Hey everyone, I’m currently working on a system that would translate oob G40 6d unit values into an 8d system. I put the Submarine defense value lower than I wanted it at 1/8, but I think it’s best for the game and for a 6 IPC unit.
Anti-Submarine Technology Delayed What I would like to suggest when using the 8 sided dice system, is a house rule that would delay the submarine ability cancelation powers of all destroyers until the beginning of the third game round.
Lets face it… A.S.D.I.C was not deployed as early in the war as oob suggests, 1940 encompassed the “happy days” of German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic, which in turn forced the Allies to develop anti-submarine equipment.
That’s a great idea! Do you think it would work in 42.2?
@Benito:
That’s a great idea! Do you think it would work in 42.2?
Don’t know about 42.2, but in G42 it would certainly save the 2 German subs that the Americans always kill first.
yeah
Do you means all three ASW powers of DDs:
Blocking Stealth move,
Blocking Submerge,
Blocking Surprise strike?
@Baron:
Do you means all three ASW powers of DDs:
Blocking Stealth move,
Blocking Submerge,
Blocking Surprise strike?
Yes, subs will get free reign for the first 2 full game rounds.
This will be interesting.
It will probably better simulate the beginning of Battle of Atlantic.
IDK if this will change anything for Sub to defend @1 or @2.
You may however play around this rule.
Subs also increase their capacities between versions over years.
Shnorkel, better torpedoes, better engines, etc.
You may use D1 for first two rounds and D2 when Destroyer get all ASW.
This can be a way to depict that things evolve.
@Young:
Hey everyone, I’m currently working on a system that would translate oob G40 6d unit values into an 8d system. I put the Submarine defense value lower than I wanted it at 1/8, but I think it’s best for the game and for a 6 IPC unit.
Anti-Submarine Technology Delayed What I would like to suggest when using the 8 sided dice system, is a house rule that would delay the submarine ability cancelation powers of all destroyers until the beginning of the third game round.
Lets face it… A.S.D.I.C was not deployed as early in the war as oob suggests, 1940 encompassed the “happy days” of German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic, which in turn forced the Allies to develop anti-submarine equipment.
The challenge is about Sub survivability.
Something which can change the Subs-DDs dynamic.
From what I tried on TripleA Redesign experiments, one way can be to lower
Subs to Attack 2 Defense 1 while
Destroyer remains Attack 3 Defense 3.
This clearly shows that in naval combat DD are better equipped, and clearly outgunned Sub.
However, to compensate, don’t block Surprise strike and Stealth, after round 2.
Only blocking Sub submerge capacity will be activated.
A weaker Subs combat capacity might be counterbalanced by more elusiveness.
1- Subs can pass through blockers (Sub is not enclosed in a given SZ, like Baltic Sea Szs).
2- Subs surprise strike always on increase survivability because enemy’s warship cannot retaliate once taken as casualty.
In addition, it increase iconic thematic of Subs (Surprise strike always on) while keeping well known absolute OOB numbers for attack and defense (A2 D1).
On the other side, making DD able to block Submerge is somehow related to ASDIIC capacity to pin down Sub when it dives and is consistent with using DD presence to allow planes to hit Subs.
So DD remain the Anti-Sub weapon and a blocker unit for all surface vessels.
And what Destroyer lose in Anti-Sub capacity, it is compensate by her new higher firepower (@3, 37.5%) and the fact that Sub D8 combat odds (A25% D12.5%) are at lowers value compared to OOB D6 Sub (A33% D16.7%).
Changing to D8 allows this kind of opportunity.
YG, based on your videos I know that you do alot of play testing for your different house rules. Please let us know how the D8 works as well as the anti-sub tech delay because it seems like a very interesting concept. I would maybe like to try this but I would like to hear how well it worked. Thanks!
@Young:
Lets face it… A.S.D.I.C was not deployed as early in the war as oob suggests, 1940 encompassed the “happy days” of German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic, which in turn forced the Allies to develop anti-submarine equipment.
A variation of this idea that you might want to consider is having a system in which the ASW capabilities of destroyers
go up and down – perhaps randomly – during the course of the game, and perhaps only for certain countries. This would be more accurate historically, and perhaps more interesting from a gaming point of view.
The situation you’ve described – at its most fundamental, “the Germans had the advantage during the first half of the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allies had the advantage during the second half” – is basically correct, with the turn-around point being mid-1943. In finer detail, however, the advantage actually swung back and forth between the two sides several times during the war. And it wasn’t a case of “before ASDIC, the Axis had the advantage; after ASDIC, the Allies had the advantage.” ASDIC already existed when the war broke out; the real problem was that the British had tested it in unrealistic conditions in peacetime, and had an overly-optimistic opinion of how effective it was going to be in actual combat and in rough weather. Moreover, ASDIC was only one part of a very long (1939-1945) and large and complex battle involving multiple technologies and tactics on both sides. These technologies (like centimetric radar, high-frequency direction-finding, and acoustic torpedoes) and tactics (like British hunter-killer groups and German wolfpacks) kept evolving during the war; intelligence and code-breaking also played a huge part, as did the weather.
A second point to keep in mind is the following one: the Battle of the Atlantic involved German U-boats (and Italian ones if we include the Mediterranean theatre) and British / Canadian / American naval surface forces. Its course does not reflect the capabilities of subs from other countries and other theatres, nor the ASW capabilities of destroyers from other countries and other theatres, so it would be misleading to automatically apply to all other countries a house rule that reflects the situation that existed specifically between British destroyers and German submarines. You might consider, instead, some sort of selective application. The Pacific theatre equivalent to the Battle of the Atlantic was the US submarine campaign against Japanese convoy routes. The rough parallel in this case is that, initially, US subs were hampered by faulty torpedoes. Once the US fixed that problem, however, Japan steadily lost shipping capacity to US subs because the Japanese gave inadequate attention to convoy protection throughout the war.
@Young:
@Benito:
That’s a great idea! Do you think it would work in 42.2?
Don’t know about 42.2, but in G42 it would certainly save the 2 German subs that the Americans always kill first.
Larry Harris and Krieghund have said that one of those Subs can be moved to an adjacent SZ, YG.
I’ve been reading this thread and not sure how to respond because of this question that keeps coming up in my head.
Why? What have you got against killing subs? Why are you trying to save them?
Why not save the tanks, or the fighters, or the whales?
Why do you want to save all of the subs until the 3rd round?
I’m not saying there’s no reason to do that, I’m just saying that I don’t know what that reason is.
Save the whales!!!
@CWO:
@Young:
Lets face it… A.S.D.I.C was not deployed as early in the war as oob suggests, 1940 encompassed the “happy days” of German U-boat dominance in the Atlantic, which in turn forced the Allies to develop anti-submarine equipment.
The situation you’ve described – at its most fundamental, “the Germans had the advantage during the first half of the Battle of the Atlantic, and the Allies had the advantage during the second half” – is basically correct, with the turn-around point being mid-1943. In finer detail, however, the advantage actually swung back and forth between the two sides several times during the war. And it wasn’t a case of “before ASDIC, the Axis had the advantage; after ASDIC, the Allies had the advantage.” ASDIC already existed when the war broke out; the real problem was that the British had tested it in unrealistic conditions in peacetime, and had an overly-optimistic opinion of how effective it was going to be in actual combat and in rough weather. Moreover, ASDIC was only one part of a very long (1939-1945) and large and complex battle involving multiple technologies and tactics on both sides. These technologies (like centimetric radar, high-frequency direction-finding, and acoustic torpedoes) and tactics (like British hunter-killer groups and German wolfpacks) kept evolving during the war; intelligence and code-breaking also played a huge part, as did the weather.
On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc: Dieppe Uncovered) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.
@Baron:
On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.
David O’Keefe’s theory that the assault on Dieppe was an elaborate diversion to capture a four-rotor Enigma machine appears to be based on the premise that the Dieppe raid otherwise seems unexplainable, especially in view of its high casualty rate. I haven’t read his book…but if it indeed revolves around the concept of “explaining the unexplainable”, then that would be a case of (to translate a Quebecois expression) “looking for noon at four o’clock.” The Dieppe operation had a logical strategic purpose: it was fundamentally a test invasion of continental Europe, intended to help the Allies plan the real invasion that would come two years later. It may plausibly have had an intelligence mission tacked on to it, but its basic purpose was to test concepts and techniques for an amphibious invasion of Fortress Europe. And the reason it produced so many casualties is that many of those concepts and techniques were disastrously flawed, including the core concept of trying to capture a port city head-on. Dieppe basically taught the Allies how NOT to mount an invasion, and they learned their lesson; for example, in June 1944, they landed on open beaches between the major ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre (which were both heavily fortified), not in the ports themselves.
@CWO:
@Baron:
On code-breaking, did you heard about this these (put forward in History Channel doc) that August 1942 Dieppe raid was in fact an ultra-secret pinch to capture new codes and enigma machines unnoticed in the harbor while the other troops were making the diversion? The famous Ian Flemming was part of this intelligence raid.
At that time, for about 4 months, the Allies were no more able to break Enigma code and were having a much harder time to watch subs.David O’Keefe’s theory that the assault on Dieppe was an elaborate diversion to capture a four-rotor Enigma machine appears to be based on the premise that the Dieppe raid otherwise seems unexplainable, especially in view of its high casualty rate. I haven’t read his book…but if it indeed revolves around the concept of “explaining the unexplainable”, then that would be a case of (to translate a Quebecois expression) “looking for noon at four o’clock.” The Dieppe operation had a logical strategic purpose: it was fundamentally a test invasion of continental Europe, intended to help the Allies plan the real invasion that would come two years later. It may plausibly have had an intelligence mission tacked on to it, but its basic purpose was to test concepts and techniques for an amphibious invasion of Fortress Europe. And the reason it produced so many casualties is that many of those concepts and techniques were disastrously flawed, including the core concept of trying to capture a port city head-on. Dieppe basically taught the Allies how NOT to mount an invasion, and they learned their lesson; for example, in June 1944, they landed on open beaches between the major ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre (which were both heavily fortified), not in the ports themselves.
“looking for noon at four o’clock.”
Do you meant:
“To look for noon at two pm”?
translate from “Chercher midi a quatorze heures.”
@Baron:
Do you meant:
“To look for noon at two pm”?
I’ve heard both “chercher midi a quatre heures” and “chercher midi a quatorze heures”. I quoted the first variant and you quoted the second variant. They’re both popular restatements of Occam’s Razor, which is the principle that when there are competing explanations for a given problem the simplest explanation is the most likely one to be correct, which is the point I was trying to make.
In that case, the more important thing for Allies was to test an amphibious assault instead of making the Intelligence Raid, right?
P.S.
If the historical meaning of this expression is true, then you can find noon at 16h.
It said that, in past times (circa 1501+), Italians had the habit to start zero hour just after dusk, then from 8 PM to noon, it makes 16 hours.
I would leave sub at D2. Still gives Germany something without changing the rules for subs.
Also for the Pacific side too.
After playing some games then you’ll know if u need to change it.
You are not a daredevil SS…
:-D
You don’t want to see a lot of Nautilus Subs roaming during first two game rounds?
