@Imperious:
Japan had the best trained soldiers individually, but Germany had the most effective troopers as per military doctrine ( in battlefield conditions). So for results with given equipment which was usually meager,the Germans faired best.
AS far as having logistical support and many tools to fight, the American soldier had the best of everything and was the most effective with what he actually had, ( which was alot more than the German or Japanese).
Soviets were not great fighters, but had some great commanders.
Soviet infantry’s best fighting quality was the individual adaptness to hardship. A Soviet soldier could live off practically nothing and survive. Soviet citizens in the 1930’s lived in very primitive conditions. While the Soviets were great in defending, they were the poor in offensive capabilities.
Well if you’re looking at infantry training at levels higher than individual fieldcraft and marksmanship, then: Germany.
Their use of auftrages tactics and mission-oriented leadership effectively kept them in the fight no matter what came at them. More than 60 years later, we’re still studying and applying their doctrine and considering it innovative.
Hmm… no mention on Canadian troops? Perhaps I’m simply biased, but they were really decent troops, definitely the best in WWI, and I think that carried over to WWII.
Germans, no doubt IMO.
Honourable mention for Finnish, Australian, Canadian and Norwegians.
Best navymen British, followed by US?
Best pilots Germans, followed by US.
Al just my opinion, of course.
I would have to side with Imperial Japanese Army…when u are trained to fight till your last breath…that has got to be some serious brainwashing…BANZAI!!!
Japan had the best trained soldiers individually, but Germany had the most effective troopers as per military doctrine ( in battlefield conditions). So for results with given equipment which was usually meager,the Germans faired best.
AS far as having logistical support and many tools to fight, the American soldier had the best of everything and was the most effective with what he actually had, ( which was alot more than the German or Japanese).
Soviets were not great fighters, but had some great commanders.
I have to totally agree with IL here.
As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots. I think that the United States made the most of their pilots, the Japanese, Russians, and Germans flew their pilots to death. This is really stupid because (although the pilots hated it) they can be better used back off the line to train the next generation of pilots. Even if you have a great pilot (Red Barron/Richthoven is a great example) his number could be up anytime, any day. Its better to pull off great pilots and make them instructors before they get killed. I believe the Brits and other Allied nations also adhered to this principle.
I have to totally agree with IL here.
As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots. I think that the United States made the most of their pilots, the Japanese, Russians, and Germans flew their pilots to death. This is really stupid because (although the pilots hated it) they can be better used back off the line to train the next generation of pilots. Even if you have a great pilot (Red Barron/Richthoven is a great example) his number could be up anytime, any day. Its better to pull off great pilots and make them instructors before they get killed. I believe the Brits and other Allied nations also adhered to this principle.
I think you meant the German Rammjaeger wich was a Sonderkommando to delay or stop the USAAF of Daylight bombingraids but it was not a success…most of those NAPOLA fighters were shot down before they even could land a hit, some of them rammed their target and around 50 planes came back safe…that is as far as I know the only time where German Pilots on purpose tried to some degree pull off a “Kamikazee”…Lack of fuel and the closing Enemy and the Nazi cult drove them to desperate meassures…but still 50 people refused to do an insane stunt like that…
I’ve never heard about Soviet Kamikazees ,only that they shot ambulances and red cross b/c the Soviets have not been in the Geneva Convention…
My Grandpa used to say that the Japanese was the best soldier b/c he would go and fight everywhere for a bowl of rice, and he was dead serious about that!!..
Spectre04 wrote: As far as Pilots, Japan, Germany, Britain,and even Russia had very good pilots.
This link gives you a list of WWII aces, sorted by number of victories. The top non-German ace on that list is Ilmari Juutilainen of Finland, with 94 victories. Juutilainen is pilot #122 on that list: there are 121 Germans in front of him. The top 200 contains four non-Germans: two pilots from Finland (including Juutilainen) and two from Japan.
To return to the subject of the OP: one way of measuring infantry training levels is combat effectiveness. According to a study done by the U.S. military, American infantry were 80 - 100% as combat-effective as their German counterparts. Another study performed by the U.S. military suggests that may have been an overestimate; and that American infantry were no more effective than British infantry. The latter were 50% as combat-effective as the Germans. Soviet infantry were 20 - 33% as combat-effective as the Germans, with the higher number being the more likely. The study suggested that Italian infantry may have been less combat-effective than the Soviets, but did not go into detail. Unfortunately, the study did not examine the combat-effectiveness of Finnish, Canadian, Australian, or Japanese infantry.
The U.S. typically achieved a 2:1 - 4:1 exchange ratio in its land battles against Japan. A large part of that was undoubtedly due to America’s superior industrial strength. For example, Japan produced 7,000 artillery pieces during WWII, compared to 257,000 artillery pieces for the U.S.. But those favorable (for the Americans) exchange ratios may not have been based on industrial production alone. Japanese banzai attacks were very similar in philosophy and execution to French “elan” style bayonet attacks used in 1914. During WWI, the French painfully learned that it does not make sense to issue bayonets to your own soldiers, and ask them to charge enemy machine guns. The Japanese use of such tactics during WWII suggests they were less advanced in their understanding of land war (and hence, probably had less advanced training techniques) than most other major powers of the era. Japanese understanding of land war became more sophisticated as the war progressed.
Thoroughly enjoyed the post - one thought though
I don’t think it helps to refer to the 2:1 - 4:1 exchange ratio of US to Japan on “land battles” because there are so many different and incomparable factors. As you mentioned - the huge industrial strength disparity. Also, the Japanese were pretty much always on defense - it’s not like there were a lot of both, like you have in Germany vs. Russia. There’s just no comparing amphibious assaults on Pacific islands to a European land war….
I’d be interested to hear analysis on USA troop performance in Europe (or any other country, just specifying USA because they had the 2 very different campaigns a world apart)
On US performance in Europe, has anyone read Rick Atkinson’s Liberation Trilogy? I just started reading the first book, which is about Torch and the liberation of North Africa. So far, it seems that US forces are inexperienced and lucky they were landing against French troops instead of in France against German troops close to their homeland.
Gamerman01 wrote:
I’d be interested to hear analysis on USA troop performance in Europe (or any other country, just specifying USA because they had the 2 very different campaigns a world apart)
In late 1942, American troops invaded Algeria. The result was a battle between the Americans and the French. The two sides soon negotiated a peace treaty. But before they did, America achieved a 2.5-to-1 exchange ratio against the French. As you pointed out, an exchange ratio is not necessarily a good measurement of infantry effectiveness. If one side (such as the United States) happens to have an overwhelming advantage in air power, equipment, and numbers, one would expect such a nation to achieve a favorable ratio.
In 1943, the U.S. and Britain invaded Italy. In the opinion of the U.S. military officer who performed the study I’d mentioned earlier, that combat represented the best example of American and British soldiers going up against Germans. However, he pointed out that the German force in Italy was relatively small, that it was a reserve force, and that as such it did not have the same equipment as a front line force of equal size might have had. Also, a significant percentage of its soldiers had been sent there for rest and recovery (recovery from battle wounds, for example). Based on his analysis of Anglo-American performance against this force, the author of the study concluded that American soldiers were 80 - 100% as combat-effective as the Germans, and that the British were 50% as combat-effective. (Elsewhere, he acknowledged the possibility that he’d overestimated American soldiers’ combat-effectiveness.)
In the Soviet Union there was a strong dislike for Stalin. When Hitler invaded, he found that a significant percentage of the population was willing to join the German Army, so that they could fight against communism. One would think that the logical place for these volunteers would be on the eastern front, against communism. However, in 1944 Germany was experiencing a dramatic troop shortage, and needed to quickly transfer soldiers to its western front to prepare against American and British invasion. Many of its best western front soldiers were placed in Calais, because that is where the Germans expected the blow to land. On most of the Normandy beachheads, American and British soldiers faced mostly Russians. Only at Omaha did the Allies face actual German soldiers. Hence the phrase “Bloody Omaha.” The U.S. lost 3000 men at Omaha, in exchange for 1200 Germans. On the one hand, the Americans enjoyed air supremacy, the benefit of battleship bombardments, far more weapons and equipment than the Germans, and a 5:1 numerical advantage over the German defenders. On the other hand, the Germans had the advantage of being the defender, and the advantage of having had time to prepare their defenses. The analysis of the Italian campaign probably provides a more accurate picture of relative combat effectiveness than does this one isolated battle.
During the initial phases of the Battle of the Bulge, bad weather prevented the Allies from receiving much benefit from their air supremacy. That’s useful, because we want ground battles, without the complicating factor of one side pummeling the other side from the air. The Battle of the Bulge was useful in another way as well, because it consisted of both attacks and counterattacks. Over the course of the battle each side was given opportunities to be on offense and on defense.
Many of Germany’s best soldiers were sent to the Battle of the Bulge. However, that battle occurred in late 1944. By that point, Germany was running very low on “best soldiers” it could send. To fill out its numbers, many of the German soldiers in that battle were old men or boys. A number of infantry divisions were poorly equipped. Germany’s tanks in that battle were often immobilized due to its fuel shortages. The exchange ratio in that battle was approximately 1:1.
The Battle of Berlin began just three months after the Battle of the Bulge. While no American troops were involved in the Battle of Berlin, that battle nevertheless illustrates the types of problems the German military faced at the time.
The German defences were mainly led by Helmuth Weidling and consisted of several depleted, badly equipped, and disorganised Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS divisions, the latter of which included many SS foreign volunteers, as well as poorly trained Volkssturm and Hitler Youth members.
The Volkssturm consisted almost entirely of old men and children; while the Hitler Youth was of course children. The Soviets experienced 81,000 losses in the Battle of Berlin; as compared to about 95,000 losses for Germany. Just two years earlier, the usual exchange ratio between Germany and the U.S.S.R. had been 3:1 in Germany’s favor. The fact that the Soviets later attained–and even slightly exceeded–a 1:1 ratio is one of several pieces of evidence which demonstrate Germany had reached the very end of its strength.
I’m less familiar with the Pacific war than I am the European war. That said, I know that during the early stages of the war between the U.S. and Japan, Japanese military doctrine called for the bulk of their defenses to be placed on or near beaches. That doctrine made them vulnerable to shore bombardment and attack from the air, and was a significant factor in the favorable exchange ratios American forces obtained. Late in the war, a maverick Japanese army officer used a different approach. His defenses on or near beaches were light. Once his beachhead defenses had been conquered, the Americans assumed that since the shell had been cracked, the whole defensive structure for that island would crumble. Instead of that, the Japanese officer and his men conducted a long and effective defensive campaign from the interior of the island. They used natural and artificial tunnels, caves, mountains, etc. Their plan was to hold out as long as possible while inflicting the maximum possible damage on the enemy.
However, it’s difficult to translate that one battle into an overall comparison between Japanese and American soldiers’ combat-effectiveness. The Japanese had the natural advantages of being on defense, and the island in question had a physical structure very, very well-suited to defense.
I read it all
Didn’t the Germans have a significant advantage of being on defense and often having higher ground in Italy, too?
I read it all
Didn’t the Germans have a significant advantage of being on defense and often having higher ground in Italy, too?
Yes, but that’s something which was taken into account when the U.S. military performed the study I’d mentioned. There were times in Italy when the German Army attacked, and of course times when the British or American armies attacked. The study looked specifically at what happened when the German army attacked, and compared those results to events when the British or American armies attacked. Same thing with defense. By looking at all available data, they were able to develop a composite picture of relative combat effectiveness.
You are right about the belligerents, Kurt. Though, it always feels weird reading that the US/Brits fought the French, initially, in French-North Africa. I like to call them the “traitor/occupied/Vichy French” and the “free French” for the other side. It just makes me feel better, haha.
Very interesting, thanks for fielding both questions Kurt!
What I’ve read, and it’s a lot, is Germany best at the start, Russia the worst with German forces becoming very differentiated later on w/ some excellent units and increasing numbers of mediocre units. The Russians were actually able to field some very effective divisions 44 on but still had a swath of cannon fodder. Britain, France etc were always ok. The US was so so, but we had excellent, unsurpassed maybe, fire control w/artillery etc that made infantry effectiveness a second order issue. On of the big lessons drawn by the US from WWII was how ineffective infantry were, especially w/rifles.
I would never say Japanese infantry were that great. They, at all times during the war, had mediocre to outdated equipment and horrible logistics. Sure, they could make up some of it w/zeal, but in the end they never came out on top of the US after 42. They had a pretty bad loss ratio to the US starting a Guadalcanal.
Keep in mind that most of the Pacific land battles in 41/early 42 were, aside from Singapore, pretty small affairs w/ Japan swooping down, surrounding and cutting off small isolated, poorly equipped garrisons.
WraithZero wrote,
I like to call them the “traitor/occupied/Vichy French” and the “free French” for the other side. It just makes me feel better, haha.
I would disagree with that characterization. I strongly believe that those who joined Vichy France never wavered in their loyalty or love for France. Love of France and war against Germany are not analogous concepts. It’s also worth noting that England and France had been at war against each other for more years than the United States has existed. Churchill’s decision to sink the French navy may have brought some of those memories to the surface.
On the other hand, many of the so-called “Free French” were communists. The stated objective of communism is to overthrow the world’s existing governments and to replace them with one world government. A communist government. Undoubtedly, many or most of these communist Free French still felt love or loyalty toward France. Perhaps communist leadership felt it would be better to wait until after the war was over to ween these men of their love for France; and to attempt to replace that love with a love for a global dictatorship of the proletariat.
Karl wrote,
What I’ve read, and it’s a lot, is Germany best at the start, Russia the worst
By the summer of 1941, 80% of German men ages 20 - 30 were members of the military. (The other 20% were considered too vital to industry to be released for military service.) Over 80% of German military losses were incurred on its eastern front. Together, these two facts meant that the enormous losses Germany would sustain on its eastern front would be made good not by drafting men of military age, but by adding men who were of non-ideal age. At first it was adding men who were maybe a few years older than that ideal range. But as the war progressed and casualties mounted, the age range of German soldiers broadened. By mid to late '44 there were plenty of old men and boys in the German Army. Also, the percentage of non-Germans in the German Army increased as the war progressed. Military historians describe the German Army of '44 as having been a shell of the German Army in '41.
Stalin tended to downplay the accomplishments of the pre-Barbarossa Red Army, so as not to alarm his neighbors. But if that propaganda effort is stripped away, we see that the Red Army had some remarkable achievements in 1939 and 1940. In 1939, the Soviet Union found itself in an undeclared war against Japan. The Red Army won a crushing victory in '39 in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol. They achieved an offensive victory over the Japanese by having a weak center, strong flanks, a high level of mobility, and excellent air power. The objective was to use enveloping tactics and mobility to surround an enemy force; while using air power to knock out roads and bridges the enemy had needed. It was a sound philosophy, soundly executed. However, Stalin ordered total censorship of this Soviet victory. The Japanese were of course less than eager to advertise their defeat. As a consequence the rest of the world did not learn of what the Red Army had accomplished in 1939.
Prior to WWII, Finland had built multi-layered defenses on the Karelian isthmus, to guard against Soviet invasion. Many or most military experts considered those defenses impregnable. Due to the layout of the land, it was impossible to bypass those defenses. The only way to conquer Finland was to go straight through some of the best-defended terrain on the entire surface of the Earth. The Red Army achieved exactly that in 1940–albeit with substantial losses. Soviet propagandists claimed that the Red Army performed poorly in that engagement; and that it would be years before it was ready for war. Those claims are evidence that the Red Army performed well; and that Soviet leaders were planning a war of aggression. (Had the Red Army actually performed badly, Soviet leaders would hardly have wanted to advertise that weakness to their expansionistic neighbors.)
It’s true that the Red Army performed poorly in Operation Barbarossa. Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio in the summer and fall of '41.
Well prior to Barbarossa, each Soviet officer had been issued a sealed packet. A packet was only to be opened upon outbreak of hostilities. When Germany invaded, each officer opened his packet. Upon doing so, he found plenty of information about what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany–and nothing at all about how to respond to a German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military’s deployment, weapons mix, troop movements and doctrine would have made perfect sense for a Soviet invasion of Germany in August 1941. They were completely unsuited to defending against a German invasion. The fact that the Soviet military leadership was taken completely off-guard was the main reason Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio in Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 ratio which would become normal later in the war.) Also in '41, Soviet generals had a far less sophisticated understanding of tactics and strategy than did their German counterparts. During the Nazi-Soviet war, Soviet generals learned by example from German generals; thereby partly closing the sophistication gap. “We taught them too well,” General von Manstein remarked.
Just going to touch on a few things here as this discussion has moved towards Eastern Front fighting and most of my research has been in this particular theater of the war. Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous. The Red Army was orders of magnitude larger and better equipped than the Finnish army, there is no level of preparedness that could have come even close to bridging the gap between those two armies. That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership and it was rightly seen by the rest of the world, and Stalin himself no doubt, as a failure. Furthermore, the assertion that this blunder was intentionally made known to the rest of the world by Soviet propagandists is erroneous. There was no covering that up, that’s how badly that campaign went.
I must also take issue with the assertion that Stalin attempted to downplay the accomplishments of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa for two reasons:
Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s
There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets
Additionally, Stalin had no reason to downplay the quality of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa. Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first. In fact, Stalin held this belief so ardently that he refused to believe intelligence given to him not only by the British but also his own staff, and even believed Hitler when he informed Stalin that Axis troops being redeployed to the Eastern frontier were simply training for the invasion of the United Kingdom.
On top of THAT is the fact that the Red Army was being completely reorganized and reequipped at the time that Barbarossa occurred, and Stalin knew that that was going to be a dangerous time for any major confrontation with his neighbours. It literally makes zero sense that he would try to downplay the quality of his troops and their accomplishments given these facts. If anything, they’re reasons that he would have been much more overt about the strength of the Red Army.
Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.
Just going to touch on a few things here as this discussion has moved towards Eastern Front fighting and most of my research has been in this particular theater of the war. Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous. The Red Army was orders of magnitude larger and better equipped than the Finnish army, there is no level of preparedness that could have come even close to bridging the gap between those two armies. That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership and it was rightly seen by the rest of the world, and Stalin himself no doubt, as a failure. Furthermore, the assertion that this blunder was intentionally made known to the rest of the world by Soviet propagandists is erroneous. There was no covering that up, that’s how badly that campaign went.
I must also take issue with the assertion that Stalin attempted to downplay the accomplishments of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa for two reasons:
Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s
There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets
Additionally, Stalin had no reason to downplay the quality of the Red Army prior to Barbarossa. Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first. In fact, Stalin held this belief so ardently that he refused to believe intelligence given to him not only by the British but also his own staff, and even believed Hitler when he informed Stalin that Axis troops being redeployed to the Eastern frontier were simply training for the invasion of the United Kingdom.
On top of THAT is the fact that the Red Army was being completely reorganized and reequipped at the time that Barbarossa occurred, and Stalin knew that that was going to be a dangerous time for any major confrontation with his neighbours. It literally makes zero sense that he would try to downplay the quality of his troops and their accomplishments given these facts. If anything, they’re reasons that he would have been much more overt about the strength of the Red Army.
Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.
Creeping Deth wrote:
Apologies to KurtGodel7 if any of this sounds abrasive, but a lot of your assertions fly in the face
with my research on the Eastern Front and interwar politics. I am only interested in scholarly
discussion and have no wish to hurt anyone’s feelings.
No apologies necessary. Prior to having read Victor Suvorov’s book, I would have agreed with the majority of your post. I was frequently surprised by the information Suvorov had brought to light, and gradually came to modify my perspective as a result of that new data. As for Suvorov’s credentials: he had been a member of the KGB, until defecting to Britain in the '70s. As a member of the KGB he had been given access to Soviet archives denied to all non-Soviets, and also denied to the vast majority of Soviet citizens. Suvorov pointed out that the Soviet Union had been a criminal regime, and that therefore the tactics of a criminal investigator were appropriate. Historians–with their reliance on journalists to write the “first draft” for them–do not always use the tactics needed to penetrate the Soviet veil of secrecy. Suvorov’s bias is anti-communist but pro-Russian. He is proud of the military achievements of the Red Army–his fellow Russians–while strongly condemning Stalin’s evil legacy of terror and mass murder.
Firstly, to consider the Soviet invasion of Finland a success is, frankly, ridiculous.
Finland had built very powerful defenses on the Karelian isthmus. Those defenses were seized during the Winter War, leaving the nation helpless against any subsequent Soviet invasion. The objective of the Winter War was (according to Suvorov) to seize those Karelian defenses, and that objective was achieved. (Despite having been considered a military impossibility.) Having rendered Finland defenseless, why didn’t Stalin grab the nation as a whole? Suvorov believes that Stalin had planned to do exactly that–after he had invaded Germany. To grab it ahead of time would be to alert Germany to Stalin’s aggressive intentions.
That the Red Army stumbled so badly against Finland demonstrates the sheer ineptitude of Soviet military leadership
In comparison with the Germans, the Red Army’s leadership was indeed inept. (Probably to a much greater degree than Stalin had realized.) But in the undeclared war between Japan and the Soviet Union, the Red Army won a series of stunning victories. Anyone looking at the results of that undeclared war would conclude the Soviets had a very high level of military preparedness in 1939; which of course had significantly increased by 1941. The favorable exchange ratio the Finns achieved during the Winter War could be seen as evidence of the strength of Finland’s defenses and the difficulty of the task of conquering those defenses.
- Germany and the Soviet Union were very interested in exchanging military research, and experts were sent
and received by both countries to evaluate the capabilities of the other during the 1930s
I remember having read something along those lines myself. However, Suvorov pointed out that on the domestic front, Stalin had a habit of allying with B against A. Then he’d align with C against B. Finally, he’d eliminate C. Suvorov believes that Stalin took exactly that same approach to Soviet foreign relations. The fact that the Soviet Union and Germany had cooperated during the '30s is not evidence of benign intent on the part of Stalin. Suvorov believes that it was more of the same “align with B against A, then align with C against B” strategy seen so often in Stalin’s domestic political affairs.
- There was nothing to cover up, the Red Army’s only notable campaign before Barbarossa was against the Japanese and the Finns and neither of those were secrets
Suvorov points out that all mention of the Soviets’ victories over the Japanese were censored from the Soviet media. Also, the Soviet propaganda machine sold the Winter War as a “defeat,” even though the Red Army succeeded in conquering Finland’s defenses. (Leaving Finland with no means of defending itself from subsequent Soviet attack.)
Indeed, one of the (many) reasons Barbarossa was such a surprise for Stalin was his belief that Hitler would not deliberately open a second front without completely dealing with the first.
It is true that Stalin believed Germany would not attack first. Soviet officers were given sealed packets, to be opened in the event of hostilities between Germany and the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded, each officer opened his packet. Upon doing so, he found plenty of information on what to do if the Soviet Union invaded Germany. And nothing at all on how he should act if Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This surprise effect was pivotal in Germany’s achieving a 10:1 exchange ratio during Operation Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 ratio which would become normal later in the war.)
Stalin’s certainty about his theory was not based on blind faith only. He was also conducting an extensive spying campaign within Germany. To create proper winter uniforms, it is absolutely necessary to use sheepskin. Stalin’s spies monitored German sheep markets, and found no evidence of preparation of such winter uniforms. Also for winter war it is necessary to have winterized fuel supplies and lubrication oil supplies. Stalin’s spies found no evidence to suggest Germany was winterizing any of its fuel or lubricant supplies. Further, Stalin’s spies had found that Germany had only enough fuel reserves for two to three months of active campaigning, after which its military operations would slow down precipitously due to lack of fuel. Finally, Stalin had a considerable numerical advantage on that front, including (IIRC) a better than 10:1 ratio in available tanks. Based on these data Stalin reasonably concluded that Hitler would be a fool to invade. According to Suvorov Hitler understood the basic logic of not invading. And he added that Hitler had had no plans to invade, until he’d gotten wind of Stalin’s plan to invade Germany. Even though Germany’s massive troop movements to the Eastern front began after Stalin’s, Germany’s were finished first. This was due to a variety of factors: Germany had a good transportation system, Germany had to send its soldiers a shorter distance than did the Soviet Union, and Germany had fewer soldiers to send. Germany’s troop concentration was therefore completed several weeks ahead of the Soviet schedule, allowing Germany to strike first.
I appreciate that synopsis Kurt, thanks for typing it up
I think it helps clear up some fog I’ve always had with this particular area of history
