AARHE 1939 Map?

Did some real brief digging around on the wiki and found this…

The last part seems to confirm those speculations in Reason 2 Marc mentioned aboved. Though I think there might still be enough in here to justify a starting Strat B for the Russians.

The fact that the Russians are unlikely to ever be able to afford another one would put a ceiling on it, and give a nod to the fact that the Soviet strategic bombing campaigns in WW2 were dwarfed by those of the Western Allies. The logic there I guess would be that Britain and America can readily expand their bomber arsenal through purchasing, whereas the Soviets are basically stuck using what they start out with, or risk just getting crushed in the land war haha.

Anyhow, here’s quick copy paster…

"Soviet strategic bombing
See also: Shuttle bombing and Operation Frantic
The first Soviet offensive bomber campaign was directed against the Romanian oilfields in the summer of 1941.[185] In response to a German raid on Moscow on the night of 21�22 July 1941, Soviet Naval Aviation launched a series of seven raids against Germany, primarily Berlin, between the night of 7�8 August and 3�4 September. These attacks were undertaken by between four and fifteen aircraft�beginning on 11 August the new Tupolev TB-7�from the island of Saaremaa, base of the 1st Torpedo Air Regiment.[185] (At least one raid of the 81st Air Division took off from Pushkin.) Besides thirty tonnes of bombs, they also dropped leaflets with Joseph Stalin’s defiant speech of 3 July. The Soviets sent a total of 549 long-range bombers over German territory in all of 1941.[185]

In March 1942 the strategic bombing arm of the Soviet Union was reorganized as the Long Range Air Force (ADD). It raided Berlin from 26�29 August and again on the night of 9�10 September with 212 planes.[185] It raided Helsinki for the first time on 24 August, Budapest on 4�5 and 9�10 September and Bucharest on 13�14 September. The German-occupied Polish cities of Krakow and Warsaw were not exempt, but the bombers concentrated primarily on military targets.[185] There were 1,114 sorties over Germany in 1942. In March 1943 there was a strategic shift: in preparation for the Kursk Offensive, the bombers were directed against the German railroads behind the front.[185] In April the Long Range Air Force expanded to eight air corps and eleven independent divisions containing 700 planes. After the Kursk preparations, the Soviets turned their attention to administrative and industrial targets in East Prussia in April. With 920 aircraft taking part, they dropped 700 tonnes of bombs there. The largest Soviet bomb of the war, an 11,000-pound weapon, was dropped on Konigsberg during one of these raids.[185]

Throughout 1943, the Soviets attempted to give the impression of cooperation between their bombers and those of the West.[185] In February 1944 they again shifted priority, this time towards terror bombing, with the goal of knocking Finland and Hungary out of the war.[185] Helsinki was struck by 733 bombers on the night of 6�7 February, by 367 on the 15�16th and 850 on the 25�26th. A total of 2,386 tonnes of bombs were dropped.[185] Budapest was hit four straight nights from 13�20 September with a total of 8,000 tonnes by 1,129 bombers. The Soviets flew 4,466 sorties into enemy territory in the year 1944. In December the Long Range Air Force was reorganized as the 18th Air Army.[185]

The main task of the 18th Air Army was to support the final offensive against Germany, but it also undertook raids against Berlin, Breslau, Danzig and Konigsberg.[185] In total, 7,158 Soviet aircraft dropped 6,700 tonnes of bombs on Germany during the war, a modest 3.1% of Soviet bomber sorties, a mere 0.5% of all Allied “strategic” sorties against German-occupied territory and a measly 0.2% of all bombs dropped on it.[185]

After the war, Marxist historians in the Soviet Union and East Germany claimed that the Soviet strategic bombing campaign was limited by moral qualms over bombing civilian centres.[185] One early bombing theorist, Vasili Chripin, whose theories influenced the Soviet Union’s first strategic bombing guidelines (1936) and the service regulations of 26 January 1940, drew back from terror bombing as advocated by Western theorists.[185] The Spanish Civil War also convinced Soviet war planners that the air force was most effective when used in close cooperation with ground forces. Nonetheless, after the war, Marshal Vasili Sokolovsky admitted that the Soviets would have gladly launched a strategic bombing offensive had they the capability.[185] In reality, the Soviets never geared aircraft production towards long-range bombers, and so never had enough to mount an effective campaign. The land-based nature of warfare on the Eastern Front also required closer cooperation between the air forces and ground troops than did, for example, the defence of Great Britain.[185]"

That note 185 heavily referenced above shows the following as its main/only source… so there’s that too I guess. Little lackluster, but you know what they say about beggers lol

Horst Boog; Derry Cook-Radmore, trans., “Part I: The Strategic Air War in Europe and Air Defence of the Reich, 1943�44”, in Germany and the Second World War, Volume VII: The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia, 1943�44/5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 [Stuttgart: Deutsche Veralgs-Anstalt GmbH, 2005]), 153�58.

Hmm.  Good point, knp.  I’m beginning to see why Larry chose the start point he did  :-P

Gargantua,  I’m beginning to like your idea of a double impulse for Germany.  It would probably be simpler.  I have a copy of the old Xeno rules, with the regular sized map and the giant blown-up version.  But I hadn’t looked at the rule book in years.

Actually, the more I think about it, there probably wouldn’t be much to gain (in the way of game-play fun) with a Sept. '39 start.  I was originally thinking it would give the Axis a couple of extra turns to shape the battlefield before the US and USSR got into it, in exchange for having to do some extra conquest.  It might also give the French player more options than just getting punched in the groin and being taken out before he can make a single decision.

I think Summer of '42 would be the simplest start point, but it seems so late in the war somehow.  At that point all the decisions that might have made a difference have already been made, and fate has locked everyone in to repeating the historical outcome.  I know the games don’t actually go that way.  It’s just a mental hang-up for me  :-)

Maybe I’ll rethink an idea I had for a Summer of '41 scenario starting with Germany massed on the Soviet border for Barbarossa.  Since a single turn could represent 6 months, Barbarossa could be early on turn 1, and Pearl Harbor could happen right at the end.  That would the need for US entry rules, and most of the neutrals who were historically dragged in would already be in play.

ok lets do it.

by the way, its buggy at the moment

*some units can move in both combat and non-combat

*not landing friendly air units (which you can’t control) would render them destroyed
(eg. Japanese planes in the axis collided “turn”)

*you can SBR victory cities (which is not too bad since in AARHE SBR is not restricted to ICs)

yeah whats what I meant
it should be the “double red lines” canal symbol
since thats how our rules have it for Black Sea

just instead of in the middle of two territories (like Anglo-Egypt and Trans-Jordon) it’ll be  fully inside Turkey (like Panama)

replace
“its income cannot be spent in other territories.
That income and only that income can be spent in its IC or VC during purchase units phase this turn.
That income is forfeited if not spent this turn.”

with
“The blockaded territory’s income can only be spent in its own VC or IC. Income from other territories may not be spent in the blockaded territory’s VC or IC.
If the blockade territory’s income is not spent this turn it is forfeited.”

yeah not much to be said here
nothing “new”

right.