G40 Redesign (currently taking suggestions)

@CWO:

The proposal is in two parts, but both parts hinge on the same assumption: that the US can only get the full benefits of a fully mobilized wartime economy if the American public is strongly motivated to support the war effort.�

Part one of the proposal has to do with the state of war in and of itself.� Even though a DoW is virtually guaranteed onder the OOB rules, it doesn’t hurt to give things a little (actually a big) nudge in the right direction.� So here’s the idea: the US can (obviously) only shift to a wartime economy if it goes to war, but it can only shift to a full wartime economy if it goes to war against both Japan and the European Axis powers.� The rationale is simple: being at war against both Japan and the Germany/Italy pairing is a far bigger crisis than being at war just in the Pacific or just in Europe, so it’s easier to convince the public that a far greater effort is needed.� Therefore: If the US is at war against Japan alone, it can only ramp up to x% of its potential full wartime economy (x being significantly smaller than 100).� If the US is at war against Germany/Italy alone, it can only ramp up to y% of its potential full wartime economy (y being significantly smaller than 100).� �Only if it’s at war against all the Axis power can it ramp up to 100% of its potential full wartime economy.

This is excellent. Very plausible and simple also. The split could be as easy as 50/50… 50% is much less than 100%. Otherwise maybe 60 (Germany)/40(Japan). But I always like standing numbers over percentages for game purposes. That can be easily arranged, ex. 30 IPCs for being at war w/ Japan and 40 IPCs for being at war w/Germany.

@CWO:

Now for part two, which has to do with the need to fight aggressively.� Here’s the idea: unless the US fights actively on both fronts, on a fairly constant basis, it won’t be able to maintain its full wartime economy.�

This part of the economic adjustment table would, in essence, deduct points from the US wartime economy if the Americans aren’t actively fighting on one of their two fronts…and would deduct even more if they’re not fighting actively on either front.� “Fighting actively” would have to be defined, of course, but here’s the neat part: it’s the “fighting actively” part that would matter, not whether the Americans are winning or losing.�

�

This is a little more nebulous and open to interpretation. We would have to define it pretty well to avoid confusion and argument. I am not sure how we would quantify “fighting actively”.

My initial thought was that we could treat the US very much like the UK/India. Income would be split between the Eastern US and Western US - the board is conveniently split for that. Western US IPCs must be placed in the West. This would not prohibit the transfer of units to the Eastern US (and to Europe) after they are purchased, but it could provide incentive to use them to fight in the Pacific.

Honestly, I don’t really like that idea. Poses a couple of problems and really dictates too much what the US buys for the logistical problems it imposes.

@CWO:

Getting the US to fight actively in this way will go a long way to keeping Japan occupied (and away from Russia), so that’s already a big help.�

The best way to incentivize activity is for money to be involved, especially for the lower economy Powers (Japan, India, ANZAC). This means more NO bonuses. I think there is an overload point with NOs, so we do have to be judicious about how many we set up. The problem I see with some of the NOs in the rules now is that their difficulty/time taken to achieve outweighs their economic gain. Or that by the time you get the NO you are already winning the game.

I think that given credible economic benefits (NOs, DoW IPC+, island territory values) and necessary strategic concerns (Japan’s Victory Points/Prestige), the US will have good reason to engage Japan. If we adopt the Independent Victory Conditions and split the game into effectively four teams (JPN, GER/ITA, US/UK, USSR)… I hope that it becomes apparent that the US and UK have as good, if not a better shot at winning the game by taking Tokyo before the USSR takes Berlin. If we split the Allies and give them reason to compete against each other, I think some of these issues may take care of themselves. The situation will be UK/ANZAC/USA versus Japan and UK/US/USSR versus Germany/Italy.

It will take time and resources for the Soviets to start their fight with Japan. Time and resources they will not have while Germany is still a credible threat. This leaves an open path to victory for the Western Allies against Japan. They really will hold victory in their hands if they put forth the effort to take Tokyo. This all would have to be ironed out in what will constitute victory, but I think part of it should involve who of the Allies can take Berlin or Tokyo first.

What the OOB format of US/UK/USSR vs Germany/Japan has is a whole heck of a lot of COOPERATION and COORDINATION and not much COMPETITION. I think that is a big failing as evidenced by the Japan Attacks USSR problem and the Allies Ignore Japan problem.

@CWO:

Is there a way to motivate the British to likewise fight actively in the Asia/Pacfic theatre?�

I have never really had issue with this. ANZAC (essentially the UK) is a given. India, with its separate economy, usually has to use its resources to fight Japan for economic sustenance (DEI and Malaya) and to prevent Japan seizing victory by assaulting Calcutta. India usually sticks to the land war though. This pretty well mimics history in that the UK didn’t assault Japanese Pacific holdings to the scale that the US did. ANZAC and UK ships were present in US fleets pretty often, but even that was mostly confined to the South and Western Pacific.

@LHoffman:

I think that given credible economic benefits (NOs, DoW IPC+, island territory values) and necessary strategic concerns (Japan’s Victory Points/Prestige), the US will have good reason to engage Japan. If we adopt the Independent Victory Conditions and split the game into effectively four teams (JPN, GER/ITA, US/UK, USSR)… I hope that it becomes apparent that the US and UK have as good, if not a better shot at winning the game by taking Tokyo before the USSR takes Berlin. If we split the Allies and give them reason to compete against each other, I think some of these issues may take care of themselves. The situation will be UK/ANZAC/USA versus Japan and UK/US/USSR versus Germany/Italy.

It will take time and resources for the Soviets to start their fight with Japan. Time and resources they will not have while Germany is still a credible threat. This leaves an open path to victory for the Western Allies against Japan. They really will hold victory in their hands if they put forth the effort to take Tokyo. This all would have to be ironed out in what will constitute victory, but I think part of it should involve who of the Allies can take Berlin or Tokyo first.

What the OOB format of US/UK/USSR vs Germany/Japan has is a whole heck of a lot of COOPERATION and COORDINATION and not much COMPETITION. I think that is a big failing as evidenced by the Japan Attacks USSR problem and the Allies Ignore Japan problem.

Hmm.  The “four-team” model you mention could perhaps profitably be paired with the “three phases” model I previously mentioned. Here are some thoughts on this.

The four-team model does reflect reasonably well the situation that existed in WWII.  On the Axis side, there was basically Japan on its own in the Asia-Pacific region and the European Axis block (Germany, Italy, plus various Axis minors like Romania) in the European/Mediterranean region.  Their respective wars were linked, but not really coordinated.  On the Allied side, the picture was more complicated because some of the Allied powers were fighting in both theatres…so we have a collection of Allied campaigns involving different combinations of countries.  Basically, though, I think it’s fair to distinguish between the USSR and everyone else (US, UK, ANZAC, France and China – though France and China are both odd cases in their own ways).  The USSR was significantly different from the other countries in ideology and governance, with the USSR being the only totalitarian dictatorship on the Allied side.  The USSR and (for simplicity) the Anglo-Americans also fought the European part of WWII in very different ways.  Russia spent most of WWII fighting a head-on land war against Germany, and its basic approach to waging this war was labour-intensive and relatively low-tech.  The Anglo-Americans spent most of WWII fighting on the fringes of Axis territory, and their basic approach to hitting Germany directly (their bomber campaign) was capital-intensive and relatively high-tech.  There was a lot of friction between the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans, with neither side really trusting each other and with both sides seeing their alliance very much as a temporary marriage of convenience.  Stalin spent the period from mid-1941 to mid-1944 complaining that Russia was bearing the brunt of the war against Germany, and demanding that his western allies open a second front.  The British, and later the British and the Americans, spent those years a) building up their forces in Britain for a cross-Channel invasion; b) explaining to Stalin that they weren’t yet ready to invade France; c) sending supplies to Stalin to keep Russia in the fight; d) fighting in fringe territories like North Africa, Sicily and Italy, in part to be seen by Stalin as actively fighting the Axis somewhere; and e) trying to convince Stalin that their bomber offensive against Germany was a “second front” in and of itself.

Your reference to the question of “who of the Allies can take Berlin or Tokyo first” raises an interesting angle, which is where the connection with the “three phases” model comes in.  For the first phase of the war, the phase of Axis dominance, I’d say that the UK and the USSR each had immediate survival as their top priority.  The middle “deep war” phase is the part of the war where the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans started to have enough breathing room to start engaging in political machinations.  Their priorities here, I’d say, were to each fight the war on a basis that they were capable of and which they felt was acceptable to them (the labour-intensive vs. capital-intensive approaches I mentioned earlier), and to try to get their allies to do what they wanted (with the USSR wanting the Anglo-Americans to open a second front, and the Anglo-Americans wanting the USSR to keep fighting Germany).  It’s in the third phase (the phase of Allied dominance) that I think we could validly start bringing into the game some competing political objectives for the USSR and the Anglo-Americans…objectives that would anticipate the Cold War.  Historically, the Russians were determined to capture Berlin themselves, while the Americans were equally determined to take the Japanese home islands themselves and, if at all possible, to prevent the Russians from setting foot there.  So perhaps we could make use of this in some way when setting victory conditions.

I’d make the split differently:

The United States of America must spend at least 33 and 1/3rd of it’s income in each theater (Atlantic/Pacific) and the remaining 3rd can be spent where the player wants.  If you are not at war with one side, then you get none of your NO’s but you can spend all of your income on the one theater you are at war in.

@Cmdr:

I’d make the split differently:

The United States of America must spend at least 33 and 1/3rd of it’s income in each theater (Atlantic/Pacific) and the remaining 3rd can be spent where the player wants.  If you are not at war with one side, then you get none of your NO’s but you can spend all of your income on the one theater you are at war in.

That does sound better.

@CWO:

Hmm.  The “four-team” model you mention could perhaps profitably be paired with the “three phases” model I previously mentioned.

Yes, it would be. Particularly the third phase which anticipates the Cold War, as you pointed out. My goal would be that the individual motivations for Allied victory would be present the whole time (i.e. it gives you a clear idea of what you must do as either the UK/US or the USSR to win the game). These motivations and goals would be most apparent towards the end of the game when the Allies are making their advances… if the Allies are winning that is.

I will say that your 3-phases seems more like an analysis of game-war progression rather than a ‘system’ to be implemented.

@CWO:

Your reference to the question of “who of the Allies can take Berlin or Tokyo first” raises an interesting angle, which is where the connection with the “three phases” model comes in.  For the first phase of the war, the phase of Axis dominance, I’d say that the UK and the USSR each had immediate survival as their top priority.  The middle “deep war” phase is the part of the war where the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans started to have enough breathing room to start engaging in political machinations.  Their priorities here, I’d say, were to each fight the war on a basis that they were capable of and which they felt was acceptable to them (the labour-intensive vs. capital-intensive approaches I mentioned earlier), and to try to get their allies to do what they wanted (with the USSR wanting the Anglo-Americans to open a second front, and the Anglo-Americans wanting the USSR to keep fighting Germany).  It’s in the third phase (the phase of Allied dominance) that I think we could validly start bringing into the game some competing political objectives for the USSR and the Anglo-Americans…objectives that would anticipate the Cold War.  Historically, the Russians were determined to capture Berlin themselves, while the Americans were equally determined to take the Japanese home islands themselves and, if at all possible, to prevent the Russians from setting foot there.  So perhaps we could make use of this in some way when setting victory conditions.

I think this is a good thing. Ultimately, the Allies (if they win) will go through all 3 phases you mentioned, even if the teams are split up as I suggested. If everything works as it should, it may even foster some friendly competition and/or deception in the vein of Diplomacy (as someone mentioned) among the Allies to see who can be the outright winner.

The Soviets were determined to take Berlin, and the Western Allies let them do so to some degree because the USSR ‘earned it’. But even before the atomic bombs were dropped, Stalin was concerned that the Western Allies were going to wrap up the war against Japan without the USSR. There were huge swaths of territory in Manchuria and the Pacific that Stalin was set on obtaining… the USSR even continued fighting after Japan ceased fighting on Aug 16. (See Operation August Storm: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria) The invasion of Manchuria boggles the mind due to the speed and scale of operations; the Soviets overran a defended and geographically difficult area the size of the entire Western European theater in under 20 days.

I studied a book in my college class Japan in WWII in which the author asserts that Japan quit the war not because of the atomic bombs, but because of how quickly the Soviet Union was advancing through Japanese territory in August of 1945. He backs this up with evidence of a longstanding fear among the Japanese of Soviet communism and the belief that the Western Allies would be more favorable in its post-war treatment of the kokutai (national polity - emperor) than the Soviets would.

All of this is a side-note, but my goal for a 4-Team game would be to create the kind of desperate competition to outmaneuver both the Axis enemies and your Allied counterpart to obtain more territory and influence in the post-war world. That is how the Allies would be judged to have won. I do think it will intrinsically address the annoying Japan-to-Moscow tank run also.

A past issue brought up on this thread that I have not really thought about is how to bring a clean and decisive end to the game. - Where there is a clear winner and so the losing side doesn’t just capitulate when the situation is hopeless. Personally, I don’t believe it is possible to do this in a satisfactory way for Axis & Allies. All the relevant board games I can think of have the same characteristic. Monopoly, Stratego, Chess, Risk… it often comes to the point where you can project a winner with great certainty. So the losing side quits rather than prolong the inevitable. Personally I don’t think there is anything wrong with this. Heck that is what Japan did… the Allies didn’t even have to invade, all they had to do was show they were more than capable.

The only way a clean victory could happen is if both sides are motivated enough to still be playing, thinking they have a chance at eventually winning. The only way I can think of doing this in Axis & Allies would be something akin to the Minor Victory option, but where nobody has to take one of the major capitals to win. The quickest way for one side to quit the game is when capitals are taken: your money is gone and your production capacity is wrecked. That is a massive setback and is very difficult to recover from without immediate outside help.

The reason my group never plays Minor Victory is that it doesn’t mean very much. There is still a lot of game left to be played and no Power is necessarily out of contention.

@LHoffman:

The Soviets were determined to take Berlin, and the Western Allies let them do so to some degree because the USSR ‘earned it’. But even before the atomic bombs were dropped, Stalin was concerned that the Western Allies were going to wrap up the war against Japan without the USSR. There were huge swaths of territory in Manchuria and the Pacific that Stalin was set on obtaining… the USSR even continued fighting after Japan ceased fighting on Aug 16. (See Operation August Storm: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_invasion_of_Manchuria) The invasion of Manchuria boggles the mind due to the speed and scale of operations; the Soviets overran a defended and geographically difficult area the size of the entire Western European theater in under 20 days.
[…]
All of this is a side-note, but my goal for a 4-Team game would be to create the kind of desperate competition to outmaneuver both the Axis enemies and your Allied counterpart to obtain more territory and influence in the post-war world. That is how the Allies would be judged to have won. I do think it will intrinsically address the annoying Japan-to-Moscow tank run also.

I’m wondering if this could also somehow be used to deal with some of the game issues that have been raised regarding China.  The rapid crumbling of Japan’s position in China in 1945 was caused in part by the Soviet-Mongolian invasion and in part by the fact that the Chinese themselves started to make serious progress when the deteriorating situation in the Pacific led Japan to get reinforcements by tapping its forces in China, specifically the Kwantung Army.  Furthermore, China had its own anticipating-the-Cold-War problem during WWII because Sun’s Nationalists and Mao’s Communists seemed at times less concerned about fighting the Japanese than in positioning themselves for a resumption of their interrupted civil war.

I will say that your 3-phases seems more like an analysis of game-war progression rather than a ‘system’ to be implemented.
[…]
A past issue brought up on this thread that I have not really thought about is how to bring a clean and decisive end to the game <<

I’m tying the two above sentences together because my answer relates to both.

My three-phase analysis did actually have an implementable-system component to it: the economic-adjustement tables that I’d proposed.  My argument was that the macroeconomic situation of the various WWII combatant nations changed in some fairly clear ways over the three major phases of the war, and that the tables could be used to simulate these changes in the game.  Those changes, in turn, might have important effects on the IPC strength of the two sides as the game progresses.  So I wasn’t just giving an abstract description of the course of the war; I was proposing a system that would (to give just one example) ensure that Japan would be dealing with a major IPC cash crunch late in the war, and therefore to give Japan a strong incentive to win early.

One related aspect of the three-phase analysis that I didn’t really make explicit was the potential idea of having victory conditions which change during the war rather than remaining constant.  I haven’t thought about that one in detail, but it might be something to explore to address the “clean end” issue you mentioned.

@CWO:

I’m wondering if this could also somehow be used to deal with some of the game issues that have been raised regarding China.� The rapid crumbling of Japan’s position in China in 1945 was caused in part by the Soviet-Mongolian invasion and in part by the fact that the Chinese themselves started to make serious progress when the deteriorating situation in the Pacific led Japan to get reinforcements by tapping its forces in China, specifically the Kwantung Army.� Furthermore, China had its own anticipating-the-Cold-War problem during WWII because Sun’s Nationalists and Mao’s Communists seemed at times less concerned about fighting the Japanese than in positioning themselves for a resumption of their interrupted civil war.�

I think it could. I haven’t thought much about China in terms of how they are played other than the musing of whether or not the Nationalists and Communists should be represented instead of one, undifferentiated Chinese force.

I am going to reserve judgement on that based on if we can do it in an easy-to-integrate and simple-to-play way. What I really want to avoid is adding more separate countries or neutrals. In my view, they slow down play and the political aspect gets more complicated. I don’t know how it works in HBG’s Global War, but from reading the rules it looks like there are a slew of minor powers and neutrals.

Breaking up China in two wouldn’t necessarily ruin gameplay though. It could be rather interesteing and add to the Western Allies vs Soviet dynamic. The Soviet player could control the Communist Chinese and the US/UK control the Nationalists. They could work together if so desired but would otherwise be independent and able to occupy territory and gather resources independently. This would aid, I believe, in slowing down Japan’s progress through China and into the Soviet Union because the player for the USSR would effectively have their own Chinese infantry/artillery force to strategically oppose Japan with.

@CWO:

My three-phase analysis did actually have an implementable-system component to it: the economic-adjustement tables that I’d proposed.  My argument was that the macroeconomic situation of the various WWII combatant nations changed in some fairly clear ways over the three major phases of the war, and that the tables could be used to simulate these changes in the game.  Those changes, in turn, might have important effects on the IPC strength of the two sides as the game progresses.  So I wasn’t just giving an abstract description of the course of the war; I was proposing a system that would (to give just one example) ensure that Japan would be dealing with a major IPC cash crunch late in the war, and therefore to give Japan a strong incentive to win early.

Ah, yes, I do recall that now. My mistake. That is worth considering. It would make the use of a turn counter or game-dial showing the changing situation over time much more relevant to gameplay.

However, I do think my initial response was that this timetable of income reduction on Japan could be redundant. Yes, it would incentivize Japan to win ASAP and early, but are they not already motivated to do that? The longer the war is drawn out the more the Allies (should) grown powerful and the harder it becomes for Japan or Germany to win. An economic drawdown occurs once the Allies start taking territory back. For Japan in particular this system would impose a time-clock on victory and with every tick down the ability for them to win may be doubly hard. They are losing territory, which saps them of money and they are on the clock, which further saps them of money, regardless of whether or not their strategic situation has changed in any real way.

@CWO:

One related aspect of the three-phase analysis that I didn’t really make explicit was the potential idea of having victory conditions which change during the war rather than remaining constant.  I haven’t thought about that one in detail, but it might be something to explore to address the “clean end” issue you mentioned.

That sounds interesting. I am reticent to have fluid rules or victory conditions, but I wouldn’t rule it out without consideration. Just means more moving parts.

@Black_Elk:

Just reading through the last two pages on a break at work. One idea which just came to me, for the idea of split theater play (“actively fighting” in two directions instead of just one), is to somehow tweak the games economic system, so that you are rewarded for fighting battles rather than only being rewarded for taking high value territories.

There are several approaches, one I mentioned previously in various threads was to award a “battle bonus” where the attacker is awarded +1 ipc for each successful battle. This ipc is not attached to the territory, so it could conceivably work for sea battles as well. Basically (if using paper money) you place 1 ipcs on the battle board.

This is like a “prize” for the battle. If the attacker prevails they get the battle buck, added directly to their purse. You could do the same if you wanted for the defender. Basically wherever the battle is fought there is always some concrete ipc value at stake.

The rationale would be something like, “we need to grab a headline” to show the public that we’re making good use of their war bonds and war products. You know for home front morale and to demonstrate that the leaders of the nation are “actively fighting” and not allowing the war to stagnate. This was a real motivation in the actual war that encouraged actions which might have been seen as premature, ill timed, or a waste of resources when considered from a purely objective standpoint, but which, from a public relations/morale standpoint was worthwhile. Maybe CWO can think of some relevant examples?

My view is that you need an ipc motivation to get this sort of thing working. I’ve discussed it before in the valueless ipc islands thread. But if you want the Americans to launch and attack for control of some worthless out of the way island, putting a buck at stake is a food way to do this. Similarly, if you want to encourage players to fight narrow battles in the near term, instead of just waiting until they have an overwhelming numbers advantage, then putting a battle buck in the pot might be a good way to do it.

I am not too sure about this. I understand the reasoning, but for the most part I feel that tactically the game moves itself along without any need for monetary incentive. I don’t see unreasonable amounts of unit build-up because time and physical spacing are good enough motivators in-and-of-themselves. Besides, no reasonable amount of money would make me take my even moderately outnumbered force into a battle I am not sure I can win. I am going to lose more units than I am going to gain back in IPCs… not to mention that the IPCs I do gain are nothing until they are physically on the board the next turn.

Might it incentivize the taking of Pacific islands? Perhaps, but I thought that is why you make the islands nominally worth something. I think it would also be difficult to differentiate battles… meaning are all battles worth the same bonus? Is 2 Tanks vs 1 infantry in the Belgian Congo worth as much as two giant fleets engaging off the coast of France?

I don’t mean to shoot your idea down, but those are the questions that first come to mind.

@LHoffman:

@CWO:

One related aspect of the three-phase analysis that I didn’t really make explicit was the potential idea of having victory conditions which change during the war rather than remaining constant.  I haven’t thought about that one in detail, but it might be something to explore to address the “clean end” issue you mentioned.

That sounds interesting. I am reticent to have fluid rules or victory conditions, but I wouldn’t rule it out without consideration. Just means more moving parts.

Well, that’s part of what would be implied by political objectives related to the Cold War.  For example, the political objective of the Russians wanting to capture Berlin before the Anglo-Americans was definitely on Moscow’s agenda in 1945, but it would have been purely aspirational in 1942 (when Germany was still on the offensive in Russia and the Anglo-Americans weren’t in continental Europe).  And it wouldn’t even have been an objective at all for Russia in 1940, when it wasn’t even at war with Germany.

@CWO:

@LHoffman:

@CWO:

One related aspect of the three-phase analysis that I didn’t really make explicit was the potential idea of having victory conditions which change during the war rather than remaining constant.�  I haven’t thought about that one in detail, but it might be something to explore to address the “clean end” issue you mentioned.

That sounds interesting. I am reticent to have fluid rules or victory conditions, but I wouldn’t rule it out without consideration. Just means more moving parts.

Well, that’s part of what would be implied by political objectives related to the Cold War.  For example, the political objective of the Russians wanting to capture Berlin before the Anglo-Americans was definitely on Moscow’s agenda in 1945, but it would have been purely aspirational in 1942 (when Germany was still on the offensive in Russia and the Anglo-Americans weren’t in continental Europe).  And it wouldn’t even have been an objective at all for Russia in 1940, when it wasn’t even at war with Germany.

Yes, but in the OOB game we have set victory conditions which include the Allies taking Berlin and Tokyo. Even though the USSR didn’t have the ability to take Berlin in 1942 does not mean that isn’t what they would do either given the chance or in the future. To me, the whole point for the Allies in the boardgame is predicated on the “Unconditional Surrender” mandate from the Casablanca conference. Even though the game begins before this event (1943), the political impact of it is sort of just wrapped into the fabric of the game as something intrinsic to Allied motivations and goals.

To me, the Tokyo and Berlin Victory Condition seems pretty inevitable. The game (and history) indicate that the Axis will continue to fight and not surrender, even in the face of overwhelming Allied gains. If that is the case, any other, lesser victory conditions for the Allies seem unnecessary.

@CWO

I understand the reasoning for a negative NO and I’m not saying it’s necessarily a bad idea, but I would still be concerned that this would encourage the US to go Pacific even more. I try and hold the islands as long as possible already. If US goes full Pacific that pretty much forces Japan to max protect anyway.

To stop the blitz to Russia a combination of a stronger China, take away a couple JPN planes and add your difficult terrain TTs should slow them down. Maybe allow two movement on coastal TTs and once you’re out of China and past the Urals, Novosibirsk and Kazakstan you jack it back up to 2. Also need to make Russia a little stronger.

@regularkid
good stuff. Looks like the US gets a pretty good boost. How’s Italy doin ?

As far as “wow we are doing great, let’s buy more war bonds!!”  thing goes, isn’t that kind of exactly what the National Objectives are?  “Wow we liberated the Philippines, let’s invest in the war effort and kick Hirohito’s butt all the way back to Tokyo!” or “Da Uncle Yosef is doing good!  Look we own the Ukraine and Hungary!”  Kinda thing.

@barney:

@CWO

@regularkid
good stuff. Looks like the US gets a pretty good boost. How’s Italy doin ?

Barney, Italy actually tends to do pretty well with NOs, as it turns out, since Germany is less likely to neglect the Mediterranean. The net result of the NOs in the mediterranean is to make life a little harder for Germany (kind of the point) and to make the Mediterranean a more active (and enjoyable) theater.

@Black_Elk:

Do you like India (Or UK Pacific) the way its handled OOB?
Do you like it as a separate player nation?
Would you nix it and just make the British into a single faction with a single economy?

Personally, I think the UK should have a single economy.  The G40 rulebook gives no rationale for the concept of splitting the UK into two economies, and I can’t think of what this concept would supposedly represent in the real world.  The British Empire/Commonwealth wasn’t divided into a Western Empire and an Eastern Empire (the way ancient Rome was at one point), despite the old story about a schoolchild who once wrote “The sun never sets on the British Empire because the sunsets in the west and the Empire is in the east.”  The pieces of the British Empire/Commonwealth at the time could more logically be classed by status rather than geography.  There was Britain’s homeland territories (the British isles), there were various gradations of colonial and/or mandate territories, and there were the self-governing Dominions: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Eire and (technically) Newfoundland (which had reverted to rule from London at its own request during the Depression).

India was certainly an economic powerhouse (it wasn’t called “the jewel of the Crown” for nothing), and it had a peculiar status within the Empire; I think it was technically a “Raj”.  If I recall correctly, British coins of the time likewise reflected the fact that India was a special case: George VI was captioned as being “Dei Gratia Rex et Ind. Imp.” – King by the Grace of God and Emperor of India."  But despite all that, India was still fundamentally an imperial possession.  During WWI, Britain had dangled before the Indian people the prospect of India being granted Dominion status (alongside the so-called “white Dominions”) after the war as a reward for its wartime service, but ultimately Britain only did so after WWII – too late to prevent India from breaking away.

I think that the “two-economy” concept in G40 is probably a warped holdover from the original A&A Pacific game, in which the “British” player technically controlled three separate entities: India, Australia, and the UK’s Southeast Asian territories like Hong Kong.  I can’t think of any logical reason for the split economy in terms that are purely consistent with G40’s own design.  It can’t be based on the fact that the UK has significant IPC-producing territories on both the E40 map and the P40 map because the same thing can be said about the US and the UK.  And it can’t be based on the fact that the UK is a full player power in both E40 and P40 because so is the US.  The argument that the UK, as a global empire, has “global responsibilities” likewise wouldn’t explain why its income is split; to me, that argument would actually support the opposite conclusion: that the UK needs to have as much flexibility as possible in spending its global income.  I’d also argue that the UK player is presented with a much more interesting and challenging task by being given free reign to treat his economy as s single pot, because that way he’s faced with the same hard decisions that Britain’s leaders faced in WWII: how much of Britain’s resources to allocate to each theatre.  (The decision to send Prince of Wales and Repulse to the Far East, where Japan blew them out of the water as they tried to defend Singapore, is an example of this kind of difficult resource-allocation problem.)