This is going to be a lengthy post so bare with me. All the points listed before about Turkey are valid. It would have been to the Germans advantage with Turkey to push another front with Russia, secure Middle East oil, and deprive Britain of that oil. But why not have 2 for one. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall’s main concern at the beginning of Operation Torch was an Axis push through Spain. After we secured Morocco, Algiers, and Oran we ran into a stalemate with the Germans at Medjez-el-Bab. Due to inexperienced US forces and the loosely integrated formation of British and US units, the Germans under Colonel-General Hans-Jurgen von Arnim pushed the Allies almost out of Tunisia in their push to Tunis. Why was this? Along with the deficiencies listed above, Marshall urged Ike to leave some of his best commanders at the rear (like Generals Patton, Allen, and Roosevelt) in fear of an Axis strike from Spain. Previous to this, it was US military consensus to enter the war with Operation Sledgehammer (which was later used for D-Day June 6 '44). Churchill greatly disapproved this, so the British urged an invasion of Northern Africa to set up an invasion of the soft under-belly of Europe. US military doctrine at the time called for direct action at the enemies strongest point. The British still reelling from European theater failure highly disapproved of such a maneuver. So Operation Torch was was approved at the stalwart pleas of the British. The initial invasion was plagued with many debacles and failures. Operations RESERVIST and TERMINAL were absolute disasters during the landings of Oran and Algiers. Inexperieced coxswains and boat commanders lost many men just trying to get to shore during the landings at Fedalla in Morocco. Patton’s own boat capsized just prior to landing on the beach due to operational inadequacies (US naval personnel were unprepared to deal with adverse Atlantic waters.) Many ships and transports were lost at the hands of mediocre French Naval arms. The Jean-Bart, a French battlecruiser, sunk a few ships even though it was operationally beached at port in Morocco by simply pointing its guns from shore to the enemy. The Allies were only able to take and secure the landings due to insufficient French military strength, most of which were French Senegalese troops. Even at that the French resistance was still able to tally a fair amount of Allied casualties. In regards to that, had the Germans been able to acquire Axis military control in Spain, they most certainly would have taken Gibralter and closed the Med. The Allies would at that point still face two choices: Operation TORCH or SLEDGEHAMMER. Had the Allies still went ahead with TORCH with German control of the Strait of Gibralter, our inexperienced Navy would have meet strong German naval resistance and German air supremacy in the landings, and would have most likely been greatly demoralized. A serious setback would have greatly delayed an Allied rebottle. This in effect would have given Axis military in Africa and Rommel a lot of breathing room to destroy the 8th army in Egypt and push to the Middle East with out even having to negotiate an alliance with Turkey. If the Allies chose option b (SLEDGEHAMMER) and accepted Axis control of the Med in this situation, our inexperienced forces coupled with untested battle cooperation with the British would have been thrown into the teeth of fortress Europe and you would have seen a D-Day invasion of France in late '42 early '43. The results of which I cannot bear to imagine. In a historical sense, operation TORCH as it really played out in history, gave our soldiers and forces much needed battle prepping for the eventual dangers to come in the landings of Sicily, Italy, ad France. Had the Axis had control of the Med and Gibralter history may have been gravely altered. A simple alliance with Turkey would have still open the door for the Allies in Northern Africa.