that the top-secret project [to have an atomic weapon at the end of the war in 1945] was actually only weeks away from completion.”  As far as I know, Germany never even got as far as having an operational nuclear reactor, let alone manufacturing enough fissionable material for an atomic bomb.  The U.S. devoted massive resources to its Manhattan Project (whereas Germany did not), and even then it took America about two-and-a-half years to get from the first operational reactor to the first operational atomic bomb.

“For example, the battleship Bismark was sunk by a torpedo dropped by a biplane left over from WW I.”

The Bismarck had its rudder damaged by a Swordfish biplane.  The damaged rudder delivered the Bismarck to the British fleet, but it didn’t sink the Bismarck.  It took gunfire from the British battleships KGV and Rodney and some torpedoes from the British cruiser Dorsetshire to sink her…and even today, there is some dispute about whether it was battle damage or scuttling which ultimately finished her off. The Swordfish, by the way, was designed in the 1930s; it was not a WWI leftover.

You are right about the Swordfish. As you correctly pointed out, even though it was a biplane, the British did not put it into production until 1936.

Like you, I was unable to check the links about the German nuclear program which had originally been cited. But after some digging I was able to find this. If the claims cited in the article are correct (which is far from certain), Germany was very close to developing a nuclear device. (I.e., something a lot less powerful than the nuclear bombs the U.S. used to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but a lot more powerful than a conventional weapon.) A full-fledged nuclear bomb would have required a far greater amount of industrial capacity than Germany was in a position to allocate.

This being said, HortenFlyingWing wrote, in his original post, “don’t mind mis-spellings, and some errors here and there.” As IL pointed out, it’s been ten years since this thread has last been active. So that means that Horten and his friend have had plenty of time to correct those errors and come up with a better article! :) I liked the original article, but I’d like an error-free article even more.

@KurtGodel7:

I liked the original article, but I’d like an error-free article even more.

Me too.  The problem with these kinds of errors is that it only takes a few serious or blatant ones to cast doubt over the credibility of the entire article, even if the rest is accurate.  They create the impression (rightly or wrongly) that an author doesn’t have enough background to evaluate the information he’s found elsewhere, and that he’s just repeating it uncritically.

As for the supposed weapon mentioned in the BBC link you provided, I agree that the claim is far from being a solid one.  And even assuming that by 1944 or 1945 Germany had developed a radiological dispersion weapon, or even a couple of fully-fledged tactical nuclear bombs, it can be argued that these wouldn’t have changed the outcome of the war.  The Eastern Front was so large, and the Russians had so many divisions along its length, that a couple of localized tactical nuclear blasts wouldn’t have greatly altered the force ratio between Germany and Russia.  Also, by the last third of 1944, Germany wasn’t just fighting on the Eastern Front; it was also fighting the Anglo-Americans in the west.  It would have taken mass-produced tactical nukes to stop the three Allied powers from advancing into Germany…and even in America in 1945, there was nothing “mass” about the number of atomic bombs produced: the U.S. was able to manufacture a grand total of three weapons by war’s end.

@CWO:

@KurtGodel7:

I liked the original article, but I’d like an error-free article even more.

Me too.  The problem with these kinds of errors is that it only takes a few serious or blatant ones to cast doubt over the credibility of the entire article, even if the rest is accurate.  They create the impression (rightly or wrongly) that an author doesn’t have enough background to evaluate the information he’s found elsewhere, and that he’s just repeating it uncritically.

As for the supposed weapon mentioned in the BBC link you provided, I agree that the claim is far from being a solid one.  And even assuming that by 1944 or 1945 Germany had developed a radiological dispersion weapon, or even a couple of fully-fledged tactical nuclear bombs, it can be argued that these wouldn’t have changed the outcome of the war.  The Eastern Front was so large, and the Russians had so many divisions along its length, that a couple of localized tactical nuclear blasts wouldn’t have greatly altered the force ratio between Germany and Russia.  Also, by the last third of 1944, Germany wasn’t just fighting on the Eastern Front; it was also fighting the Anglo-Americans in the west.  It would have taken mass-produced tactical nukes to stop the three Allied powers from advancing into Germany…and even in America in 1945, there was nothing “mass” about the number of atomic bombs produced: the U.S. was able to manufacture a grand total of three weapons by war’s end.

I wonder if we’ve become less accepting of error today than we’d been thirty or forty years ago. Or–maybe I’m not phrasing that correctly–maybe it’s just become easier to do our own research, and therefore to detect errors, than it had been.

For example, a few years ago I’d come across some articles from The Guardian about Britain’s use of torture on political prisoners around 1945 - '47. Below is a quote:

Former prisoners [of Bad Nenndorf] told Hayward that they had been whipped as well as beaten. This, the detective said, seemed unbelievable, until “our inquiries of warders and guards produced most unexpected corroboration”. Threats to execute prisoners, or to arrest, torture and murder their wives and children were considered “perfectly proper”, on the grounds that such threats were never carried out.

Moreover, any prisoner thought to be uncooperative during interrogation was taken to a punishment cell where they would be stripped and repeatedly doused in water. This punishment could continue for weeks, even in sub-zero temperatures.

Naked prisoners were handcuffed back-to-back and forced to stand before open windows in midwinter. Frostbite became common. One victim of the cold cell punishment was Buttlar, who swallowed the spoon handle to escape. An anti-Nazi, he had spent two years as a prisoner of the Gestapo. “I never in all those two years had undergone such treatments,” he said.

Britain opened the Bad Nenndorf secret prison in the second half of 1945, and initially used it primarily on key Nazi officials. Its willingness to resort to the above-described methods to obtain confessions casts considerable doubt on any confessions thus extorted! Many people, if subjected to physical torture + threats to their families, will do or say anything they believe will keep their families safe.

Having been exposed to the article about Bad Nenndorf and a torture center in London, I found that my view of other historical sources had changed. This is particularly true of historical sources which I’d once regarded as credible, but which did not acknowledge the possibility of torture + coercion when reporting the confessions of senior Nazi officials. It is also true of sources which describe the exterminations which occurred in Nazi Germany without bothering to mention the Anglo-American food blockade or the famine/near famine conditions which resulted. (I learned about Germany’s food situation when reading Adam Tooze’s book, The Wages of Destruction.)

A number of people widely regarded as credible WWII historians have made truly remarkable errors and omissions in their description of WWII history. That does not excuse non-professionals from making errors of a similar or lesser scale. But it does mean that accuracy is perhaps harder to attain in this subject than elsewhere, in part because mainstream WWII historians have traditionally been too uncritical in accepting the claims of Allied governments. This represents something of a double standard; in that the claims made by the LBJ administration about the Vietnam War, or by the Bush administration about the second Iraq War, very often do not receive uncritical acceptance. There is no reason why we should uncritically accept the FDR or Truman administrations’ claims about WWII. But until mainstream historians start doing a better job of separating cold hard facts from Allied propaganda, it will be difficult for non-professionals (who rely on those mainstream historians for most of their information) to create error-free summations of WWII history.

I realize I have strayed (if only slightly) from the subject at hand. To return to that subject, I agree that by late ‘44, Germany’s military fortunes were bad enough that they could not have been saved by a few tactical nuclear devices. The first few strikes would do the most damage, after which the Soviets and Americans would respond by spreading out their forces. To have significantly altered Germany’s fortunes, the tactical nuclear weapons would have had to destroy the heart of the enemies’ strength arrayed against Germany. IIRC, Germany in '44 had 400,000 men on its western front, as compared to 2 million men in the Anglo-American force. While German infantry had enjoyed a qualitative advantage over their British and American counterparts in 1943, that advantage had slipped away by January of '45. (If not earlier.) This was largely because in late '44/'45, many German soldiers on the Western front were poorly trained, poorly armed old men or young boys, foreign soldiers who had little interest in dying for Germany, or else German men of military age who’d realized the war was lost. Even if half the Anglo-American force had been destroyed with tactical nuclear weapons, they would still have enjoyed a better than 2:1 advantage in manpower, near-complete air supremacy, a commanding advantage in tanks, artillery, and other weaponry, as well as all the other advantages their overwhelming industrial capacity could bring to bear. Likewise, the Soviet force on Germany’s eastern front was much larger, better-armed, and far stronger than the German force it faced.

Interesting set of articles (from what I can determine as the links are apparently broken).

No question that the German educational system (set up by Bismark in the mid 1800’s) and the German industrial capabilities let to some amazing technology during the war. I would also agree that part of this was due to the fact that by 1944 (and maybe sooner) only a revolutionary technology would win the war…Hitlers “wonder weapons”.

Still, I think there is too much emphasis on the German achievements and too little recognition of the allied “wonder weapons”; perhaps due to a respect for the Nazi scientists and engineers.  It is important to recognize that the allies had some amazing technological advances during this time as well.

1. The A-bomb developed during the Manhattan project.  While the USSR, UK, Germany, and Japan all had similar programs, only the US was able to develop this in time to make a difference in the war.  The USSR developed one later, based in large part from stolen technology   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_atomic_bomb_project

The scientific research was directed by noted Soviet nuclear physicist Igor Kurchatov, and benefited from highly successful espionage efforts on the part of the Soviet military intelligence. Ultimately the USSR tested its first nuclear weapon in August 1949.

.  The extent of the technology that needed to be developed to do this should not be underestimated.

2. the proximity fuse,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proximity_fuze

Vannevar Bush, head of the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during this war, credited the proximity fuze with three significant effects:[9]

* First, it was important in defense from Japanese Kamikaze attacks in the Pacific. Bush **estimated a sevenfold increase in the effectiveness of 5-inch antiaircraft artillery with this innovation.[10]
   * It was an important part of the radar-controlled antiaircraft batteries that finally neutralized the German V-1 bomb attacks on England.[10]
   * Third, it was released for use in Europe just before the Battle of the Bulge. At first the fuzes were only used in situations where they could not be captured by the Germans. They were used in land-based artillery in the South Pacific in 1944. They were incorporated into bombs dropped by the U.S. Air Force on Japan in 1945, and they were used to defend Britain **against the V-1 attacks of 1944, achieving a kill ratio of about 79%. (They were ineffective against the much faster V-2 missiles.) There was no risk of a dud falling into enemy hands. The Pentagon decided it was too dangerous to have a fuze fall into German hands because they might reverse engineer it and create a weapon that would destroy the Allied bombers, or at least find a way to jam the radio signals. Therefore they refused to allow the Allied artillery use of the fuzes in 1944.
   * General Dwight D. Eisenhower protested vehemently and demanded he be allowed to use the fuzes. He prevailed and the VT fuzes were first used in the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, when they made the Allied artillery far more devastating, as all the shells now exploded just before hitting the ground. **It decimated German divisions caught in the open. The Germans felt safe from timed fire because they thought that the bad weather would prevent accurate observation. U.S. general George S. Patton said that the introduction of the proximity fuze required a full revision of the tactics of land warfare.[11] (emphasis mine) had an incredible influence on the battlefield.  Had the Germans developed this (and they had a program to do so) in conjunction with the V2, I would assume a similar increase in effectiveness.  Yet it was the allies who developed it first and who benefited.

3. Radar - the allies radar and sonar capabilities were much more advanced than anything the axis had.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cavity_magnetron

While radar was being developed during World War II, there arose an urgent need for a high-power microwave generator that worked at shorter wavelengths (around 10 cm (3 GHz)) rather than the 150 cm (200 MHz) that was available from tube-based generators of the time. It was known that a multi-cavity resonant magnetron had been developed and patented in 1935 by Hans Hollmann in Berlin.[14] However, the German military considered its frequency drift to be undesirable and based their radar systems on the klystron instead. But klystrons could not achieve the high power output that magnetrons eventually reached. **This was one reason that German night fighter radars were not a match for their British counterparts…The combination of small-cavity magnetrons, small antennas, and high resolution allowed small, high quality radars to be installed in aircraft. They could be used by maritime patrol aircraft to detect objects as small as a submarine periscope, which allowed aircraft to attack and destroy submerged submarines which had previously been undetectable from the air. Centimetric contour mapping radars like H2S improved the accuracy of Allied bombers used in the strategic bombing campaign. Centimetric gun-laying radars were likewise far more accurate than the older technology. They made the big-gunned Allied battleships more deadly and, along with the newly developed proximity fuze, made anti-aircraft guns much more dangerous to attacking aircraft. The two coupled together and used by anti-aircraft batteries, placed along the flight path of German V-1 flying bombs on their way to London, are credited with destroying many of the flying bombs before they reached their target.

4. Cryptography was better on the allied side, providing a critical intelligence advantage.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_cryptography#World_War_II_cryptography

The war was won by the allies because the Nazi’s failed to defeat the Soviet Union.  The Nazi wonder weapons were too little, too late but even if they had been developed soon enough, I think the Allied wonder weapons could have countered the Nazi’s.

That said, the technological breakthroughs, by both sides of the conflict, demonstrate impressive work by their scientists and engineers.********

@221B:

Still, I think there is too much emphasis on the German achievements and too little recognition of the allied “wonder weapons”; perhaps due to a respect for the Nazi scientists and engineers.  It is important to recognize that the allies had some amazing technological advances during this time as well.

Yours is a solid post, and a good contribution to this discussion! I came across many of the same things when doing research for my rules set

The race to build an atomic bomb started as a result of breakthroughs made by German scientists and published in academic journals. A successful atomic bomb effort required a large group of highly talented scientists and engineers, as well as a massive allocation of industrial capacity. Germany had the talented scientists it needed, but it lacked excess industrial capacity to devote to a project which would require years before yielding any benefits at all. Clearly the U.S. achieved something impressive both by having its scientists create a successful bomb design, and because it had been able to enrich the required uranium and plutonium. But Germany deserves credit for a strong nuclear program as well–albeit a nuclear program which lacked the access to industrial capacity to solve the problems the Americans solved.

You’ve correctly pointed out the proximity fuse’s impact on anti-air fire and artillery fire. It was devastating. Toward the end of the war, the Germans seem to have developed a proximity fuse of their own, which they had apparently intended to include on their surface to air missile. From the link (towards the end):

Both proximity and self-destruction fuzes were provided. The proximity fuzes were projected on the I.R., Electronic, and acoustic principals; however, the latter had essentially been dropped by the designers as the maximum range at which the actuating impulse was of sufficient magnitude was too small to derive most effective results from the warhead.

Unfortunately, the article does not indicate how the proximity fuses described above compare to those employed by the British and Americans; or whether the Germans’ proximity fuses were small enough to be practical for normal AA fire. (The referenced surface to air missile weighed 1800 kg / 4000 lbs.) At first glance, proximity fuses seem to be an area similar to radar, in the sense that the Germans had a respectable research effort underway, even if the British and Americans were somewhat ahead.

I also looked at the R4M–a German air-to-air missile used near the end of the war–on the theory that it might also have had a proximity fuse. From Wikipedia:

Only a small number of aircraft were fitted with the R4M, mostly Messerschmitt Me 262s and the ground attack version of the Fw 190s . . .

The weapon had excellent results. . . . in March 1945, six R4M-armed Me 262s flying out of the Oberammergau flight test center and led by Luftwaffe General Gordon Gollob claimed to have shot down fourteen B-17s in a mission.[citation needed] In April 1945, R4M-equipped Me 262s claimed to have shot down thirty B-17s for the loss of three aircraft.[citation needed]

Unfortunately, the Wikipedia is light on detail, and doesn’t indicate whether the R4M used a proximity fuse.

You mentioned that the Allies were ahead of the Germans in cryptography. That’s a good point and one worth expanding upon. During the war Britain had several Colossus computational machines. These were digital programmable electronic devices designed for problem-solving. They may or may not be considered full-fledged computers, depending on how broad your definition of a computer is. Regardless, they were critical in Britain’s code-breaking and computational efforts.

Germany had also made breakthroughs in computational research. From Wikipedia: “[The Zuse Z3 was] the world’s first working programmable, fully automatic computing machine. It was Turing-complete, and by modern standards the Z3 was one of the first machines that could be considered a complete computing machine.” The Z3 was introduced in 1941; several years before the Colossus. However, development on the Zuse machines was considerably slowed due to lack of adequate funding. “Zuse asked the German government for funding to replace the relays with fully electronic switches, but funding was denied.” But by the end of the war, Zuse had built the Z4, which was “the world’s first commercial digital computer.” (Albeit an electro-mechanical computer, instead of fully electronic like the Colossus or the later, far more powerful ENIAC.)

The war was won by the allies because the Nazi’s failed to defeat the Soviet Union.  The Nazi wonder weapons were too little, too late but even if they had been developed soon enough, I think the Allied wonder weapons could have countered the Nazi’s.

It’s tempting to point out that the Allied advantage in industrial capacity and manpower was so overwhelming that they did not need to counter Germany’s wonder weapons with wonder weapons of their own. Sheer numbers would have been enough. In 1939, Germany had a population of 69 million people, as compared to 169 million for the Soviet Union. That disparity gave the Soviets an overwhelming advantage in the manpower available for infantry. In the spring of 1941, the German Army consisted of 150 divisions, 100 of which were used to invade the Soviet Union. By the fall of '41, Soviet recruitment efforts had increased the size of their own army to a staggering 600 divisions. Also, if you look at these aircraft production numbers you can see that the Allies had an overwhelming advantage in military aircraft production (a reasonably good proxy for overall military production).

If those advantages had been taken away–if the Allies had had roughly equal manpower and industrial capacity to that of the Axis–would the new weapons being designed by the Allies have been enough to counter those of the Germans? I don’t think they would have been. German jets, with their air-to-air missiles, would have gained near-total domination of the skies. Their advanced Type XXI U-boats would have been devastating against Allied shipping. Allied artillery and AA guns would have been very significantly enhanced by proximity fuses, but the artillery would have been vulnerable to attacks from the air. (Especially because Germany had developed an air-to-surface missile.) The Germans would have had better tank designs, and night vision for their planned tanks. Not to mention their increasingly long-ranged Panzerfaust hand-held anti-tank weapons. While the Allies would have had their share of advantages as well, I don’t think those advantages would have offset all that.

Kurt,

Excellent points, I appreciate you taking the time to discuss.  It is difficult, however, to assess what might have happened so there are no right or wrong answers.  What if this had happened, what if they had developed that…

A couple of more points I’d really like your opinion on if you (or others) have time:

1. How would the German ME262 compare to the UK built (and operational during WWII) Gloster Meteor jet in combat?  What about the Horton HO-229 vs. the Meteor ?  Or the US P-80?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Me262
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_Meteor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horten_Ho_229

My guess is that the Ho-229 would have ran circles around them all…but I cannot definitely say that since we don’t know what would have happened.

2. The German V-2 was an incredible advance unmatched by the Allies…or was it?  Consider what the American Robert Goddard developed decades before the Germans or the cold war space race between the US and USSR:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_H._Goddard

Its a long read (but very well worth it), so I’ll simply quote from Werner Von Braun …

Don’t you know about your own rocket pioneer? Dr. Goddard was ahead of us all.

Wernher von Braun, when asked about Goddard’s work following World War II[84]

What if the US had invested even a small amount of money toward Goddards work (as they certainly would have had the V-2 or proposed V-3 really started affecting the Allied war effort)?

@221B:

What if the US had invested even a small amount of money toward Goddards work (as they certainly would have had the V-2 or proposed V-3 really started affecting the Allied war effort)?

I’d say that, if the Americans had developed a ballistic missile along the lines of the V2, and had gotten it operational around the same time the German V2 came into service, the effect on WWII would have been minimal. Although very sophisticated by WWII standards, the V2 was a relatively short-range weapon carrying a relatively light payload, and its guidance system was only accurate enough to allow it to hit a city-sized target.  It would have been useless as a tactical weapon, and it would only have been significantly useful (in American hands) as a strategic weapon if it had carried a nuclear warhead.  Armed with a conventional high-explosive warhead, it was a far less efficient strategic weapon (in both precision and payload) than groups of heavy bombers (which the Americans were deploying in huge numbers by 1944 and 1945).  And the short range of the V2 would have limited its use to Europe; the distances between Japan and the bases the Americans were able to set up in the Pacific were too great.

An upgraded missile like the V3 might have had more range, and perhaps a bigger payload, but again without a nuclear warhead it would have been a less effective delivery system than the B-17 or the Superfortress.  It should also be noted that, in Japan’s case, the most effective bombing tactic turned out to be mass low-level raids using incendiary bombs…a technique not suited to ballistic missiles.

The Krummlauf (English: Curved barrel) a bent barrel attachment for the Sturmgewehr 44 developed by Germany in World War II. The curved barrel included a periscope sighting device for shooting around corners from a safe position.

I found it in wikipedia and thought it would be as well an advanced tech…I originally found it in a book about German rifles WWII…Fighting from house to house is WCS (worst case Scenario) for a Soldier…Now these days they got camera and are able to bent the rifle barrel…

I’m not goin to write a long article like you guys but I want in on this topic. Yeah the Germans (my mom’s family has German roots  :-) ) invented alot of useful tools. To bad many were put to use by the power hungry Kaisers and the even greater evil  :evil: Adolf Hitler  :evil:. The MP 44 was the first assault rifle and the the V1 and V2 were some of the most advanced rockets of the time period. However all these inventions weren’t completely used. The German propoganda suggested that the Germans possed and incredible ammount of trucks and motorized vehicles for their units. However this is far from the truth. Only 40% of the Heer’s units were mechnized, while most relied on horses and wagons for supply colums and troops marched on foot or rode bicycles. The German advances in jet aircraft and heavy tanks such as the Messerschmitt Me 262 and King Tiger were not useful enough to end the war as the Allies outnumbered these with more quickly built machines like the P-51 Mustang and Sherman tanks. However none the less these advancments were very valuable to future sciences. And besides were not talking about how the Nazis lost the war right?  :-)

@221B:

Kurt,

Excellent points, I appreciate you taking the time to discuss.  It is difficult, however, to assess what might have happened so there are no right or wrong answers.  What if this had happened, what if they had developed that…

A couple of more points I’d really like your opinion on if you (or others) have time:

1. How would the German ME262 compare to the UK built (and operational during WWII) Gloster Meteor jet in combat?  What about the Horton HO-229 vs. the Meteor ?  Or the US P-80?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Me262
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gloster_Meteor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horten_Ho_229

My guess is that the Ho-229 would have ran circles around them all…but I cannot definitely say that since we don’t know what would have happened.

2. The German V-2 was an incredible advance unmatched by the Allies…or was it?  Consider what the American Robert Goddard developed decades before the Germans or the cold war space race between the US and USSR:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_H._Goddard

Its a long read (but very well worth it), so I’ll simply quote from Werner Von Braun …

Don’t you know about your own rocket pioneer? Dr. Goddard was ahead of us all.

Wernher von Braun, when asked about Goddard’s work following World War II[84]

What if the US had invested even a small amount of money toward Goddards work (as they certainly would have had the V-2 or proposed V-3 really started affecting the Allied war effort)?

Excellent post! In response to part 1–not all jets are created equal, as you yourself noted. There were basically two ways engineers could go with jet engines. On the one hand, they could use centrifugal flow jet engines. These were comparatively simple, easily engineered, and well-understood. However, they were associated with severe technical limitations. Their other choice was to use axial flow jet engines. Engines of this type posed a significantly greater engineering challenge than did centrifugal flow jet engines. But the potential reward (in terms of performance) was also greater.

The British and American jet programs of WWII used centrifugal jet engines. That, in combination with their lack of an advanced, aerodynamic body design, meant that their jet aircraft did not exceed the best available piston aircraft during WWII.

German jets used the advanced, axial-flow jet engines. (It had taken them several years to iron out the associated difficulties.) Not only that, but they were significantly ahead of the Allies in terms of aerodynamic research.

The Horten flying wing–otherwise known as the Ho 229–was similar in both shape and concept to the U.S.'s much later, flying wing stealth bomber. (The Horten also had stealthy properties and was difficult to detect on radar.) The flying wing was the result of an effort to meet Goering’s goal of 1000/1000/1000. He’d wanted a bomber that could travel 1000 km/hr, with an operational radius of 1000 km, and which could deliver 1000 kg to its target. The flying wing shape was originally intended to help the plane meet these three goals; but which unexpectedly gave the plane a stealthy profile with respect to radar. This jet bomber was faster than any of the available Allied planes of the time–including their jet fighters–and I agree with your assessment that it would have run circles around them all. The Me 262 achieved a 5:1 kill ratio, and I don’t see why the (very fast) Horten flying wing couldn’t have done the same.

To address the second part of your post: in itself, the V2 was a fairly useless weapon–at least for delivering a conventional payload. The OP stated that the Germans were working on improving the guidance systems for V2s, such that they could be targeted at specific Allied ships, or at the centers of Allied factories, with near-certainty of getting a direct hit. He added this would have been available in 1947 (IIRC). Had the Germans been able to achieve that, the V2 would have gone from being an expensive distraction whose only real purpose was to soak up far more of the Allied bombing effort than it deserved, to a real weapon with decisive strategic importance. However, I have not yet done the research necessary to either confirm or refute the OP’s statements about this.

Another potential use for Germany’s rockets would have been to deliver either chemical or nuclear payloads. The Germans were significantly ahead of the Allies in nerve gas-related research; which means that even a small, inaccurately delivered payload would have been devastating. The three- and four-stage rockets under development would have allowed that nerve gas to be delivered to any target in the world. That same technology would also have allowed them to deliver a nuclear payload anywhere in the world, had they been able to build one.

You made a good point about Robert Goddard. He gave the U.S. an early lead in the rocket race, and the U.S. even had a nascent rocket program during WWI! He began developing a bazooka-like weapon in 1917.

Thanks to a nozzle invented by Swedish inventor Gustaf Laval, Goddard was able to increase the efficiency of his rockets from 2% to 64%. Goddard’s research was intelligent and forward-thinking, and anticipated a number of later developments in rocketry and space flight. However,

The publication of Goddard’s document gained him national attention from U.S. newspapers, most of it negative. Although Goddard’s discussion of targeting the moon was only a small part of the work as a whole and was intended as an illustration of the possibilities rather than a declaration of Goddard’s intent, the papers sensationalized his ideas to the point of misrepresentation and ridicule.

According to an editorial in New York Times, “Of course [Goddard] only seems to lack the knowledge ladled out daily in high schools.”

As a result of harsh criticism from the media and from other scientists, and understanding better than most the military applications for which foreign powers could use this technology, Goddard became increasingly suspicious of others and often worked alone, which limited the impact of his work. Another limiting factor was the lack of support from the American government, military and academia as to the study of the atmosphere, near space and military applications.

Irresponsible journalism by the New York Times and other media outlets meant that Goddard’s work was no longer seen as politically acceptable. From then on, the mainstream view was rejection and ridicule. That campaign cost Goddard much of the institutional support he might otherwise have received; and served to prevent the U.S. from developing much of a rocket program until after WWII. The reason for these media attacks was because Goddard had, in the '20s, mentioned the idea of someday flying a rocket to the Moon; and had done some preliminary calculations. All of this goes to show that one ought never to believe any statement any journalist makes about science, ever. (Unless, of course, that statement can be verified by a credible–i.e., non-journalist–source.)

As an instrument for “reaching extreme altitudes”, Goddard’s rockets were not very successful; they did not achieve an altitude greater than 2.7 km (in 1937), at a time when airplanes could reach up to 15 km and balloons 22 km. By contrast, German rocket scientists had already achieved an altitude of 3.5 km with the A-2 rocket (in 1934), reached 12 km by 1939 with the A-5 and 84 km in 1942 with the A-4 (V-2), reaching the outer limits of the atmosphere.

Goddard’s pace was slower than the Germans’ because he did not have the resources they did.

The above situation was the exact opposite of so many other forward-looking research efforts–such as computers and nuclear technology–in which the German scientists did not have the available resources of their Allied counterparts. The U.S. clearly had the spare resources to devote to Goddard’s rocket program, had it chosen to do so.

@KurtGodel7:

The OP stated that the Germans were working on improving the guidance systems for V2s, such that they could be targeted at specific Allied ships, or at the centers of Allied factories, with near-certainty of getting a direct hit. He added this would have been available in 1947 (IIRC). Had the Germans been able to achieve that, the V2 would have gone from being an expensive distraction whose only real purpose was to soak up far more of the Allied bombing effort than it deserved, to a real weapon with decisive strategic importance. However, I have not yet done the research necessary to either confirm or refute the OP’s statements about this.

A terminal guidance system allowing a ballistic missile to hit a specific building or ship with near certainty is completely incredible for 1947.  This sort of thing only became possible very recently, with the introduction of laser designation systems (which require a friendly aircraft or ground unit to illuminate the target) and GPS-based targeting systems (such as those used on cruise missiles, which are conceptually closer to the V1 than the V2).  As recently the the First Gulf War, such systems weren’t foolproof: those precision strikes we saw on CNN were the ones that hit, not the ones that missed.

Another difficulty is that having a precise-enough guidance system is only one-half of what’s required.  The other requirement involves having the exact coordinates of the target, down to an accuracy of a few meters.  In pre-GPS, pre-satellite days, such precise data would have been difficult for Germany to acquire for enemy buildings, and impossible to acquire for non-fixed targets like ships (especially given the degree of air superiority which the Allies had over their own territories, which precludes enemy reconnaissance flights).

Just a few weeks ago, there were news reports that China was supposedly developing a ballistic missile system capable of targeting individual enemy ships off its coast.  Some analysts issued dire warnings that this spelled the end of U.S. naval supremacy, but others expressed scepticism over the feasibility of such a weapon system – so I find it difficult to believe that something similar would have been achievable by Germany sixty-plus years ago.

@CWO:

@KurtGodel7:

The OP stated that the Germans were working on improving the guidance systems for V2s, such that they could be targeted at specific Allied ships, or at the centers of Allied factories, with near-certainty of getting a direct hit. He added this would have been available in 1947 (IIRC). Had the Germans been able to achieve that, the V2 would have gone from being an expensive distraction whose only real purpose was to soak up far more of the Allied bombing effort than it deserved, to a real weapon with decisive strategic importance. However, I have not yet done the research necessary to either confirm or refute the OP’s statements about this.

A terminal guidance system allowing a ballistic missile to hit a specific building or ship with near certainty is completely incredible for 1947.  This sort of thing only became possible very recently, with the introduction of laser designation systems (which require a friendly aircraft or ground unit to illuminate the target) and GPS-based targeting systems (such as those used on cruise missiles, which are conceptually closer to the V1 than the V2).  As recently the the First Gulf War, such systems weren’t foolproof: those precision strikes we saw on CNN were the ones that hit, not the ones that missed.

Another difficulty is that having a precise-enough guidance system is only one-half of what’s required.  The other requirement involves having the exact coordinates of the target, down to an accuracy of a few meters.  In pre-GPS, pre-satellite days, such precise data would have been difficult for Germany to acquire for enemy buildings, and impossible to acquire for non-fixed targets like ships (especially given the degree of air superiority which the Allies had over their own territories, which precludes enemy reconnaissance flights).

Just a few weeks ago, there were news reports that China was supposedly developing a ballistic missile system capable of targeting individual enemy ships off its coast.  Some analysts issued dire warnings that this spelled the end of U.S. naval supremacy, but others expressed scepticism over the feasibility of such a weapon system – so I find it difficult to believe that something similar would have been achievable by Germany sixty-plus years ago.

Thanks for the informative response! It sounds like you have a firm grasp of your subject matter. I’ve been doing a lot of research for my rules set, but this sounds like one area that I can safely consider settled. (Unless, of course, someone were to post a link supporting the OP’s statements about highly accurate V2s by 1947.)

@KurtGodel7:

This jet bomber was faster than any of the available Allied planes of the time–including their jet fighters–and I agree with your assessment that it would have run circles around them all. The Me 262 achieved a 5:1 kill ratio, and I don’t see why the (very fast) Horten flying wing couldn’t have done the same.

I was puzzled by the notion of a late-WWII bomber – whatever its propulsion system – “running circles” around a late-WWII fighter, since fighters are supposed to be more agile than bombers, so I had a quick look into this subject.  I was surprised to see that the Horten Ho 229A was actually quite a small 1-man plane, not at all the big lumbering aircraft which the word “bomber” normally suggests.  It had a loaded weight of 15,238 lb – about a ton lighter than the loaded weight of the Lockheed Hudson light bomber (17,500 lb), about half the loaded weight of the B-25J Mitchell medium bomber (33,510 lb), and about three-and-half times less than the loaded weight of the B-17G heavy bomber (54,000 lb).  That would put the Horten roughly in the same weight class as the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 13,580 lb), or the Lockheed P-38L Lightning multi-role fighter / ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 17,500 lb).  This suggests that the Horten could not have carried a large bomb payload – particularly since its Junkers Jumo 004B turbojets had a very high fuel consumption, which implies a large weight allocation for fuel tanks at the expense of bomb-carrying capacity.

@CWO:

@KurtGodel7:

This jet bomber was faster than any of the available Allied planes of the time–including their jet fighters–and I agree with your assessment that it would have run circles around them all. The Me 262 achieved a 5:1 kill ratio, and I don’t see why the (very fast) Horten flying wing couldn’t have done the same.

I was puzzled by the notion of a late-WWII bomber – whatever its propulsion system – “running circles” around a late-WWII fighter, since fighters are supposed to be more agile than bombers, so I had a quick look into this subject.  I was surprised to see that the Horten Ho 229A was actually quite a small 1-man plane, not at all the big lumbering aircraft which the word “bomber” normally suggests.  It had a loaded weight of 15,238 lb – about a ton lighter than the loaded weight of the Lockheed Hudson light bomber (17,500 lb), about half the loaded weight of the B-25J Mitchell medium bomber (33,510 lb), and about three-and-half times less than the loaded weight of the B-17G heavy bomber (54,000 lb).  That would put the Horten roughly in the same weight class as the Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 13,580 lb), or the Lockheed P-38L Lightning multi-role fighter / ground-attack aircraft (loaded weight = 17,500 lb).  This suggests that the Horten could not have carried a large bomb payload – particularly since its Junkers Jumo 004B turbojets had a very high fuel consumption, which implies a large weight allocation for fuel tanks at the expense of bomb-carrying capacity.

You are correct about the limited size of the Horten flying wing’s payload. Its normal bomb load was 1000 kg (2200 lbs), as compared to 2000 - 3600 kg (depending on the distance of the target) for a Flying Fortress. The Superfortress carried 9000 kg of bombs. The Horten flying wing’s unique shape allowed it to carry a larger payload a longer distance than it otherwise could have; and did much to offset the inefficiency of the jet engines which you pointed out. But it was clearly not a heavy bomber like the four engined British and American aircraft. This airplane’s purpose was to be fast enough and stealthy enough to radar to allow the Germans to do at least some bombing, despite the Allies’ air supremacy. It was also intended for use as a fighter.