Historically stupid people

[Der Kuenstler]

Have you guys heard of the McCollum memo?

On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors.

The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html

[Private-Panic]

I have been reading this thread with interest.

The trouble with history is that it attempts to draw conclusions from the actions of thousands of individuals. But those individuals are often working at odds with each other and attempting to drive events in different directions. This allows selective use of the facts to support any number of pre-determined conclusions. The more black and white the conclusion the more sceptical we should be about it.

Nevertheless, it is surely accepted by all but the most prejudicial of observers that the US & UK were operating in a context of aggressive axis powers all too ready to wage war on anyone and everyone to gain their objectives. In their determination to resist the allies too were willing to wage war. Resistance meant that war was inevitable, as the axis would brook no resistance. Japan attacked the USA & UK because they represented a barrier to Japan’s militaristic aims, not because Japan itself was threatened.

That this may have lead to the usual shenanigans seeking to ensure that the other side were clearly seen as the aggressor by a domestic US population is almost irrelevant.

[LHoffman]

@KurtGodel7:

I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.

If I have time, I may dig into some quotes from the book. However it is far more than a few quotes or passages which convey the all-encompassing nature of his argument.

[baron Münchhausen]

@Der:

Have you guys heard of the McCollum memo?

On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors.

The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html

Yes, the first time I came to the conclusion that FDR knew there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor around 6 to 8th December 1941. But it was draw because of other details on the web site and not only on that memo. About Carrier not in Pearl, I thought it was intended. But, the general importance on Battleships was still mainstream and in mind of Admirals the best naval weapon to secure. At that time, Carriers and planes were not proven first class Naval weapon. So, it cannot be considered as a voluntary bait. In fact, the real danger was :  “E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.”, as Battle of Atlantic was demonstrating to all at that time, and not “F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.” But to let voluntarily crushing this fleet seems plainly dumb. Any military adviser would have discarded this to FDR.

However, on a political-propaganda level, I thought Pearl attack-yet-to-come was perceived as the only way to sway all public opinion toward war (which was the real interest of USA and UK at that time, but non-interventionism seems very hard to change in mind of peaceful people). Assuming that FDR couldn’t dismiss his electoral engagement and get a majority of citizen on his side, he have to wait such raid and hope their will be not so much victims (near 2500 deaths). Making an utilitarian calculus: “a few sacrifices to save millions” (but still against his vows as President of USA to protect US citizens?).

It is an hard case to get a conviction of culprit on FDR.
After more reading and time, I believed it is not the case.

I read that a lot of long range aircraft patrols in North Pacific were interrupted on command at start of December until Pearl.
But IDK what is the credibility of this source and I cannot found it now.
This can be a first evidence, but circumstantial at best. It suppose FDR knew Nagumo’s fleet date of departure, so to turn a blind eyes and let happen this long range air-naval raid.
Is there any evidence on that point?

Finally, on this 7th December day Declaration of War, can FDR close admin omit to tell Kimmel about Japan DOW in advance (known, before official declaration, by spy and cyphers) and they were going to attack on going raid. Yet, you need to provide evidence that FDR knew that Pearl was first objective.

That’s about where I am on this issue.
Hard to prove that it was not plain confusion instead of a planned lack of communication.

[Wolfshanze]

@Baron:

On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.

If he was, he’s the stupidest person ever in the history of military planning.  The B-29 Superfortress barely had the range from Tinian in the Marianas… the B-17 with a much shorter (2,000 mi) range than the B-29 (3,250 mi) would never make it from Guam (also in the Marianas), and the Philippines are also too far from Japan for the B-17 to make it… unless you’re talking one-way kamikaze trips.  In either case, this is complete hogwash about FDR planning to bomb Japan with B-17s from Guam and the Philippines.

[CWO Marc]

For whoever might be interested, the revised edition of the book “At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor” by the late Gordon W. Prange, with supplementary material by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is a comprehensive account of the circumstances leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, of the attack itself, and of part of the aftermath (including the investigations into the disaster).  Despite its provocative subtitle “The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor”, the book is not revisionist: it lays plenty of blame all around for what happened, but it does not support the notion that there were any conspiracies involved.  In fact, there’s a whole chapter at the end of the book which is devoted to Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories, and which seeks to disprove them.  Prange wrote the earlier Pearl Harbor book “Tora, Tora, Tora”, which was one of the two main sources for the movie of the same name.  Prange, Goldstein and Dillon are also the authors of the companion book Miracle at Midway, about that particular battle.  Both books are good reads, but they take a bit of slogging to get through because they’re methodical and detailed and sober in tone; At Dawn We Slept is a sizable brick, about twice as thick as the Midway book.

[baron Münchhausen]

@Wolfshanze:

@Baron:

On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.

If he was, he’s the stupidest person ever in the history of military planning.  The B-29 Superfortress barely had the range from Tinian in the Marianas… the B-17 with a much shorter (2,000 mi) range than the B-29 (3,250 mi) would never make it from Guam (also in the Marianas), and the Philippines are also too far from Japan for the B-17 to make it… unless you’re talking one-way kamikaze trips.  In either case, this is complete hogwash about FDR planning to bomb Japan with B-17s from Guam and the Philippines.

Thanks, I will investigate that mistake said plainly on a rather serious documentary.
There was indeed B-17s going to Philippines, however.

[Wolfshanze]

Yes, B-17s were sent to the Philippines… but that doesn’t mean that B-17s in the Philippines would be bombing mainland Japan. They just don’t have the range to fly to Japan, bomb and make it back to the Philippines. The B-17 can fly 2,000 miles fully fueled… in Europe, its about 580 air miles between London and Berlin, so well within range of the B-17 round trip… but Manila to Tokyo is 1,860 miles ONE WAY. I don’t care what documentary you saw, or how serious the narrator was… B-17s can’t bomb Japan from the Philippines (1,860 miles) or Guam (1,568 miles) unless they don’t plan on getting back home. The B-29 Superfortress with the much greater 3,250 mile range, was at the very limit of its range to make the round trip from Tinian in the Marianas to Japan as it was… the B-17 just didn’t have the range… no narrator, despite his tone, can change that fact.

Maybe the narrator said B-17s were sent to the Philippines to threaten Japan, as-in Japanese interests in the area, not to be taken as direct bombing of mainland Japan. You could bomb Formosa from the Philippines with B-17s, as that’s a similar distance as London is to Berlin, but there’s no way to have B-17s in the Philippines make the round trip to mainland Japan and back… its just impossible.

[baron Münchhausen]

Does B-17 rather able to do same things than B-25 but at longer range with more payload ?

I read that some of these B-17 were based in Australia and succeed at attacking a few IJN ships?

[LHoffman]

@Baron:

Does B-17 rather able to do same things than B-25 but at longer range with more payload ?

I read that some of these B-17 were based in Australia and succeed at attacking a few IJN ships?

That’s accurate. B-25s were treated more as heavy attack aircraft and gunships than strategic bombers. They were smaller and faster but with less range and payload than a B-17.

[Wolfshanze]

@Baron:

Does B-17 rather able to do same things than B-25 but at longer range with more payload ?

I read that some of these B-17 were based in Australia and succeed at attacking a few IJN ships?

Yes and no… you’re kinda talking the difference between a tactical bomber (like the B-25) and a strategic bomber (like the B-17).  The B-17 has longer range and a bigger payload than the B-25, but its also less maneuverable, and usually used for different roles (strategic over tactical bombing).

As with anything in war, there can be fuzzy lines that are crossed (B-17s used for tactical missions like bombing ships and B-25s used for strategic bombing, like the Doolittle raid), but generally speaking those two bombers were used for different purposes.