Historically stupid people

Hoover was only credible with Chicken recipes. He was a disgraced president and usually his views would also be considered lightly and with great trepidation. I wouldn’t listen to anything President Grant said about the Civil War or his own presidency either.

The main thing is to make the Germans during WW2 look like the victims who got stuck in a war by FDR, Churchill and Stalin. Goering was a skinny guy and ate little as well.

@Der:

There is evidence that Roosevelt purposely drew Japan into the war. One example would be moving the Pacific fleet to Hawaii when it would have been safer to remain based on the West Coast. Another is that none of the USA’s most modern vessels were moored in Pearl harbor on December 7th. The latest equipment, including all carriers, just “happened” to be elsewhere that day.

This argument is very much borne out of coincidental hindsight rather than supportable fact.

It wasn’t just Pearl Harbor that was built up or reinforced. The US did the same in the Philippines, Wake, Guam and Midway. All of which point to preparation for a swift response to Japanese aggression, should it have occurred. And it did. The Japanese decided to attack and/or invade all of those (minus Midway) immediately as a part of their overall battle plan to obtain as much territory and inflict as much damage as quickly as possible at the outset of war.

Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were all engaged in operations either planned months in advance (Saratoga) or under orders conforming to their normal cycles of departure. Lexington was reinforcing Marine squadrons at Midway. Enterprise was doing the same at Wake. Both were under direct orders from Adm. Kimmel based on requests (not orders) from the Navy Dept. Saratoga was taking on her new air group in San Diego after an extended refit that occurred for the entire year of 1941. Contrary to keeping them safe, the deployment of Enterprise and (especially) Lexington left the two carriers extremely vulnerable to attack from the Japanese fleet. The timing of Enterprise’s return to Pearl Harbor on Dec 7 was anyhting but ‘safe’. Enterprise and Lexington quickly received order to engage the enemy fleet if found. Because both ships were split up and unable to support one another, the likelyhood of a successful attack against the Japanese was very small. Even had Enterprise and Lexington been able to engage the enemy together, it would have been 2 underprepared carriers versus 6 battle ready Japanese carriers plus surface escorts. Both Enterprise and Lexington would have been sunk.  In hindsight, deploying Lexington and Enterprise where they were and for what purpose on and around Dec 7 was highly unwise if US command was aware of Japanese plans.

If Roosevelt knew of Japanese intentions and timeframe of battle, as you imply, would it not have been more appropriate to position the carriers such that they would be able to ambush the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, very much like they did at Midway?

That Roosevelt ordered the carriers elsewhere on purpose, so as to save them from the destruction, also implies that he (or those he trusted with such intelligence) very pointedly foresaw the significant strategic importance of aircraft carriers versus battleships which eventually became clear in the Second World War. That would be a stretch. USN carrier tactics were still being developed at the beginning of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 was indecisive in many respects because carrier vs carrier battles as such had never been fought before and battle execution was crude. In fact, carrier based aircraft had never before sunk a capital ship under way at sea until December 10, 1941 when Japanese aircraft destroyed HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. That Roosevelt and established naval leaders could have precisely predicted the massive advantage of naval air power without historical precedent is an attribution very much borne out of hindsight. Additionally, it is a convenience which diminishes the accomplishments of the Japanese Navy in executing the Pearl Harbor attack.

But it was not only US tactics that were flawed at the beginning of the war. The Japanese proceeded with the attack on Pearl Harbor having received a report that the US carriers would not be present. Carriers were to be secondary targets to the battleships and critical shore installations were to be even lesser targets than that. As successful and daring as their attack was, the Japanese strategic blunders were their own; not the manipulative string-pulling of FDR and the US Navy.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/Missing_Carriers.html
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/yamamoto-planning-pearl-harbor/

@LHoffman:

This argument is very much borne out of coincidental hindsight rather than supportable fact.

It wasn’t just Pearl Harbor that was built up or reinforced. The US did the same in the Philippines, Wake, Guam and Midway. All of which point to preparation for a swift response to Japanese aggression, should it have occurred. And it did. The Japanese decided to attack and/or invade all of those (minus Midway) immediately as a part of their overall battle plan to obtain as much territory and inflict as much damage as quickly as possible at the outset of war.

Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were all engaged in operations either planned months in advance (Saratoga) or under orders conforming to their normal cycles of departure. Lexington was reinforcing Marine squadrons at Midway. Enterprise was doing the same at Wake. Both were under direct orders from Adm. Kimmel based on requests (not orders) from the Navy Dept. Saratoga was taking on her new air group in San Diego after an extended refit that occurred for the entire year of 1941. Contrary to keeping them safe, the deployment of Enterprise and (especially) Lexington left the two carriers extremely vulnerable to attack from the Japanese fleet. The timing of Enterprise’s return to Pearl Harbor on Dec 7 was anyhting but ‘safe’. Enterprise and Lexington quickly received order to engage the enemy fleet if found. Because both ships were split up and unable to support one another, the likelyhood of a successful attack against the Japanese was very small. Even had Enterprise and Lexington been able to engage the enemy together, it would have been 2 underprepared carriers versus 6 battle ready Japanese carriers plus surface escorts. Both Enterprise and Lexington would have been sunk. �In hindsight, deploying Lexington and Enterprise where they were and for what purpose on and around Dec 7 was highly unwise if US command was aware of Japanese plans.

If Roosevelt knew of Japanese intentions and timeframe of battle, as you imply, would it not have been more appropriate to position the carriers such that they would be able to ambush the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, very much like they did at Midway?

That Roosevelt ordered the carriers elsewhere on purpose, so as to save them from the destruction, also implies that he (or those he trusted with such intelligence) very pointedly foresaw the significant strategic importance of aircraft carriers versus battleships which eventually became clear in the Second World War. That would be a stretch. USN carrier tactics were still being developed at the beginning of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 was indecisive in many respects because carrier vs carrier battles as such had never been fought before and battle execution was crude. In fact, carrier based aircraft had never before sunk a capital ship under way at sea until December 10, 1941 when Japanese aircraft destroyed HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. That Roosevelt and established naval leaders could have precisely predicted the massive advantage of naval air power without historical precedent is an attribution very much borne out of hindsight. Additionally, it is a convenience which diminishes the accomplishments of the Japanese Navy in executing the Pearl Harbor attack.

But it was not only US tactics that were flawed at the beginning of the war. The Japanese proceeded with the attack on Pearl Harbor having received a report that the US carriers would not be present. Carriers were to be secondary targets to the battleships and critical shore installations were to be even lesser targets than that. As successful and daring as their attack was, the Japanese strategic blunders were their own; not the manipulative string-pulling of FDR and the US Navy.

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/Missing_Carriers.html
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/yamamoto-planning-pearl-harbor/

I haven’t studied the specifics of the carrier movement orders, and I’m not going to debate you on that point. Until I obtain firsthand knowledge of those movement orders, I’ll allow that there’s a chance your theory is correct. That the carriers were absent from Pearl for benign reasons.

However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.

You suggested that it would have been appropriate for FDR to position the carriers to ambush the Japanese forces, if indeed his motives were nefarious. (Which they were.) However, it’s worth pointing out that, from FDR’s perspective, Japan’s initial attack was intended to achieve a political objective, not a military one. If there was even a hint of conflict between a political and military objective, the political objective would be prioritized. At least for the initial attack. Military objectives could be achieved later. Later being after the U.S. was safely in the war, and after FDR had wrung every last drop of propaganda advantage he could out of Pearl Harbor. The account FDR gave of December 7th–the Japanese winning a victory through treachery, while the U.S. was attempting to negotiate in good faith–bore absolutely no relationship to reality. If a politician is lying that blatantly and outlandishly, there is usually a reason why.

If the U.S. navy had assaulted the Japanese fleet before it launched its strike on Pearl, that would have interfered with FDR’s intended narrative of Japan as the aggressor, the U.S. the naive but honest victim of a sucker punch. Even worse (from FDR’s perspective) if the U.S. had achieved initial victories in the war against Japan, those victories might have discouraged Germany from declaring war against the U.S. FDR’s main objective for engaging in hostilities in the first place was to ensure the defeat of National Socialist Germany and the victory of Soviet communism.

On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.
However the main goal of embargo was to pressure Japan to cease war in China.

And Japan stay the course but the emperor’s counselor (all military) were killed by other military-men and replaced by even more war-oriented generals. Tojo? The previous ones were far less enthusiastic to make war.
Even Yamamoto was reluctant to attack USA, and he still planed the Pearl attack and was not confident about Nagumo obeying his orders. As history revealed, Nagumo disobeyed and never launch any second waves. Yamamoto only hoped on a short war. And he needed a complete destruction of Pearl Harbor facilities, fuel and shipyard. I believe both forgot Submarines however.
So, politically, there was a coup, Japan may have back off in China and negotiate with US to cease embargo.

Also, I heard even FDR close counselors were very plainly surprised and didn’t fake it.

However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.

Ridiculous narrative.

Japan attacked China and committed atrocities since 1931. Its about time US defended them and cut off the oil. Japan could have avoided this easily by pulling out of China proper. Its not a provoking act to stand up against aggression. You almost make it seem that we deserved the Hawaiian attack.  Also, FDR did not refuse to meet with anybody. The Japanese ambassadors didn’t force themselves to see FDR in Dec 41, they were invited to discuss resolution of aggressive acts against nations.

You are always on the wrong side of any facts and basic lessons of History.

If we cut off UK’s oil, i guess they should have attacked as well right?

Same bogus arguments as Germany being starved during wartime, while Goering eats AYCE crab legs at the Stuttgart Buffet. Totally ignoring the fact that Germany started many wars and could easily make for peace, or end Himmler’s hunger plan and extermination for untermensh

@KurtGodel7:

I haven’t studied the specifics of the carrier movement orders, and I’m not going to debate you on that point. Until I obtain firsthand knowledge of those movement orders, I’ll allow that there’s a chance your theory is correct. That the carriers were absent from Pearl for benign reasons.

I linked to that testimony in my post above. You can read at your leisure.

@KurtGodel7:

However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.

I can argue all day and give numerous facts and circumstances which have been given before… and it still will not change your mind. So I am not going to bother. However, if you have the time, I would highly recommend reading this http://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/85001/the-pacific-war-1931-1945-by-saburo-ienaga/9780394734965/. Ienaga is a Japanese scholar who was in Japan during the war. His take is critical on both the Japanese and the Americans, but focuses very much on how Japan entered into and continued a futile war entirely of its own accord. His research goes back to the late 1800s and the Meiji Restoration and many events leading up to Japanese aggression in the 1930s. This is a well balanced and pointedly realistic assessment of the origins of the Pacific War. You would do well to read it and compare to your existing conclusions about the war.

@KurtGodel7:

You suggested that it would have been appropriate for FDR to position the carriers to ambush the Japanese forces, if indeed his motives were nefarious. (Which they were.) However, it’s worth pointing out that, from FDR’s perspective, Japan’s initial attack was intended to achieve a political objective, not a military one. If there was even a hint of conflict between a political and military objective, the political objective would be prioritized. At least for the initial attack. Military objectives could be achieved later. Later being after the U.S. was safely in the war, and after FDR had wrung every last drop of propaganda advantage he could out of Pearl Harbor. The account FDR gave of December 7th–the Japanese winning a victory through treachery, while the U.S. was attempting to negotiate in good faith–bore absolutely no relationship to reality. If a politician is lying that blatantly and outlandishly, there is usually a reason why.

If the U.S. navy had assaulted the Japanese fleet before it launched its strike on Pearl, that would have interfered with FDR’s intended narrative of Japan as the aggressor, the U.S. the naive but honest victim of a sucker punch. Even worse (from FDR’s perspective) if the U.S. had achieved initial victories in the war against Japan, those victories might have discouraged Germany from declaring war against the U.S. FDR’s main objective for engaging in hostilities in the first place was to ensure the defeat of National Socialist Germany and the victory of Soviet communism.

What you are suggesting is an incredibly circuitous and complex route for President Roosevelt to achieve his ultimate objective of war with Nazi Germany… and beyond that some type of post-war world hegemony between the USA and USSR. It again portrays Roosevelt as a manipulative puppet master, orchestrating world events entirely on his terms. And everything worked out exactly as planned. EDIT: Except dying before you can see it all work out.  :wink:

From the scarce evidence I read and heard, FDR wanted the war with Japan in the best interest of USA and UK against Nazi Germany. But that doesn’t mean he was aware of the incoming assault on Pearl Harbor.
Probably he was thinking Japan assault will start in South-East Asia but not as close as Hawaii.

Carriers, according to main stream documentary, were shipping escorting Fighters to Wake (Enterprise) and Midway (IDK, Wasp or Hornet?).
This make sense to provide more escorting Fgs for B-17 Flying Fortress going to Philippines and westward, in the forthcoming Airbombing raids over Japan. Which, from my POV, is an acceptable strategy for someone knowing that US people didn’t want to go to war.  Embargo, Submarines raids (on japanese merchant shipping) and Air raids seems a logical politic and strategy to convinced Japan to stop their hegemonic policy in Asia/China at minimum US citizens cost in life.

Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedence.

@Baron:

Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedence

Well said.

@LHoffman:

@Baron:

Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedence

Well said.

Thanks Hoffman.
I would add on FDR behalf that even if he was happy that USA can enter war (for the best interest of US Nation and against Isolationist dominant opinion at that time), he can be very sad that Japan succeeded to raid Pearl Harbor and was authentically outrages about it. Galvanizing all US citizen was then necessary to use this event politically as most as possible. He must have seized this opportunity to turn public opinion against isolationism.

I even heard that if Japan had only taken Philipinnes and Guam, FDR would have work much harder to lead USA public opinion into a war on the opposite side of the Globe. Political predictions are not the most accurate, there is so much contingencies.

@LHoffman:

I linked to that testimony in my post above. You can read at your leisure.

I can argue all day and give numerous facts and circumstances which have been given before… and it still will not change your mind. So I am not going to bother. However, if you have the time, I would highly recommend reading this http://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/85001/the-pacific-war-1931-1945-by-saburo-ienaga/9780394734965/. Ienaga is a Japanese scholar who was in Japan during the war. His take is critical on both the Japanese and the Americans, but focuses very much on how Japan entered into and continued a futile war entirely of its own accord. His research goes back to the late 1800s and the Meiji Restoration and many events leading up to Japanese aggression in the 1930s. This is a well balanced and pointedly realistic assessment of the origins of the Pacific War. You would do well to read it and compare to your existing conclusions about the war.

What you are suggesting is an incredibly circuitous and complex route for President Roosevelt to achieve his ultimate objective of war with Nazi Germany… and beyond that some type of post-war world hegemony between the USA and USSR. It again portrays Roosevelt as a manipulative puppet master, orchestrating world events entirely on his terms. And everything worked out exactly as planned. EDIT: Except dying before you can see it all work out.� :wink:

I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.

Speaking of bringing forth specific content from books, I’d like to present a few quotes from Herbert Hoover’s book Freedom Betrayed.

Page 846:

The third wrong turning was the imposition of the economic sanctions in July. That was undeclared war on Japan by which starvation and ruin stared her in the face and if continued would soon be war, for the simple reason that no people of dignity would run up the white flag under such provocation. It could effect no strategic purpose in the protection of the United States or China or even the British Empire.The fourth wrong turning was certainly the rejection of the Konoye proposals of September and the Emperor’s proposals of November. . . . Konoye had begun his negotiations two months before the sanctions. . . . It can never be forgotten that three times during 1941 Japan made overtures for peace negotiation. America never made one unless a futile proposal to the Emperor the day before Pearl Harbor could be called peace.

P. 833

[MacArthur] said that Roosevelt could have made peace with Konoye in September 1941 and could have obtained all of the American objectives in the Pacific and the freedom of China and probably Manchuria. He said Konoye was authorized by the Emperor to agree to complete withdrawal.

p 828

"[Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, father of JFK] said that when the Ghormley Commission went to England in mid-1940, it was for the purposes of preparing joint military action, and yet through that entire election campaign Roosevelt was promising the American people he would never go to war.

p 827

Kennedy said that Bullitt, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the Poles not to make terms with the Germans and that he Kennedy, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the British to make guarantees to the Poles. Kennedy said that he had received a cable from Roosevelt to “put a poker up Chamberlain’s back and to make him stand up.” . . . He said that after Chamberlain had given these guarantees, Chamberlain told him (Kennedy) that he hoped the Americans and the Jews would now be satisfied but that he (Chamberlain) felt that he had signed the doom of civilization.

Collectively, these quotes leave little room for doubt that FDR’s objectives were 1) to create a war in Europe, and 2) to join the war as quickly as he could. As IL pointed out in his otherwise error-ridden post, Japan had been engaging in aggression in China since 1931. If stopping Japanese aggression against China was important to FDR, why wait until 1941 to do anything about it? Why was stopping that aggression so much more important in 1941 than it had been in 1937 when Japan launched a major offensive against China? (An offensive which FDR ignored.) If saving China’s bacon was truly the objective, then why not simply accept the Konoye proposals made in 1941–proposals which would have accomplished exactly that?

FDR’s actions would have been nonsensical, had his actual objectives borne any relation at all to his stated objectives. I firmly believe he was working toward a different set of objectives: the twin objectives of the destruction of National Socialist Germany and the victory of the Soviet Union. A war between the U.S. and Japan would help achieve both, even if FDR hadn’t managed to use the Pacific war as a doorway through which to enter the European war. Even if the U.S. had done nothing more in WWII than go to war against Japan, that alone would have been sufficient to prevent any sort of serious Japanese invasion of the U.S.S.R. Stalin would have a one front war, greatly increasing his chances of victory. But Pearl Harbor (from FDR’s perspective) was even better than just that, because he got what he truly wanted: direct American involvement in the European conflict, on the side of the Soviet Union.

Have you guys heard of the McCollum memo?

On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors.

The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html

I have been reading this thread with interest.

The trouble with history is that it attempts to draw conclusions from the actions of thousands of individuals. But those individuals are often working at odds with each other and attempting to drive events in different directions. This allows selective use of the facts to support any number of pre-determined conclusions. The more black and white the conclusion the more sceptical we should be about it.

Nevertheless, it is surely accepted by all but the most prejudicial of observers that the US & UK were operating in a context of aggressive axis powers all too ready to wage war on anyone and everyone to gain their objectives. In their determination to resist the allies too were willing to wage war. Resistance meant that war was inevitable, as the axis would brook no resistance. Japan attacked the USA & UK because they represented a barrier to Japan’s militaristic aims, not because Japan itself was threatened.

That this may have lead to the usual shenanigans seeking to ensure that the other side were clearly seen as the aggressor by a domestic US population is almost irrelevant.

@KurtGodel7:

I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.

If I have time, I may dig into some quotes from the book. However it is far more than a few quotes or passages which convey the all-encompassing nature of his argument.

@Der:

Have you guys heard of the McCollum memo?

On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors.

The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html

Yes, the first time I came to the conclusion that FDR knew there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor around 6 to 8th December 1941. But it was draw because of other details on the web site and not only on that memo. About Carrier not in Pearl, I thought it was intended. But, the general importance on Battleships was still mainstream and in mind of Admirals the best naval weapon to secure. At that time, Carriers and planes were not proven first class Naval weapon. So, it cannot be considered as a voluntary bait. In fact, the real danger was :  “E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.”, as Battle of Atlantic was demonstrating to all at that time, and not “F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.” But to let voluntarily crushing this fleet seems plainly dumb. Any military adviser would have discarded this to FDR.

However, on a political-propaganda level, I thought Pearl attack-yet-to-come was perceived as the only way to sway all public opinion toward war (which was the real interest of USA and UK at that time, but non-interventionism seems very hard to change in mind of peaceful people). Assuming that FDR couldn’t dismiss his electoral engagement and get a majority of citizen on his side, he have to wait such raid and hope their will be not so much victims (near 2500 deaths). Making an utilitarian calculus: “a few sacrifices to save millions” (but still against his vows as President of USA to protect US citizens?).

It is an hard case to get a conviction of culprit on FDR.
After more reading and time, I believed it is not the case.

I read that a lot of long range aircraft patrols in North Pacific were interrupted on command at start of December until Pearl.
But IDK what is the credibility of this source and I cannot found it now.
This can be a first evidence, but circumstantial at best. It suppose FDR knew Nagumo’s fleet date of departure, so to turn a blind eyes and let happen this long range air-naval raid.
Is there any evidence on that point?

Finally, on this 7th December day Declaration of War, can FDR close admin omit to tell Kimmel about Japan DOW in advance (known, before official declaration, by spy and cyphers) and they were going to attack on going raid. Yet, you need to provide evidence that FDR knew that Pearl was first objective.

That’s about where I am on this issue.
Hard to prove that it was not plain confusion instead of a planned lack of communication.

@Baron:

On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.

If he was, he’s the stupidest person ever in the history of military planning.  The B-29 Superfortress barely had the range from Tinian in the Marianas… the B-17 with a much shorter (2,000 mi) range than the B-29 (3,250 mi) would never make it from Guam (also in the Marianas), and the Philippines are also too far from Japan for the B-17 to make it… unless you’re talking one-way kamikaze trips.  In either case, this is complete hogwash about FDR planning to bomb Japan with B-17s from Guam and the Philippines.

For whoever might be interested, the revised edition of the book “At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor” by the late Gordon W. Prange, with supplementary material by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is a comprehensive account of the circumstances leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, of the attack itself, and of part of the aftermath (including the investigations into the disaster).  Despite its provocative subtitle “The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor”, the book is not revisionist: it lays plenty of blame all around for what happened, but it does not support the notion that there were any conspiracies involved.  In fact, there’s a whole chapter at the end of the book which is devoted to Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories, and which seeks to disprove them.  Prange wrote the earlier Pearl Harbor book “Tora, Tora, Tora”, which was one of the two main sources for the movie of the same name.  Prange, Goldstein and Dillon are also the authors of the companion book Miracle at Midway, about that particular battle.  Both books are good reads, but they take a bit of slogging to get through because they’re methodical and detailed and sober in tone; At Dawn We Slept is a sizable brick, about twice as thick as the Midway book.

@Wolfshanze:

@Baron:

On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.

If he was, he’s the stupidest person ever in the history of military planning.  The B-29 Superfortress barely had the range from Tinian in the Marianas… the B-17 with a much shorter (2,000 mi) range than the B-29 (3,250 mi) would never make it from Guam (also in the Marianas), and the Philippines are also too far from Japan for the B-17 to make it… unless you’re talking one-way kamikaze trips.  In either case, this is complete hogwash about FDR planning to bomb Japan with B-17s from Guam and the Philippines.

Thanks, I will investigate that mistake said plainly on a rather serious documentary.
There was indeed B-17s going to Philippines, however.

Yes, B-17s were sent to the Philippines… but that doesn’t mean that B-17s in the Philippines would be bombing mainland Japan. They just don’t have the range to fly to Japan, bomb and make it back to the Philippines. The B-17 can fly 2,000 miles fully fueled… in Europe, its about 580 air miles between London and Berlin, so well within range of the B-17 round trip… but Manila to Tokyo is 1,860 miles ONE WAY. I don’t care what documentary you saw, or how serious the narrator was… B-17s can’t bomb Japan from the Philippines (1,860 miles) or Guam (1,568 miles) unless they don’t plan on getting back home. The B-29 Superfortress with the much greater 3,250 mile range, was at the very limit of its range to make the round trip from Tinian in the Marianas to Japan as it was… the B-17 just didn’t have the range… no narrator, despite his tone, can change that fact.

Maybe the narrator said B-17s were sent to the Philippines to threaten Japan, as-in Japanese interests in the area, not to be taken as direct bombing of mainland Japan. You could bomb Formosa from the Philippines with B-17s, as that’s a similar distance as London is to Berlin, but there’s no way to have B-17s in the Philippines make the round trip to mainland Japan and back… its just impossible.

Does B-17 rather able to do same things than B-25 but at longer range with more payload ?

I read that some of these B-17 were based in Australia and succeed at attacking a few IJN ships?

@Baron:

Does B-17 rather able to do same things than B-25 but at longer range with more payload ?

I read that some of these B-17 were based in Australia and succeed at attacking a few IJN ships?

That’s accurate. B-25s were treated more as heavy attack aircraft and gunships than strategic bombers. They were smaller and faster but with less range and payload than a B-17.