Of the various bombing strategies the Germans used against Britain in the months following the fall of France (they switched plans about half a dozen times), the most effective one was to attack RAF bases. That strategy nearly put Fighter Command out of business before the Luftwaffe switched to bombing London. (I can’t recall if the Luftwaffe also attacked the Chain Home radar stations along the coast, or even realized how important they were, but if I had been Hermann Goering – a mental image which gives me a serious case of the giggles – I would have hit them hard.)
That said, however, it’s been speculated that if the Luftwaffe had had the good sense to keep bombing RAF bases, to the point where Fighter Command would have started to crack, the RAF would have responded by withdrawing its fighters to the north and to the west, out of Luftwaffe bomber range. This would have left southeastern Britain unprotected against air attack, and would thus have created the air superiority conditions which Germany needed to launch the Sea Lion cross-Channel invasion. At first glance, one would therefore think that such an RAF withdrawl would have been a disastrous move. Its purpose, however, would have been to “save the furniture” so that the RAF could then be thrown back into the fight at the critical moment: when the Sea Lion operation started. The RAF’s aim under those circumstances wouldn’t have been to shoot down the Luftwaffe in the air (as was the case during the Battle of Britain); the prime objective would have been the destruction of the invasion forces at sea.