@Gargantua:
Yeah but all those “superior” components would break down more regularily…
and for every 1 German tank, there were 3 Russian tanks or more!
When one looks at the economic base of the Axis powers, it becomes fairly obvious that they were virtually doomed to fail from the start.
The break-down myth is an interesting area to study actually (of course new designs had teething issues, which was true for the Russians and the US as well). The biggest reasons for breakdowns of German armor, especially on the eastern front, was not unreliability of parts, but the distances that tanks were required to cover. In the west in 1940 for example armor was moved to rail heads, and then deployed to battle near by. The situation in Russia was completely different during the 1941 and 1942 summer campaigns. In both campaigns Germany was on the attack, and due to the need to convert Russian rail to the standard European gauge, German armor and transport had to drive to the front. This resulted in armor covering thousands of kilometers of territory on unimproved roads. By the time any replacements reached the front they would have traveled hundreds of kilometers from the nearest rail head before firing a single shot in anger.
During this relentless advance, and thanks to the lack of rail transport, armor was not only covering more ground than it was intended to do, but maintenance/service intervals were stretched far beyond their breaking point. All of this adds up to a calamity waiting to happen when it comes to available armor. If you look at the daily logs of a Panzer division’s tank strength, which normally list available, short term repair, and long term repair status as well as reasons for each status (ex. mechanical breakdown), you will find that on average German armor suffered mechanical failures during offensive campaigns on a similar rate to other armies on the western front.