I’m all for HRs for whatever reason people may want to apply them to thier games. I guess I’m just not finding it all that attractive to strengthen TBs automatically while nerfing the fighter even at a lower cost.
I think that there are many players who would like to see a different way of allocating casualties between air and surface units as well as how they interact since 1914 has come out. I also think this would essentially need to go further than a few stat changes and or house rules. I am of the belief that to do this you would need to create a variant.
There are a lot of posts suggesting an entire change to how combat is conducted in order to make combat more realistic and make players allocate casualties based on type of unit rather than simply taking the weakest cheapest unit as a casualty.
I personally think that it requires a variant that departs from the OOB methodology.
This is an interesting point you raise, and it’s made me wonder something about the long-running debates we’ve seen on this message board about the combat values and the purchase prices that should be allocated to particular units (notably in the case of the TacBomber, over which there has been much heated argument). Some of these arguments have revolved around the question of whether such-and-such a set of combat values is historically accurate, either when the unit is examined on its own or when it’s paired with another unit. I’ve had moments of frustration over these debates because, at times, I’ve found myself wondering how on earth it’s possible for so many different people to have such radically different views of what does (and does not) constitute a “historically accurate” house rule. I think that Toblerone’s post points to a possible explanation. Global 1940 is a strategic-level game, which therefore (appropriately) depicts the performance of weapon systems at an extremely high level of abstraction and also features a very abstract combat-resolution mechanism. Given that level of abstraction, is it any wonder that there have been disagreements about whether a particular set of unit combat values is realistic or not?
Combat values, by their nature, involve specific numbers (such as A1/D1/M1/C1, to use a random example), but that specificity creates the misleading illusion that it has a one-to-one relationship with the real-world performance characteristics of real-world weapons. These weapon performances are described by specific numbers too, but with the difference that those figures are incredibly complex. Just looking at the performance of a single battleship main gun for instance (and ignoring the rest of the ship, including the fire-control system), we run into such variables as caliber, barrel length, rifling twist rate, bagged propellant weight and composition, projectile characteristics (shape, casing composition, ballistic cap design, proportion of explosive charge to overall mass, type of explosive charge, fusing mechanism), and so on and so forth. Modeling all of these things accurately – and in combination with all the other components of a weapon platform – is virtually impossible in a tactical-scale game, let alone in a strategic-level one.
I’m not saying that we shouldn’t strive to come up with house rules that are historically credible; goodness knows that I’ve argued for historical accuracy time after time in the comments I’ve made in HR dicussion threads. What I’m realizing now, however, is that there’s very little point in trying to prove that a particular set of combat values is (or is not) historically accurate because, given A&A’s high level of abstraction, such a thing can’t be proven in an empirically demonstrable way. The argument has occasionally been made that A&A is an inaccurate depiction of history (and thus that we don’t need to worry about whether a particular house rule is historically accurate), but I’d phrase that concept differently. I’d say that A&A is an impressionistic depiction of history (due to its high level of abstraction), and I’d say that this has been a fundamental reason for some of the disagreements we’ve seen here: because, in the absence of demonstrably accurate fine-scale modeling, a person’s reaction to a particular HR will hinge on whether it feels right to them, on whether it fits their personal conception of whether Method X of depicting combat at such a high level of abstraction is more realistic than Method Y.
I could agree with that Marc. One point I’ve tried to explain with difficulty at times, in different conversations on the board, is that the way the game functions is not totally concrete and fluctuates with the flow of events. Also that time is not concrete nor linear at all times.
The first turn for example is linear in time in comparison to the second turn. However during the first turn all the nation’s turns are  sometimes occurring at the same time, not in real life but the representation of the game. Larry once stated that in game term time is more like a rubber band rather than strictly linear.
Like we know in global Germany is probably going to attack France first, which is linear. We also know that the German player will probably attack elsewhere, and may roll that battle first. The way the mechanics of the game work, it’s possible that both battles are actually happening at the same time the way time is simulated in the game.
The other thought is about units. 2 infantry fighting in Midway don’t necessarily represent 2 infantry fighting in Moscow. What I mean is, is that 2 infantry in Midway may represent 4000 troops, but 2 infantry in Moscow may represent 40,000 troops. They don’t really represent all troops just mostly what that unit consists of. Either way in game terms, two infantry are two infantry.
Now we could suppose that if those troops moved to Moscow we could assume that along their travel they gained supply and reinforcements which is not represented by anything in the game. The same could be said for supply in general. It happens or is assumed to happen in the game but there really is no way to quantify it within the game. The IPC system is a good example of this.
So yes CWO Marc, your points are well taken and I agree with them. I must say I still like to hose rule and modify the game, but I don’t think we can ever say with absoluteness why any idea is good or bad pertaining to concrete figures that don’t necessarily exist. I think it is all subject to our view of the abstract.
@CWO:
I guess I’m just not finding it all that attractive to strengthen TBs automatically while nerfing the fighter even at a lower cost.
This is an interesting point you raise, and it’s made me wonder something about the long-running debates we’ve seen on this message board about the combat values and the purchase prices that should be allocated to particular units (notably in the case of the TacBomber, over which there has been much heated argument). Some of these arguments have revolved around the question of whether such-and-such a set of combat values is historically accurate, either when the unit is examined on its own or when it’s paired with another unit.
I’ve had moments of frustration over these debates because, at times, I’ve found myself wondering how on earth it’s possible for so many different people to have such radically different views of what does (and does not) constitute a “historically accurate” house rule. I think that Toblerone’s post points to a possible explanation. Global 1940 is a strategic-level game, which therefore (appropriately) depicts the performance of weapon systems at an extremely high level of abstraction and also features a very abstract combat-resolution mechanism. Given that level of abstraction, is it any wonder that there have been disagreements about whether a particular set of unit combat values is realistic or not?
Combat values, by their nature, involve specific numbers (such as A1/D1/M1/C1, to use a random example), but that specificity creates the misleading illusion that it has a one-to-one relationship with the real-world performance characteristics of real-world weapons.
These weapon performances are described by specific numbers too, but with the difference that those figures are incredibly complex.
Just looking at the performance of a single battleship main gun for instance (and ignoring the rest of the ship, including the fire-control system), we run into such variables as caliber, barrel length, rifling twist rate, bagged propellant weight and composition, projectile characteristics (shape, casing composition, ballistic cap design, proportion of explosive charge to overall mass, type of explosive charge, fusing mechanism), and so on and so forth. Modeling all of these things accurately – and in combination with all the other components of a weapon platform – is virtually impossible in a tactical-scale game, let alone in a strategic-level one.
I’m not saying that we shouldn’t strive to come up with house rules that are historically credible; goodness knows that I’ve argued for historical accuracy time after time in the comments I’ve made in HR dicussion threads.
What I’m realizing now, however, is that there’s very little point in trying to prove that a particular set of combat values is (or is not) historically accurate because, given A&A’s high level of abstraction, such a thing can’t be proven in an empirically demonstrable way. The argument has occasionally been made that A&A is an inaccurate depiction of history (and thus that we don’t need to worry about whether a particular house rule is historically accurate), but I’d phrase that concept differently. I’d say that A&A is an impressionistic depiction of history (due to its high level of abstraction), and I’d say that this has been a fundamental reason for some of the disagreements we’ve seen here: because, in the absence of demonstrably accurate fine-scale modeling, a person’s reaction to a particular HR will hinge on whether it feels right to them, on whether it fits their personal conception of whether Method X of depicting combat at such a high level of abstraction is more realistic than Method Y.
There is many interesting points in your long, and probably time-taken to write, post. I bolded what IMO are important points, some of which I will comments freely.
Your perspective on the topics, is what I called a “meta-langage”.
We take a pause on the “what” of the discussion (the topics), to better look at the “how” (the process of investigation).
Usually it happens when people are name-callings, but this time, as everyone is having polite interventions, it is more a way to find an escape road between what could become irreductible POVs on the topic. I don’t think we are at this limit but your post help to think about this:
How do we decides that a OOB rules or units is more or less historically accurate than an other OOB units or HRuled?
Clearly, we have our guts feeling at first, this intuitive response cannot be neglect.
It is like anyone can have while typing a word and suddenly doesn’t feel comfortable with a specific way of writing a word.
It is based on the knowledge of the game, of WWII and all the weapons and combat at all level.
It takes often time to translate in appropriate words what this feeling was revealing about our understanding of all these aspects.
Once this said, I will try to suggest additional criterias:
it is overall symbolic depiction and consistency.
The units and rules give us somekind of description (more or less distorted) of the interaction between real WWII units and situations.
The more we can associate an individual, a tactical and a strategical caracteristics to it, the more we feel the accuracy of a rule or unit.
Once this done, here come the consistency criteria which play a role, because all aspects cannot be taken into account in any abstract game.
The more elements we can keep, within a simple rule, the better. The other(s) is (are) a left-over for additional HR, enhancement, etc.
Now, coming back to the topic on TcB (vs Fg), I’m almost sure we can get a general agreement on the main traits which describe Fg and TcB.
However, what someone prefer to keep to create the best historical depiction, and at what level and within what kind of game mechanics.
Here is a lot of debatable questions.
I’m sure it possible to continue this thread by, at least, sharing are different historical view and see what kind of consensus we can obtain.
Well taking everything into account on the topic. SBs get an attack boost from fighters and tanks already. This could be extended to cruisers and also apply to TBs on defense when combined with any of the three units. It makes a case to buy cruisers. It makes the case for surface/air coordination at the strategic level both offesively and defensively without too much complication.
Well taking everything into account on the topic. SBs get an attack boost from fighters and tanks already. This could be extended to cruisers and also apply to TBs on defense when combined with any of the three units. It makes a case to buy cruisers. It makes the case for surface/air coordination at the strategic level both offesively and defensively without too much complication.
Are you on fire? You seem to have a lot of ideas in the last few days.
This idea about extending the pairing bonus to cruiser is original.
This give me an example about the symbolic depiction I was talking about.
From a game perspective, it is a legitimate goal to provide some incentive to buy cruiser unit.
(Symbolic level: I think it was historically the core ship of all navies, I may be wrong.
But if it is the case, then the actual OOB cost creates distortion since it is a seldom buying.
And give the false impression it was not a worthy weapon during WWII compared to destroyers, submarines, and carriers.)
However, at first glance, it seems wrong (my guts feeling) to provide Cruiser the capacity to boost TacB on attack.
To agree with you on this specific point, I would need more explanations on the historical background of the use of Torpedoes and Dive Bombers with Cruisers, and how it provides a real case for surface/air coordination at the strategic level both offensively and defensively without too much complication. Because, I don’t see how a plane going far away from his carrier group can need or provide helps to cruisers (tactical level, here)
About a coordination between warships and planes unit I have another situation to analyze.
It is about the historical capacity of Fgs to sink subs vs the TcB (thinking Avenger Torpedo Bomber).
If what I learned about the ASW on U-boat is true,
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=33181.msg1263095#msg1263095
so no Fg (F4F-Wildcat) were able to destroy and sink all by itself any Submarine and always need is bigger brother Avenger, it provides an historical background to get specific attribute to both.
For example, we can say: keeping the Fg give +1A to TcB when paired 1:1
Fg (A3D4) can never hit subs. And the presence of a destroyer change nothing.
TcB (A3-4D3) can always hit subs even without a destroyer, but is not an ASW and cannot forbid sub’s submerge and first strike.
In other words, TcB is attacking as any cruiser or battleship.
Example, a TcB A3D3 unit attacking a bunch of Subs,
TcB needs a Destroyer to keep them from submerging before the attack.
It can still bring with him a Fg unit, so it will raise is attacking factor to A@4.
However, Fg cannot hit subs.
This can be easily explained by the historical background.
Fg unit provide an additionnal “eye” on the ocean, Subs can be more easily seen and destroyed by the Fg and TcB coordination.
So, just changing the ability to hit or not to hit subs can modify the interest of player toward this unit. A carrier group compose of DDs and Fgs only will be much more vulnerable to a Subs attack than a mix group of Fgs and TcBs.
It can also be seen on defense against attacking Submarine, like you suggested: letting TcB D3-4.
Any Fg paired 1:1 can give +D1 to TcB.
This way, the Anti-sub warfare is simplified: Fg can never hit subs, TcB always can.
And the historical Air coordination ASW between Fg and Tc is easily depicted by this rule.
We could think also about an ASW Air to warships coordination with Fg.
Example: Fg paired 1:1 with a Destroyer unit could give +1A to Destroyer when attacking Subs.
However, this one can imply much more complication on both parts: historical bakground and game rules depiction.
On historical background, the question is which type of planes was used on mission patrol against Subs: Fg or TcB?
If is is mostly TcB, then do we really need to add a bonus from TcB toward DD or the reverse?
Because the DD ASW is already needed in the game so TcB can be able to hit subs unable to submerge.
@aequitas:
@Baron:
Some interesting ways to develop a distinctive capacities for TcBs.
The capacity to hit subs vs Fgs should be examin closer.The capacity to hit subs via any Airplane is a diffrent Type/Art of war wich will be very difficult to bring to a HR.
Just because there would be a Sub present in a selected Sz, doesn’t give you as an attacker the same opportunity to hit the same one.
If a DD is present and a Carrier, diffrent story (maybe).
But as long the Sub remains silent how would you know?Adding a HR to hit a sub via Airplanes means that you don’t need to buy any more subs at all!
I provide a more extensive view of ASW with Fg and TcB on my previous post.
Sorry, I don’t clearly understand or cannot see all the implications you draw in your post. Help me, please.
@Baron:
Well taking everything into account on the topic. SBs get an attack boost from fighters and tanks already. This could be extended to cruisers and also apply to TBs on defense when combined with any of the three units. It makes a case to buy cruisers. It makes the case for surface/air coordination at the strategic level both offesively and defensively without too much complication.
Are you on fire? You seem to have a lot of ideas in the last few days. LOL…maybe.
This idea about extending the pairing bonus to cruiser is original. Even though historically the TB could potentially get a boost from almost any ship, In game terms the cruiser is lacking in reasons to purchase.
This give me an example about the symbolic depiction I was talking about.
From a game perspective, it is a legitimate goal to provide some incentive to buy cruiser unit. I think so.
(Symbolic level: I think it was historically the core ship of all navies, I may be wrong.
But if it is the case, then the actual OOB cost creates distortion since it is a seldom buying.
And give the false impression it was not a worthy weapon during WWII compared to destroyers, submarines, and carriers.)However, at first glance, it seems wrong (my guts feeling) to provide Cruiser the capacity to boost TacB on attack.
To agree with you on this specific point, I would need more explanations on the historical background of the use of Torpedoes and Dive Bombers with Cruisers, and how it provides a real case for surface/air coordination at the strategic level both offensively and defensively without too much complication. Because, I don’t see how a plane going far away from his carrier group can need or provide helps to cruisers (tactical level, here) Well from a strategic level a tac bomber game piece functions as a representative of many types of light bomber including torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster. I chose the cruiser because it is the naval counter-part of the tank in game terms. I also chose the cruiser because all in-game naval vessels have their own distinct role with the exception being the cruiser. Also I think the cruiser giving +1 over other vessels keeps it simple. A good example but off topic is destroyers, we all know destroyers did shore-bombardment, but to give them that ability in the game might make them too powerful although realistic from many POV. That is another reason I chose the cruiser. With the ability to pair with TBs gives the cruiser an advantage and it’s own niche in the game.
About a coordination between warships and planes unit I have another situation to analyze.
It is about the historical capacity of Fgs to sink subs vs the TcB (thinking Avenger Torpedo Bomber).If what I learned about the ASW on U-boat is true,
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=33181.msg1263095#msg1263095
so no Fg (F4F-Wildcat) were able to destroy and sink all by itself any Submarine and always need is bigger brother Avenger, it provides an historical background to get specific attribute to both.For example, we can say: keeping the Fg give +1A to TcB when paired 1:1
Fg (A3D4) can never hit subs. And the presence of a destroyer change nothing.
TcB (A3-4D3) can always hit subs even without a destroyer, but is not an ASW and cannot forbid sub’s submerge and first strike.
In other words, TcB is attacking as any cruiser or battleship.Example, a TcB A3D3 unit attacking a bunch of Subs,
TcB needs a Destroyer to keep them from submerging before the attack.
It can still bring with him a Fg unit, so it will raise is attacking factor to A@4.
However, Fg cannot hit subs.This can be easily explained by the historical background.
Fg unit provide an additionnal “eye” on the ocean, Subs can be more easily seen and destroyed by the Fg and TcB coordination.So, just changing the ability to hit or not to hit subs can modify the interest of player toward this unit. A carrier group compose of DDs and Fgs only will be much more vulnerable to a Subs attack than a mix group of Fgs and TcBs.
It can also be seen on defense against attacking Submarine, like you suggested: letting TcB D3-4.
Any Fg paired 1:1 can give +D1 to TcB.This way, the Anti-sub warfare is simplified: Fg can never hit subs, TcB always can.
And the historical Air coordination ASW between Fg and Tc is easily depicted by this rule.We could think also about an ASW Air to warships coordination with Fg.
Example: Fg paired 1:1 with a Destroyer unit could give +1A to Destroyer when attacking Subs.However, this one can imply much more complication on both parts: historical bakground and game rules depiction.
On historical background, the question is which type of planes was used on mission patrol against Subs: Fg or TcB?
If is is mostly TcB, then do we really need to add a bonus from TcB toward DD or the reverse?
Because the DD ASW is already needed in the game so TcB can be able to hit subs unable to submerge. Either aircraft type was pretty capable of attacking subs, but I think the general ideas you posted here is not overly complicated a makes a good compromise between game-play, historical roles and makes the game a bit more interesting.
This idea about extending the pairing bonus to cruiser is original. Even though historically the TB could potentially get a boost from almost any ship, In game terms the cruiser is lacking in reasons to purchase.
There is many ways to give some incentive toward Cruiser.
With the ability to pair with TBs gives the cruiser an advantage and it’s own niche in the game.
In itself, your idea can easily be added into my summary of various options for Cruiser.
But, wanting to stay more on the way we see Tac Bombers, I cannot see how could really work together cruiser and TcB, as I tried to show for ASW with DD…
If you can show someway, I would be glad to add it into my Pocket.
Nonetheless, you introduce another figure I never thought about: the tank buster.
Well from a strategic level a tac bomber game piece functions as a representative of many types of light bomber including torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster.
Does the Typhoon fit into this description of TcB?
And am I wrong thinking that TcB vs Fg, have a greater range?
In which category Fg or TcB, would you put all the light planes which have a scouting role?
Either aircraft type was pretty capable of attacking subs
Attacking Subs both are capable, but destroying one? All that I infer from my main historical source is that Machine guns weren’t enough to sink a sub. Bombs or torpedoes were needed.
@Baron:
On historical background, the question is which type of planes was used on mission patrol against Subs: Fg or TcB?
For whatever this information might be worth, the aircraft which were most involved in antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic in the second half of WWII, when the Allies finally closed the mid-Atlantic air gap, were the PBY Catalina (a seaplane), the Wellington (a medium bomber) and the Liberator (a heavy bomber). An effective and successful configuration for these aircraft was to equip them with ASV air-to-surface radar and with Leigh Light floodlamps. This combination of equipment allowed them to pick up a surfaced U-boat on radar at night, approach undetected until they were virtually on top of the sub, then floodlight it and hit it with bombs before it had time to submerge.
@CWO:
@Baron:
On historical background, the question is which type of planes was used on mission patrol against Subs: Fg or TcB?
For whatever this information might be worth, the aircraft which were most involved in antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic in the second half of WWII, when the Allies finally closed the mid-Atlantic air gap, were the PBY Catalina (a seaplane), the Wellington (a medium bomber) and the Liberator (a heavy bomber). An effective and successful configuration for these aircraft was to equip them with ASV air-to-surface radar and with Leigh Light floodlamps. This combination of equipment allowed them to pick up a surfaced U-boat on radar at night, approach undetected until they were virtually on top of the sub, then floodlight it and hit it with bombs before it had time to submerge.
Thanks for the details Marc. These ones are in the Strat. Bomber category, isn’t?
And on carrier group, do you have an idea if one was mainly use of the other?
For example, do they let some Tactical Bomber doing the long range recon, while the Fg were staying with other TcB armed to attack as soon as they received a radio call?
Or they kept TcB on the carrier, launching Fgs away (being faster) until they pick a target, then all TcB and escort Fg take off from the carrier?
Or is it a mix of both, depending of which aircrafts they have under hand?
@Baron:
Or is it a mix of both, depending of which aircrafts they have under hand?
It was none of the above. None of the three planes I mentioned were capable of operating from a carrier. The Catalina was a seaplane: it landed directly on the water and took off directly from the water, and could also operate from land-based runways. The Wellington and the Liberator were exclusively land-based planes. Both of them were too big (the Lib was about the size of a B-17 Flying Fortress) and required too much runway length to reach takeoff speed to operate from carriers. (The Doolittle Raid proved that a Mitchell B-25 medium bomber could, with special training and techniques, take off from a carrier, but that operation was a one-time special case.) The three aircraft I mentioned operated from bases ashore to do their ASW work. The Lib was a four-engined bomber, so it can only be regarded (in A&A terms) as a strategic bomber. The two-engined Wellington was, in my opinion, too big and not fast or nimble enough to be regarded as a tactical bomber – but A&A’s term “tactical bomber” is so vague and broad (and hence unsatisfactory in my opinion) that one could get into endless arguments about what it should and shouldn’t cover.
If the concept you’re interested in pursuing is focussed on pairing TacBombers with carriers for the specific purpose of attacking submarines, the closest real-life parallel I can think of was the use of escort carriers (a.k.a. jeep carriers) in the Battle of the Atlantic. Both the US and the UK used this approach in the second half of WWII (along with the non-carrier planes I mentioned above) in their fight against the U-boats. I can’t recall what sorts of planes jeep carriers used for this specific purpose, but as carrier-capable planes they’d be much smaller than a Wellington or a Liberator, and were thus planes which could more credibly be called tactical aircraft.
And by the way, I can’t think of a single WWII example of cruisers and Tac Bombers being paired together for ASW work, so I would recommend dropping that concept. Unit pairings in land warfare don’t necessarily have equivalent pairings in naval warfare.
@Baron:
This idea about extending the pairing bonus to cruiser is original. Even though historically the TB could potentially get a boost from almost any ship, In game terms the cruiser is lacking in reasons to purchase.
There is many ways to give some incentive toward Cruiser. The cruiser could be dropped as far as ASW. I must have read incorrectly. I was giving the TB a plus +1 just to give the cruiser a boost in game terms.
With the ability to pair with TBs gives the cruiser an advantage and it’s own niche in the game.
In itself, your idea can easily be added into my summary of various options for Cruiser.
But, wanting to stay more on the way we see Tac Bombers, I cannot see how could really work together cruiser and TcB, as I tried to show for ASW with DD…If you can show someway, I would be glad to add it into my Pocket.
Nonetheless, you introduce another figure I never thought about: the tank buster.
Well from a strategic level a tac bomber game piece functions as a representative of many types of light bomber including torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster.
Does the Typhoon fit into this description of TcB? I consider the role of the typhoon as a ground attack aircraft that fits into the parameters of what I think the Tactical bomber represents in A&A.
And am I wrong thinking that TcB vs Fg, have a greater range? That is not easily pinned down if we consider Every type of Tactical bomber, but for game purposes and scale I think a range of four is appropriate.
In which category Fg or TcB, would you put all the light planes which have a scouting role?
Either aircraft type was pretty capable of attacking subs
Attacking Subs both are capable, but destroying one? All that I infer from my main historical source is that Machine guns weren’t enough to sink a sub. Bombs or torpedoes were needed. Fighters carried small bombs, but not torpedoes, and not necessarily the heavier bombs some naval TBs carried. In air-to-surface tactical warfare, whether dive bombing or using torpedoes the goal was to try and make as accurate as possibly delivery of ordinance onto the target. Machine guns could inflict a lot of damage but not the impact of bombs or rockets. Torpedoes are not really a weapon an aircraft would use to take out subs. Overall TBs run a very large spectrum. A good resource is to read up on all types to gather an average idea of what the TB probably represents.
@CWO:
@Baron:
On historical background, the question is which type of planes was used on mission patrol against Subs: Fg or TcB?
For whatever this information might be worth, the aircraft which were most involved in antisubmarine warfare in the Atlantic in the second half of WWII, when the Allies finally closed the mid-Atlantic air gap, were the PBY Catalina (a seaplane), the Wellington (a medium bomber) and the Liberator (a heavy bomber). An effective and successful configuration for these aircraft was to equip them with ASV air-to-surface radar and with Leigh Light floodlamps. This combination of equipment allowed them to pick up a surfaced U-boat on radar at night, approach undetected until they were virtually on top of the sub, then floodlight it and hit it with bombs before it had time to submerge.
All true.
@CWO:
@Baron:
Or is it a mix of both, depending of which aircrafts they have under hand?
It was none of the above. None of the three planes I mentioned were capable of operating from a carrier. The Catalina was a seaplane: it landed directly on the water and took off directly from the water, and could also operate from land-based runways. The Wellington and the Liberator were exclusively land-based planes. Both of them were too big (the Lib was about the size of a B-17 Flying Fortress) and required too much runway length to reach takeoff speed to operate from carriers. (The Doolittle Raid proved that a Mitchell B-25 medium bomber could, with special training and techniques, take off from a carrier, but that operation was a one-time special case.) The three aircraft I mentioned operated from bases ashore to do their ASW work. The Lib was a four-engined bomber, so it can only be regarded (in A&A terms) as a strategic bomber. The two-engined Wellington was, in my opinion, too big and not fast or nimble enough to be regarded as a tactical bomber – but A&A’s term “tactical bomber” is so vague and broad (and hence unsatisfactory in my opinion) that one could get into endless arguments about what it should and shouldn’t cover. That is a good synopsis.
If the concept you’re interested in pursuing is focussed on pairing TacBombers with carriers for the specific purpose of attacking submarines, the closest real-life parallel I can think of was the use of escort carriers (a.k.a. jeep carriers) in the Battle of the Atlantic. Both the US and the UK used this approach in the second half of WWII (along with the non-carrier planes I mentioned above) in their fight against the U-boats. I can’t recall what sorts of planes jeep carriers used for this specific purpose, but as carrier-capable planes they’d be much smaller than a Wellington or a Liberator, and were thus planes which could more credibly be called tactical aircraft.
And by the way, I can’t think of a single WWII example of cruisers and Tac Bombers being paired together for ASW work, so I would recommend dropping that concept. Unit pairings in land warfare don’t necessarily have equivalent pairings in naval warfare.
Unit pairings in land warfare don’t necessarily have equivalent pairings in naval warfare.
Well from a strategic level a tac bomber game piece functions as a representative of many types of light bomber including torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster.
Does the Typhoon fit into this description of TcB? I consider the role of the typhoon as a ground attack aircraft that fits into the parameters of what I think the Tactical bomber represents in A&A.
Is their any other type of planes which should be put inside TcB category, besides torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster?
Does the kind of rockets attack made by typhoon as aircraft tank-destroyer is a paradigm of the coordination between TcB and Tank?
So it should be the first tactical situation we should have in mind when a TcB get A4 from being paired 1:1 with a Tank?
Or is there better depiction with some Stukka dive-bomber with Panzer? Or even T-34 and Sturmovik?
Thanks sharing.
@CWO:
@Baron:
Or is it a mix of both, depending of which aircrafts they have under hand?
It was none of the above. None of the three planes I mentioned were capable of operating from a carrier. The Catalina was a seaplane: it landed directly on the water and took off directly from the water, and could also operate from land-based runways. The Wellington and the Liberator were exclusively land-based planes. Both of them were too big (the Lib was about the size of a B-17 Flying Fortress) and required too much runway length to reach takeoff speed to operate from carriers. (The Doolittle Raid proved that a Mitchell B-25 medium bomber could, with special training and techniques, take off from a carrier, but that operation was a one-time special case.) The three aircraft I mentioned operated from bases ashore to do their ASW work. The Lib was a four-engined bomber, so it can only be regarded (in A&A terms) as a strategic bomber. The two-engined Wellington was, in my opinion, too big and not fast or nimble enough to be regarded as a tactical bomber – but A&A’s term “tactical bomber” is so vague and broad (and hence unsatisfactory in my opinion) that one could get into endless arguments about what it should and shouldn’t cover.
If the concept you’re interested in pursuing is focussed on pairing TacBombers with carriers for the specific purpose of attacking submarines, the closest real-life parallel I can think of was the use of escort carriers (a.k.a. jeep carriers) in the Battle of the Atlantic. Both the US and the UK used this approach in the second half of WWII (along with the non-carrier planes I mentioned above) in their fight against the U-boats. I can’t recall what sorts of planes jeep carriers used for this specific purpose, but as carrier-capable planes they’d be much smaller than a Wellington or a Liberator, and were thus planes which could more credibly be called tactical aircraft.
And by the way, I can’t think of a single WWII example of cruisers and Tac Bombers being paired together for ASW work, so I would recommend dropping that concept. Unit pairings in land warfare don’t necessarily have equivalent pairings in naval warfare.
On Jeep carrier and their planes, here is what I got:
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=33181.msg1263095#msg1263095
I’m not able to find much about ASW in Pacific against IJN submarines.
Do you have any idea of how they do fight them?
Was it really the same way as in the Atlantic?
Do they rely more on destroyer for antisub patrol, or even USAN submarines?
More on planes: Avenger (or Dauntless?) and/or F4F Wildcat (or F6F-Hellcat)?
If you find some links on the web, I will be very interested.
What you post point is that StB unit were able to hunt and sink submarine. That’d arise another problem of depiction on ASW. I would adress it latter.
I prefer to focus on different way of depicting Fg and TcB in combat situations of WWII.
Thanks,
My main source about F4F Wildcat doing ASW in Atlantic:
http://uboat.net/allies/aircraft/wildcat.htm
@Baron:
Well from a strategic level a tac bomber game piece functions as a representative of many types of light bomber including torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster.
Does the Typhoon fit into this description of TcB? I consider the role of the typhoon as a ground attack aircraft that fits into the parameters of what I think the Tactical bomber represents in A&A.
Is their any other type of planes which should be put inside TcB category, besides torpedo, dive-bomber and tank buster?
Does the kind of rockets attack made by typhoon as aircraft tank-destroyer is a paradigm of the coordination between TcB and Tank?
So it should be the first tactical situation we should have in mind when a TcB get A4 from being paired 1:1 with a Tank?Or is there better depiction with some Stukka dive-bomber with Panzer? Or even T-34 and Sturmovik?
Thanks sharing.
To be honest Baron the TB could encompass so many types of aircraft I would recommend going to Wikipedia and look up “list of WWII aircraft”. While I’m not a huge fan of wkiipedia, it will give you a general idea of all the types of aircraft without having to read endless books on the subject. My POV (And more so CWO Marc’s, he’s very knowledgeable) comes from years of personal interest and study of WWII in all it’s aspects.
I’d start with the Wikipedia article and research the categories of the different types of aircraft and then start with reference book. Once you have a consensus of what various types apply to the categories we have represented in A&A it gives you a valuable perspective on what the game and can’t represent.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_aircraft_of_World_War_II
Have fun.
Ok, I will take a look into it. I’m a neophyte.
But, I’m sure that you have yet made your idea about the main categories, no?
Or, on the other side, what shouldn’t have a plane to be in the Fg category instead of the TcB, according to you?
@Baron:
@aequitas:
@Baron:
Some interesting ways to develop a distinctive capacities for TcBs.
The capacity to hit subs vs Fgs should be examin closer.The capacity to hit subs via any Airplane is a diffrent Type/Art of war wich will be very difficult to bring to a HR.
Just because there would be a Sub present in a selected Sz, doesn’t give you as an attacker the same opportunity to hit the same one.
If a DD is present and a Carrier, diffrent story (maybe).
But as long the Sub remains silent how would you know?Adding a HR to hit a sub via Airplanes means that you don’t need to buy any more subs at all!
I provide a more extensive view of ASW with Fg and TcB on my previous post.
Sorry, I don’t clearly understand or cannot see all the implications you draw in your post. Help me, please.
CWOMarc explained already a lot of what I meant.
But to be more detailed and precisley:
I meant you need DD’s to detect subs, any airplanes can’t detect SS unless they had been given orders to fly to a certain sz by Bletchley Park and start their search.
As CWOMarc allready mentioned, catalinas could take off and land on sea and didn’t need much of a performance to drop their load like TacB to destroy Subs.
I added Carrier along with DD’s to detect SS, but was more thinking of detecting SS in touching sz (recon planes for example, I don’t know). A nice and need adding for a HR.
The Subs greatest benefit was to be silence. As long nobody knew that there was a sub arround, it was the deadliest weapon arround.
These are all abilitys a TacB does not quiet fit in I think.
If I recall correctly, there may be confirmed sinkings of German subs by Spitfires at Gibraltar, but I might err.
@Baron:
But, I’m sure that you have yet made your idea about the main categories, no?
Or, on the other side, what shouldn’t have a plane to be in the Fg category instead of the TcB, according to you?
I’m going to go out on a bit of a limb here by proposing my own generic definition of the three aircraft types mentioned in the A&A rules. It’s a personal definition, so there’s nothing gospel about it, but I hope it will provide you with a useful basis for thinking about these three very broad aircraft types. And I’ll immediately add these qualifiers: 1) the A&A StBm, TacBm and Ftr categories are in many ways artificial categories created for game purposes; and 2) in the real world of WWII, some aircraft could be seen as fitting a very narrow type but others were very versatile multi-mission aircraft – especially when their model variants are taken into account – which could serve effectively in many roles.
So, with those qualifiers out of the way, here’s how I see those categories.
A fighter is an aircraft whose primary mission is to shoot down other aircraft in air-to-air combat (bombers, other fighters, ground-attack planes, reconnaissance planes, or whatever). Aircraft well suited to this primary mission are typically fast and maneuverable; fighters with an exceptionally high rate of climb are sometimes described as interceptors. In WWII, their primary armament for air-to-air combat usually consisted of machine guns and/or small automatic cannons (typically 20mm). In very, very general terms (since exceptions exist), they tended to be smaller than bombers – though this was sometimes very relative depending on the specific aircraft types being compared. Fighters tend to be shorter-ranged than bombers: they carry less fuel (to avoid having the excess weight impair their maneuverability), and in active combat they consume fuel at a very high rate because they’re using their engine(s) at full power. Drop tanks compensate for this fuel problem to some degree. Fighters can attack ground targets (strafing being one such form of attack), but a fighter which is optimzed for air-to-air combat is not ideal in the ground-attack role, since the sighting mechanisms, the weapons and the aerodynamic characteristics required for the two roles are different. (Basically, air-to-air combat requires high maneuverability at high speeds, while ground-attack missions require high stability and steadiness at low speeds. A high-performance air-superiority fighter flown at the combat engagement speed of a ground-attack aircraft might very well stall and crash.)
In A&A terms, the way I’d distinguish a tactical bomber from a strategic bomber would be to say that a tactical bomber has the primary mission of attacking highly specific (and often moving) targets on the ground or in the water, while a strategic bomber has the primary mission of attacking more geographically diffuse (and usually static) targets on the ground (but almost never in the water). To put it another way: tactical bombers function a bit like tank guns (which fire a single shell in a straight line at a specific target at short range), while strategic bombers function a bit like howitzers (which fire a barrage of shells in a high, indirect curve towards a general target area at long range).
To highlight this distinction, I’m going to switch at this point from the term “tactical bomber” (which I feel is too problematic) to “strike aircraft” (also known as “attack aircraft” or “surface-attack aircraft”). Such planes fall into many subtypes, such as tank-buster planes, dive bombers, fighter-bombers, torpedo bombers, light bombers, and the fuzzy category of multi-mission strike planes. Their common characteristic is that their mission involves attacking very specific (and often fairly small) individual targets (such as a tank, a train or a ship) with a high degree of precision, usually from a very low altitude. In WWII, strike aircraft carried such ordnance as bombs (small to medium sized) and/or rockets, and some were equiped with heavy automatic cannons (around 35mm). Their weapon load was almost always very limited in quantity. They had good aerodynamic performance at low altitude (where the air is denser that at high altitude) and at low speeds (which was necessary to allow them to aim accurately at their targets, especially when these were very small). Strike aircraft often provided direct, on-the-spot support to friendly forces, and thus often operated close to the front lines. They had some ability to defend themselves against other aircraft, but were not optimized for that role and hence were typically at a disadvantage when engaging fighters (since fighters are optimized to shoot down other planes, in the same way that an agile attack submarine is better at killing other subs than an unwieldy ballistic missile submarine, even though both types are armed with torpedoes).
Strategic bombers, as I’ve already said, had the primary mission in WWII of attacking more geographically diffuse (and usually static) targets on the ground. In WWII (pre-smart bomb days), this usually meant attacking areas rather than specific individual targets: one example would be cities, but other examples from June 1944 would be the coastal defenses on the Normandy coast and the areas of the French bocage countryside where German troops were dug in. WWII strategic bombers tended to be big, long-range, relatively slow aircraft. They tended to carry a large payload of bombs (explosive or incendiary), which they tend to drop from a high altitude (though not always). They tended to conduct raids deep behind enemy lines. Their accuracy in WWII was pretty bad by the laser-guided standards of 2014; even in daylight, with the aid of the Norden bombsight, the Americans didn’t have an easy time taking out specific targets even when they were as large as factory complexes (for example the Schweinfurt ball bearing plant). Their performance against moving surface ships tended to be poor (the B-17s which attacked the Japanese fleet at Midway scored no hits as I recall), though there were exceptions (such as the ASV/Leigh Light ASW planes I mentioned previously). Even against big, static naval targets – such as the Tirpitz at Trondheim – they were lucky to hit targets which were that specific. Their organic defensive capabilities varied depending on the specific type (the American B-17 and B-29 were well-armed by bomber standards), but this protection was marginal at best against full-fledged enemy fighters flown by good pilots. The best protection for a bomber was an escort fighter, especially a long-range one which could stay at the bomber’s side for the whole mission.
