On paper – and I stress the “on paper” part – Germany, Italy and Japan did have plans to divide up the world between themselves, at least insofar as definining their respective zones of military operations. These plans were part of a secret military agreement reached between Japan, Germany and Italy on 18 January 1942. A translation of the text of the agreement is given in Appendix D of the book Reluctant Allies: German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War II (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2001). The section of the agreement concerning the division of zones of operations reads:
The German and Italian armed forces, as well as the Japanese army and navy, will, within the framework of the zones allocated to them hereinafter, carry out the required operations.
1. Japan
a. The waters to the east of approximately 70 degrees east longitude up to the west coast of the American Continent, as well as the continents and islands located in these waters (Australia, Dutch East Indies, New Zealand, etc.).
b. The Continent of Asia, east of approximately 70 degrees east longitude.
2. Germany and Italy
a. The waters to the west of approximately 70 degrees east longitude up to the east coast of the American Continent, as well as the continents and island located in these waters (Africa, Iceland, etc.).
b. The Near East, the Middle East, and Europe west of approximately 70 degrees east longitude.
3. In the Indian Ocean, each side may carry out operations across the above-agreed boundary according to the situation.
Even though this agreement merely defines zones of military operations (as opposed to dividing up the world for purposes of conquest and occupation), it’s still a rather optimistic aspirational document; as far as the Eurasian landmass is concerned, it doesn’t reflect realistically how far to the east Germany could have advanced nor how far to the west Japan could have advanced.
In its campaigns in the Pacific and Southeast Asia from December 1941 to May 1942, Japan gave the US and the UK and the Netherlands the impression that Japan was a military juggernaut…but Japan’s campaigns against China and Russia in the period from 1937 to 1941 paint a different picture. Despite the fact that Japan was unified, regimented, industrialized country with fairly advanced military technology, and that China in contrast was a politically fragmented, industrially backward, militarily weak country, Japan never managed to conquer more than about a third of China, even though on paper it should have beaten the pants off of both Chiang and Mao. And Japan did even worse in its undeclared Manchurian/Mongolian border wars against the USSR in the late 30s and early 40s; it failed to make territorial gains of any significance, and in the last of those conflicts it got trounced by the Soviets (headed by an at-the-time relatively obscure general named Georgi Zhukov). The USSR was in quite a different league from China, both industrially and militarily, and it showed. Japan had been operating on the basis of the fond memories it had of the years immediately after WWI, when it had occupied some significant stretches of real estate in Eastern Russia, and Japan had fantasies of recapturing those past glories; those fantasies, by one account, included controlling all the Russian territory east of Lake Baikal. In their only attempt to turn those fantasies into reality, however (meaning the border wars I’ve mentioned), the Japanese failed lamentably and they eventually agreed to a non-aggression pact with the Soviets.