@SuperbattleshipYamato hard to argue against any of this really. The IJN was so far gone by this point in the war that there’s not really much they could have done to salvage their situation one way or another. The bit about the allies not having many LSTs in general is something I never knew before though.
Historically stupid people
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@Herr:
Good sir, this is not evidence at all. At best it could only be circumstantial, but I think even that would be pushing it.
I’ve been reading up on this “U.S. provoked Japan to attack U.S”-theory, as it was rather new to me. I don’t find it convincing.
My general impression of the theory is that is seems very much based on a U.S. point of view. Which can be OK, but it becomes too narrow. Thinking Japan had no other option that attacking after the embargo was at force, seems to generally underestemate the value of diplomacy and international trade.
Also it seems based almost entirely on hindsight. FDR did this or that, which led to certain consequences. Accordingly, the consequences were wanted. Isn’t this too shallow? It almost looks like conspiracy theories, everything is part of someone’s great plan. Nothing happens by coincidence and the other party’s actions are always anticipated and desired…
For example Hoover’s book, which I only know through the article. Hoover seems to argue it was a waste for U.S. to get involved in the European theatre, since Nazi-Germany never could conquer the Soviet, because of the vast distances, hard winters, mud on the Eastern front and so on. Sure, it is easy to say after the war, when the outcome is well known. But I strongly doubt the common understanding late 1941 or even early 1942 was in line with that. At that moment Nazi-Germany had conquered half of Europe, practically never lost any considerable battles or failed hugely in any way yet - maybe apart from battle of Britain, if the Sealion-threat even was off by then.
And Hoover seems to argue that the U.S. should only send enough material to U.K. to neutralize the Sealion-threat. Well, who during the war knew exactly the amount of required materials? Tranferred to the conflicts of today, the question would have been how much materials and men the U.S. would need to defeat the taliban 15 years ago. Or to stabilize Iraq? Maybe some skilled military official could give an estimate. And still be completely off, as he would of course fail to predict the firing of the Iraqi army and the consequences thereof. Or fail to see the Arab spring, which led to the civil war in Syria, which made room for the ISIS, which destabilized half the Middle East including Iraq. It is easy for someone to come up with the answer in 10 or 50 years time. But when the heat is on? Hindsight!
Any description of the arguments in Hoover’s book, written by an interventionist, is highly unlikely to do justice to the book or its content.
The idea that FDR deliberately and cynically provoked the Pearl Harbor attack is not the product of 20/20 hindsight. It’s based on hard, solid data. For example: a moderate Japanese prime minister rose to power in 1941. He’d staked his entire political career on the idea that he could negotiate a peaceful resolution to the differences which had arisen between Japan’s government and the FDR administration. FDR refused a meeting with him for months. They knew that the longer he failed to come away with some kind of diplomatic win–something–the weaker his hold on power would be. This prime minister would have been willing to grant extensive concessions in China and elsewhere. In exchange, he wanted the U.S. to cease the aggressive measures it had adopted shortly after Barbarossa.
But that kind of peaceful resolution didn’t take place. Instead, the FDR administration passively watched this prime minister’s credibility wither with each month he failed to secure a meeting, or any real negotiation with the U.S. Eventually he was replaced by hardline Japanese militarists. Such was Japanese respect for the United States’ military, that even those militarists attempted a negotiated solution. The FDR administration gave them more or less the same treatment it had given to their moderate predecessor. It didn’t take the militarists long to give up on the idea of a negotiated settlement. At that point they began issuing the orders for war.
Had the goal been to pressure the Japanese into making concessions in China, then when the Japanese came to the negotiating table willing to do exactly that, it would have made sense for the FDR administration to have shown up at that table as well. The conspicuous absence of any effort at all on the part of FDR’s administration to negotiate a peace treaty is a clear indication that peace in the Pacific had never been their objective.
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As an American, I firmly believe my nation’s political and plutocratic Establishment is evil, and is not morally superior to anyone.
Kurt, we are just going to have to agree to disagree about a lot things, which is fine.
However, I will say given the recent change in US leadership cough you may be more right on this last point than I like to think….
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Also Kurt, again, I question your history:
In occupied Germany, the thinking behind the Morgenthau plan was at first reflected in the U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067[2][3] and in the Allied Industrial plans for Germany aimed at “industrial disarmament”.[3] Compared with the Morgenthau Plan, however, JCS 1067 contained a number of deliberate “loopholes”, limiting any action to short-term military measures and preventing large-scale destruction of mines and industrial plants, giving wide-ranging discretion to the military governor and Morgenthau’s opponents at the War Department.[4][5] In 1947, JCS 1067 was replaced by JCS 1779, which aimed at restoring a “stable and productive Germany” and was soon followed by the Marshall Plan.[4][6]
Sure not nice, but I doubt such directive had much real impact on the ground as Germany was already largely ruined in 1946 and no where to go but up.
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Also Kurt, again, I question your history:
In occupied Germany, the thinking behind the Morgenthau plan was at first reflected in the U.S. occupation directive JCS 1067[2][3] and in the Allied Industrial plans for Germany aimed at “industrial disarmament”.[3] Compared with the Morgenthau Plan, however, JCS 1067 contained a number of deliberate “loopholes”, limiting any action to short-term military measures and preventing large-scale destruction of mines and industrial plants, giving wide-ranging discretion to the military governor and Morgenthau’s opponents at the War Department.[4][5] In 1947, JCS 1067 was replaced by JCS 1779, which aimed at restoring a “stable and productive Germany” and was soon followed by the Marshall Plan.[4][6]
Sure not nice, but I doubt such directive had much real impact on the ground as Germany was already largely ruined in 1946 and no where to go but up.
oh, source of quote:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morgenthau_Plan#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEGreiner1995327.E2.80.93328_6-0
(I know Wikipedia is not considered totally credible, but actually I think the history stuff is pretty good and well cited.)
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Also Kurt, again, I question your history: . . .
Sure not nice, but I doubt such directive had much real impact on the ground as Germany was already largely ruined in 1946 and no where to go but up.As long as you’re relying on Wikipedia, I may as well do the same. :)
During 1945 it was estimated that the average German civilian in the U.S. and the United Kingdom occupation zones received 1,200 calories a day.[16] Meanwhile, non-German Displaced Persons were receiving 2,300 calories through emergency food imports and Red Cross help.[17] . . .
U.S. occupation forces were under strict orders not to share their food with the German population, and this also applied to their wives when they arrived later in the occupation. The women were under orders not to allow their German maids to get hold of any leftovers; “the food was to be destroyed or made inedible”, although in view of the starving German population facing them many housewives chose to disregard these official orders.[18]
In mid-1946 non-German relief organizations were permitted to help starving German children.[20] [Prior to that, it would have been against the law for a relief organization to give food to a starving German child.] The German food situation became worst during the very cold winter of 1946-47, when German calorie intake ranged from 1,000 to 1,500 calories per day, a situation made worse by severe lack of fuel for heating.[21] Average adult calorie intake in the U.S was 3,200-3,300. . . .
On March 20, 1945, President Roosevelt was warned that the JCS 1067 was not workable: it would let the Germans “stew in their own juice”. Roosevelt’s response was “Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!” Asked if he wanted the German people to starve, he replied, “Why not?”[32]
The starvation caused by JCS 1067 was deliberate, and served no possible military purpose. On the contrary: the deliberate starvation of Germans made West Germany ripe for communist revolution. To allow the Soviets to add West Germany to their sphere could not possibly serve American national interests. This starvation was not only bloodthirsty, vindictive, and inhuman. It was also treasonous.
The Establishment which instituted these despicable crimes against humanity is just as evil today as it had been during the Dresden raid, or when JCS 1067 was enacted. Trump’s presidency represented a sort of rebellion against Establishment rule. I will not comment on whether Trump is morally superior to that Establishment. But it would be impossible for anyone to be morally inferior to it, or more evil than it.
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Hmmm, you have a point. Although, like we’ve argued before, I don’t think you can reasonably differentiate civilians and combatants in a total war scenario. However, allowing the vanquished to starve isn’t in conformity with US declarations re: human rights etc. But understandably there was a lot of bad feelings towards the Germans after WWII. I will only point out that as you note, the US pulled back on this policy and reversed course. What other great powers in history have done that? Not many, I am sure.
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Hmmm, you have a point. Although, like we’ve argued before, I don’t think you can reasonably differentiate civilians and combatants in a total war scenario. However, allowing the vanquished to starve isn’t in conformity with US declarations re: human rights etc. But understandably there was a lot of bad feelings towards the Germans after WWII. I will only point out that as you note, the US pulled back on this policy and reversed course. What other great powers in history have done that? Not many, I am sure.
I would argue that the distinction between combatants and civilians is one of the two pillars of the laws of war. Military personnel are supposed to wear uniforms, are allowed to shoot enemy combatants, and be shot at by said combatants. Civilians are not legitimate targets of violence. But in exchange for that protection, they are not allowed to shoot or otherwise kill enemy civilians or military personnel. To remove this distinction is to multiply the brutality of war, and the associated loss of human life. Just because the Establishment did exactly that–in both world wars, not just WWII–doesn’t mean their position was good or right.
The bad feelings towards Germans after WWII existed because the Establishment accused National Socialist Germany of being guilty of the Establishment’s chief sins. Those sins include mass murder, the desire for world conquest, rejection of traditional morality. The unstated theory was that anyone who opposed mass murder or supported traditional morality should support the Establishment!
It is not normal–at least not in modern times–for the victor in a war to starve the vanquished after the war was over. That the Establishment chose to do this anyway speaks volumes, and demonstrates that the Establishment of 1945 - '47 was not morally superior to the Establishment which had turned a blind eye to the Soviet crimes against humanity of the 1930s.
I would also point out that support for the Marshall Plan came from a new breed of American politician: anti-communist Republicans. Prior to 1948, the vast majority of American politicians fell into two categories: pro-Soviet interventionists, such as FDR. And anti-interventionists, such as Herbert Hoover. The idea of using interventionism to oppose communism was not on the table–at least not prior to '48. The fact that the anti-communist interventionists were, for the most part, decent, well-intentioned people should not serve as an apology for the shameful actions and war crimes committed by pro-communist interventionists such as FDR.
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Hoover was only credible with Chicken recipes. He was a disgraced president and usually his views would also be considered lightly and with great trepidation. I wouldn’t listen to anything President Grant said about the Civil War or his own presidency either.
The main thing is to make the Germans during WW2 look like the victims who got stuck in a war by FDR, Churchill and Stalin. Goering was a skinny guy and ate little as well.
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@Der:
There is evidence that Roosevelt purposely drew Japan into the war. One example would be moving the Pacific fleet to Hawaii when it would have been safer to remain based on the West Coast. Another is that none of the USA’s most modern vessels were moored in Pearl harbor on December 7th. The latest equipment, including all carriers, just “happened” to be elsewhere that day.
This argument is very much borne out of coincidental hindsight rather than supportable fact.
It wasn’t just Pearl Harbor that was built up or reinforced. The US did the same in the Philippines, Wake, Guam and Midway. All of which point to preparation for a swift response to Japanese aggression, should it have occurred. And it did. The Japanese decided to attack and/or invade all of those (minus Midway) immediately as a part of their overall battle plan to obtain as much territory and inflict as much damage as quickly as possible at the outset of war.
Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were all engaged in operations either planned months in advance (Saratoga) or under orders conforming to their normal cycles of departure. Lexington was reinforcing Marine squadrons at Midway. Enterprise was doing the same at Wake. Both were under direct orders from Adm. Kimmel based on requests (not orders) from the Navy Dept. Saratoga was taking on her new air group in San Diego after an extended refit that occurred for the entire year of 1941. Contrary to keeping them safe, the deployment of Enterprise and (especially) Lexington left the two carriers extremely vulnerable to attack from the Japanese fleet. The timing of Enterprise’s return to Pearl Harbor on Dec 7 was anyhting but ‘safe’. Enterprise and Lexington quickly received order to engage the enemy fleet if found. Because both ships were split up and unable to support one another, the likelyhood of a successful attack against the Japanese was very small. Even had Enterprise and Lexington been able to engage the enemy together, it would have been 2 underprepared carriers versus 6 battle ready Japanese carriers plus surface escorts. Both Enterprise and Lexington would have been sunk. In hindsight, deploying Lexington and Enterprise where they were and for what purpose on and around Dec 7 was highly unwise if US command was aware of Japanese plans.
If Roosevelt knew of Japanese intentions and timeframe of battle, as you imply, would it not have been more appropriate to position the carriers such that they would be able to ambush the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, very much like they did at Midway?
That Roosevelt ordered the carriers elsewhere on purpose, so as to save them from the destruction, also implies that he (or those he trusted with such intelligence) very pointedly foresaw the significant strategic importance of aircraft carriers versus battleships which eventually became clear in the Second World War. That would be a stretch. USN carrier tactics were still being developed at the beginning of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 was indecisive in many respects because carrier vs carrier battles as such had never been fought before and battle execution was crude. In fact, carrier based aircraft had never before sunk a capital ship under way at sea until December 10, 1941 when Japanese aircraft destroyed HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. That Roosevelt and established naval leaders could have precisely predicted the massive advantage of naval air power without historical precedent is an attribution very much borne out of hindsight. Additionally, it is a convenience which diminishes the accomplishments of the Japanese Navy in executing the Pearl Harbor attack.
But it was not only US tactics that were flawed at the beginning of the war. The Japanese proceeded with the attack on Pearl Harbor having received a report that the US carriers would not be present. Carriers were to be secondary targets to the battleships and critical shore installations were to be even lesser targets than that. As successful and daring as their attack was, the Japanese strategic blunders were their own; not the manipulative string-pulling of FDR and the US Navy.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/Missing_Carriers.html
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/yamamoto-planning-pearl-harbor/ -
This argument is very much borne out of coincidental hindsight rather than supportable fact.
It wasn’t just Pearl Harbor that was built up or reinforced. The US did the same in the Philippines, Wake, Guam and Midway. All of which point to preparation for a swift response to Japanese aggression, should it have occurred. And it did. The Japanese decided to attack and/or invade all of those (minus Midway) immediately as a part of their overall battle plan to obtain as much territory and inflict as much damage as quickly as possible at the outset of war.
Enterprise, Lexington and Saratoga were all engaged in operations either planned months in advance (Saratoga) or under orders conforming to their normal cycles of departure. Lexington was reinforcing Marine squadrons at Midway. Enterprise was doing the same at Wake. Both were under direct orders from Adm. Kimmel based on requests (not orders) from the Navy Dept. Saratoga was taking on her new air group in San Diego after an extended refit that occurred for the entire year of 1941. Contrary to keeping them safe, the deployment of Enterprise and (especially) Lexington left the two carriers extremely vulnerable to attack from the Japanese fleet. The timing of Enterprise’s return to Pearl Harbor on Dec 7 was anyhting but ‘safe’. Enterprise and Lexington quickly received order to engage the enemy fleet if found. Because both ships were split up and unable to support one another, the likelyhood of a successful attack against the Japanese was very small. Even had Enterprise and Lexington been able to engage the enemy together, it would have been 2 underprepared carriers versus 6 battle ready Japanese carriers plus surface escorts. Both Enterprise and Lexington would have been sunk. �In hindsight, deploying Lexington and Enterprise where they were and for what purpose on and around Dec 7 was highly unwise if US command was aware of Japanese plans.
If Roosevelt knew of Japanese intentions and timeframe of battle, as you imply, would it not have been more appropriate to position the carriers such that they would be able to ambush the Japanese at Pearl Harbor, very much like they did at Midway?
That Roosevelt ordered the carriers elsewhere on purpose, so as to save them from the destruction, also implies that he (or those he trusted with such intelligence) very pointedly foresaw the significant strategic importance of aircraft carriers versus battleships which eventually became clear in the Second World War. That would be a stretch. USN carrier tactics were still being developed at the beginning of the war. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May of 1942 was indecisive in many respects because carrier vs carrier battles as such had never been fought before and battle execution was crude. In fact, carrier based aircraft had never before sunk a capital ship under way at sea until December 10, 1941 when Japanese aircraft destroyed HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse. That Roosevelt and established naval leaders could have precisely predicted the massive advantage of naval air power without historical precedent is an attribution very much borne out of hindsight. Additionally, it is a convenience which diminishes the accomplishments of the Japanese Navy in executing the Pearl Harbor attack.
But it was not only US tactics that were flawed at the beginning of the war. The Japanese proceeded with the attack on Pearl Harbor having received a report that the US carriers would not be present. Carriers were to be secondary targets to the battleships and critical shore installations were to be even lesser targets than that. As successful and daring as their attack was, the Japanese strategic blunders were their own; not the manipulative string-pulling of FDR and the US Navy.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/Missing_Carriers.html
http://www.thehistoryreader.com/modern-history/yamamoto-planning-pearl-harbor/I haven’t studied the specifics of the carrier movement orders, and I’m not going to debate you on that point. Until I obtain firsthand knowledge of those movement orders, I’ll allow that there’s a chance your theory is correct. That the carriers were absent from Pearl for benign reasons.
However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.
You suggested that it would have been appropriate for FDR to position the carriers to ambush the Japanese forces, if indeed his motives were nefarious. (Which they were.) However, it’s worth pointing out that, from FDR’s perspective, Japan’s initial attack was intended to achieve a political objective, not a military one. If there was even a hint of conflict between a political and military objective, the political objective would be prioritized. At least for the initial attack. Military objectives could be achieved later. Later being after the U.S. was safely in the war, and after FDR had wrung every last drop of propaganda advantage he could out of Pearl Harbor. The account FDR gave of December 7th–the Japanese winning a victory through treachery, while the U.S. was attempting to negotiate in good faith–bore absolutely no relationship to reality. If a politician is lying that blatantly and outlandishly, there is usually a reason why.
If the U.S. navy had assaulted the Japanese fleet before it launched its strike on Pearl, that would have interfered with FDR’s intended narrative of Japan as the aggressor, the U.S. the naive but honest victim of a sucker punch. Even worse (from FDR’s perspective) if the U.S. had achieved initial victories in the war against Japan, those victories might have discouraged Germany from declaring war against the U.S. FDR’s main objective for engaging in hostilities in the first place was to ensure the defeat of National Socialist Germany and the victory of Soviet communism.
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On FDR, I learned he was planing bombing Japan with B-17 and making plan to use Philippines, Guam and China.
However the main goal of embargo was to pressure Japan to cease war in China.And Japan stay the course but the emperor’s counselor (all military) were killed by other military-men and replaced by even more war-oriented generals. Tojo? The previous ones were far less enthusiastic to make war.
Even Yamamoto was reluctant to attack USA, and he still planed the Pearl attack and was not confident about Nagumo obeying his orders. As history revealed, Nagumo disobeyed and never launch any second waves. Yamamoto only hoped on a short war. And he needed a complete destruction of Pearl Harbor facilities, fuel and shipyard. I believe both forgot Submarines however.
So, politically, there was a coup, Japan may have back off in China and negotiate with US to cease embargo.Also, I heard even FDR close counselors were very plainly surprised and didn’t fake it.
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However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.
Ridiculous narrative.
Japan attacked China and committed atrocities since 1931. Its about time US defended them and cut off the oil. Japan could have avoided this easily by pulling out of China proper. Its not a provoking act to stand up against aggression. You almost make it seem that we deserved the Hawaiian attack. Also, FDR did not refuse to meet with anybody. The Japanese ambassadors didn’t force themselves to see FDR in Dec 41, they were invited to discuss resolution of aggressive acts against nations.
You are always on the wrong side of any facts and basic lessons of History.
If we cut off UK’s oil, i guess they should have attacked as well right?
Same bogus arguments as Germany being starved during wartime, while Goering eats AYCE crab legs at the Stuttgart Buffet. Totally ignoring the fact that Germany started many wars and could easily make for peace, or end Himmler’s hunger plan and extermination for untermensh
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I haven’t studied the specifics of the carrier movement orders, and I’m not going to debate you on that point. Until I obtain firsthand knowledge of those movement orders, I’ll allow that there’s a chance your theory is correct. That the carriers were absent from Pearl for benign reasons.
I linked to that testimony in my post above. You can read at your leisure.
However, it still remains the case that FDR and his administration deliberately provoked Japan. Eight separate measures were employed in an effort to provoke Japanese aggression, the most notable of which was the oil embargo. Once that embargo was imposed, Japan had about a year before its economy and military ground to a halt. FDR consistently refused to meet with the Japanese, or to discuss his requirements for having the embargo or other “soft war” measures rescinded.
I can argue all day and give numerous facts and circumstances which have been given before… and it still will not change your mind. So I am not going to bother. However, if you have the time, I would highly recommend reading this http://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/85001/the-pacific-war-1931-1945-by-saburo-ienaga/9780394734965/. Ienaga is a Japanese scholar who was in Japan during the war. His take is critical on both the Japanese and the Americans, but focuses very much on how Japan entered into and continued a futile war entirely of its own accord. His research goes back to the late 1800s and the Meiji Restoration and many events leading up to Japanese aggression in the 1930s. This is a well balanced and pointedly realistic assessment of the origins of the Pacific War. You would do well to read it and compare to your existing conclusions about the war.
You suggested that it would have been appropriate for FDR to position the carriers to ambush the Japanese forces, if indeed his motives were nefarious. (Which they were.) However, it’s worth pointing out that, from FDR’s perspective, Japan’s initial attack was intended to achieve a political objective, not a military one. If there was even a hint of conflict between a political and military objective, the political objective would be prioritized. At least for the initial attack. Military objectives could be achieved later. Later being after the U.S. was safely in the war, and after FDR had wrung every last drop of propaganda advantage he could out of Pearl Harbor. The account FDR gave of December 7th–the Japanese winning a victory through treachery, while the U.S. was attempting to negotiate in good faith–bore absolutely no relationship to reality. If a politician is lying that blatantly and outlandishly, there is usually a reason why.
If the U.S. navy had assaulted the Japanese fleet before it launched its strike on Pearl, that would have interfered with FDR’s intended narrative of Japan as the aggressor, the U.S. the naive but honest victim of a sucker punch. Even worse (from FDR’s perspective) if the U.S. had achieved initial victories in the war against Japan, those victories might have discouraged Germany from declaring war against the U.S. FDR’s main objective for engaging in hostilities in the first place was to ensure the defeat of National Socialist Germany and the victory of Soviet communism.
What you are suggesting is an incredibly circuitous and complex route for President Roosevelt to achieve his ultimate objective of war with Nazi Germany… and beyond that some type of post-war world hegemony between the USA and USSR. It again portrays Roosevelt as a manipulative puppet master, orchestrating world events entirely on his terms. And everything worked out exactly as planned. EDIT: Except dying before you can see it all work out. :wink:
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From the scarce evidence I read and heard, FDR wanted the war with Japan in the best interest of USA and UK against Nazi Germany. But that doesn’t mean he was aware of the incoming assault on Pearl Harbor.
Probably he was thinking Japan assault will start in South-East Asia but not as close as Hawaii.Carriers, according to main stream documentary, were shipping escorting Fighters to Wake (Enterprise) and Midway (IDK, Wasp or Hornet?).
This make sense to provide more escorting Fgs for B-17 Flying Fortress going to Philippines and westward, in the forthcoming Airbombing raids over Japan. Which, from my POV, is an acceptable strategy for someone knowing that US people didn’t want to go to war. Embargo, Submarines raids (on japanese merchant shipping) and Air raids seems a logical politic and strategy to convinced Japan to stop their hegemonic policy in Asia/China at minimum US citizens cost in life.Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedence. -
@Baron:
Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedenceWell said.
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@Baron:
Morale have little or no importance in real estate politics, higher Nation interests must be primary concerns.
All states are first egoistic beast IMO, as they should.
To be chivalric in any way is a luxury, only if both interest and morale collides.
You can use ethics deeds in propaganda (like saving/helping Afgan women from Talibans) but you cannot sacrifice people lives on morality matters.
National interest must take precedenceWell said.
Thanks Hoffman.
I would add on FDR behalf that even if he was happy that USA can enter war (for the best interest of US Nation and against Isolationist dominant opinion at that time), he can be very sad that Japan succeeded to raid Pearl Harbor and was authentically outrages about it. Galvanizing all US citizen was then necessary to use this event politically as most as possible. He must have seized this opportunity to turn public opinion against isolationism.I even heard that if Japan had only taken Philipinnes and Guam, FDR would have work much harder to lead USA public opinion into a war on the opposite side of the Globe. Political predictions are not the most accurate, there is so much contingencies.
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I linked to that testimony in my post above. You can read at your leisure.
I can argue all day and give numerous facts and circumstances which have been given before… and it still will not change your mind. So I am not going to bother. However, if you have the time, I would highly recommend reading this http://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/85001/the-pacific-war-1931-1945-by-saburo-ienaga/9780394734965/. Ienaga is a Japanese scholar who was in Japan during the war. His take is critical on both the Japanese and the Americans, but focuses very much on how Japan entered into and continued a futile war entirely of its own accord. His research goes back to the late 1800s and the Meiji Restoration and many events leading up to Japanese aggression in the 1930s. This is a well balanced and pointedly realistic assessment of the origins of the Pacific War. You would do well to read it and compare to your existing conclusions about the war.
What you are suggesting is an incredibly circuitous and complex route for President Roosevelt to achieve his ultimate objective of war with Nazi Germany… and beyond that some type of post-war world hegemony between the USA and USSR. It again portrays Roosevelt as a manipulative puppet master, orchestrating world events entirely on his terms. And everything worked out exactly as planned. EDIT: Except dying before you can see it all work out.� :wink:
I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.
Speaking of bringing forth specific content from books, I’d like to present a few quotes from Herbert Hoover’s book Freedom Betrayed.
Page 846:
The third wrong turning was the imposition of the economic sanctions in July. That was undeclared war on Japan by which starvation and ruin stared her in the face and if continued would soon be war, for the simple reason that no people of dignity would run up the white flag under such provocation. It could effect no strategic purpose in the protection of the United States or China or even the British Empire.The fourth wrong turning was certainly the rejection of the Konoye proposals of September and the Emperor’s proposals of November. . . . Konoye had begun his negotiations two months before the sanctions. . . . It can never be forgotten that three times during 1941 Japan made overtures for peace negotiation. America never made one unless a futile proposal to the Emperor the day before Pearl Harbor could be called peace.
P. 833
[MacArthur] said that Roosevelt could have made peace with Konoye in September 1941 and could have obtained all of the American objectives in the Pacific and the freedom of China and probably Manchuria. He said Konoye was authorized by the Emperor to agree to complete withdrawal.
p 828
"[Ambassador Joseph Kennedy, father of JFK] said that when the Ghormley Commission went to England in mid-1940, it was for the purposes of preparing joint military action, and yet through that entire election campaign Roosevelt was promising the American people he would never go to war.
p 827
Kennedy said that Bullitt, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the Poles not to make terms with the Germans and that he Kennedy, under instructions from Roosevelt, was constantly urging the British to make guarantees to the Poles. Kennedy said that he had received a cable from Roosevelt to “put a poker up Chamberlain’s back and to make him stand up.” . . . He said that after Chamberlain had given these guarantees, Chamberlain told him (Kennedy) that he hoped the Americans and the Jews would now be satisfied but that he (Chamberlain) felt that he had signed the doom of civilization.
Collectively, these quotes leave little room for doubt that FDR’s objectives were 1) to create a war in Europe, and 2) to join the war as quickly as he could. As IL pointed out in his otherwise error-ridden post, Japan had been engaging in aggression in China since 1931. If stopping Japanese aggression against China was important to FDR, why wait until 1941 to do anything about it? Why was stopping that aggression so much more important in 1941 than it had been in 1937 when Japan launched a major offensive against China? (An offensive which FDR ignored.) If saving China’s bacon was truly the objective, then why not simply accept the Konoye proposals made in 1941–proposals which would have accomplished exactly that?
FDR’s actions would have been nonsensical, had his actual objectives borne any relation at all to his stated objectives. I firmly believe he was working toward a different set of objectives: the twin objectives of the destruction of National Socialist Germany and the victory of the Soviet Union. A war between the U.S. and Japan would help achieve both, even if FDR hadn’t managed to use the Pacific war as a doorway through which to enter the European war. Even if the U.S. had done nothing more in WWII than go to war against Japan, that alone would have been sufficient to prevent any sort of serious Japanese invasion of the U.S.S.R. Stalin would have a one front war, greatly increasing his chances of victory. But Pearl Harbor (from FDR’s perspective) was even better than just that, because he got what he truly wanted: direct American involvement in the European conflict, on the side of the Soviet Union.
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Have you guys heard of the McCollum memo?
On October 7, 1940, Lieutenant Commander Arthur McCollum of the Office of Naval Intelligence submitted a memo to Navy Captains Walter Anderson and Dudley Knox. Captains Anderson and Knox were two of President Roosevelt’s most trusted military advisors.
The memo, scanned below, detailed an 8 step plan to provoke Japan into attacking the United States. President Roosevelt, over the course of 1941, implemented all 8 of the recommendations contained in the McCollum memo. Following the eighth provocation, Japan attacked. The public was told that it was a complete surprise, an “intelligence failure”, and America entered World War Two.
http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/McCollum/index.html
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I have been reading this thread with interest.
The trouble with history is that it attempts to draw conclusions from the actions of thousands of individuals. But those individuals are often working at odds with each other and attempting to drive events in different directions. This allows selective use of the facts to support any number of pre-determined conclusions. The more black and white the conclusion the more sceptical we should be about it.
Nevertheless, it is surely accepted by all but the most prejudicial of observers that the US & UK were operating in a context of aggressive axis powers all too ready to wage war on anyone and everyone to gain their objectives. In their determination to resist the allies too were willing to wage war. Resistance meant that war was inevitable, as the axis would brook no resistance. Japan attacked the USA & UK because they represented a barrier to Japan’s militaristic aims, not because Japan itself was threatened.
That this may have lead to the usual shenanigans seeking to ensure that the other side were clearly seen as the aggressor by a domestic US population is almost irrelevant.
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I clicked on the link to the book you recommended, eventually working my way to Amazon, attempting to get a feel for what the author had to offer. Some of the customer reviews I read were written by those who liked the book; others by those who didn’t. But none of the book’s fans or critics went into any detail. The best the reviews had to offer was a tidbit here, a tidbit there. One reviewer mentioned that the author had to go to court to get the book published, because the government considered it too anti-Japanese. Another reviewer complained that the book was not anti-Japanese enough, and stated that the death march of Bataan was not mentioned, and that the rape of Nanking was given relatively little attention. While I’m certainly open to learning more about WWII, I typically like to get a feel for what a book has to offer before deciding to make the time investment into reading it. If you have specific content from the book which you believe absolves the FDR administration from the guilt of starting the war between the U.S. and Japan, I will certainly read whatever quotes you provide, and will do my best to consider them as impartially as I can.
If I have time, I may dig into some quotes from the book. However it is far more than a few quotes or passages which convey the all-encompassing nature of his argument.
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