Could Germany have won WWII?

If there is lingering doubt about the pro-Soviet nature of FDR’s foreign policy, I’d like to address it here. Below is text quoted from the CIA.

In the very year of the Teheran conference, [FDR] was reminded of hidden microphones when watching Mission to Moscow, a movie based on a book of that title by Joseph E. Davies, America’s second Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Produced in 1943 with the President’s blessing, possibly even at his explicit request, this blatant piece of propaganda was designed to drum up public enthusiasm for a political shotgun wedding: It colored Stalin as a simple, practical man with whom one could do business; rhapsodized about Soviet construction, government, and politics; and justified the Soviet blood purges, [and] the Moscow show trials. . . .

Attempting to forestall any criticism of the Soviet system, Davies even contrived to make a brief for bugging. In one scene, set in the American Embassy in Moscow, the Ambassador’s assistants warn him of listening devices, but he rebukes them severely:

I say nothing outside the Kremlin that I wouldn’t say to Stalin’s face. Do you? . . . We’re here in a sense as guests of the Soviet government, and I’m going to believe they trust the United States as a friend until they prove otherwise. Is that clear?

When the assistant persists that still, after all, there may be microphones, Davies, played with aplomb by FDR’s favorite actor, Walter Huston, cuts him off: “Then let 'em hear! We’ll be friends that much faster!”

This cinematic scene was based on an actual incident. In 1937, when a bug was discovered directly over the Ambassador’s desk at the US Embassy in Moscow, the real Davies laughed it off. If the Soviets wanted to listen in, he told his incredulous staff–which included George Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and other skilled State Department diplomats–they would only obtain proof of America’s sincere desire to cooperate with them.

FDR strongly approved of the film. In his assessment of Soviet politics, he was much closer to Davies, his second Ambassador, than to his first, William C. Bullitt.

@Narvik:

OK, but do you have a comment to my allworldwars link ?

It was a good link. Many of the thoughts expressed in the link were also expressed by von Manstein. Nothing in the link was contradicted by von Manstein.

Von Manstein wrote that Germany’s senior generals should, in '39 or early '40, have recognized that Germany could not win a long war against Britain and France. The only military means of avoiding such a war was to conquer France. But the generals didn’t develop a plan to conquer France. Instead, their preferred plan involved conquering Channel ports, for subsequent attacks on British shipping. He concluded that in avoiding the tactical risks associated with trying to conquer France, they accepted an enormous level of strategic risk.

Von Manstein created an alternative plan–one designed to eliminate France’s ability to wage war. The German generals rejected this plan; and refused to show it to Hitler. Once Hitler finally learned of the plan, he adopted it instead of the one his generals had proffered. Von Manstein’s plan worked magnificently, and France fell.

Hitler seems to have drawn several incorrect conclusions from this incident.

1. His generals had let him down.

It’s true that most of his generals had let him down. But Hitler could have responded by promoting his best generals above the others. The response he chose–putting himself in command of the Army as a whole, and later micromanaging the Eastern front–was not the right one.

2. Hitler’s military judgement was superior to that of his generals.

The fact that he showed better military judgement than most of his generals, in one instance only, does not mean he was the best military commander Germany had. The Soviets had an overwhelming numerical advantage over Germany. Von Manstein felt the best way to even the odds was to make the most of Germany’s advantages in mobility and superior generalship. But this, Hitler was not willing to do. He was unwilling to release forces from less crucial portions of the eastern front to focus on the most decisive portions. He was also unwilling to even temporarily relinquish any land, unless the situation absolutely demanded it. This tied Germany down in defensive battles; thereby making its tactics easier to predict and easier to counter.

Below is a list of Generaloberst Lothar Rendulic’s reasons why Germany lost the war. After each item on his list, I’ve given von Manstein’s impression.

1. Excessive self-confidence of Adolf Hitler.

Von Manstein stated that Hitler greatly overrated his own military competence. He also stated that in military situations, Hitler was sometimes too confident, sometimes not confident enough. He felt Hitler was guilty of willfully blinding himself to reality–of seeing things as he wanted them to be, rather than as they actually were.

2. Overrating of importance of holding territory. (Wrong impressions gained from World War I.)

Von Manstein strongly agreed with this! Time and time again, von Manstein described how valuable military opportunities had been wasted due to Hitler’s insistence on holding every last square foot of land.

3. Increasing mistrust of Generals.

From von Manstein’s book:

‘One thing we must be clear about, mein Fuehrer,’ I began, ‘is that the extremely critical situation we are now in cannot be put down to the enemy’s [numerical] superiority alone, great though it is. It is also due to the way in which we are led.’

As I spoke these words, Hitler’s expression hardened. He stared at me with a look which made me feel he wished to crush my will to continue. I cannot remember a human gaze ever conveying such willpower. . . . I still went on talking, however, and told Hitler that things simply could not go on under the present type of leadership. I must, I said, revert to the proposal I had made to him twice already. To handle grand strategy he needed one thoroughly responsible Chief-of-Staff on whose advice alone he must rely in all matters of military policy. . . .

‘Even I cannot get the field marshals to obey me!’ he cried. ‘Do you imagine, for example, that they would obey you any more readily?’ . . .

When I replied that my orders were always carried out, he made no further comment and brought the meeting to a close.

4. Wrong ideas on air warfare. (Wrong development of the Air Force, too few fighters!)

Von Manstein hasn’t explored this subject in detail. However, he has made references to Goering’s incompetence, and his tendency to over-promise and under-deliver.

5. Commanding officers of the Waffen-SS units mostly insufficiently trained and not prepared for their tasks.

Von Manstein agreed with this also. He stated that the Waffen S.S. units often received many of the best recruits–very high quality soldiers. But Waffen SS units’ losses were high in relation to their achievements. He’s created the impression that the Waffen SS hadn’t reached the same level of institutional competence as the German Army.

@Narvik:

Yes, its easy to agree with Manstein and Rendulic. But AH,s grand mistake IMHO was too many fronts. If its true that Sovjet Union was the main threat to the security of Germany, then the Eastern Front would be decisive, and it would be rational to allocate all resources to that decisive front. But only 60 % of Germanys military force was used there, and this was unnecessary, because Germany had good flank protection both to north and south. It was no need to use half a million men in Norway and Finland, because Sweden was pro-Germany and would protect the iron ore mines against the Allies. And there were no need to use a million men in Balkans neither, because Greece would never allow UK to bomb the Ploesti oil fields from Greek territory, but AH did not trust the Swedes nor the Greeks. After the Vichy government was installed, it was no need to have a million men in France either. And to declare war against neutral USA and use so many resources in the Atlantic was plain stupid, and would only serve to strengthen an obvious defeat. On top of that, AH even made a domestic front, against the Jews.

To wrap it up, Germanys best bet to win would be to ignore Norway, the Balkans, North Africa, the Atlantic and the Jews, and commit all 5 million men of the Army and Airforce, together with the one million allied soldiers, and go straight for Moscow. That would be a cut-throat victory, making everything else irrelevant. But then, AH would not be AH.

But only 60 % of Germanys military force was used there, and this was unnecessary,
because Germany had good flank protection both to north and south.

This seems true, and supports one of the main themes of von Manstein’s book. Von Manstein wrote that Hitler shouldn’t have been in charge of the Army as a whole.

To wrap it up, Germanys best bet to win would be to ignore Norway, the Balkans,
North Africa, the Atlantic and the Jews, and commit all 5 million men of the Army
and Airforce, together with the one million allied soldiers, and go straight for Moscow.

I agree that Hitler wasn’t going to win any decisive victories on any of the “distraction fronts” you described. But I’m not willing to go so far as to say he could have gotten away with ignoring those fronts completely. Britain was at war; and the British government had no interest in a negotiated peace. That meant Germany needed to pay at least some attention to the “distraction fronts” you mentioned, if only to prevent a small problem from growing into a big one.

Shortly after hostilities started, Britain and France imposed a food blockade against Germany. That blockade was so successful in creating a European food crisis that in 1940, Herbert Hoover wrote the following:

The food situation in the present war is already more desperate than at the same stage in the [First] World War. … If this war is long continued, there is but one implacable end… the greatest famine in history.

To cope with these famine conditions, the German government decided to feed its own people first, other Nordic people second, Slavs third, and Jews not at all. The situation became so desperate that Germany was unable to provide more than starvation-level rations to Soviet POWs forced to work in German weapons manufacturing plants. Hitler had ordered these POWs to be fed–not because of sentimental reasons, but because their labor was absolutely essential to the German war effort. However, the government official tasked with carrying out the order lacked the food with which to feed them. Millions of Soviet POWs starved to death as a result.

And to declare war against neutral USA and use so many resources in the Atlantic was plain stupid,

About two weeks before the Pearl Harbor attack, a confidential U.S. government document was leaked. The document made the following seem true:
1. The U.S. was too weak for a two ocean war.
2. In the event of a Japanese attack, the U.S. would be tied down in the Pacific for the time being.
3. Whether the U.S. was or wasn’t attacked, it would get around to going to war eventually. When it did so, its primary target would be Germany.

There is evidence to suggest that FDR himself leaked this document, to bait Germany into declaring war against the U.S. Even while the U.S. was still technically neutral, massive quantities of Lend-Lease Aid had flowed to Britain and the Soviet Union. If the U.S. was too weak to protect its shipping–as was claimed in the document–a declaration of war would represent a golden opportunity to prevent Britain from receiving its warplanes, or the U.S.S.R. from receiving its planes, tanks, and artillery pieces. If the U.S. was going to declare war on Germany sooner or later anyway, why not speed up the process by a year or two in order to take advantage of the sub war opportunities which then existed? Germany needed decisive victories against the U.S.S.R. in 1942. Getting rid of a lot of that Lend Lease Aid might make the difference between decisive victories on the Soviet front and stagnation.

That, at least, was Hitler’s logic when he made the decision to declare war on the U.S. It probably wasn’t the best decision he ever made. On the other hand, the pro-war faction eventually succeeded in getting the U.S. into WWI. Hitler felt they could achieve the same thing in WWII, given sufficient time.

To wrap it up, Germanys best bet to win would be to . . . go straight for Moscow.

Von Manstein expressed the same thing in his book. He wrote that the Soviets had to defend Moscow. Moscow therefore represented an opportunity to encircle and destroy a very large portion of the Red Army. He also wrote that after Moscow fell, it would be exceedingly difficult for the Soviets to mount concentrated offensives, due to the loss of so much of their transportation system. With the Red Army crippled, the areas Hitler wanted for economic reasons–such as the Baku oilfields–would become much easier to take.

@Narvik:

OK, so lets agree on the strategy so far.

Another decisive issue, that AH was only partly responsible to, was the failure in production. Germany was out-produced by everybody.

Look at the labor and production charts in this link http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Front_(World_War_II)

From -42 the Sovjet Union had a labor force of 8 000 000 men compared to a labor force of 16 000 000 in Germany.
But the Russian out-produced Germany.
Russia made 24 000 Tanks compared to 9000 German.
Russia made 25 000 Planes compared to 15 000 German.
And the numbers compared to USA is even more skewed.

The reason is that every German Tank was handmade, while the T-34 and Sherman,s were made on assembly line like the old T-Fords.
Yes, the German Tanks were superior in quality, but it was impossible to get spare parts when they broke down.
The Allies won the production war by quantity and efficiency.

On top of that, AH ordered stuff that was not necessary to win the war. The two big surface ships Bismarck and Tirpitz used as much steel as ten Panzer Divisions. When you play Germany in a game of A&A, what do you buy before you attack Russia ? 2 Battleships or 10 Mechanized infantry ? What do you imagine is the best purchase, and why should this be different from a real world scenario ?

Another decisive issue, that AH was only partly responsible to, was the failure in production.

The production failure was due to three factors:

1. Failure to sufficiently expand German industrial capacity during the Weimar Republic.
2. Lack of a good tank design.
3. Insufficient sense of urgency. This last was Hitler’s fault.

During the Weimar Republic, the German economy was stagnant. This was largely due to the repressive Versailles Treaty, and also due to the fact that during the '20s, the British and French governments had closed their empires to German trade. Things were so bad that a large percentage of Germany’s population suffered prolonged and severe hunger. In that environment, it didn’t make economic sense for German industrial firms to invest in the machinery absolutely necessary to maximize industrial output.

When Hitler came to power, one of his first objectives was to raise the German workforce up to what he considered an acceptable standard of living. Initial productivity gains were largely used to increase wages, reduce the workweek to 40 hours, and increase paid vacation time. By around 1935 or '36, Hitler’s goals for improving the lot of the German workforce had mostly been met. The time had come to rapidly increase industrial output. To effect this, most additional increases in productivity were diverted into corporate profits, not additional benefits for German workers. However, sharp restrictions were placed on the amount of profits which could be paid out in dividends. Most of these profits had to be retained by the companies which earned them. At that point, the companies only had one way they could spend their profits: to purchase expensive new machinery to increase productivity. The consequent increase in German industrial capacity would prepare the nation for war. However, the full effect of these efforts was not felt until 1944.

During the Weimar Republic, the German military had been forbidden from having tanks or an air force. When Hitler came to power, there was no good tank design or airplane design in existence. To rectify this problem, Germany encouraged the creation of multiple designs, hoping that at least one would prove to be effective. They arrived at designs which were combat-effective, but did not have time to create a design which was both combat-effective and easily mass-produced.

Late in the war they were in the process of fixing this problem. The E-Series tanks would have been even more combat-effective than existing Panther and Tiger designs, while being much easier to mass produce.

The E-50 Standardpanzer was intended as a standard medium tank, replacing the Panther and Tiger I. . . . Compared to these earlier designs however, the amount of drilling and machining involved in producing these standardpanzers was reduced drastically, which would have made them quicker, easier and cheaper to produce, as would the proposed conical spring system, replacing their predecessors’ complex and costly dual torsion bar system.

Both the E-50 and E-75 would have had infrared lighting and sights for night combat. The E-75 would have had armor 185 mm - 80 mm. The Soviet Union continued producing T-55s until 1981. The armor on the T-55 is 100mm - 60 mm. The E-Series tanks would almost certainly have solved Germany’s tank design problems.

In 1942, Germany produced 9,000 tanks. In '44 it produced 27,000. It produced 16,000 military aircraft in '42, and 40,000 military aircraft in '44. In '42, 1.4% of German tank production consisted of heavy tanks (50 tons or more). By '44 heavy tank production was 26% of the total. These massive increases were achieved before the crucial E-Series could be put into production. The E-series would undoubtedly have caused additional dramatic production increases.