@SuperbattleshipYamato Yeah I get you 100%. Alternate History is a niche interest in the first place so finding other people willing to go down the rabbit hole is always tough.
Barbarossa - a preemtive strike?
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@Imperious:
I am not complaining, just pointing out what happened in the last threads and you got to admit you make those claims at some point in every thread. I just wish you wouldn’t and i won’t mention it again unless you bring it up again.
In terms of OP it is true that Stalin directed Zhukov to prepare operational study of undertaking an attack against Germany. He did present the comfort to Hitler, to allow him to get bogged down in another war of attrition against France and hoped to feed Germany the materials to continue such a war till they were bled white.
Unfortunate for Stalin the surprising quick collapse of France put Stalin in a panic, as he was not ready for a general war and then tried to do anything to make Hitler feel like a long term alliance was possible. Stalin ramped up production of war material in an effort to catch up. But also Stalin was ever the opportunist, and would have easily embarked on anything that could be negotiated in terms of carving up parts of the Middle East ans UK colonial assets, provided Stalin’s claims in Scandinavia in particular were recognized. The Molotov- Ribbentrop talks in 1940 basically broke down on this point, as Hitler must have a free hand in Scandinavia while Stalin wanted to bring Finland back into the Soviet fold. Otherwise, if they got over this issue they would have fought the British in 1940-41. Hitler basically also didn’t trust Stalin and the look of a military alliance wold not look right since German diplomacy was mostly supporting the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Thanks for the good post, and for helping get things back on topic.
Otherwise, if they got over this issue they would have fought the British in 1940-41.
I’ve read about this before, and I believe you’re right. Hitler and Stalin had certainly discussed carving up the British Empire–which would have occurred in '40 - '41. Had they gone through with those plans, it would likely have delayed the Nazi-Soviet war by a few years.
I’m not sure which side would have benefited more by the delay. The Red Army was not ready for war prior to late '41 or early '42. On the other hand, Germany’s industry was not ready for war until 1944.
The Molotov- Ribbentrop talks in 1940 basically broke down on this point, as
Hitler must have a free hand in Scandinavia while Stalin wanted to bring Finland back into the Soviet fold.The phrase “bring Finland back into the Soviet fold” prompted me to do a little reading. The Russian Empire conquered Finland in 1809. Finland remained part of Russia until 1917; when it achieved independence. Even though Finland had never belonged to the Soviet Union, Stalin certainly felt entitled to any territory Imperial Russia had ever controlled. (And to the rest of the world also.) Hitler was not comfortable with letting the U.S.S.R. gobble up Germany’s allies. So I could see why this would be a sticking point.
provided Stalin’s claims in Scandinavia in particular were recognized.
Stalin was also eyeing Turkey. Not that he needed to annex the whole thing right away. I think the plan was to start off with some Soviet influence in Turkey–various naval or other military bases, for example. Also an understanding that Turkey ultimately belonged in the Soviet sphere, not the German sphere. As you pointed out, Stalin’s intention of annexing Finland was the single biggest point of disagreement. But there were other points also, of which Turkey was one example. I also recollect something about Stalin wanting another slice of Romania.
But also Stalin was ever the opportunist
This is true. Von Manstein expressed the view that the Soviet Union would probably not attack Germany as long as Germany remained strong, but would attack once Germany showed weakness. Once the plan to carve up the British Empire had fallen through, the question then became: did Stalin feel his military would be ready to begin a war of conquest against Germany in the fall of '41? In a different thread, I mentioned that the Red Army was in the process of changing doctrines when the Germans invaded. Perhaps Stalin felt that transition would be complete by the fall of '41.
As an aside: the fall might seem like an odd time to invade. In this case though it makes some sense. The Soviets had better winter gear than the Germans, and were better-prepared for winter combat.
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Stalin was also eyeing Turkey. Not that he needed to annex the whole thing right away. I think the plan was to start off with some Soviet influence in Turkey–various naval or other military bases, for example. Also an understanding that Turkey ultimately belonged in the Soviet sphere, not the German sphere. As you pointed out, Stalin’s intention of annexing Finland was the single biggest point of disagreement. But there were other points also, of which Turkey was one example. I also recollect something about Stalin wanting another slice of Romania.
The foreign policy goal for Russia has always been to secure warm water ports, and the British were very keen on preventing this to preserve the balance of power. This made them somewhat enemies and Stalin would welcome a final settlement of accounts.
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The Red Army was not ready for war prior to late '41 or early '42. On the other hand, Germany’s industry was not ready for war until 1944.
According to the book cited above, Stalin instituted a universal military draft on Sept 1, 1939. The draft age was also reduced from 21 to 19, and in some cases 18. In July of '39 the Red Army numbered 1,871,600 men. By June 22, 1941, it numbered 5,081,000 men. This law adopted in 1939 allowed for the Red Army to increase from 1.5 million to 5.7 million in the Spring of '41 without declaring mobilization. In addition the law allowed for the preparation of 18 million reservists.
"This army development had a time limit, because Stalin called several age groups into the Red Army at the same time - in essence, all the young men in the country. The duration of army service for the majority of the population…was two years, so the country had tp enter a major war before Sept 1, 1941. If not, all the young people would go home on Sept 1, 1941, and then there would be almost nobody left to draft. It is impossible to maintain an army of this size without a war: it does not produce anything and it consumes everything produced by the country.
When he made the decision to launch a secret mobilization, Stalin firmly knew that within 2 years, in the Summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a large war…To put it more simply, the decision to enter a large war was made in the Kremlin in August of 1939 and the deadline for entering the war was set - the Summer of 1941." - Quoted from pp.125-126 of The Chief Culprit.
Viktor Suvorov makes a very good case here that the soviets were plenty prepared for ATTACK in 1941, just not prepared for DEFENSE. Stalin never thought Hitler would be foolhardy enough to attack his much larger country. When a man with a knife raises his arm to stab someone in an attack stance, he makes himself vulnerable to an attack himself for a few moments. This was the time when Hitler attacked.
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@Imperious:
Stalin was also eyeing Turkey. Not that he needed to annex the whole thing right away. I think the plan was to start off with some Soviet influence in Turkey–various naval or other military bases, for example. Also an understanding that Turkey ultimately belonged in the Soviet sphere, not the German sphere. As you pointed out, Stalin’s intention of annexing Finland was the single biggest point of disagreement. But there were other points also, of which Turkey was one example. I also recollect something about Stalin wanting another slice of Romania.
The foreign policy goal for Russia has always been to secure warm water ports, and the British were very keen on preventing this to preserve the balance of power. This made them somewhat enemies and Stalin would welcome a final settlement of accounts.
Interesting commentary IL.
With Putin’s recent attempts to bully and destabilize almost every nation around the Black Sea, and now a few more in the Baltic, it only drives in this reality…
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Viktor Suvorov makes a very good case here that the soviets were plenty prepared for ATTACK in 1941, just not prepared for DEFENSE. Stalin never thought Hitler would be foolhardy enough to attack his much larger country.
One untold item regarding Hitlers decision to attack was because the Soviets were planning on doing this first. The official line of History does not generally accept this because it’s info coming from the people serving in Hitlers Reich and it would soften the view of Hitler because he might have invaded to throw off impending attack against the Reich, and the Soviets would look worse.
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@Der:
According to the book cited above, Stalin instituted a universal military draft on Sept 1, 1939. The draft age was also reduced from 21 to 19, and in some cases 18. In July of '39 the Red Army numbered 1,871,600 men. By June 22, 1941, it numbered 5,081,000 men. This law adopted in 1939 allowed for the Red Army to increase from 1.5 million to 5.7 million in the Spring of '41 without declaring mobilization. In addition the law allowed for the preparation of 18 million reservists.
"This army development had a time limit, because Stalin called several age groups into the Red Army at the same time - in essence, all the young men in the country. The duration of army service for the majority of the population…was two years, so the country had tp enter a major war before Sept 1, 1941. If not, all the young people would go home on Sept 1, 1941, and then there would be almost nobody left to draft. It is impossible to maintain an army of this size without a war: it does not produce anything and it consumes everything produced by the country.
When he made the decision to launch a secret mobilization, Stalin firmly knew that within 2 years, in the Summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a large war…To put it more simply, the decision to enter a large war was made in the Kremlin in August of 1939 and the deadline for entering the war was set - the Summer of 1941." - Quoted from pp.125-126 of The Chief Culprit.
Viktor Suvorov makes a very good case here that the soviets were plenty prepared for ATTACK in 1941, just not prepared for DEFENSE. Stalin never thought Hitler would be foolhardy enough to attack his much larger country. When a man with a knife raises his arm to stab someone in an attack stance, he makes himself vulnerable to an attack himself for a few moments. This was the time when Hitler attacked.
I’m about a quarter of the way through Suvorov’s book. He’s making a very compelling case that the Soviet Union was indeed in an attack stance in June of '41. But I haven’t yet decided whether Stalin’s attack was planned for the summer of '41 or the early fall.
As you noted in your original post, Stalin had very large numbers of light tanks deployed on the border. (In addition to his very large numbers of medium tanks.) The plan seems to have been to use the medium tanks, artillery, and aircraft to create a hole in the enemy’s front. Then drive the light tanks through the hole, and exploit the resulting breakthrough. As you noted, the light tanks were typically able to move at very high speeds–especially on highways–and many had the ability to propel themselves across rivers or even lakes. Such tanks are not very useful on defense, but a very effective tool on offense.
Stalin also had close to 2 million paratroopers as of June '41. (As compared to 4000 for Germany.) Pravda claimed the number was only 1 million, presumably in an effort to avoid alarming Stalin’s neighbors. Paratroopers are of course intended for offense, not defense. In addition, Stalin also had accumulated very large numbers of gliders on the German-Soviet front. The plan was for wave 1 of the airborne attack to consist of paratroopers, wave 2 to consist of soldiers and heavy equipment moved behind enemy lines via gliders. This airborne attack would be used in conjunction with a ground-based assault. The problem with those gliders was that the Soviets didn’t have spare hangers in which they could be stored over the winter. Without hangars, large numbers of gliders would have been lost to winter winds. The presence of gliders and the absence of hangers suggests an intended attack date in the summer or early fall of '41.
However, Stalin had not yet ordered the construction of large numbers of Ivanov attack planes. The Ivanov was similar to the Stuka. Except that the Ivanov had been designed more recently, and was therefore more advanced. Like the Stuka, it was intended for precision attacks against ground targets. It was unsuited to air-to-air combat, and was very vulnerable to enemy planes. In the war Stalin envisioned, large numbers of Ivanovs and other ground attack aircraft would have been used to destroy the German air force on the ground. However, the Soviet military did not yet have large numbers of Ivanovs as of June of '41. Suvorov believes that Stalin had delayed production of the Ivanov in order to avoid alarming his neighbors. Even so, it would have been to Stalin’s advantage to have engaged in large-scale production of Ivanovs for at least a few months before launching his invasion. The fact he hadn’t yet produced large numbers of Ivanovs as of June '41 suggests the invasion was intended for the early to mid fall. Perhaps an attack date of September would have given Stalin enough time to manufacture large numbers of Ivanovs before starting; while still giving himself plenty of time to use the gliders before winter set in.
The Ivanovs were intended to be simple, and very easy to manufacture. Stalin ultimately planned to have at least 100,000 of them. Their main weapon was to have been air-to-surface rockets. After Hitler attacked first, and after the Germans gained air superiority, it became clear that the Ivanov was not the right weapon for the circumstances which obtained. The Soviets continued with their plans to manufacture large numbers of rockets. But instead of mounting them on Ivanovs–as was originally intended–they installed them on Katayushka ground-based rocket launchers. If the Soviets had had air supremacy, mounting those rockets on Ivanovs would have been more effective. Unlike Katayushka ground crews, Ivanov pilots would have been able to see the targets they were attacking. Ivanovs would have attacked in successive waves. Anything not destroyed by the first wave would have been targeted by the second or third.
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-I can’t see the fact that the Soviets produced large quantities of offensive tanks and planes as evidence that they necessarily planned to attack in 1941. Rather, this was the most up-to-date technology at the time…unlike WWI, the WWII technology favored offensive strategies, as the Soviets discovered in the brief conflict wiht Japan in 1939.
-Nor can Stalin be blamed for considering the possibility of a pre-emptive war against Germany. However, if Stalin intended to initiate such a thing, the ideal time would have been before France fell, not after. Stalin and his planners seem to have felt the Soviet forces were not ready for war with Germany at that time.
-To be fair, some of the blame for the Soviet-Nazi pact and the resulting consequences should fall on Churchill and co., who seemed as intent on making war on the Soviets as they were on making war on the Nazis.
-While it is true that some in the communist international wanted a revolutionary war in Europe, it’s equally true that Hitler made it plain that he intended to conquer Lebensraum in the east. Therefore, the fact that the Soviets were building up military forces on the border does not necessarily mean they planned to invade, especially given German aggression in Europe from 1938-41.
-Stalin was planning for war since at least 1928–much of the suffering and oppression caused by rapid industrialization and dispossession was justified by the threat of looming war and how it would be impossible for a non-industrialized nation to survive such a war. But I don’t think Stalin knew who he would be fighting (whether Germany or the Allies).
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-I can’t see the fact that the Soviets produced large quantities of offensive tanks and planes as evidence that they necessarily planned to attack in 1941. Rather, this was the most up-to-date technology at the time…unlike WWI, the WWII technology favored offensive strategies, as the Soviets discovered in the brief conflict wiht Japan in 1939.
-Nor can Stalin be blamed for considering the possibility of a pre-emptive war against Germany. However, if Stalin intended to initiate such a thing, the ideal time would have been before France fell, not after. Stalin and his planners seem to have felt the Soviet forces were not ready for war with Germany at that time.
-To be fair, some of the blame for the Soviet-Nazi pact and the resulting consequences should fall on Churchill and co., who seemed as intent on making war on the Soviets as they were on making war on the Nazis.
-While it is true that some in the communist international wanted a revolutionary war in Europe, it’s equally true that Hitler made it plain that he intended to conquer Lebensraum in the east. Therefore, the fact that the Soviets were building up military forces on the border does not necessarily mean they planned to invade, especially given German aggression in Europe from 1938-41.
-Stalin was planning for war since at least 1928–much of the suffering and oppression caused by rapid industrialization and dispossession was justified by the threat of looming war and how it would be impossible for a non-industrialized nation to survive such a war. But I don’t think Stalin knew who he would be fighting (whether Germany or the Allies).
I wasn’t necessarily convinced either–not until I’d started reading Suvorov’s book. Granted, I never doubted that Stalin planned to invade Europe eventually. (Regardless of whether it was controlled by the Nazis or the Western democracies.) But I’d been under the impression that Stalin had wanted the Nazis and the democracies to fight each other as long as possible first, so that both sides would have been bled white.
But Suvorov has made a compelling case that Stalin had planned to launch his invasion of Europe earlier than I’d realized. He pointed out that in June '41, the border between Germany and the Soviet Union was a wavy line. Where the German part of the line jutted into the Soviet territory, the Germans had large concentrations of troops and airfields. Where the Soviet part of the wavy line jutted into German territory, the Soviets likewise had large troop concentrations, airfields, and other military gear. Both sides were as far forward as physically possible. In a defensive war that kind of forward deployment would have made no sense. Very easy to get cut off and surrounded when your deployment is like that. Very easy for your airfields to quickly fall to the enemy, your planes destroyed on the ground. These things are in fact what happened to the Soviets, because Germany struck first. Had the Soviet Union struck the first blow, those same things would have happened to the Germans.
Another factor Suvorov pointed out was that Stalin had ordered the dismantlement of defensive fortifications. (The so-called “Stalin Line.”) He didn’t order the construction of new defensive fortifications further forward. He also disbanded partisan operations, so that the men could be freed up for offensive operations. (Such as paratroopers.)
However, if Stalin intended to initiate such a thing, the ideal time would have been before France fell, not after.
Stalin had hoped that the war between Germany and France would be long and bloody–much like WWI. He hoped that the war would weaken the fighting ability of both nations, while increasing revolutionary fervor. Eventually, the time would come for the Red Army to march in and sweep up the pieces. Both the German and French pieces. After Germany rolled right over France, Stalin might have decided that he wasn’t going to get the long, bloody war between Germany and the West he’d wanted. So why not invade Germany?
-To be fair, some of the blame for the Soviet-Nazi pact and the resulting consequences should fall on Churchill and co
To the extent that Hitler incurred blame by temporarily adopting a pro-Soviet foreign policy, he more than cleansed himself by launching Operation Barbarossa.
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But Suvorov has made a compelling case that Stalin had planned to launch his invasion of Europe earlier than I’d realized.
Alternately, the Soviets may simply have been working from the principle that the best defense is a good offense – in other words, that the best way to respond to a German attack against the USSR is to launch a massive counter-attack in the opposite direction as soon as the shooting starts. I once saw a 1970s-vintage television interview with a Soviet general (I think his name was Simoyan) who said that Soviet officers of the time were told that the USSR’s strategy was to never fight a war on its own territory, that its response to any invasion would be to throw the enemy back at the border and to keep going thereafter, so that the war would be fought on the enemy’s territory as much as possible. This strategy implies the presence of strong forces at the border. To the defender, these forces are regarded as defensive in nature. To the people on the other side of the border, however, they tend to look like an offensive force that’s preparing to launch an invasion.
There was a similar situation during the Cold War, specifically around the 1970s if I recall correctly. NATO planners were considering how to meet a possible Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, with West Germany as the probable target of the initial attack. NATO assumed that the attack would be a tank-heavy Blitzkrieg-style invasion, to which – from a purely technical viewpoint – the correct response is to set up a defense in depth. As much as this made sense militarily, however, it was politically unacceptable to West Germany because it implied that at least half their country would be overrun before the Warsaw Pact forces could be stopped. So, to satisfy West Germany, NATO opted for a concept of “forward defense” – which unfortunately had two problems. The first problem is that this type of “hard piecrust” defense on the borders is very dangerous because, if the attacker breaks through the crust there’s nothing behind it to stop him. The second problem – the relevant one for the present discussion – is that, to the other side, “forward defense” doesn’t look like a defensive stance at all; it looks like the preparation for an invasion. Which is exactly how the USSR saw it: the Soviets were convinced that NATO was setting itself up for an invasion of Eastern Europe. NATO did not actually have any such intentions, but perception alone can have a powerful influence on the course of political and military events. One also needs to remember the military axiom that, regardless of probable enemy intentions, it’s always prudent to take enemy capabilities into account.
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@Der:
This post is based on information given by Viktor Suvorov, a Soviet Army Cold War-era Soviet military intelligence officer who defected to the United Kingdom. The information is from a video here on youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Clv-c6QdBs, as well as one of his recent books, entitled The Chief Culprit. http://www.amazon.com/The-Chief-Culprit-Stalins-Design/dp/1591148065
I haven’t read Surovov’s book but I’ve read quite a few comments on his theories. The following are a sum of those comments plus my own ideas.
First of all, look at the official coat of arms of the Soviet Union during this time:
Notice there are no borders shown of the Soviet Union - the hammer and sickle are imposed over the entire globe. Imagine if any other country had such a logo - it would be very offensive, wouldn’t it? But this was the goal Stalin and communism - to eventually rule the entire world. Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire”, and he was right.
Well, since Marxist theory was developed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks the idea was to spread the revolution to the rest of the world after it was consolidated in Russia. During the 1920s and 30s there was even an dedicated organization (Coninform, later Cominertn) to spread the revolution to the capitalist countries and coordinate the communist parties everywhere. But in how to achieve this there was a lot of discussion inside the Soviet Union, since some considered that it was required to develop the worker class before it was possible to achieve a revolution (and that communist was the ‘natural’ result of the development of human societies after capitalist), while others took a more revolutionary approach.
So yes, communist ideology typically saw the dissemination of regimes and the implementation of world socialism as its goal. But in real life, the Soviet leaders usually took a more pragmatic approach and rather waited to see if the opportunity presented itself, rather than trying to implement communist regimes everywhere.
The Soviet Union showed its aggressive nature by dividing Poland with Germany in 1939. The Soviets then attacked Finland in November 1939. They completely trounced the Japanese in the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol in 1939, resulting in a neutrality pact with Japan. Afterwards they forcibly occupied the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in June of 1940. This all happened a year before Germany attacked the Soviet Union.
Historians often paint the Soviet Union as an innocent victim of German aggression. Some say that Stalin was afraid of Hitler and wanted peace with him at all costs.
One of the main causes which led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Munich Pact signed between Hitler and the western leaders and the later occupation of Chechoslovakia by the Nazis. The USSR had a alliance with Chechoslovakia like France had but once the western leaders caved in to Hitler’s demands (and completely ignoring the USSR during the Munich talks), Stalin started tp realize that he couldn’t count on the UK/France to contain Hitler.
The Munich Pact also had another effect, which was to greatly influence German influence in Eastern Europe, which Stalin was eager to contain. The UK, France, Romania, Poland and the USSR tried to make a treaty to contain Germany in August 1939 but once it failed (no one really trusted one another) then Stalin turned and signed a Pact with Hitler, since he also suspected (suspicion of everyone being his trademark) that the capitalists had left him hung to dry against Hitler.
Since he didn’t want to get the short stick, the division of Poland and the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics were part of a deal for Stalin to gain time since he knew that the Red Army was in no condition to engage in a major war due to the purges and its outdated equipment and it was not until 1942 that the Red Army was considered fit for offensive operations. That’s also another reason why Hitler had to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 - Hitler was afraid that by 1942 the Soviet Union would likely be prepared to deal with a German invasion.
DIVIDING POLAND
In 1939 there was a natural barrier between Germany and Russia - Poland. As long as Poland was there, Germany could not attack Russia. Wasn’t Stalin safer from big bad Hitler with an intact Poland between them? But on August 23rd, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed, dividing Poland between Hitler and Stalin. This was signed in MOSCOW, not Berlin. Hitler was not there. Stalin was there. Stalin signed it. In this pact the two nations agreed to attack Poland on Sept. 1st, the next week. In doing this, Stalin was removing his safe buffer zone between Russia and Germany. This proves he was not afraid of Germany at all.
Proves he was not afraid? He knew that Germany would trounce over Poland since the western powers were too far away to do anything (and they had already done nothing when Germany raped Chechoslovakia) why wouldn’t he sign a pact to get a buffer zone between Russia and Germany? Your logic makes no sense.
“WE’RE NOT READY”
When Germany began its attack on Sept 1st as agreed, Stalin said “We’re not ready” and did not attack from the other side. This made Germany look like the total bad guy in the rest of the world’s eyes. This is exactly what Stalin wanted. Britain and France declared war on Germany three days later. Stalin left all the heavy lifting to Germany - he let the Germans destroy the Polish armies. It wasn’t until the 17th of September, after the battle was won, that Stalin said “OK we’re ready now” and moved into Poland from the East.
Again, it was Stalin’s suspicious nature. He wasn’t required to attack Poland when Germany did, but since he didn’t trust Hitler would keep his part of the bargain, he moved to take the portion of Poland that was earmarked for Russia once it seemed that Poland would fall.
RUSSIANS SUPPLIED HITLER’S WAR MACHINE
After this, Stalin was an enthusiastic supporter of Hitler, supplying him with huge amounts of oil and raw materials. The triumphs of blitzkrieg, the luftwaffe, and the u-boats were due largely to the steady supply of Russian oil and other vital war materials during this time.
Stalin was buying time. Above all, he didn’t want a war with Germany until the Red Army was ready and he believed that the oil and raw materials would dissuade Hitler from attacking. He also tried in 1941 to get the Soviet Union to join the Axis but Germany wasn’t interested since Hitler was already preparing to attack Russia.
SHREWD STALIN
The reason for this support was that Stalin wanted to use the Germans as his hammer to destroy Europe’s armies. Then, when much of the German war machine was across the channel occupied with Sealion, Stalin would proceed to “liberate” Europe from the “evil” Germans. Of course any “liberated” country would end up a communist puppet like the Baltic States.
This implies a lot of wrong assumptions: a) that the Soviets were ready to attack Germany while Sea Lion was taking place during 1940 (which it wasn’t and Stalin knew it); b) that the Germans would use most of their army for Sea Lion (which it wouldn’t, according to the plans).
RUSSIA WAS PREPARED FOR ATTACK, NOT DEFENSE
There is much evidence provided in Suvorov’s book which I can’t list here - I recommend you get the book. But here are a few facts:
- The Soviets produced over 1,500 amphibious tanks in the thirties. Amphibious tanks are for offense - crossing rivers where bridges have been blown. In defense, you would cross your own bridges and blow them behind you.
- Much Soviet armor and guns were of huge caliber and would not be of much use but for bombarding fortresses, which would be done on offense.
- Over 2,700 BT-7 tanks were built from 1935-1940. These tanks could drop their tracks in order to run up to 70 MPH on paved highways. Germany had the paved highways, not Russia.
- Thousands of Russian planes were setup on airfields within 800 meters of Germany. This was ideal for an attack, as the planes could be in range to support invading ground units. But it was bad for defense. This resulted in 3,922 Soviet aircraft destroyed in the first three days of the German attack.
- Over six million Russian/German phrase books were published in Russia for the Soviet Army in May of 1941, a month before the German attack.
- In 1941 the Soviet Union had more than 1 million trained paratroopers. Paratroopers can only be used effectively in attack.
This can all be explained by Soviet doctrine: in case of an imminent attack it was considered that the best defense would be to contain at the border and the engage and destroy the aggressor on it own territory. This doctrine was also the reason why the Germany was so successful during the early stages of Barbarossa: the Soviet armies were close to the border due to it, but they had no defensive preparations (since the border had moved due to Stalin taking half of Poland) and Stalin didn’t believe that Hitler would attack in 1941.
HITLER’S ONLY CHOICE
Hitler eventually caught on to Stalin’s plan and, rather than wait for Stalin’s unstoppable attack, did a pre-emptive strike. Stalin totally did not expect this. In 1939, the Soviets had 21,100 battle ready tanks. Even more by 1941. Many of these were lost or abandoned in the early blitzkrieg because they were packed together at the borders in preparation for an attack on Germany.
The Germans eventually lost the war to the much larger Soviets, but if they would have waited for a Soviet attack, all of Europe would have ended up under Communist rule.
Ok, so you’re ignoring that Hitler had defended since the 1920s to take territory in Eastern Europe/Russia that he considered vital for Germany’s survival, and that he expected that, after the Battle of France, the UK would join Germany in a war against communism. Plus, even in 1942, the Red Army would not be in a condition of attacking Germany and facing the German Army, which had a lot of experience gained from conquering Poland, Norway, France, etc. Hitler himself considered the Red Army a joke, specially after the debacle in Finland in 1939.
Hitler did attack because he realized that the longer he waited, the better prepared the Soviet Union would be for the war (which was exactly the same logic he followed in invading Poland/France against the opinion of the German High Command).
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I haven’t read Surovov’s book but I’ve read quite a few comments on his theories. The following are a sum of those comments plus my own ideas.
Well, since Marxist theory was developed by Lenin and the Bolsheviks the idea was to spread the revolution to the rest of the world after it was consolidated in Russia. During the 1920s and 30s there was even an dedicated organization (Coninform, later Cominertn) to spread the revolution to the capitalist countries and coordinate the communist parties everywhere. But in how to achieve this there was a lot of discussion inside the Soviet Union, since some considered that it was required to develop the worker class before it was possible to achieve a revolution (and that communist was the ‘natural’ result of the development of human societies after capitalist), while others took a more revolutionary approach.
So yes, communist ideology typically saw the dissemination of regimes and the implementation of world socialism as its goal. But in real life, the Soviet leaders usually took a more pragmatic approach and rather waited to see if the opportunity presented itself, rather than trying to implement communist regimes everywhere.
One of the main causes which led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the Munich Pact signed between Hitler and the western leaders and the later occupation of Chechoslovakia by the Nazis. The USSR had a alliance with Chechoslovakia like France had but once the western leaders caved in to Hitler’s demands (and completely ignoring the USSR during the Munich talks), Stalin started tp realize that he couldn’t count on the UK/France to contain Hitler.
The Munich Pact also had another effect, which was to greatly influence German influence in Eastern Europe, which Stalin was eager to contain. The UK, France, Romania, Poland and the USSR tried to make a treaty to contain Germany in August 1939 but once it failed (no one really trusted one another) then Stalin turned and signed a Pact with Hitler, since he also suspected (suspicion of everyone being his trademark) that the capitalists had left him hung to dry against Hitler.
Since he didn’t want to get the short stick, the division of Poland and the Soviet occupation of the Baltic republics were part of a deal for Stalin to gain time since he knew that the Red Army was in no condition to engage in a major war due to the purges and its outdated equipment and it was not until 1942 that the Red Army was considered fit for offensive operations. That’s also another reason why Hitler had to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 - Hitler was afraid that by 1942 the Soviet Union would likely be prepared to deal with a German invasion.
Proves he was not afraid? He knew that Germany would trounce over Poland since the western powers were too far away to do anything (and they had already done nothing when Germany raped Chechoslovakia) why wouldn’t he sign a pact to get a buffer zone between Russia and Germany? Your logic makes no sense.
Again, it was Stalin’s suspicious nature. He wasn’t required to attack Poland when Germany did, but since he didn’t trust Hitler would keep his part of the bargain, he moved to take the portion of Poland that was earmarked for Russia once it seemed that Poland would fall.
Stalin was buying time. Above all, he didn’t want a war with Germany until the Red Army was ready and he believed that the oil and raw materials would dissuade Hitler from attacking. He also tried in 1941 to get the Soviet Union to join the Axis but Germany wasn’t interested since Hitler was already preparing to attack Russia.
This implies a lot of wrong assumptions: a) that the Soviets were ready to attack Germany while Sea Lion was taking place during 1940 (which it wasn’t and Stalin knew it); b) that the Germans would use most of their army for Sea Lion (which it wouldn’t, according to the plans).
This can all be explained by Soviet doctrine: in case of an imminent attack it was considered that the best defense would be to contain at the border and the engage and destroy the aggressor on it own territory. This doctrine was also the reason why the Germany was so successful during the early stages of Barbarossa: the Soviet armies were close to the border due to it, but they had no defensive preparations (since the border had moved due to Stalin taking half of Poland) and Stalin didn’t believe that Hitler would attack in 1941.
Ok, so you’re ignoring that Hitler had defended since the 1920s to take territory in Eastern Europe/Russia that he considered vital for Germany’s survival, and that he expected that, after the Battle of France, the UK would join Germany in a war against communism. Plus, even in 1942, the Red Army would not be in a condition of attacking Germany and facing the German Army, which had a lot of experience gained from conquering Poland, Norway, France, etc. Hitler himself considered the Red Army a joke, specially after the debacle in Finland in 1939.
Hitler did attack because he realized that the longer he waited, the better prepared the Soviet Union would be for the war (which was exactly the same logic he followed in invading Poland/France against the opinion of the German High Command).
I’m about halfway through Suvorov’s book. He’s addressed a number of the points you’ve raised.
First and foremost, he pointed out that the Red Army did extremely well against the Japanese in 1939. Zhukov achieved this by launching a surprise attack against the Japanese. After their defeat at Khalkhin Gol, and the destruction of Japan’s Sixth Army, the Japanese lost any appetite they might have had for conflict with the Soviet Union.
It was standard practice for the Soviet government to loudly celebrate any successes it achieved. In this case, it was completely silent about its victory over Japan. As the person in overall charge of the Soviet government’s censorship policy, Stalin nixed any story which related to Khalkhin Gol. Suvorov pointed out that if Stalin was planning on surprising another opponent with those tactics, silence would have made sense.
There is the impression–which I’d been under as well, at least until reading Suvorov’s book–that the Red Army performed poorly in the Winter War. Suvorov points out that the task of invading Finland was generally considered impossible. The Finns had created a defensive pale–a lightly defended area. The second layer of their defense consisted of the nearly impregnable Mannerheim Line. In order to pass through the Finnish defensive pale, it was necessary to walk or drive along a road. (The forest on either side of the road was typically impenetrable.) There were also snow-covered lakes, with relatively thin ice on top of the snow. These lakes were indistinguishable from snow-covered open fields. Everything looked the same, because it was all covered with snow.
Imagine a Soviet column moving along the road in this defensive pale. As the first few tanks or heavy artillery pieces are crossing a bridge, the bridge blows up. The demolition charges were built into the bridge itself (and so hidden from view). Moreover, the bridge at the rear of the column blows up as well. There are large numbers of land mines on either side of the road, preventing the Soviets from leaving. At this point, Finnish sniper units appear. They are on skis; and are far more familiar with the forest than are the Soviet invaders. They start by taking out the Soviet officers and tractor drivers. Now the column is stuck, unable to leave the road, and subject to further attacks. That was the defensive pale. Only heavy artillery could harm Finnish pillboxes (layer 2 of their defenses). Anything to be used on the pillboxes first had to be moved through the defensive pale.
Overcoming all that was generally considered a militarily impossible task. A task which the Red Army achieved in a few months.
In the middle of winter, no less. Having overcome Finland’s defenses, Stalin refrained from conquering the rest of Finland. Not only that, he began spreading the rumor that the Red Army had fought poorly in that engagement. Hitler believed these accounts, and concluded the Red Army was not a threat.In the summer of 1940, Stalin did something very similar to Romania. The bulk of Germany’s strength was in France. Only 10 German divisions were on the Nazi-Soviet border, and none at all were in Romania. Under those circumstances, Stalin demanded and received Bessarabia. The Red Army could easily have conquered all of Romania; thereby cutting Germany off from the bulk of its oil supply.
In many ways, the summer of 1940 would have been a perfect time for the Soviet Union to invade Germany. He could have begun the war by taking away most of Germany’s oil supply, and by rolling right over the token force on the German-Soviet border. Instead he waited. Why?
Suvorov pointed out that the way Stalin came to power in the first place was by partnering with X to destroy Y. Once Y was gone, Stalin would partner with Z to destroy X. Then he’d destroy Z. At the end of this process, no one was left standing except him. Suvorov believes–and with reason–that Stalin intended to use exactly this same approach to international affairs. In this case, his plan appears to have been to partner with Hitler to destroy the Western democracies; then to destroy Hitler. Suvorov believes that the reason Stalin didn’t attack in 1940 is because he’d wanted Hitler to successfully launch Operation Sea Lion.
Imagine this scenario: the British Isles are conquered by the Nazis in 1940. Then in 1941, the Red Army defeats the Wehrmacht. At that point, there would be no one to stop the Soviets from occupying all of Europe, including Britain itself. Some British might even have seen the Soviets as liberators from their German oppressors. (At least initially.) From Stalin’s perspective this scenario would have been quite positive. Instead of having to defeat the Germans, and the French, and the British, he’d need to defeat the Germans only.
He’d set himself up nicely to go after Germany, after Hitler’s work was finished. His conquest of Karelia positioned him to take out the rest of Finland, whenever it became necessary to cut off Germany’s supply of nickel, or its iron ore from Sweden. His acquisition of Bessarabia put him that much closer to Romania’s oil fields. But he didn’t want to take Hitler’s natural resources away from him immediately. Not until his usefulness against the Western democracies had been expended.
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Glad you actually got the book I’ve been referring to and are reading it, Kurt!
If people don’t like reading, they should at least watch the youtube video link in my first post on this subject. Its not that long, and you may go away with a far different impression of Stalin and his intentions than what you’ve been taught.
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