Dreadful Axis Mistakes

@Linkon:

Based on what I have seen of A&A players actions…

1.  Japan should not have honored their Russian non-aggression pact.
Japan player usu attacks the USSR in A&A.

2.  Japan should have sunk the US carriers.
Another common Round 1 move.

3.  Italy should have developed better fighters, bombers, and air force training.
Would have made a big difference in many battles.  Aggresive Germany players will stack air power to take Africa in the game.

4.  Italy should have built aircraft carriers before the war started.
Their navy was 50% disabled for years after Taranto.  This cost them the Mediteranian and Africa.  Having carriers, the naval command would likely find ways to utilize them, and eventually develop defences by ships and ports against aircraft.

5.  Axis did not recruit Spain, Iceland, or Turkey early in the war.
Spain and Iceland offer great airbase stations to blockade convoys to GBR.
Turkey’s military could have fought to close the Suez and eventually claim the rich Saudi Oil fields.

I agree that from an AA standpoint, a lot of what the Axis did in the historical war didn’t make sense. But a lot of that didn’t represent Axis error so much as Larry Harris oversimplifying historical reality. That’s not a criticism: there is no way Larry Harris could possibly have designed a game that was both balanced and historically accurate. If he’d tried to make a game that was both those things and had the desired level of simplicity, he would have taken on an impossible task. The game he designed makes good sense, despite (or perhaps because of) its lack of historical accuracy.

In the historical war, a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union would have been much less practical than it is in AA terms. During WWII, the Soviet Union produced over 516,000 artillery pieces, compared to about 13,000 for Japan. The Soviets produced 105,000 tanks, compared to 2,500 tanks for Japan. The latter difference was exacerbated by the fact that Soviet tanks tended to be good, solid T-34s, or even T-34-85s, as opposed to the obsolete light tanks which constituted nearly all of Japanese tank production. The Soviets also had a large population advantage, and could field a much, much larger infantry force than could either Germany or Japan. Add to this the fact the Japanese Army was already bogged down in China, Southeast Asia, Pacific islands, and elsewhere, and the potential for a serious invasion diminishes further. Even if Japan did succeed in conquering the Soviets’ Pacific coast, Japan’s very limited logistics system would have precluded much in the way of further advance.

This is not to suggest that a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union would have been an outright impossibility, especially not in the summer of 1941. But Japan did not have the resources to take on the Soviets and the British and Americans. It was one or the other, and Japan chose the latter. This was largely because the American oil embargo forced Japan to acquire the Dutch East Indies, which meant war against Britain. Japanese leaders assumed that if they attacked Britain, the U.S. would declare war against them as well.

America’s carriers were not at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, or else they would likely have been destroyed. Japan made several subsequent efforts to sink those carriers, including the Battle of Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. Both battles occurred within a year of the Pearl Harbor attack.

I agree that Italy should have done many things differently. The Italian military was riddled with problems, including bad or inadequate equipment, bad leadership, poor morale, lack of military discipline, lack of preparedness, and a total inability to unite doctrine, available equipment and forces, and the other tools at its disposal to achieve a larger strategy. Britain’s ability to launch a Pearl Harbor-style surprise attack on Taranto–after the Japanese had done the same thing to the Americans–underscores the limitations of the Italian military. Italian aircraft carriers would have been useful for clearing the Eastern Mediterranean of its British naval presence, and might also have been useful in an attack on Gibraltar.

Spain in particular–or at least its dictator, Franco–wanted to remain neutral, and had zero intention of going to war on the Axis side. His supposed willingness to join the Axis was just a sham. Turkey’s leaders may also have preferred neutrality to joining the Axis, though it’s possible they may have proved more easily persuaded than Franco.

It’s hard for me to envision Iceland joining the war. One would think that Britain would have used its powerful navy to send an invasion force to conquer it. But barring that, it would at very least have imposed a naval blockade intended to starve the Icelanders into submission. What rewards could Germany offer, or threats could it make, to offset that? From Iceland’s perspective, neutrality was almost certainly the best option.

But while Iceland was almost certainly not an option for Germany, it’s possible Spain and Turkey might have been–regardless of how badly their leaders wanted to stay out of the war. Suppose Hitler had laid down the law to Franco, and had said something along the lines of, “Join the Axis or we will invade.” Suppose he’d said the same thing to Turkey’s leaders. And suppose that, as an added incentive, he’d offered Turkey’s leaders a good portion of whichever land he’d intended to conquer. (Either Britain’s possessions in the Syria/Iraq/Jordan area or Soviet Caucasus.) The time to make such threats would have been 1940, because after that the German Army was fully occupied by its Soviet counterpart.

Enjoyed that post too.

Throwing in 2 cents:
Japan was very wary of the Russians.  They got their butt kicked in the Jap-Russo war the TR helped? mediate the end of.
Oh, and Turkey was a big part of WWI and lost, right?  Wouldn’t that be a major reason they stayed out of WWII?

Excellent response regarding USA carriers - I have nothing to add, but to emphasize the importance that there were ZERO USA carriers at Pearl on 12/7/41.

And about Japan’s lack of manpower/resources/good tanks - this is one of my biggest pet peeves with A&A.  I understand it isn’t meant to be historically accurate (extremely well put by Kurt) but it drives me crazy when Japan gets powerful (which is almost always, in the ridiculous 1941 scenario of AA50) and has so many infantry and tank units.  Basically, in all these games where Japan is outproducing America turn after turn, it’s an absurdity that is necessary to make a fair game….  Like in Revised, people would crank out about 6-8 tanks a turn on the mainland and rush them toward Moscow, obliterating India (Japan never took India in the war), China, and all of Eastern Russia.  None of these 3 were accomplished by Japan (supply lines are ridiculously long for these scenarios as well).  But Revised is dead (to me anyway) and in the 1940 version, the USA has a more powerful economy, and the Jap hold on power is much more tenuous.  (I have yet to be convinced that the current version of 1940, Alpha2, is not heavily slanted towards the Allies.  Just saying this as my perspective thus far - not saying it’s really bad or good)

@KurtGodel7:

It’s hard for me to envision Iceland joining the war. One would think that Britain would have used its powerful navy to send an invasion force to conquer it.

In fact, that’s precisely what happened: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Iceland

@KurtGodel7:

It’s hard for me to envision Iceland joining the war. One would think that Britain would have used its powerful navy to send an invasion force to conquer it. But barring that, it would at very least have imposed a naval blockade intended to starve the Icelanders into submission. What rewards could Germany offer, or threats could it make, to offset that? From Iceland’s perspective, neutrality was almost certainly the best option.

But while Iceland was almost certainly not an option for Germany, it’s possible Spain and Turkey might have been–regardless of how badly their leaders wanted to stay out of the war. Suppose Hitler had laid down the law to Franco, and had said something along the lines of, “Join the Axis or we will invade.” Suppose he’d said the same thing to Turkey’s leaders. And suppose that, as an added incentive, he’d offered Turkey’s leaders a good portion of whichever land he’d intended to conquer. (Either Britain’s possessions in the Syria/Iraq/Jordan area or Soviet Caucasus.) The time to make such threats would have been 1940, because after that the German Army was fully occupied by its Soviet counterpart.

Iceland was full of Arians. 
Norway had a Nazi Party that formed the colaboration government after they were invaded.
Hitler’s Ideology of Arianism is similar to some of the other Pan-National events in other parts of the world today.

@KurtGodel7:

In the historical war, a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union would have been much less practical than it is in AA terms. During WWII, the Soviet Union produced over 516,000 artillery pieces, compared to about 13,000 for Japan. The Soviets produced 105,000 tanks, compared to 2,500 tanks for Japan. The latter difference was exacerbated by the fact that Soviet tanks tended to be good, solid T-34s, or even T-34-85s, as opposed to the obsolete light tanks which constituted nearly all of Japanese tank production. The Soviets also had a large population advantage, and could field a much, much larger infantry force than could either Germany or Japan. Add to this the fact the Japanese Army was already bogged down in China, Southeast Asia, Pacific islands, and elsewhere, and the potential for a serious invasion diminishes further. Even if Japan did succeed in conquering the Soviets’ Pacific coast, Japan’s very limited logistics system would have precluded much in the way of further advance.

This is not to suggest that a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union would have been an outright impossibility, especially not in the summer of 1941. But Japan did not have the resources to take on the Soviets and the British and Americans. It was one or the other, and Japan chose the latter. This was largely because the American oil embargo forced Japan to acquire the Dutch East Indies, which meant war against Britain. Japanese leaders assumed that if they attacked Britain, the U.S. would declare war against them as well.

Historically, Japan already beaten both Russia and China, often at starting battle odds of 1:2 or worse.  They had local air supremacy, and often used combined arms tactics that were not avaible to the opposition.

I remember reading that their Siberia campaign stalled mainly due to bad weather that prevented their air power to assert.
Wikipedia reports that Tokyo put a limit on air attacks of Soviet airfields.
Later battles by Japan in WWII were typified by their numerical inferiorities.

@Linkon:

Iceland was full of Arians. 
Norway had a Nazi Party that formed the colaboration government after they were invaded.

Iceland wasn’t a Norwegian territory when WWII started.  It had been a Danish dependency since 1814, and it had been a semi-independent country with ties to the King of Denmark since 1918.

Vidkun Quisling’s Norwegian fascist party, the Nasjonal Samling, never received more than 2.5% of the vote from the time of its foundation in 1933 to the time of the Nazi invasion, so it was very much a fringe movement.  The only reason they eventually achieved power is that the Nazis installed them as a collaborationist government after they had invaded and occupied the country.  Nazi-style parties were formed in many countries in the years leading up to WWII – including Britain and the United States – but their existence did not in itself mean that those countries were full of Aryan supremacists.  The fact that they were for the most part regarded as marginal extremist groups actually suggests the opposite: that the voters of those countries for the most part rejected fascist ideologies.

@Linkon:

Historically, Japan already beaten both Russia and China, often at starting battle odds of 1:2 or worse.  They had local air supremacy, and often used combined arms tactics that were not avaible to the opposition.

I remember reading that their Siberia campaign stalled mainly due to bad weather that prevented their air power to assert.
Wikipedia reports that Tokyo put a limit on air attacks of Soviet airfields.
Later battles by Japan in WWII were typified by their numerical inferiorities.

I’m in the midst of working on a rules set for a WWII strategy game. Where possible, I have incorporated qualitative differences between unit types. For example, a jet fighter is much better at air-to-air combat, and a lot harder to shoot down, than a piston-driven fighter. (Though the difference between the best possible piston fighter and the worst possible jet fighter is rather small.)

I have been able to find some pretty good data comparing the qualitative effectiveness of German infantry against the infantry they faced. (Soviet, British, and American.) Unfortunately, my data on the relative effectiveness of Chinese and Japanese infantry is less complete. I have tentatively made Japanese infantry qualitatively the same as Soviet infantry. This means they are a step down from British or American infantry, and two steps down from German infantry. I have made Chinese infantry a step or two down from Japanese infantry.

Your post seems to suggest I may have underestimated the effectiveness of Japanese infantry. I’d be happy to have an excuse to strengthen the early game Axis, especially Japan. But before I can increase the qualitative effectiveness of Japan’s infantry, I will need a link to a reasonably authoritative source which addresses the subject of Japanese infantry’s effectiveness.

@KurtGodel7:

I’m in the midst of working on a rules set for a WWII strategy game. Where possible, I have incorporated qualitative differences between unit types. For example, a jet fighter is much better at air-to-air combat, and a lot harder to shoot down, than a piston-driven fighter. (Though the difference between the best possible piston fighter and the worst possible jet fighter is rather small.)

I have been able to find some pretty good data comparing the qualitative effectiveness of German infantry against the infantry they faced. (Soviet, British, and American.)

Please keep us posted.  I’m interested in this rules set you’re working on.

@KurtGodel7:

Your post seems to suggest I may have underestimated the effectiveness of Japanese infantry. I’d be happy to have an excuse to strengthen the early game Axis, especially Japan. But before I can increase the qualitative effectiveness of Japan’s infantry, I will need a link to a reasonably authoritative source which addresses the subject of Japanese infantry’s effectiveness.

IMO, the strength of the Japanese military is very clear. They were a Effective fighting force. During Iwo Jima, only 22,000 men held off 70,000 men for a whole month, and it was expected that an invasion of Japan itself would involve MILLIONS of American casualties. I think that’s just amazing. However, they did not have the manpower to replace the lost units.

Being on defense and having months to dig into mountains is why the Japanese were able to slow the US down.  You always need on average, 3 times as many offensive soldiers as defensive soldiers. The Japanese produced as many machine guns during the entire war as the US produced every month starting in 1943.  Without lots of heavy artillery the ‘queen of the battlefield’, modern tanks and lots of machine guns, the Japanese Infantry would do poorly against a similarly equipped foe

@MrMalachiCrunch:

Being on defense and having months to dig into mountains is why the Japanese were able to slow the US down.  You always need on average, 3 times as many offensive soldiers as defensive soldiers. The Japanese produced as many machine guns during the entire war as the US produced every month starting in 1943.  Without lots of heavy artillery the ‘queen of the battlefield’, modern tanks and lots of machine guns, the Japanese Infantry would do poorly against a similarly equipped foe

I echo Bruce Willis here.  Don’t forget their extreme training to never surrender (although many did) and Bushido, the code of the warrior.  They believed their Emperor was God.  Americans are not so willing to die and our culture, mores, and beliefs are very very different.
So looking at the bitter fighting on those glorified airbases in the Pacific as a measurement of Japanese infantry military might is very misleading.

@gamerman01:

@MrMalachiCrunch:

Being on defense and having months to dig into mountains is why the Japanese were able to slow the US down.  You always need on average, 3 times as many offensive soldiers as defensive soldiers. The Japanese produced as many machine guns during the entire war as the US produced every month starting in 1943.  Without lots of heavy artillery the ‘queen of the battlefield’, modern tanks and lots of machine guns, the Japanese Infantry would do poorly against a similarly equipped foe

I echo Bruce Willis here.  Don’t forget their extreme training to never surrender (although many did) and Bushido, the code of the warrior.  They believed their Emperor was God.  Americans are not so willing to die and our culture, mores, and beliefs are very very different.
So looking at the bitter fighting on those glorified airbases in the Pacific as a measurement of Japanese infantry military might is very misleading.

Japan should have studied the 3 to 1 attacker to defender rule. Japan’s attacks and counter attacks lacked the numbers of men to produce any results.

Japaneses commandement was poor.
There was dissension between army and navy.
That’s the main reason of japan defeat!

@otahere34:

@KurtGodel7:

Your post seems to suggest I may have underestimated the effectiveness of Japanese infantry. I’d be happy to have an excuse to strengthen the early game Axis, especially Japan. But before I can increase the qualitative effectiveness of Japan’s infantry, I will need a link to a reasonably authoritative source which addresses the subject of Japanese infantry’s effectiveness.

IMO, the strength of the Japanese military is very clear. They were a Effective fighting force. During Iwo Jima, only 22,000 men held off 70,000 men for a whole month, and it was expected that an invasion of Japan itself would involve MILLIONS of American casualties. I think that’s just amazing. However, they did not have the manpower to replace the lost units.

if they used the soldiers they lost on those desolate islands in Burma in suicidal attacks, the fate of India would have been much different…

The biggest mistake was Germany not going full steam on the wartime economy until 1943 or so. The women were not working initially.

The biggest shortfall was in the fighter production and the submarine production, Had there been an extra 100 subs and an extra 1,000 at the start of the war (especially a longer range fighter), it would have been much harder for the UK to resist. Losing the battle of britain was the biggest problem.