One of my strongest objections to the piece is the sentence,
| To use a sports analogy, it was as if a Major League Baseball franchise, in seeking to win
| the World Series, decided to model itself not on the New York Yankees but rather on the
| Chicago Cubs.
I’ll begin with the following quote, from pages 405 - 406 of Adam Tooze’s book Wages of Destruction
London by the end of June 1940 was expecting delivery from the United States of no less than 10,800 aircraft and 13,000 aero-engines over the next eighteen months. This was in addition to Britain’s own production of 15,000 military aircraft. . . . By way of comparison, total aircraft production for Germany in 1940 came to only 10,826 aircraft and in 1941 it expanded to only 12,000. . . On 23 July 1940 British procurements agents in Washington were invited to a clandestine meeting with American industrial planners, from which emerged a scheme to expand the capacity of the United States aircraft industry so that it would be able to deliver no less than 72,000 aircraft per annum, guaranteeing to the British a supply of 3,000 planes per month, three times the current German output.
The scale of Anglo-American aircraft production left Germany with a brutal choice. If it attempted no further conquests, its aircraft production would, over time, be dwarfed by that of the British and Americans. If Germany were to lose control over its own skies, it would mean the loss of its cities, and of a significant portion of its population. To prevent that outcome, Germany needed more manpower, industrial capacity, and raw materials. All of which could be found to the east, in the Soviet Union. Conquering the Soviet Union would also provide Germany the farmland it needed to feed its own people–a must in light of the British food blockade. Finally, the conquest of the Soviet Union would have the obvious advantages of destroying communism and of securing Germany’s eastern border from a land war.
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, the total German Army consisted of 150 divisions. Of those, 100 were used in the invasion. German military planners had believed they would face 200 Soviet divisions. They were off by a factor of three. In the months immediately following the German invasion, the Soviet Army had expanded itself to a staggering 600 divisions. This advantage in manpower was compounded by its edge in industrial output.
From page 588 of Tooze’s book:
The Soviet Union in 1942 managed to out-produce Germany in virtually every category of weapons. The margin for small arms and artillery was 3:1. For tanks it was a staggering 4:1, a differential compounded by the superior quality of the T34 tank. Even in combat aircraft the margin was 2:1. . . . To avoid misunderstandings, this is emphatically a story of Soviet success not German failure.
Despite these disadvantages, the German Army achieved significant success. In Operation Barbarossa, the German military killed over 800,000 Soviet soldiers, and captured another 3.3 million, at the loss of only 275,000 German soldiers killed or missing. Even later, when the Soviet military had learned from its past mistakes, and the fortunes of war were turning against Germany, it still maintained favorable ratios. In the battle of Kursk (1943), Germany experienced 170,000 casualties, as compared to 860,000 for the Soviet Union. The German military of WWII included the highest-scoring fighter ace of all time (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erich_Hartmann ) and the highest-scoring tank commander ever (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Knispel ). To compare a military like this to the Chicago Cubs is a major stretch, even for the most avid and diehard Cubs fan. Germany fought extremely well on a man-for-man basis, and was beaten only because the Allies had several times as much industrial capacity and available manpower for infantry as the Axis nations had.