The easiest thing Germany could have done to win the war.

[baron Münchhausen]

It takes time to adjust from old ways to the new ways of war requirements.
Even Blitzkrieg in France seemed a combination of discoveries made during war in Poland and stubborness of Guderian.

[Colt45554]

“Total War” earlier than 1943.

[Imperious Leader]

All Hitler would need to do is after finishing off France, be the best of friends with Stalin and even use him to take the UK colonial assets within reach with the spoils going to each party in a fair way. Make peace with UK or bomb them into rubble and never get allied with Japan or DOW USA. After this just let the holdings percolate for at least 20 years.

[Wolfshanze]

@Imperious:

All Hitler would need to do is after finishing off France, be the best of friends with Stalin and even use him to take the UK colonial assets within reach with the spoils going to each party in a fair way. Make peace with UK or bomb them into rubble and never get allied with Japan or DOW USA. After this just let the holdings percolate for at least 20 years.

Not the dumbest thing Hitler could have done to be sure… there is merit here…

[Bob77]

@Wolfshanze:

@Bob77:

Better winter gear on the eastern front. Allowed rommel to countet attack dday landings with armor.

There wasn’t much armor near the beach to counterattack with… due to the compromise, most of it was inland and unable to reach during the day due to aircover… the other thing that wasn’t there was Rommel himself… he was on vacation in Germany on June 6.

Two hours before the seaborne landings began, Rundstedt ordered the two reserve panzer divisions available for counterattack in Normandy, the 12th SS Panzer and Panzer Lehr, to move immediately toward Caen. The only place such landings could come in lower Normandy were on the Calvados and Cotentin coasts. He wanted armor there to meet the attack.

Rundstedt’s reasoning was sound, his action decisive, his orders clear. But the panzer divisions were not under his command. They were in OKW reserve. To save precious time, Rundstedt had first ordered them to move out, then requested OKW approval. OKW did not approve. At 0730 Jodi informed Rundstedt that the two divisions could not be committed until Hitler gave the order, and Hitler was still sleeping. Rundstedt had to countermand the move-out order. Hitler slept until noon.

The two panzer divisions spent the morning waiting. There was a heavy overcast; they could have moved out free from serious interference from Allied aircraft. It was 1600 when Hitler at last gave his approval. By then the clouds had broken up and Allied fighters and bombers ranged the skies over Normandy, smashing anything that moved.
There were armor units available. When i think of dday and the atlantic wall, i think of rommel ( wether there or not).

[barney]

even if D-Day failed, which it easily could have, I don’t see the Germans stopping the soviets no matter what. Would’ve taken longer and some different after war stuff, like the soviets owning all of europe, but stopping the invasion I don’t think could have won them the war

[Bob77]

I will concede to that

[variance]

@barney:

even if D-Day failed, which it easily could have, I don’t see the Germans stopping the soviets no matter what. Would’ve taken longer and some different after war stuff, like the soviets owning all of europe, but stopping the invasion I don’t think could have won them the war

Operation bagration as going on at the same time and the Russian army was several times greater than what the allies had in the west. Almost all of the German army was fighting them. I know this hurts everyone’s feelings, and not to diminish what our soldiers did, but it was a sideshow.  The Russians won the war in Europe.  America won the war in the Pacific.

[baron Münchhausen]

The real achievement of Allies is a successful D-Day, keeping the surprise effect.
There was so many details which could have turned bad or worse.
It was such an incredible strategic and logistic feat.

[Linkon]

A steady stream of cement into the English Channel should turn it into dry land after six years.  A lasting peace treaty w Stalin allows the panzers to roll up the big island / peninsula.

[Caesar-Seriona]

I always said Hitler ignoring Tojo’s request to bring Stalin into the Axis powers was the gunshot into the head. I can’t think of a single point that Hitler could change and that would change the war. Taking on one of the largest military’s, largest industrial nations was not good for Germany and the sad part is that the German allies they brought was a handicap in the end.

[aequitas-et-veritas]

• trust in mass production

• simplify production

• stick to entrusted material

• stick to a few calibers only (5cm; 7.5cm and 8.8cm)

• produce Me262’s mass

• produce PIV and PV’s and StuG’s only

• spend Resources and develop real Submarines like XXI types

• build two minor flightdecks CV’S out of KDF Dampfer to secure the Channel (holding 10 Ftr’s each)

Something like that IMO.

AetV

[CWO Marc]

The first four points on aev’s list are indeed sensible and practical things, related to some important basic elements of modern warfare, which would indeed have been helpful to Germany.  I’m not sure if they would have compensated sufficiently for some of the more fundamental mistakes the German leadership made, but they would have helped.  The other four points on the list are more difficult to assess, for various reasons.  One of the reasons the Me262 wasn’t mass-produced (in addition to the question of strategic priorities) was that Germany was (as I recall) having problems with the high-temperature steels required for its jet turbines.  Regarding the Walther and Elektro subs, it could be argued that by the time these designs were operational the Allies had learned from their mistakes in the first half of the Battle of the Atlantic and had put in place (and had done so in large numbers) a wide range of weapons and technologies and tactics to deal with the submarine menace.  The Allies had also realized that, although sinking subs was useful, their first priority was ensuring the safe and timely arrival of their convoys.  To put the argument in exaggerated terms: saving all their convoys and sinking zero U-boats from 1939 to 1945 would have been a tremendous Allied victory, whereas sinking 100% of Germany’s U-boats but losing 100% of their convoys in the process would have been an Allied catastrophe.  The Walthers and Elektros were good at hiding underwater for a long time, which was fine for getting from France to the deep Atlantic and back again without being detected, but that ability in itself was meaningless unless they actually went into combat against convoys (and thus exposed themselves to detection and attack by the escort vessels which were concentrated around the convoys).  The final point about German aircraft carriers, in my opinion, wouldn’t have made any difference: if having carriers was the only thing needed to secure the English Channel, then Britain would have had nothing to worry about in 1940 because the Royal Navy had several carriers in service and Germany had none.

[Caesar-Seriona]

Also another German issue that tends to get ignored in history is Germany not doing for Italy and the other Axis Europe like what US did for the allies. By some kind of Lend-Lease, Italy had a very weak army and the Generals of Italy knew that and Hitler for the most part ignored request for equipment sharing. Rommel himself said that he respected Italy troops in Africa, they were great fighters and good men, he however had no respect for there officer corp that would continue to ignored the fact that Italy and Germany where allies so they would not take German orders and there logical corp would refuse to resupply German forces even though Rommel had no problem doing for the Italians.

Also I believe that Germany taking his military into Poland too soon was a great weakness, maybe not a defeat but a weakness. I think if he stuck with Plan Z like the Admiralty wanted, Germany would be in better position to take on Home Fleet.

[aequitas-et-veritas]

Thank you CWOMarc for your kind answer.
I would like to adress that if there would have been a smarter develop Institution without German bureaucracy, it would have solved many issues like the Me262, Panther,XXI boats, Caliber Arguments, building and Priorities.
Thats all. :-)

[Karl7]

All interesting points, and I will only add this:

It seems odd to me that Germany would not have driven a harder position regarding a negotiated settlement with the UK after the fall of France.  I know there were some tepid efforts that went nowhere.  But what if Germany delivered an “inverted ultimatum” in which Germany declared it was going to unilaterally conclude a final peace treaty with France and then withdraw from France. (Albeit France would be under a right-wing, Vichy-ish government.),

What would UK have done?  Said no?  The UK people would have continued supporting a war government that was going to “reinvade” France?  The US would have been off-footed too.  The UK would no longer been under threat, taking the wind out of the US interventionist sails.

I think such a deft move would have thrown the UK off balance.  Why go on fighting after a bruising loss when the enemy is ostensibly giving up its gains?

True Italy would have been a problem to get to go along given they were losing their colonies, but if I were Hitler I would have said, “tough luck.”

My understanding was the Hitler never intended to “conquer” the west, just defeat them so as Germany could move eastward without a potential 2nd front in the rear.

[barney]

Interesting thought Karl and one I’ve never heard mentioned or entertained myself. Hmm… would be like France, USA and Germany agreeing to Versailles and UK saying no.

Obviously some differences between the two but an interesting "what if " nonetheless : )

[Karl7]

@barney:

Interesting thought Karl and one I’ve never heard mentioned or entertained myself. Hmm… would be like France, USA and Germany agreeing to Versailles and UK saying no.

Obviously some differences between the two but an interesting "what if " nonetheless : )

Yes, one major historical fact that often gets overlooked is that the “unconditional surrender”/total victory aspect of WWII was not in play until 1942 when Roosevelt unilaterally made it Allied policy.  Until then, most sides at least entertained the idea the war could be concluded via negotiated settlement that would result in some sort of preservation of the status quo.  Initially the UK made noise like they would never negotiate w/Germany, but I think that would have proved problematic to follow through if Germany had, as I said, pulled out of France after 1940.

What ifs….  :lol:

[Gargantua]

Good thought Karl, and I do like the vien that it’s on, but I don’t think it would have worked.

The international community still would have seen it as a puppet government - and invaded anyways; and the German ego at that point was too big to accept that kind of situation.

[CWO Marc]

The kind of scenario described by Karl is imaginative (I don’t think I’ve ever previously heard a scenario along those exact lines), but I think it’s improbable for a number of reasons.  Hitler had a visceral hatred for France (dating back to his WWI experiences, and to Germany’s 1918 surrender, which Hitler regarded as a national tragedy), and his 1940 conquest of France was to a large degree (though not exclusively) motivated by a desire for revenge; it wasn’t entirely about securing his western flank for a campaign against the Soviets.  The concept of Hitler defeating France and then basically saying to the international community “There, I’ve proved my point.  Now, shall we all sit down and discuss a reasonable settlement?” strikes me as being out of character with Hitler, who wasn’t known for his reasonableness or for his subtlety.  And I’m not sure he would have found any buyers among the international community, which by then understood that treaties with Hitler were meaningless stopgaps at best and a prelude to invasion at worst.

The concept of Hitler unilaterally withdrawing from France and leaving behind a puppet regime in charge of the whole country would probably have been problematic both to Germany and to France.  Germany did set up a few puppet regimes during WWII, but as far as I know they were all small, obscure, and buried deep inside German-controlled Europe.  In other words, they were strategically inconsequential.  The concept wouldn’t have worked in France, which is a large country, which controlled a vast colonial empire, and which has an Atlantic coastline within eyeball distance of Britain on a clear day.  Hitler was very worried about that coastline, as can be seen from which parts of France he chose to keep under direct German occupation; it constituted a threat to his western flank which could not be eliminated even with France under German occupation, and it would have been even more of a vulnerable area if it had been left in the hands of the Vichy regime, which Hitler rightfully distrusted.  The Vichy regime was a collaborationist regime, but it was too much of a loose cannon to be considered a puppet regime; part of its agenda was maintaining the fiction (in its own mind as well as among the French population) that it was its own boss.  Consider what happened when the Allies invaded North Africa: Germany was angered that the French colonial forces had not resisted more energetically, and it promptly occupied the southern part of France controlled by Vichy; the Vichy regime responded by scuttling its fleet to keep it out of German hands.  True puppet regimes are much more docile than that.