Good point.
National Socialism vs. Communism.
-
I am not coming back in Kurt, even though I am disappointed by your last post.
-
Narvik wrote,
Bottom line is that Germany started two world wars, for no rational reason other than just for fun.
You seem like a good guy. I assume you’re telling the truth to the best of your ability. However, the above represents Allied propaganda; and is not connected to reality. I say that as someone who myself passionately repeated Allied lies–at least until I learned better.
WWI began as a conflict between Austria and Serbia. A member of Austrian nobility had been assassinated. Serbia was subjected to Austrian anger over that assassination, due in large part to its past track record of harboring anti-Austrian terrorists. Serbia refused some of the demands Austria made upon it. Russia supported Serbia’s position, with France quietly and behind the scenes egging Russia on. Note that all this happened before Germany took a position on these matters.
der Kaizer started a world war because he wanted to rule and suppress the whole world
The above statement is Allied propaganda, with no basis in reality. This particular Allied claim does not merit acknowledgement, let alone a detailed rebuttal. I once believed such things myself. It was only after doing a lot of research that I realized how many Allied lies I’d swallowed; or how little actual interest the Allied leaders had in any sort of morality. (Despite their frequent, loud protestations to the contrary.)
No German was starving in 1939 neither, yet der Fuhrer (new name same wrapping) started a
world war for the second time, just because he wanted to rule and suppress the whole world.During the Weimar Republic, most Germans experienced what one historian referred to as “prolonged and insatiable hunger” due to the brutal economic conditions imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. It was only by breaking free of that sadistic treaty that Hitler was able to spare the German people from additional hunger.
He even wrote a book about it so there would be no doubt.
I’ve read that book–twice–and found nothing in it to justify either the Allied big lie that Hitler wanted to rule the world, or the Allied big lie that Hitler had formulated plans to kill the Jews even before he took office. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote about his desire to conquer the Soviet Union–or at least the portion of the Soviet Union west of the Urals. That conquest would protect Germany and Europe from the evil of communism, and would give Germany the same position of strength with respect to Europe that the United States had relative to North America. As Hitler pointed out, no one had ever succeeded in imposing a Versailles Treaty on the United States. He wanted to make sure no one could ever again do so with respect to Germany.
One of Hitler’s reasons for going to war was described in John Toland’s book Adolf Hitler. Toland’s book was favorably reviewed by the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Newsweek, Library Journal, and a number of other major media publications.
[A.I.] Berndt [a German government official] thought the reported number of German nationals killed by Poles too small and simply added a nought. At first Hitler refused to believe such a figure but, when Berndt replied that it may have been somewhat exaggerated but something monstrous must have happened to give rise to such stories, Hitler shouted ‘They’ll pay for this! Now no one will stop me from teaching these fellows a lesson they’ll never forget! I will not have my Germans butchered like cattle!’ At this point the Fuhrer went to the phone and, in Berndt’s presence, ordered Keitel to issue ‘Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War.’ [pp. 566 - 567].
Also from Toland’s book:
Lipski never asked to see Hitler’s sixteen-point proposal . . . He was following his orders ‘not to enter into any concrete negotiations.’ The Poles were apparently so confident they could whip the Germans (with help from their allies) that they were not interested in discussing Hitler’s offer. [p. 567]
In 1939, France had promised Poland that, if Germany attacked, France would launch a major offensive within 15 days of mobilization. That claim was an outright lie.
In his post-war diaries general Edmund Ironside, the chief of Imperial General Staff commented on French promises “The French had lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it”.[24] The French initiated full mobilization and began the limited Saar Offensive on 7 September but halted short of the German defensive lines and then withdrew to their own defences around 13 September. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed by dispatch marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions were in contact with the enemy, and that French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The Polish military envoy to France, general Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki, upon receiving the text of the message sent by Gamelin, alerted marshal Śmigły: “I received the message by general Gamelin. Please don’t believe a single word in the dispatch”.[23] The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line.
Back when the Polish were ignoring German peace proposals and killing Germans–albeit only one tenth as many Germans as Berndt had reported to Hitler–they’d expected France to honor its promise to launch a general offensive against Germany within 15 days of mobilization. Combined, France and Poland had at least as many infantry, tanks, and artillery as Germany. A general French offensive would have forced Germany to allocate the bulk of its military assets to its Western front; thereby turning a short war into a long war. In a long war, the Western democracies’ industrial advantages over Germany would have made Allied victory nearly inevitable; and Poland would have been on the victors’ side of the peace table.
Polish leaders wanted to expand westward.
[In 1941], an office of the Polish Government in Exile wrote to warn Władysław Sikorski that if the [Atlantic] Charter was implemented with regards to national self-determination, it would make the desired Polish annexation of Danzig, East Prussia and parts of German Silesia impossible, which led the Poles to approach Britain asking for a flexible interpretation of the Charter.[25]
-
Now you claim that Poland started WW II ?
-
Narvik wrote:
Now you claim that Poland started WW II ?
Poland was an expansionistic military dictatorship. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, it had already engaged in several territorial annexations. (Including helping itself to a slice of Czechoslovakia in 1938.) Polish leaders wanted to help themselves to some German territory as well: notably East Prussia and part of Silesia. Their desire to do that was an important contributing factor in the start of the war.
But I do not feel that Poland’s raw desire for expansionism was the primary factor in the outbreak of hostilities. The primary factor was the pro-Soviet foreign policies consistently embraced by every major democracy prior to 1948. During the 1930s, it was widely believed that there would be war between Germany on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies on the other. Western democratic leaders–especially Daladier and FDR–were very eager to see exactly this kind of war.
Daladier wanted war between France and Germany. However, he did not want to go it alone. He wanted at least one major ally: Britain, or the United States, or the Soviet Union. He wasn’t all that picky which. FDR wanted to go to war against Germany as well. But at least initially, he was unable to persuade Congress or the American people that war was necessary. Making the case for war was difficult, given that the American people realized we’d gone into WWI based on a pack of Allied lies. For example, Germany was not guilty of killing millions of Belgians during WWI, despite Allied claims to the contrary.
If during the '30s Western democratic leaders were willing to carve up Germany with the Soviet Union, why didn’t Stalin want to go along with those plans? The answer is that Stalin wanted to conquer both Germany and the Western European democracies. A war in which everyone ganged up on Germany would (from Stalin’s perspective) have been too easy for the Western democracies, and would have left them in too strong a position. Therefore Stalin declined Western democratic invitations to carve up Germany, while using communist influence to promote “anti-fascism” and warmongering in Western democracies.
After the fall of France, Stalin’s plan was to invade Germany. By destroying the German Army only, Stalin would have taken control not just of Germany itself, but of France as well. He would have sold the Soviet invasion of France as a “liberation” from hostile German occupation. However, Germany invaded the Soviet Union at least a month before Stalin’s preparations to invade Germany were complete. The German attack took Stalin completely by surprise. Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio during Operation Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 exchange ratio it normally achieved against Soviet forces.)
Even though Stalin declined to participate in a preemptive Allied effort to carve up Germany, Soviet and Western democratic influence in Eastern Europe was such that, during the ‘30s, most Eastern European nations had adopted anti-German foreign policies. Both Poland and other Eastern European nations wanted to be on what they felt would be the winning side in the impending conflict between Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Soviets’ allies.
The stated long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest. Prior to 1948, the major Western democracies were useless in preventing Soviet expansion. In 1919 - '21, for example, no major Western democracy came to Poland’s aid when the Soviets went to war to annex it. Only the efforts of the Polish military (and the fact the Soviet Union was still in a state of civil war against the czarists) prevented Poland from becoming the newest Soviet socialist republic. The Soviets had achieved far greater penetration of Western democratic political processes (and influence over Western democracies) during the '30s and early '40s than had been the case during the Polish-Soviet War. The Western democracies were less likely to intervene against Soviet expansion during the '30s or early '40s than they’d been back in 1920, when they did nothing at all to prevent the U.S.S.R. from annexing Poland.
All of which reinforced Hitler’s conviction that peace and security for Germany could only be achieved by conquering the Soviet Union itself. Such a conquest would be difficult, given the fact that Stalin and the Western democracies had successfully persuaded most Eastern European nations to adopt anti-German foreign policies. Hitler used a carrot and stick policy to convert those Eastern European nations into German allies. Czechoslovakia had signed a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935. It was therefore annexed in 1938–a none-too-subtle message to any other Eastern European nation which might think of allying with Stalin against Hitler. Poland abruptly adopted an anti-German foreign policy in 1939 (mostly in response to false French promises about a general offensive against Germany).
In 1941, Italy invaded Greece. The Greeks fought off the Italian invasion. But they were careful not to provoke Germany. They didn’t attempt to conquer much Italian land, and they did not invite Britain to reinforce Greek positions. Germany therefore remained neutral in that conflict. However, the Greek government which demonstrated this restraint was voted out of office by a different, more aggressive Greek government. The replacement Greek government invited the British in; and took a more aggressive approach about conquering Italian territory. Germany therefore invaded Greece (and destroyed the pro-Soviet government which had arisen in Yugoslavia) as the final touches on its pre-Barbarossa efforts. With the fall of Greece and Yugoslavia, all of the nations between Germany and the Soviet Union were either allied with Germany or neutral in Germany’s favor. By that point, it was recognized that any Eastern European nation which engaged in bad (i.e., pro-Soviet) behavior would be very quickly punished by Germany. Ridding Eastern Europe of Soviet influence was an obvious prelude to the invasion of the Soviet Union itself.
-
And world war 1 was started because they could a lot of rivalries between countries that just needed a reason to go to war.
It started over a assasination and a lot of alliances just followed eachother untill everybody was at war, ofcourse some where just opportunists that saw some gain ( like france gaining ground they lost 100 years ago ).Historians have taken different stances on the causal blame for WWI. Three factors that weighs heavily with those that think G shoulders more responsibility than anyone else, ShadowHawk, are:
- the so called “blank cheque” that G gave Austria
- that G needed war in 1914 as R rearmament and railway investments would erode its advantage by 1915
- that G pounced on R’s mobilisation order against Austria as a casus belli, despite knowing that R needed weeks longer than anyone else to mobilise.
I’d be interested to know what your view is on these points ShadowHawk?
-
Privat Panic, you made a comeback ?
-
So you could say that France and to a little extend the UK and US started WW2 by blaming germany for starting a war it did not really start…
Actually, the Versailles Treaty did not place sole blame on Germany for starting the war. It just said that Germany and her allies were responsible for the war damages in France and Belgium (and elsewhere maybe) and thus gave a legal basis for demanding reparations.
-
Actually, the Versailles Treaty did not place sole blame on Germany for starting the war. It just said that Germany and her allies were responsible for the war damages in France and Belgium (and elsewhere maybe) and thus gave a legal basis for demanding reparations.
I’m not disagreeing. But the Versailles Treaty was part of a larger package of measures which, collectively, crippled Germany both economically and militarily.
-
The reparations payments demanded by Versailles were staggering. Those alone had the potential to cripple the German economy.
-
During the '20s, Britain and France closed their empires to German imports. That made it much more difficult for Germany to obtain the foreign currency needed to meet its obligations.
-
The Versailles Treaty prohibited Germany from having more than a token military, which meant that other than the Western democracies, there would be no counterweight to Soviet expansionism in Europe. The Western democracies had no interest in being that counterweight–at least not prior to 1948.
-
Important parts of Germany were placed under hostile foreign occupation. France was given control of the Rhineland and the Saar, Czechoslovakia control of the Sudetenland, and Poland control of West Prussia. This also made economic recovery more difficult.
-
For whatever reason, the government of the Weimar Republic was weak. I’m not sure how much of that (if any) represented deliberate intent by the Allies, and how much was due to random chance. But for whatever reason, that government was unable to make the most of Germany’s (admittedly) meager position.
Germany is a net food importer and a net raw materials importer. In order to pay for all that food and all those raw materials, it must be a net exporter of manufactured goods. This means that it’s very vulnerable to other countries simply closing themselves to German exports; as the British and French empires did in the '20s, and as the U.S. did as part of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1929. When the economic pressure of that is added to the economic pressure the Allies exerted with their demands for massive reparations payments, the result was disastrous. (Especially when coupled with the loss of the heart of German industry–the Rhineland–to hostile French occupation.) It was this combination of factors which made the Weimar Republic unable to feed its own people.
In order to postpone its economic problems, the Weimar Republic borrowed large sums of money–especially from the United States. Over the short-term, that borrowing provided it desperately needed infusions of capital. But the underlying economy did not improve during the '20s. Which meant that later on, the Germans were dealing with the above-described economic problems, plus massive interest payments to nations such as the United States. Eventually, Britain and France were able to talk the United States into forgiving their war debts. In exchange for which, they would seek no further reparations payments from Germany. Thus, one of Germany’s most important economic problems was solved before Hitler came to power. However, its remaining economic problems (massive debt payments, markets closed to German exports, an industrial heartland under hostile French occupation) were severe enough to produce the economically disastrous conditions and widespread hunger needed to bring Hitler to power.
-
-
-
@Private:
- the so called “blank cheque” that G gave Austria
- that G needed war in 1914 as R rearmament and railway investments would erode its advantage by 1915
- that G pounced on R’s mobilisation order against Austria as a casus belli, despite knowing that R needed weeks longer than anyone else to mobilise.
I’d be interested to know what your view is on these points ShadowHawk?
Your second point is another way of saying that Russia was aggressively militarizing. Which is true; and the same could also be said of France. As for your third point: Russia mobilized before any of the Central Powers; with the mobilization directed against Austria.
I agree that the blank check Germany gave to Austria was a contributing factor. The same could be said of the blank check France gave to Russia. Serbian support for terrorism was also an important factor; especially given the fact that the targets of terrorist attacks were sometimes members of the Austrian nobility.
But the most important factor in the start of WWI may well have been France. After its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, France began assembling an anti-German alliance. Russia was persuaded to join this alliance, despite the czar having given his word that he would not do so. Britain joined the alliance as well; abandoning its traditional foreign policy of glorious neutrality. The United States would later (unfortunately) join the alliance in 1917.
Diplomatic winds shift, and diplomatic circumstances are subject to change. Having assembled an anti-German alliance, it was in France’s interest to see that alliance used to defeat Germany. If in 1914 Europe had experienced a decade or two of peace, France’s anti-German alliance might have drifted apart. Britain might have gone back to being gloriously neutral, and Russia might have reconciled with Germany. It was therefore in France’s interest to go to war before this happened. That explains the French decision to give a blank check to Russia, and its decision to encourage Russia to support a terrorist state such as Serbia.
-
Russia was growing its military and transport capabilities (is that the same thing as militarising?) although whether it was aggressive or defensive (as it started from a point of disadvantage) is the debate we would no doubt have.
France’s actions before both world wars were driven by a fear of Germany. If you find that fear understandable then some of those actions become more so.
My memory is that the first declaration of war was by Austria against Serbia. This was despite Serbia having given in to virtually all of Austria’s demands. So the German blank cheque was more immediate to the commencement of hostilities, albeit that the French blank cheque was also contributory.
The fact that Russia attempted the distinction that its mobilisation was only against Austria would only have worked if Germany had not wanted war in 1914 (debatable) and so put their faith in Russian assertions (difficult).
-
Private Panic wrote:
Russia was growing its military and transport capabilities (is that the same thing as militarising?)
Growing one’s military capabilities is normally seen as the same thing as militarizing.
although whether it was aggressive or defensive (as it started from a point of disadvantage) is the debate we would no doubt have.
I do not profess to know whether Russia’s motives in militarizing were aggressive or defensive. It’s possible that, at least in some instances, there was not a major distinction between the two. For example, a national leader might think, “If we are weak, we will get conquered. So we must become strong to avoid that.” So that sounds nice and defensive and everything. Except that same leader might think, “Once we become strong, we will then have the chance to conquer those who are weak.” The distinction between defensive and offensive thinking isn’t always warranted. Also, there is the possibility that some leaders of major European nations felt war to be inevitable.
France’s actions before both world wars were driven by a fear of Germany.
You are correct, but have not gone far enough. It would be more accurate to say that France’s actions before both world wars were driven by a centuries-old anti-Germanism. A deep-seated, fixed belief that anything bad for Germany must be good for France. That whatever relations between Germany and France might be over the short term, eventually things would deteriorate and come to blows. (Which was why, from the French perspective, a weak Germany was so important.) A French policy of maintaining a weak Germany had begun hundreds of years earlier, when France divided Germany into 300 small pieces. (The Treaty of Westphalia.) Between the Treaty of Westphalia and 1940, France’s policy was consistently to seek a weak and divided Germany. That philosophy was at the heart of the Versailles Treaty. It is also why Germany was eventually united by Prussia. Prussia is about as far away from France as you can be and still be in Germany–and was thus less vulnerable to French military influence than western Germany.
This was despite Serbia having given in to virtually all of Austria’s demands.
Serbia accepted some demands and rejected others. In that particular instance, I think Serbia’s leaders were being more reasonable than Austria’s leaders. Serbia’s past track record of harboring anti-Austrian terrorists worked against it. The people making decisions about Austria’s foreign policy (the Austrian nobility) were the same people who’d just been targeted in the recent assassination. Typically, if you go after people’s families, they become less than reasonable in their response.
So the German blank cheque was more immediate to the commencement of hostilities
That is not necessarily the case. Serbia was emboldened by the Russian guarantee; and Russia was emboldened by the French guarantee. Austria was emboldened by the German guarantee. I could be mistaken, but I think that if any of those guarantees had not been given, hostilities would not have commenced.
The fact that Russia attempted the distinction that its mobilisation was only against
Austria would only have worked if Germany had not wanted war in 1914 (debatable)
and so put their faith in Russian assertions (difficult).A certain amount of German thinking was driven by the desire to be a good ally to Austria. German leadership didn’t want to leave Austria to its fate, if Russia was mobilizing against it. Both Germany and Austria were aristocracies; and they had a good relationship with each other.
-
Could you guys start a new thread?
-
YEA start something like “Poland and not Germany started world war two” Those were real funny especially if you add in Heydrichs narrative of the Gleiwitz incident like it was a fact.
-
-
@Imperious:
YEA start something like “Poland and not Germany started world war two” Those were real funny especially if you add in Heydrichs narrative of the Gleiwitz incident like it was a fact.
…or what about this > It was France that started two world wars, not Germany, and when it went wrong USA had to bail them out.
-
How about a thread on: " Churchill forced Germany into invading country after country looking for food to feed Herman Goering" Or “If it wasn’t for Hitler, Germany would have staved to death due to that devil Winston Churchill” Or “The Allied rebuilding of postwar Europe was the greatest crime of History which cost 1 billion lives”. any of these are viable candidates for comedy.
here is a typical neo nazi espousing this garbage…
-
Here, here, IL!
-
To address the points made by IL–not once in this thread (or in any of my posts here these last few years) have I cited a neo-Nazi or other extremist source. My references have consistently been from highly respected mainstream sources; or at worst from Wikipedia. The key claims made by Wikipedia have been buttressed by other, more prestigious mainstream sources.
I can understand repeating Allied lies if one doesn’t know they’re lies. I did that myself, back before I’d learned better. But I’d always been guided by the conviction that there is such a thing as absolute truth, and that one can learn what that absolute truth is by studying hard enough. There are those here who don’t seem to share that conviction. Those who seem to believe that the truth is whatever they want it to have been; or whatever the Allied propagandists made up. For example: I have shown that the Nazis simply could not have fed everyone within their borders; and that the reason this was the case was the Allied food blockade. IL’s response to that truth was to attack me, personally, for having pointed it out. He then proceeded to simply ignore that particular truth in his moral calculus regarding who was right or wrong in the war. Of course repetitions of Allied propaganda (as he and others have done in this thread and elsewhere) are going to feel right to those who have spent their entire sentient lifetimes exposed to such propaganda. The question we should be asking is not whether Allied propaganda feels right. Rather, we should ask to what extent, if any, that propaganda was based on objective reality.
Typically, a religion will contain factual claims, as well as moral conclusions based on those claims. Often, it will also contain a story about how that religion came into being. A story which, if believed, demonstrates the validity of the religion, and the evil of those who oppose it. While the Allied propaganda effort is not generally considered a religion in the traditional sense, it contains the above-described elements of a religion. There are factual claims intended to support the good-versus-evil mythos. There are moral conclusions based on those factual claims. “Eugenics is wrong because the Nazis believed in it,” for example. Large numbers of WWII history books are written with the deliberate intent of making the Allies look better than they were, and the Nazis worse than they were, in order to promote the Allied view. If (for example) Soviet mass murders are mentioned at all–which is far from guaranteed in any Allied-friendly history book–we are not told the names of the victims, shown their pictures, or told anything about their life stories. Soviet and Western democratic war crimes are either omitted completely or (at best) treated as statistics. Nazi war crimes are treated as tragedies. Extenuating circumstances (such as Allied-imposed famine conditions in German-held Europe) are simply ignored.
Personally, I find the Allied religion shallow, hypocritical, and insipid. That does not mean I’m a Nazi. People had views about morality before Allied propagandists created their worthless religion. They will go on having views of morality long after the Allied religion is dead and buried. In the meantime, there will be those here who will treat me as a heretic. What they fail to realize is that being a heretic is the only acceptable option, if the religion in question does not (and was never intended to) reflect morality or truth.
-
You should worry more about NAZI lies, the kind espoused by them to excuse themselves from some of the worst crimes in History….at Nuremberg and as such nonsense to excuse behaviors in Hitlers speeches. If Hitler could not feed everybody, he could just easily surrender, stop killing everybody, stop invading every nation, stop feeding Herman, and stop causing everyone else to starve by sinking merchant ships. to blame the agents that stopped the idiot Hitler from killing millions is no greater than reasoning of a child.
To use and advocate this line of reasoning is a travesty in light of the real facts.
Suggested Topics
