@MrMalachiCrunch:
CWO Marc, excellent points. I was under the impression there were critical hours, even a day or so where high level command decisions had to be made, and nobody dared wake up Hitler, the only person who could release the panzers and that this fact was decisive. Not as decisive then as I thought?
How do you think the Germans would have fared with all things being equal except for the complete air dominance. Let’s say that the Germans at least had ME-262s available for air surveillance and that the air dominance was a bit more in Germany’s favour in so far that they would be able to operate the the 262s as surveillance. The Germans were still able to surprise the allies in the Battle of the Bulge, had they advance knowledge of where the landing was to be would they have been able to move enough to be effective in June 1944 or where they that paralyzed by air supremacy of the allies? I was under the impression the allies didn’t begin the anti-armour air interdiction missions until a few months after D-Day where they gained access to French air bases?
As I recall, the overall German plan was a combination of the options open to them: forces all along the Atlantic Wall, some mobile reserves back from the coast, and huge concentrations of forces in the Pas de Calais area. Cornelius Ryan’s book The Longest Day devotes a fair bit of attention to the fact that the Panzer reserves could not be released without the authorization of Hitler (whom nobody dared to wake) and to the failed efforts of some Panzer units to get to the coast at the tail end of the day. My recollection of the attempted Panzer movement described by Ryan is hazy (I kind of skimmed over that part of the book), but I would estimate that, in order to have been able to throw the Allies back into the English Channel, the Germans would have needed to concentrate against the Normandy beachhead far more tanks than would have been possible for them to deploy there in a short enough amount of time to make a difference.
Remember that the strategic and operational mobility of tanks across long distances is very different from their tactical mobility on the battlefield. The proper way to move tanks quickly and over long distances, and to ensure that they are all ready to fight once they arrive at their destination, is by ship when cross-ocean travel is required and by railroad when you’re on land. (Very light tanks can travel by truck or by transport plane, but they’re of little use in an armoured slugging match.) Rail transportation of tanks takes a lot of time and effort to plan and implement (and is impaired when you have Free French forces blowing up tracks and bridges, or Allied ground-attack aircraft firing cannons and rockets at you). The alternative is for tanks to “march” on their own to the area where they’re needed. This is slower than rail travel (especially if you have to go cross-country rather than along roads). It also causes multiple problems which only get worse as the distance increases and as you push the driving speed of your tanks: fuel consumption, crew exhaustion, track breakage and general wear-and-tear requiring maintanance stops. The further you go and the faster you go, the more machines you’ll lose along the way, and the worse shape the remaining tanks will be when they finally reach the battlefield.
As for the question of “How do you think the Germans would have fared with all things being equal except for the complete air dominance?”, the thing to remember is that air dominance was one of the biggest advantages the Allies had in Normandy and they deliberately put a lot of effort into getting it in the months leading up to the invasion. If I remember correctly, there were some very heated arguments at the very highest levels of the Allied air command structure during that preliminary period between the generals who wanted Allied fighters to concentrate on escorting Allied bombers over Germany and the generals who felt that their priority should be to destroy the Luftwaffe in France in order to achieve air superiority – indeed, air supremacy – for D-Day. It was the air supremacy argument which eventually prevailed. The movie version of The Longest Day captures this nicely in the story of two Luftwaffe fighter pilots, Priller and his wingman, who spend the first half of the film calling their bosses idiots for scattering the Luftwaffe’s France-based planes all over the countryside and moving them back from the expected invasion area. The bosses are doing this because Allied planes have been waging a campaign to find and destroy as many Luftwaffe planes as possible (preferably on the ground). In the second half of the film, with the invasion under way, Priller and his wingman are the only two German fighter pilots who manage to attack the invasion beaches; apart from this single German two-plane sortie, the Allies owned the sky on that day. Priller himself recognizes this: as he and his wingman head for home after having strafed the beaches, Priller laughs and says sarcastically, “This was the great moment of the German Luftwaffe!”