i think a good example would be Dunkirk. Talk about how Germany surprised the Allies by sweeping down and cutting off their ability to retreat from there. Even though the Allies evacuated a surprisingly large amount of troops by sea, the units that were left behind were annihilated (sandwiched).

from wikipedia’s overview of wwii:

Germany withdrew from the Balkans and held Hungary until February 1945.

Romania turned against Germany in August 1944, threatening German lines of retreat from the Ukraine.

ok I’ve put it in

now

1. what about attacker? why and why not

2. what about naval combat? why and why not

3. need example of “sandwiched” in WWII for iltalics in draft

1. I don’t know what specifically about the attacker retreats you are asking about. Since there are no territories of unresolved combats that are currently under their control this sandwiching rule can’t affect attackers.

2. I think we can make naval retrats better. What if we say defender naval retreats stay in that sea zone and move out on their next turn? The defneder also has the choice of not moving and sending in reinforcment naval units to attack in that sea zone again (a faint retreat). We should restrict where the units could retreat so that they still can’t move where attacking units came from. The defender would remember (or write down?) where he can and can’t retreat to until his next turn.

3. Battle of Kursk

Here is from Wikipedia (notice what I made bold):

On July 4, the Wehrmacht launched a much-delayed offensive against the Soviet Union at the Kursk salient. Their intentions were known by the Soviets, and they hastened to defend the salient with an enormous system of earthwork defenses. Both sides massed their armor for what became a decisive military engagement. The Germans attacked from both the north and south of the salient and hoped to meet in the middle, cutting off the salient and trapping 60 Soviet divisions. The German offensive was ground down as little progress was made through the Soviet defenses. The Soviets then brought up their reserves, and the largest tank battle of the war occurred near the city of Prokhorovka. The Germans had exhausted their armored forces and could not stop the Soviet counter-offensive that threw them back across their starting positions.

Germans trapped the Soviets behind enemy lines so the Soviets had no where to retreat. They would have died had the Soviet reinforcements not saved them. This example doesn’t result in the killing of the would-be retreaters so maybe we should use a different example?

why are poeple so opposed to this “instant killing of retreats” idea? It’s not that big a thing that will hardly ever come up, it really simplifies the game a lot, and if it does come up I think it invokes some intersting stategy to the game and is not that unrealistic anyway.

Here’s an example of what I’m talking about… let’s say Russia has a large force in Karelia, a small force in West Russia and controls Archangel with a negligible force. Let’s say Germany has a large force in Eastern Europe, a small force in both Belorussia and Ukraine. It’s Germany’s turn, and Germany decides to send in the large E. Europe and small Belorussian armies to attack Karelia. Also, Germany decides to send in the small Ukraine force to attack West Russia. Germany decides to conduct the Karelia battle first. The Russian player decided to retreat from Karelia first chance he gets. He can retreat to Archangel without any risk, but a retreat to West Russia would allow him to attack Ukraine next turn and surprise the Germans and thus be a better retreat option. Russia is now at a strategic dilemma… should he do the safe retreat into Archangel (where there’s no unresolved combat) or the riskier but better positioned retreat to West Russia? Well, the Russian player needs to weigh the odds of losing the West Russia battle. Even though it’s not likely the Ukraine force will deafeat the West Russian defending force, if he happens to lose the West Russia battle and decided to retreat the Karelia army there, then the large force coming down from Karelia will be sandwiched in and killed off. This would give him a large loss, but still at an unlikely outcome (because the attacking Ukraine army is so small compared to the West Russia army).

The type of thinking that the Russian player is doing is the type of strategic thinking that I would like to introduce to the game. I think the game needs more strategic thinking in that respect. Not only is the Russian player doing more strategic thinking, but the German player made a nice move to put the Russian player in this difficult spot. The German player didn’t need to attack West Russia with such a weaker force, but he did it just to put Russia in this tough position. This is added strategic maneuvering on both player’s parts, IMO.Â

I hate to say something can’t be done. You might be able to do it, but it would probably add too much complexity for what it will be bringing to the game. Bridges/rivers were very important in WWII tactics, but it does seem very hard to introduce in the game.

Here’s an idea (forgetting about complexity for a moment), have a list of historical “bottlenecks” during WWII. I use the general term bottlenecks to refer to any key points such as bridges, mountain passes, etc… Each bottleneck connects 2 different territories. Western Europe and Germany are connected by the Rhine, for example. At the start of the game, all bottlenecks are “open”, that is that there is no penalty for moving between the respective connected territories (in this case W. Europe to Germany and vise versa). During a player’s turn who controls at least one of those 2 territories may destroy the bottleneck (i.e. blow the bridge/ mountain pass road, etc…). Until the bottleneck is repaired (cost of 1 IPC and 1 full turn to build maybe? I don’t know, we can discuss that later.), attacking units have some penalty (such as -1 attack strength) when moving from 1 of the territories to the other (i.e. moving from W. Europe to Germany or vise versa).

Maybe other bottlenecks could include the Burma Road, the Alps (connects Southern and Western Europe), Yellow River (connects China and Manchuria), etc…

This idea needs some work but it’s not too bad for coming up with it on the fly like that, right?

The solution must be universal and easy. The just die thing can be rigged in such a way to kill too many units for nothing.

I’d like to point out that “many units can be killed for nothing” only when the defender chooses to retreat there. I would look at the combat in the territory I’m retreated into, and only choose to retreat there if there was only <5% chance I’d lose that battle. If I then lose that battle by some miracle, then I knew my odds and took that chance. The moral of this example is that “many units are killed” only if the defender accepts the risk. The defender knows what he’s doing, let him choose. And why is the defender force sandwiched between the 2 enemy forces an unrealistic annihilation anyway? I like the rule… simple and justifiably realistic IMO.

So will players have to write down how many attacking units are coming from which territory in case they decide to retreat? How else will the attacker remember how many units came from which territories?

Defender Retreat, Naval Combat, Extra Move

Yeah thats often the main argument against having Defender Retreat at all. The idea of attacker deciding retreat is interesting. In fact the nature of naval combat is different to land combat, such that I think the player that remains (whether attack or defender) should have this ability.

I’m glad you can see my point as to how that can be realistic. I think that you are right that it’s better if we have the defender choose where the attaker can retreat. For example, in the old rules, Germany could attack Karelia with a large force from Eastern Europe and a small backtracking force Archangel. If combat wasn’t resolved by the frist round, then Germany could retreat everyone to Archangel and thus gaining an extra move (move 2 not 1) for all those units in Eastern Europe to get to Archangel in one move. If the defender (Russia in the example) picks where the attacker (Germany) could retreat then Germany wouldn’t be able to do this unrealistic maneuver. I think this would be a good change.

So if its a USSR NA it would have to be standard. Like Germany’s Biltzreig NA.
But when people don’t play with NA we could have a problem.

Why can’t NAs be thought of as more standard? I know we initially thought of them as non-standard, but why can’t we challenge that idea? I think people would like it because it’s shows a history lesson… what would have happened in WWII if there were or weren’t a Russian Winter? People can see for themselves by either using or not using this NA.

Attacker Retreat

Attacker may choose to retreat some or all of his units. Retreating naval units must retreat to adjacent territories which they came from.

Defender Retreat

Defender may choose to retreat some or all of his units after attacker declares intention to press on with the attack. Retreating naval units must retreat to friendly adjacent sea zones with no unresolved combat. In the case where all adjacent friendly territories have pending combat, the involved combats are resolved together, cycle by cycle and retreats can only be made to friendly territories with no pending combat.

So the attacker is more restricted than the defender in where he can retreat? What if we made the attacker choose where the defender can retreat? I think it’s justified because the attacking units shield where the defending units can and can’t retreat. Obviously, the defending units can never retreat where the attacking units came from. This would invoke a little more strategy to the game.

I’m worried that if we keep the rule as it is now that the defender will retreat naval units just so they will be able to attack a space 1 extra move away.