And the Allies never had it during the war? Would the Axis have won. I hear it’s very important.
Dreadful Axis Mistakes
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@CWO:
@221B:
Winter arrives in Moscow a full month before either Leningrad or Stalingrad.
Moscow is about 500 miles north of Stalingrad, so I can understand winter arriving there a month earlier, but it’s about 200 miles south of Leningrad, so I’m puzzled at the notion that winter would arrive in Leningrad a month later.
Leningrad is by the sea which delays, and moderates, winter.
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Yes Russia was a big mistake by the Germans. Just like an A&A game. Who plans Sealion and Barbarossa on the same turn?
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While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely.
Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940. The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion.
Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.
The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table.
Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US. And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating? Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.
What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate? Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey? Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete?
Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back. Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options. And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.
But I think more importantly, the attack on the Soviets was something the Nazi party had advocated all along. Ideologically, it was the perfect next move.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leibensraum
(German for “habitat” or literally “living space”) was one of the major political ideas of Adolf Hitler, and an important component of Nazi ideology. It served as the motivation for the expansionist policies of Nazi Germany, aiming to provide extra space for the growth of the German population, for a Greater Germany. In Hitler’s book Mein Kampf, he detailed his belief that the German people needed Lebensraum (“living space”, i.e. land and raw materials), and that it should be found in the East. It was the stated policy of the Nazis to kill, deport, or enslave the Polish, Russian and other Slavic populations, whom they considered inferior, and to repopulate the land with Germanic peoples.
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You do know the reason why most of these plans (Africa) “faltered” was becaues of US involment. Also whats your nationality Baker?
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In my opinion, while there are obviously many factors that one can look at when analyzing the Axis loss, I think the biggest mistake was getting the US involved. However, by the nature of the war and the goals of the Axis, US involvement may have been inevitable from the start.
Honestly, I don’t see how you can beat American production. When a unified and willing nation has the capacity to build more guns, tanks, planes, and ships than much of the rest of the world combined, how can any opponent possibly oppose it?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II#Summary_of_production
Check out the first table and compare just how much more the US alone produced than the rest of the Axis combined. If you’re a power that has massive goals (control and military domination of large swaths of territory), and you try to wage war against that kind industry, you’re in for a walloping. Of course, in a situation like Vietnam, where the flexing of industrial might is limited by small scale guerilla-warfare in jungles, American power isn’t invincible.
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@221B:
While it would make sense (as others have stated here) for Germany to win against the UK prior to any military action against the USSR, I would like to point out that a German victory against the UK at the time of Barbarossa had become most unlikely.
Operation Sealion was unlikely to succeed even had it been undertaken in ideal conditions in July 1940. The longer time went on, the better prepared the UK was against a German invasion.
Likewise the U-boat campaign never destroyed sufficient shipping to really force England to negotiate a peace; and the British (and Americans) were continuously improving their defenses against the U-boats.
The African campaign faltered; but even had it succeeded, might not have been sufficient to bring the UK to the negotiating table.
Even with the Soviets providing the Germans pretty much everything they wanted, Germany would be hard pressed to keep up with the UK with virtually unlimited manpower from her colonies and immense industrial support from the US. And how for long would Stalin be so accommodating? Doing nothing seems like simply waiting for defeat as Germany is still in a strategically weaker position over the long term.
What other options (besides a successful invasion of the UK) did Hitler have to either negotiate a peace, or ensure at a minimum a stalemate? Invade Gibraltar via Spain? Pour resources into the African campaign? Go to the middle east via Turkey? Technological advances (jet planes, V-1, V-2, etc. - this was attempted later in the war without success)? or grab the rich resources of the USSR to ensure sufficient resources to compete?
Of these choices, the attack of the Soviets seemed the most likely to succeed, with most Germans believing their war would be over in a matter of weeks (just like the rest of Europe). No one, believed they would hold out for long at all, let alone turn the Germans back. Russia was easily accessible to Germany (sharing a border across what used to be Poland), unlike most of the other strategic options. And of these choices, the Soviet territory was by far the richest in potential return, with large surpluses of Ukrainian wheat, Caucasus oil, and other resources the Germans needed.
Very interesting post…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead. If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered. Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige. Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).
Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars. I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris. It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state. They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.
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Very interesting post…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead. If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered. Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige. Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).
Another thing which would have put Britain in a difficult position would have been a German seizure of the Middle East, thus cutting Britain off from its source of oil there (and redirecting that oil to Germany, which needed it badly). This move would probably not have been fatal to Britain in itself, since it was also getting oil from the U.S., but it would have put significant added strain on Britain’s war effort. It’s a bit like the remark made by Nimitz (if I remember correctly) about what the effect would have been if Japan had destroyed Pearl Harbor’s shipyard facilities and oil storage tanks on December 7: the U.S. would still have won in the end, but the blow would have been so damaging that it would have prolonged the war by a year.
Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars. I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris. It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state. They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.
During the planning for Barbarossa, Hitler was apparently reminded by his generals of his own statement (in Mein Kampf, I believe) that it would be folly for Germany to fight a two-front war. Hitler responded that, given Britain’s weakened condition in mid-1941, an invasion of Russia would not violate the two-front war principle because the fighting would only be on one front…provided the war against Russia was a short one. And that’s where things fell apart. Germany and Japan, for a variety of reasons, were both only in a position to win relatively short wars, not lengthy wars of attrition. Both planned to do so through the application of innovative tactics, good training, good leadership, and in some cases superior weaponry, combined with exploiting the fact that their potential enemies were not well prepared (again for a variety of reasons) to deal with an attack. It was an approach that worked brilliantly for Germany in Poland and France, and for Japan in the Dutch East Indies and the British territories in the Far East. Germany, however, failed in its bid to deliver a quick knock-out blow to Britain and Russia, and Japan likewise to the United States, and both countries ended up in lengthy attritional conflicts.
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…however I’m inclined to think the Africa campaign would have had a good chance of succeeding if a large part of the air and armor slotted for Barbarossa had been sent to Africa instead. If Axis succeeded in shutting down the Suez Canal then perhaps amphib operations against Malta, Gibraltar, and Cyprus could have been considered. Every little colonial defeat was a further blow to British morale and prestige. Hitler didn’t necessarily need to Sea Lion–just keep conquering one colonial possession after another, and keep offering peace to UK at terms the common people of UK could accept (eg the autonomy of UK and its colonies).
Hitler himself had decried 2-front wars. I see Barbarossa as the Nazi party falling victim to his own hubris. It wasn’t even clearly winning the war with UK, and somehow the solution is start another war with an even more powerful state. They should have at least obtained the cooperation and assistance of Japan before embarking on such an absurd all-in bet.
I agree with you that Africa could have been made a decisive front…Not sure if the closer proximity to Axis would have compensated enough for the much smaller merchant marine available, but it was certainly a good possibility. In hindsight, it is perhaps a better option than Barbarossa (though at the time the Germans believed the weakened British to still be much superior to the Russians in terms of military capacity).
It would have had the bonus of perhaps bringing the French fleet completely over to the axis side. From Egypt, further forays into Iraq, and (perhaps via the French fleet) to the colonies on the East coast of Africa, perhaps even to India (though I think the sheer manpower available to the British in India would be an impediment to any action there).
I will think about the relative sizes of the Axis (Italian) and British shipping capacity and in the distances the men, equipment, and supplies would need to traverse to engage in this front some more. Perhaps I’ll post more later…
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@221B:
It would have had the bonus of perhaps bringing the French fleet completely over to the axis side.
I doubt that. Vichy France wanted to keep its fleet in French hands, not hand it over either to the Allies or to the Germans.
When German forces retaliated against the Anglo-American “Torch” landings in North Africa by occupying the southern “unoccupied zone” of France (the zone had up to then been under Vichy control), the Vichy forces in North Africa considered this a breach of the armistice terms France had signed with Germany. To quote Wikipedia on what happened next: “The Germans formulated Operation Lila with the aim of capturing intact the demobilised French fleet at Toulon. French naval commanders, however, managed to delay the Germans by negotiation and subterfuge long enough to scuttle their ships on 27 November, before the Germans could seize them, preventing three battleships, seven cruisers, 28 destroyers and 20 submarines from falling into the hands of the Axis powers.”
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japan attacking perl harbour
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I am fairly well-read on Germany, so I can offer my own opinion on them, but as for Japan, all I really can say is Pearl Harbor?
Germany–
Stopping the bombing of Britain- British morale was in decline during the bombing, and despite what Axis and Allies represents, strategic bombing raids are pretty effective. With Britain being bombed, more Allied planes had to be focused on defense and less attacks on Germany. However, this mistake isn’t very severe, because Germany didn’t have the industrial capacity to match Britain plane for plane forever, especially with the UK’s colonies.Calling off the attack on Moscow, which led to…
Capture of Leningrad, Stalingrad, and Moscow simultaneously- Huge mistake. Hitler, in his infinite wisdom, decided he needed three important cities, and that he had the capacity to take all three at the same time. The Germans were losing numerical superiority as more and more Russians from the far east were redeployed.
Stalingrad- Bombing the daylights out of the city created so much rubble that the Soviet troops could hide and fight an attrition war with the Germans. Without defined parameters, German tanks were easily stuck in what used to be streets and were easy prey for antitank weapons.
Inferior tank designs- The T-34 Soviet tank, while less manuverable and operated by inexperienced crews, was strong enough to resist shells of some German tank models completely. German tank crews were disheartened to find out in one incident, after they hit a T-34 and surrounded it, the surrendered Soviet crew was uninjured, just dazed from the impact, and the tank was fully operational. While this would be remedied with the Tiger tank, it was too late in the war.
At one point in the seige of Stalingrad, Hitler was so desperate to achieve victory he ordered experienced tank crews be armed with pistols and act as infantry. This cost the Germans immensley in terms of valuable soldiers.
The surrounding of the 6th army. Rather than place competent commanders, Hitler promoted those who followed orders, so when the 6th German army was counterattacked outside of Stalingrad, Field Marshal Paulus, rather than assemble a quick mechanized force of tanks and half-tracks which could have possibly repelled the disorganized Soviet attack, he patiently waited for orders from Fuhrer headquarters, which led to the defeat at Stalingrad.
The holocaust- so many resources were diverted into genocide rather than helping the Wehrmacht.
In general, Barbarossa was a huge mistake. Soviet industry was simply moved from the Ukraine and Belorussia to the Urals, and Soviet tank production was vastly superior to German tank production, something Hitler refused to believe.
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@M:
I am fairly well-read on Germany, so I can offer my own opinion on them, but as for Japan, all I really can say is Pearl Harbor?
Japan’s best chance to win in the Pacific was to avoid a war with the United States entirely. If Japan had (as was the case historically) attacked British and Dutch territories in the Pacific and South-East Asia, but had NOT attacked any U.S. (or U.S.-controlled) territories – and if for good measure Japan had publicly announced that it had no intention of ever doing so unless attacked by America – this would have at least delayed and just possibly prevented U.S. entry into the war. There was still a lot of isolationist sentiment in the States at the time, and no great love for European “imperialist” powers like Britain and Holland, so the idea of going to war with Japan to defend the British and Dutch colonial empires would not have been an easy sell.
Let’s assume, however, that U.S. entry into the war was inevitable – for example, because of American pro-China sentiment (which was strong), or whatever reason. Japan’s best chance to win under those circumstances would still have been to avoid attacking the U.S., in order to give the U.S. few reasons to fight, and to put the U.S. in the position where it would have to be the country to open the hostilities. Japan’s strategy, in other words, should have been to make sure that the Americans lacked motivation, so that: a) America would mobilize its people and its industry to the smallest possible degree, and b) America would be inclined to accept a negotiated settlement once they realized how long the war would have to be and/or once they suffered a few big early defeats at Japan’s hands. But what did Japan do instead? It launched a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor while its diplomats were still (more or less) involved in discussions with Washington. It did the one thing which guaranteed that American public opinion would be outraged, and that the nation would unite in an all-out effort to win at all costs in order to punish Japan for what was seen as an act of treachery.
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One of the biggest mistakes made by Germany was the suppression and Oppression of the Eastern European nations after invasion. In the Baltic states and Ukraine for example, they were greeted as liberators… they squandered their chance to bring these nations into the Axis orbit as minor partners when they treated the locals as sub-human.
Not only did they lose the free co-operation of these nations, but in the end they were fighting a war behind their own lines against all kinds of passive and sometimes active resistance.
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One of the biggest mistakes made by Germany was the suppression and Oppression of the Eastern European nations after invasion. In the Baltic states and Ukraine for example, they were greeted as liberators… they squandered their chance to bring these nations into the Axis orbit as minor partners when they treated the locals as sub-human.
Not only did they lose the free co-operation of these nations, but in the end they were fighting a war behind their own lines against all kinds of passive and sometimes active resistance.
Excellent point. I even believe that the entire Nazi racial ideology contributed to the defeat of Germany. The holocaust was not only a horrible crime at a humanitarian level, but it also robbed Germany of many great minds and organizers in science, culture, and economics. Germany’s Jews thought of themselves as Germans, and many fought for Germany in World War I. Instead of keeping all that potential available for the benefit of their country, the Nazis expelled or murdered them. And to do so, they built a gruesome and expensive system of oppression, manned by large numbers of other Germans who could instead have fought at the front.
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The holocaust- so many resources were diverted into genocide rather than helping the Wehrmacht.
i just want to add to this
just think about the oh how many greman jews they killed. imagine if theye were concriped in to the army insted…… i find it hard to belive but if hiler was just a litter smarter we would w=have lost the war!
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The holocaust- so many resources were diverted into genocide rather than helping the Wehrmacht.
i just want to add to this
just think about the oh how many greman jews they killed. imagine if theye were concriped in to the army insted…… i find it hard to belive but if hiler was just a litter smarter we would w=have lost the war!
While it certainly would have helped the Axis cause, there is no possible way that would change the outcome of the war. Sure, 6 million people alive (or 11 million total) would be nice in the army, yet remember only a fraction of those people were men (Germans would never ever consider women in the army at this time period, they didn’t send the women to factories during the war and the German tank crews were horrified to find out at their first approach of Stalingrad they had shot women (the women were operating the AA guns)), many were old, disabled, or anti-Nazi in the first place, such as Communists or some Catholics.
The sheer amount of people available to the Allies once the USA joined the war, along with India and China to some extent, means it would become a war of numbers, and Germany had a numerical advantage over Poland, Denmark, Norway, and France, but not the Soviets or Americans or British,
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@Herr:
The holocaust was not only a horrible crime at a humanitarian level, but it also robbed Germany of many great minds and organizers in science, culture, and economics. Germany’s Jews thought of themselves as Germans, and many fought for Germany in World War I. Instead of keeping all that potential available for the benefit of their country, the Nazis expelled or murdered them.
One example of this kind of counterproductiveness was the fact that certain members of the Nazi establishment were suspicious of nuclear theory because it was viewed as “Jewish physics”.
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As of 1940, Germany had a number of severe disadvantages. The first and foremost is that the U.S. had already committed itself to the Allied war effort. Even though the U.S. was technically at peace with the Axis, it had committed itself to sending large numbers of military aircraft to Britain for use against Germany. In 1941, the U.S. produced 19,000 military aircraft, compared to 12,000 for Germany and 5,000 for Japan. The U.S. outproduced both major Axis nations combined even though it was still (technically) at peace until December of that year. Plans were being implemented to expand American military aircraft production to 70,000 per year, with half the produced planes being sent to Britain for use against Germany.
Regardless of whether Hitler did or did not declare war on the U.S., he would still have to face America’s industrial might; and would have to find an answer to the U.S.-built aircraft that would be used to attack Germany’s cities and its people. In addition, the British had imposed a food blockade on Germany, which meant that over the long run there would not be enough food to feed the people within Germany’s borders. Some would have to starve or otherwise be exterminated.
Russia had fought poorly in WWI. It had also fought poorly in the war in 1905 between itself and Japan. Further, the Soviet Union had fought very badly in its invasion of Finland (in 1940). That track record had led German military planners to anticipate it would fight badly if it was invaded. They also believed the Red Army consisted of 200 divisions. (As compared to 150 divisions for the German Army.) This was a severe underestimate: by the fall of '41, the Red Army consisted of 600 divisions. Likewise, German military planners had grossly underestimated the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.
Germany’s supply lines were a problem due to its lack of oil. In the long term that problem could be solved by upgrading its rail network and using coal-powered trains to move supplies. The plan was to surround and capture the bulk of the Red Army in the western regions most accessible to the German Army. With the core of the Soviet military strength broken, the German Army could then push eastwards to take the grain, oil, industrial capacity, and manpower it so desperately needed. These resources would allow it to counter the large numbers of British- and American-made aircraft being used against Germany.
Over the short-term, however, the invasion would make Germany’s food situation worse. Most western Soviet territories ran at a food deficit. Even the Ukraine’s food surplus was not as large as it once had been due to Stalin’s industrialization and collectivization efforts. Because Germany didn’t have the food it required to feed everyone, the solution was to starve or exterminate those it liked the least. Jews received the lowest priority for food allocations, and people in the occupied Soviet territories the second-lowest. Because the British (and later American) food blockade had forced Germany into a situation where it had to starve people in its occupied territories, Hitler felt that getting local populations to cooperate through fear might be more effective than would a more positive approach. It’s difficult to convince a population that you are their friend when you are starving them to death. Germany had no food with which to avert widespread starvation.
Clearly, the invasion of the Soviet Union failed to solve Germany’s problems. In fact it greatly added to them. Over the short-term at least, Stalin would likely have been content to sit and watch Germany and the Western democracies fight each other. He regarded both sides as equally enemies, and wanted nothing more than a long, bloody war which would bleed both sides white. Once Europe was sufficiently weakened and war-weary, the Red Army would of course move west to pick up the pieces. Stalin’s approach meant that over the short-term at least, Germany could avoid facing the Red Army if it wished to do so. (Though it would have to face that army eventually.) However, the Red Army had experienced a purge several years ago, in order to eliminate the old, gentlemanly officer corps, and to replace it with one more loyal to communism. (I’ve seen it alleged that the new officer corps was intended to be more thuggish–an accusation which seems borne out by the atrocities committed by the Red Army.) Also, in the spring of 1941 the Red Army was in the midst of a doctrine change. With the Red Army still recovering from the purge, and in the midst of a doctrine change, there was an opportunity to attack it when it was unready–an opportunity which would not have existed in '43 or '44.
In the U.S., some media outlets were isolationist, while others were interventionist. However, the isolationist media outlets were being bought up by those who favored interventionism. The American public had recognized the U.S. had been duped into entering into WWI, and that sentiment made it reluctant to enter another European war. But with American media outlets and the president being strongly pro-war (and generally pro-communist), Hitler felt it was only a matter of time before the U.S. declared war on Germany. (Much like it had during WWI.) He also mistakenly believed that the U.S. would initially be too occupied with its war against Japan to do much against Germany. Declaring war meant that Germany would have to deal with the American Army + its military production, instead of just its military production. Whether that would or wouldn’t have mattered over the long-term depends on how successful FDR and his allies in the media would have been in getting the U.S. into the war had Germany not declared war.
It is also worth noting that by 1941 the U.S. had broken Japan’s diplomatic code, which meant that the U.S. government knew more about the goings-on in Tokyo than did the Japanese ambassador. Specifically, they knew that if they presented a reasonable offer for lifting the oil embargo Japan would accept. But if the U.S. asked for dramatic concessions on Japan’s part, Japan would go to war within a matter of weeks. The U.S. asked for very dramatic concessions indeed. The war between the U.S. and Japan helped turn the latter nation’s attention away from the Soviet Union; while also giving FDR the chance he needed to fully mobilize America’s resources for war. Also, a leaked U.S. government document persuaded Hitler that the U.S. was temporarily too weak for a two ocean war; and that he could therefore get away with sinking the massive quantities of Lend-Lease Aid flooding into the Soviet Union and Britain. Shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Stalin shipped 100 divisions west across the Trans-Siberian railway because he knew Japan could no longer seriously attack him. Those 100 divisions arrived in the dead of winter, and proved critical to the Soviets’ success.
To make a long story short, Germany in 1940 had very few good options. Germany was weaker than either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R., and the leaders of both nations were committed to the destruction of the German military. The case could be made that Germany had significantly less long-term strength than did Britain–a nation which was already at war against Germany in 1940. The conquest of North Africa and the Middle East would have helped Germany’s situation somewhat, especially in terms of oil. Had Hitler chosen that path, Germany’s situation would have improved with respect to Britain. Also, the delay would have allowed Germany to build up its own industry. However, the U.S. and the Soviet Union would also have become significantly stronger during the delay.
The only chance for an Axis victory I can see would have been under the following scenario. In 1941 Germany invades Turkey and North Africa; and secures control over the Middle East. It begins recruiting large numbers of Muslim men for its army, which it sends against the British force in India. Then in the winter of '41, Japan declares war against the U.K., but not the U.S. Germany and Japan would combine to take India, and would divide it between the two of them. Germany would then dedicate 1942 to improving its industrial capacity, developing new, more modern weapons, fending off Allied bombing raids, submarine warfare, and southward conquest along the Nile. It would also attempt to recruit soldiers from India’s Muslim population.
1943 would likely be similar to '42. The main difference would be that there would be significantly more American-made planes being shipped to Britain every year. Germany would continue to push south in Africa, with the intended goal of taking South Africa. If Africa fell to the Axis, and if Australia and New Zealand negotiated a separate peace treaty with Japan, the British war effort would then be limited to the British Isles and Canada.
In 1944 Hitler would invade the Soviet Union. The Red Army would have been significantly stronger in '44 than it had been in '41. But several factors could offset that. 1) Germany could invade from the south (Persia), in addition to from the west. 2) Germany would have a much larger initial invasion force because of help from the Muslim men it had recruited. 3) During WWII, Germany massively expanded its military production between '42 and '44. It produced nearly three times as many military aircraft in '44 as in '42; and four times as many tanks. This scenario assumes that a somewhat similar production increase would have taken place. 4) Later in the war, Germany was significantly ahead of its enemies in most major technological areas. Its Me 262 jets achieved a 5:1 kill ratio; and that ratio increased to 10:1 when they were equipped with its best air-to-air missiles. Later in the war it created the assault rifle, it had the best tank designs, it had the best handheld anti-tank weapons, its Type XXI U-boats were the best submarines of the war, etc. Assuming the critical years of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union would have been '44 and '45, many of these technological advances could have appeared in sufficient numbers to make a difference. (Especially if that had been the plan from '40 onward.)
Under this scenario, the plan would not necessarily have been to conquer the Soviet Union in its entirety. Instead, Germany would conquer whatever it could gain during two years of conquest. After that it would negotiate a peace treaty with Stalin. Conquest of a significant portion of Soviet lands–ideally including Moscow, the Caucasus oil fields, and other strategically important areas–would provide Hitler with the resources he needed to hold his own in the long, grinding air and sea war against Britain. FDR would die in '45. It’s likely that his successor would either have been less pro-communist/committed to Germany’s destruction than FDR had been, or else would lack FDR’s ability to get Congress to do his bidding. Further, Britain would be in dire financial straits by this point, making it difficult to justify further increases in Lend-Lease Aid. (The U.K. was close to bankruptcy even as early as '40.) With its colonies conquered and with Germany victorious over the Soviet Union, and (possibly) with the American commitment to Lend-Lease Aid lessening, there is at least the chance that Churchill might have been replaced with some other leader more willing to negotiate a peace treaty. That peace treaty would have ended the war at last, and would have allowed Germany to escape the horror of postwar Soviet occupation.
On the other hand, it’s quite possible the British wouldn’t have agreed to peace; and that the Americans would have become increasingly pro-war due to the institutional influences described earlier. If those things were to occur, then in 1946 Germany’s plan would have been to focus on building Type XXI U-boats to sink much of the British Navy, while using its jets to gain control over the skies above Britain and Germany. Naval and air superiority would pave the way for an invasion of the U.K. in late '46 or early '47. At that point, Germany could at last achieve peace, unless of course the U.S. had declared war on it. But by this point, Germany would have the industrial capacity, food supplies, oil, and access to raw materials necessary to hold its own even against the U.S.
I don’t know whether the above plan would have worked. But, at least with 20/20 hindsight, this seems to have been among the best available plans to ensure an Axis victory.
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:lol: Enjoyable read. I like the part where I was trying to imagine German officers persuading Muslim masses to fight for the Nazis, and Germany and Japan splitting up India.
It sounds like the German officers would have benefitted from playing A&A. After playing a lot of A&A it dawns on me that Japan never succeeded at taking Hawaii, Australia, India, much of China, Russia, Alaska, California…… Speaking of Japan, I’m surprised you didn’t mention Midway. What if Japan was the one who won a(some) huge decisive naval and air battle(s)??
The European Axis never did really dominate North Africa (for long at all), keep the Allies out of the Med, take Turkey, the middle East, Stalingrad, Leningrad (right?), dominate the Atlantic, or achieve air superiority over Britain or Europe (only for relatively brief stretches of time)
So I’m wondering, Kurt, what you think about the Axis and Allies games that we have now - AA50 and 1940? Since you know a lot about WWII history and you think about what-if scenarios, I’m curious as to your thoughts about A&A. Like what is absurd, what is pretty realistic, etc. Maybe even what you wish was different (house rule type of things) I know this will undoubtedly open a can of worms on this site, so if you want to PM me that would be cool too.
Yes, I understand A&A is just a game and not a historical simulation. It ignores SO many real-life factors, it’s just an abstraction, and succeeds tremendously in what it was created for - immense fun coming from wonderful combinations of skill (strategy, tactics, and planning) and luck.
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:lol: Enjoyable read. I like the part where I was trying to imagine German officers persuading Muslim masses to fight for the Nazis, and Germany and Japan splitting up India.
It sounds like the German officers would have benefitted from playing A&A. After playing a lot of A&A it dawns on me that Japan never succeeded at taking Hawaii, Australia, India, much of China, Russia, Alaska, California…… Speaking of Japan, I’m surprised you didn’t mention Midway. What if Japan was the one who won a(some) huge decisive naval and air battle(s)??
The European Axis never did really dominate North Africa (for long at all), keep the Allies out of the Med, take Turkey, the middle East, Stalingrad, Leningrad (right?), dominate the Atlantic, or achieve air superiority over Britain or Europe (only for relatively brief stretches of time)
So I’m wondering, Kurt, what you think about the Axis and Allies games that we have now - AA50 and 1940? Since you know a lot about WWII history and you think about what-if scenarios, I’m curious as to your thoughts about A&A. Like what is absurd, what is pretty realistic, etc. Maybe even what you wish was different (house rule type of things) I know this will undoubtedly open a can of worms on this site, so if you want to PM me that would be cool too.
Yes, I understand A&A is just a game and not a historical simulation. It ignores SO many real-life factors, it’s just an abstraction, and succeeds tremendously in what it was created for - immense fun coming from wonderful combinations of skill (strategy, tactics, and planning) and luck.
Thanks for the compliments! :)
I didn’t mention Midway because in my Axis victory scenario I’d envisioned Japan avoiding war with the U.S. in the first place. It’s worth noting that in 1943, the U.S. produced 86,000 military aircraft to just 17,000 for Japan. Had the Japanese won at Midway, it would have prolonged the Pacific war, and would have forced the U.S. to temporarily divert resources from the Pacific theater. But Japan had no long-term prospects for a military victory in that war, and its only real hope was at the negotiating table.
I think that the German military planners’ biggest problem was a lack of adequate information, particularly about Soviet military strength. If the Red Army had consisted of just 200 divisions (as they believed) and if it had fought as poorly against Germany as it had against Finland, the decision to invade the Soviet Union would have been the best one available. The rewards for conquest would have included oil, grain, industrial capacity, manpower for German factories, and access to vital raw materials. The rewards for conquering the Middle East would likely have been significantly smaller than that.
The other mistake German military planners made is that they failed to appreciate the kind of qualitative edge their hardware might provide around 1944 - '45. It’s also possible that in 1941, they may not have fully appreciated just what kind of military production capacity Germany could achieve, or how far away from that maximum potential it was. Between those two things, they got into a sort of “now or never” thinking which led to a bid for outright military victory in '41 (the invasion of the Soviet Union), rather than building themselves up and invading later. With a rapid buildup of Germany’s military production + rapid technological advancement, time could have been on Germany’s side. (Even though the opposite appeared to be the case in '41, and for completely logical reasons.)
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