Was WWII necessary?

@DiegoMaxwell

Congratulations to Mr. Prewitt. It should be noted, however, that France’s highest order of merit is called the Legion of Honour (Légion d’honneur), not the Legion of Armour, and also that France doesn’t actually have knighthoods in the same sense as Britain does. “Chevalier” (knight) is indeed one of the Legion of Honour’s five levels, and the name is a holdover from the days when France still had an aristocracy, but the French nobility system went out the window with the French Revolution. I once saw a series of amusing cartoons depicting what life in France would be like today if the Bourbon monarchy hadn’t fallen, and one of them showed an irate air traveler standing at the ticket counter of “Royal Air France” and telling the ticket agent “But I’m a baron and I have a confirmed reservation!” The agent replies, “I’m sorry, sir, but the Duke of So-and-so has precedence over you, so we gave him your seat.” In fairness, the same sort of thing actually happens in real-life republican France. A few years ago, there was scandal involving one of the major D-Day anniversaries (I think it was the 50th one), when the French government contacted various hotels in Normany and appropriated some of their existing reservations so that various French officials could have rooms for the event. Some of those rooms, however, had been reserved by foreign veterans of the D-Day invasion. When the story broke on the front page of French newspapers (under such headlines as “Our Liberators Insulted!”), public opinion was outraged and the French government beat a hasty retreat. The prevailing editorial opinion over this affair was: Do this to our own citizens if you want, but don’t do this to the heroes who ended the occupation of France.

Here’s a great project that a filmmaker has been working on. And I think it’s especially nice that he’s a young man, not someone from a generation closer to WWII.

Thursday, February 28, 2019 6:38AM EST

A young American filmmaker is on a mission to interview every last Second World War veteran to share the stories of as many combat veterans as possible – before it is too late.

Rishi Sharma has spent the past three years documenting the lives of living Second World War veterans in the U.S., U.K. and Canada for his non-profit organization Heroes of the Second World War.

The average age of Second World War vet is now 93 years old, and the number of survivors is slowly diminishing with the passing of time.

After three years of visiting seniors’ homes to record veterans’ stories, Sharma says has filmed more than a thousand interviews.

https://www.ctvnews.ca/lifestyle/american-filmmaker-on-a-mission-to-interview-every-last-second-world-war-veteran-1.4316271

Good post. However, I would like to make a correction. During WWII, Winston Churchill (later joined by FDR) imposed a food blockade on Germany. The Hunger Plan was the Nazi government’s effort to deal with the resulting food crisis. The Hunger Plan involved the starvation of captured Soviet cities; so that the food which would otherwise have fed those cities could instead be used to prevent starvation elsewhere in the Reich.

The plan had never been to starve Soviet POWs. Those POWs were conscripted to work in German weapons factories. Everyone, from Hitler on down, recognized those POWs were an essential component of Germany’s war machine. That is why Hitler ordered the POWs to be fed.

However, the Reich lacked the manpower necessary to cordon off captured Soviet cities from the Soviet countryside. Due to the lack of that manpower, the Nazis were unable to prevent food from flowing from the captured Soviet countryside to captured Soviet cities. The Hunger Plan mostly failed: the planned starvation in captured Soviet cities mostly did not occur. That failure didn’t result in fewer deaths. Just different deaths than those the Nazi government had envisioned with their Hunger Plan. Due to the failure of the Hunger Plan, the man tasked with feeding the Soviet POWs didn’t have the food he needed to carry out the order Hitler had given to him: the order to feed the Soviet POWs. Because it was physically impossible for that man to carry out his orders, millions of Soviet POWs starved to death while in German captivity.

The Nazi leadership had deep-seated fears about Germany’s food situation. One of the reasons Hitler wanted lebensraum was so that Germany could physically feed itself, even if Britain imposed a food blockade. (As it did in WWI, and as Churchill again did in WWII.) The two most vital resources Hitler required from the western Soviet Union were food and petroleum. For Barbarossa to have been successful from the Nazi perspective, Germany needed to capture a considerable portion of Soviet oilfields, and a considerable portion of Soviet farmland.

To address your question of what Hitler should have done differently: he should have placed von Manstein in charge of Barbarossa in its entirety. Doing so would have resulted in a far greater level of success. Moscow and Leningrad almost certainly would have fallen in 1941, paving the way for additional German successes in 1942.

@Narvik:

That myth could have fooled me. I always believed that Hitler attacked Russia because he had promised to do so in his book Mein Kampf, written in 1920, long before Stalin was even remotely able to make plans about invading Germany

You will recall that Hitler was a soldier, who later became a politician. Like other democratically elected politicians, Hitler promised good things to his constituents. As a general rule, democratically elected politicians make many promises, but seldom deliver on those promises. (At least that’s been the pattern in my country, the United States.)

The Soviet Union was the most evil major regime in human history. Hitler’s pledge to bring that criminal regime to justice was a very lofty promise. Ridding the world of Soviet evil would have helped the world more than a cure for cancer. Unless you or someone you know was the victim of Soviet crimes against humanity, it’s hard to fully appreciate the full magnitude of the promise to rid the world of Soviet evil.

However, when a politician pledges to make the world a better place in some way, there is a good chance he’s being insincere. Was Hitler’s promise to make the world better (by destroying the evil of communism) just another hollow campaign promise from another democratically-elected politician? My sense is that Hitler’s promise to destroy communism was made sincerely, and that he really did intend to follow through on the commitment he’d made.

In 1940, Hitler thought he had the luxury of putting off that invasion until a later time. Sure, he would have invaded eventually. But in the meantime, his trade agreement with the Soviet Union was helping Germany wage war against Britain. So why not clean up the mess in the west now (for example by conquering Britain itself, or at least a good share of the British Empire), while putting off the invasion of the U.S.S.R. until some other time?

But the Soviet Union undertook a number of measures which, collectively, convinced Hitler he no longer had the time he’d once thought. A few months after the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, the U.S.S.R. invaded Finland. Finland’s Mannerheim Line was probably the best-defended terrain on the surface of the Earth. While the Germans found a way to go around the Maginot Line, the terrain left the Soviet invasion force with no choice but to plow straight through the Mannerheim Line. Such a feat was widely considered impossible, but the Soviets achieved it in only a few months’ time. After having conquered Finland’s defenses, Stalin allowed Finland to retain the bulk of its land. The Soviet government announced the Red Army had fought poorly in that war, and Hitler naively believed those propaganda claims. (Hitler was not normally one to gullibly accept communist lies. In this case, however, Soviet propaganda dovetailed with poor Russian performance in WWI, and with Hitler’s racial beliefs about Slavic inferiority.)

Shortly after his success against Finland, Stalin demanded a slice of Romania. The Romanians had no choice but to acquiesce to that demand, because their nation was far less well-defended than Finland had been. Germany was utterly dependent on Swedish iron ore, and on Romanian oil. With the Mannerheim Line conquered, Stalin was excellently positioned to take the rest of Finland, and to cut Germany off from its Swedish iron ore. With the Soviets having helped themselves to a large slice of Romanian land, and with them strongly hinting at a desire for another slice, the Romanian oilfields were also in jeopardy. During 1940 it had become increasingly clear that the primary focus of Soviet expansionism was westward, and not (as Stalin had claimed) southward.

Hitler began his preparations to invade the Soviet Union several months after the U.S.S.R. had begun gearing up to invade Germany. However, Germany proved quicker on its feet than the U.S.S.R. Partly that was because Germany had a better road and rail network than the Soviets. That was also partly because the Germans had fewer men and machines to ship; and needed to ship them over a much shorter distance than was the case for Soviet men and machines. Finally, Germany had the best-run military of any major participant in WWII. The competence gap between the Germans and Soviets was much larger than Soviet prewar planning had suggested. Germany invaded on June 22nd; whereas the Soviet troop movement to the front had been scheduled for completion on July 10th, 1941.

Narvik wrote:

On top of that, the average and casual Italian at this point had a very low morale, since they by now knew that Italy would loose, even if the Axis won the war.

That statement rings false. Germany did not have plans to enslave Italy after the war. In his writings, Hitler pointed out that if a nation wants allies, it must establish a reputation for treating its allies well. It was a logical conclusion for the leader of any nation, and I have seen no evidence to suggest Hitler had deviated from that logic.

I agree Italian morale was low. There were several reasons for that.

Mussolini seized power through military means. His views were not necessarily representative of those of most Italians. Mussolini did not build a strong relationship with the Italian people after seizing office. He had no reason to rely on the Italian people to stick with him through thick and thin. Most Italians did not believe in Mussolini’s dream of a revived Roman Empire, and thought his foreign adventures were rather pointless. Italy was unprepared for war. It lacked a strong military culture and strong military traditions. Its army was not afforded the weapons which would have been necessary to destroy Britain’s Matilda tanks. Its military leadership was lacking. It’s hard to maintain high morale when it’s obvious that your opponent has a much better sense of what he’s doing than your own military has of what it’s doing.

Note that all four problems existed before Hitler came to power in Germany. It’s not as though Mussolini’s Italy had a great military tradition, which then collapsed once Hitler and Mussolini became allies. On the contrary: Italy’s military tradition and military preparedness were greatly lacking both before and after Hitler and Mussolini became allies.

@Clyde85:

@ABWorsham:

I would be aiming for a German victory in WWI, the Allies had their chance and screwed up.

A German victory in WW1 would be ideal here, but I believe that you wouldn’t need to bring and weapons back with you, just a history book, and point to the few mistakes Germany made and say, “ok, now don’t do that, do this instead”.

If I had to choose a weapon though, i’m kinda torn. On the one hand, bringing back the StuG III would be great to help the Germans break the dead lock without a doubt, but I wonder how well German industry could support them once they went into action, long enough to break the front? Maybe. On the other hand, if I were to bring back the MG42, I know that German industry could support and and keep these weapons running, meaning longer usage and a greater chance of this weapon tipping the balance for a German victory.Â

Awesome points, the MG 42 would have shredded Allied ranks between the lines.

Here’s a weapon which could more properly be described as “low-profile” rather than underrated: the proximity-fused anti-aircraft artillery shell.  Proximity fuses were essentially miniature radar sets, built small enough to fit in a shell and tough enough to withstand the tremendous kick of being fired from a gun.  They were quite a technical achievement and they increased the chance that a shell would bring down an airplane even if it didn’t hit it directly.  The Americans kept the proximity fuse very hush-hush; if I recall correctly, it was restricted to being used at sea, where unexploded shells couldn’t be recovered by the enemy and studied for their secrets.

Another effective weapon whose details were kept secret from the American public was the shaped-charge warhead.  I own a laminated WWII magazine advertisement page which tells Americans about a revolutionary new anti-armour weapon called the bazooka; it makes the point that GIs are finding it very effective against German tanks, but it adds that the exact details of how it works and what it looks like can’t be revealed.  As it happens, the Germans knew all about the Munroe Effect (discovered as far back as the 19th century) and had their own shaped-charge anti-tank weapon: the Panzerfaust.  An amusing example of the public on your side being kept in the dark more than the military people on the enemy side.

Rommel praised the fighting ability Australian troops in North Africa, he considered 9th Australian the best division in Africa.