G40 Redesign (currently taking suggestions)

[baron Münchhausen]

Here is the list of 1942.2 seven Zero IPCs Islands (Midway is the last one):
@Baron:

Here is my proposition for 1942.2
Give +1 IPC to these 6 Japanese Islands:
1- Formosa
2- Okinawa
3- Iwo Jima
4- Wake Island
5- Caroline Islands
6- Solomon Islands

Give +1 IPC to 3 UK territories (bigger islands):
1- Western Australia
2- Eastern Australia
3- New Zealand

Give +3 IPCs to 2 US Islands:
1- +2 To Hawaiian Island
2- +1 Midway Island

All this increase in IPCs will be received at the end of the first turn for the next, second round purchase.

This increase in 6 IPCs can easily be put into this costlier naval war.

@Der:

@Baron:

Why not just using this mechanics: paying 2 IPCs from the looser to the winner, instead?

I personally don’t care for that idea, the main reason is it is an exception to all the rest of the rules of taking territories. In order for this game to be learnable and enjoyable, the rules should be consistent with as few exceptions as possible.

The second reason is that it goes against the general reasoning that Oztea brought up. The islands should be worth something because of morale and shipping reasons.

1. Morale - if an island is lost on Japan’s perimeter, the citizens would feel bad about it EVERY turn the island was in enemy hands. Not just the first turn.
2. Shipping - islands taken from your defensive perimeter would result in enemy forward bases and thus better recon for directing submarine attacks, etc.  This would continue to damage your economy EVERY turn, not just the first.

@CWO:

@Der:

The second reason is that it goes against the general reasoning that Oztea brought up. The islands should be worth something because of morale and shipping reasons.

The concept of having islands be worth IPCs because of shipping efficiencies is pretty solid, as I mentioned in an earlier post, but I’m dubious about the whole “morale value = IPCs” concept for a couple of reasons.  First: the strategic bombing campaigns against Britain, Germany and Japan showed that populations in wartime can “keep calm and carry on” to a remarkable degree even when their own homes and family members are being blown to bits by enemy bombers, and that wartime industries can keep functioning as a result.  If wartime populations remained resilient (and industrially productive) in the face of having their towns demolished and/or incinerated, I doubt that their productivity would have been seriously dented just from reading bad news in the papers.  Second: there’s no guarantee that wartime citizens would even have learned that a particular island territory had been lost to the enemy – especially in dictatorships like Germany and Japan, where the media was tightly controlled.  Japan in particular was notorious for suppressing bad news; as an example, survivors of the sinking of the Yamato were put into detention when they returned to Japan to prevent them from talking.  Even in the US and Britain, which were democratic states with a free press, the government sometimes filtered bad news to some degree: delaying its release, providing few details on security grounds, putting a positive spin on events and so forth.  Wartime governments of all stripes are always happy to play up their successes (to the point sometimes of exaggerating or inventing them, such as when Japan portrayed Midway as a great victory for the IJN), but they’re understandably reluctant to discuss their failures.

[baron Münchhausen]

@Black_Elk:

Another one just mentioned, but which has been kicked around before.

Team Coordination Rules:
Unit co-location restrictions
For G40 and 1942.2

Rule: Basic formulation = (Nation’s) units cannot end their turn in (Teammate’s) “starting” territories, if those territories were still under friendly control at the start of the turn.*
So…

Japanese units cannot end their turn in European Axis starting territories.

European Axis units cannot end their turn in Japanese starting territories.

Western Allies units cannot end their turn in Soviet starting territories.

Soviet Units cannot end their turn in Western Allies starting territories. **

*If the territory in question was under enemy control at the start of the turn, then it may be liberated by a teammate, but the liberator must leave the following turn or be in violation of the rule. If the units are unable to leave a liberated territory on the following turn they will be automatically removed.

**1942.2 Option: US supported starting Chinese territories are not considered “Western” for the rule as stated above. Soviet units may end their turn in Chinese territories, but American units (including those in China) still cannot end their turn in starting Russian territories. So the movement across the border of Western China is one way, from Russia to US supported China, but not the other way around.

Purpose: To prevent gamey and ahistorical unit movements by teammates. For example, by the US/British in Soviet starting territories, by the Soviets in British starting territories, by the Japanese in European Axis starting Territories etc. Restricts aircraft transits in particular, to prevent the worst abuses. Likely creates some balance issues by sides.
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=39465.0

I’m not sure anything short of this, will ever give us a way to develop a proper balance on the center, or a proper incentive for a dual theater war, and present a game that actually looks like WW2.

Everything we’ve seen OOB (from the NAP, to Russian NOs etc) has all been half-measures. I’m thinking we need to go all the way, or it will always be gamey as all hell, with fighter transits and can-openers and propping up teammates along one dimension/theater while totally ignoring the other theater.

No idea what might be possible in tripleA, or if anyone would have the energy to create/test the game under such conditions. The idea is admittedly pretty sweeping, but I honestly can’t think of a simpler way to go with it.

If this rule was the bedrock, then it would be possible to actually build a balanced set up that didn’t totally rely on such gamey and ahistorical distortions.

I prefer self-imposed sound strategy rather than special rules.
G40, at least bring NO IPCs to Russia when no Allies on its TTys.

I’m still wondering about creating a different game dynamics for Japan against USA.
What motivate Germany toward Moscow is clearly a lot of IPCs, even Africa is a kind of diversion and fool’s gold.
It cuts a few IPCs from UK into Germany’s purse. But, it cost a lot of units.

In 1942.2, you need more incentive to conquer islands and Crush San Francisco.
San Francisco rule needs to be well named.
It needs deterrent to not do Japan CCrush and incentive to go JSF Invasion.

A) Deterrent to JCC
1-If you make Sinkiang and Szechwan impassable toward Russia (like Sahara or Mongolia) for both ground and air units.
It forces Japan to go north or south or both. Which is still (M3) not too difficult via India. It just take more land units to put North or South coming from Asian IC. It also makes Kwantung IC very far from Moscow. FrenchIndoChina appears better starting place.

2- I once proposed a Non-Agression Pact bonus for Japan only, with a bonus to Moscow if Japan broke it.
Maybe this can be a start to create a different dynamics, leaving Germany to his own fight while US being much absorbed by Japan in PTO.
For example, giving 5 IPCs to Japan (1 DD or 1 StB) while Moscow received 0 IPC can be an incentive to not break NAP.
But, if Japan breaks it, Moscow received immediately 15 IPCs (1 Fg+ 1 StB) and 5 IPCs each round while Japan none.

Number are indicative, of course.

1. Moscow can fight a one dimensional war with increased income from Soviet Far East, Buryatia, Yakut SSR to Evenki TTy not taken by Japan (near 5 *1 IPC TTy, if Novosibirsk is included. )
2. Japan gets enough money to fight war against USA: 35 vs 42.
3. If all six japanese zero islands worth 1 IPC, it rise to 41 vs 42.
4. USA will be dragged down to not let Japan keep PTO Islands.
   And try to increase his income faster.

B. Incentive toward San Francisco

Japan needs to fight for PTO Islands and get some reward.
All zero PTO island should received some values or even a simple 3 IPCs when conquered and zero after might help.
This bonus may include all islands and Australia, too.

Another trick is any zero island taken from Japan cut 2 IPCs from Japan income.

Midway, Hawaii, Mexico and Alaska may simply get +2 IPCs.
So USA, after first turn would rise to 50 IPCs. (Or on set-up.)
IDK, but need to find a way to make it worth the cost of naval war.

We need to find a few older ideas about this in the House rule thread and put it into Master list.

Barney added this option into G40. IDK how far it works. But, at least, it is a starter for incentive.

If we want that Japan fight toward USA instead of Center Crush, it needs some kind of incentive as SS stated:
@SS:

What I mean is like you said have some islands worth more or all so it would be worth fighting for these islands due to the increased value of territories. Midway 3 icp’s, Solomans island 3 icp’s for samples and then have it where certain land territories are worth more where there is back and forth fighting. Like some land territories between Germany and Russia increased values.

So, if it requires that many rounds to get 5 IPCs from Russia invasion, it becomes a better strategy to turn westward or southward. It also indirectly help Germany because USA will not repel Japan without a massive investment.

So JSFI becomes like a third scenario:
Germany vs Russia & UK.
Japan vs USA & UK.

KJF seems to me:
Germany vs Russia.
Japan vs UK, USA, Russia

KGF is usually:
Germany vs Russia, UK & USA
Japan vs UK (India) & Russia

This NAP can still be broken and reverse to standard situation but Russia will get a few more IPCs which might balanced things out.

[Black_Elk]

This is the issue as I see it…

If the Western Allies can fly 100 TUV in aircraft to Moscow to prevent the Russian capital from falling, they will always do it. No cash bonus to the Soviets is going to be enough to prevent this move if it’s legal.

Similarly if Japan can fly 100 TUV to Berlin to prevent it from falling, they will, and in that case what possible bonus would even make sense that wouldn’t be abused?

You could try the same thing with penalties, but at a certain point, you’re going to end up with even more rules and special objectives to deal with these specific situations, then you have with formula  I laid out above.

I gather that in a “what if” game, we want the options and play patterns to be flexible. But under the OOB co-location scheme, it’s clear what sort of gameplay is being rewarded. It’s the kind where all nations attempt to converge at defensive choke points, production hotspots or Capitals to maximize hitpoints and defense power in one large do or die engagement. We have been habituated into accepting this situation going back to classic, but I don’t know that it actually makes the game any more interesting or entertaining.

Does it really give the players more options?

In my experience, once a player sees the advantage of coordinating for defense in A&A, they never look back. Both sides must then adapt to this dynamic. The game devolves to a center crush vs KGF where everyone is trying to link up at the center and present the largest possible stack.

Frankly I think this dynamic is pretty lame. Maybe it’s time we try something new for a foundation?

The whole game would be reset, which means that such a change would recommend other complimentary adjustments. You could do all the same things you might try under OOB co-location rules, such as a NAP or Objective Bonuses, things to deal with Zero IPC islands etc, but the underlying basic dynamics of the overall gameplay would look more like WW2.

@Baron:

@Black_Elk:

Another one just mentioned, but which has been kicked around before.

Team Coordination Rules:
Unit co-location restrictions
For G40 and 1942.2

Rule: Basic formulation = (Nation’s) units cannot end their turn in (Teammate’s) “starting” territories, if those territories were still under friendly control at the start of the turn.*
So…

Japanese units cannot end their turn in European Axis starting territories.

European Axis units cannot end their turn in Japanese starting territories.

Western Allies units cannot end their turn in Soviet starting territories.

Soviet Units cannot end their turn in Western Allies starting territories. **

*If the territory in question was under enemy control at the start of the turn, then it may be liberated by a teammate, but the liberator must leave the following turn or be in violation of the rule. If the units are unable to leave a liberated territory on the following turn they will be automatically removed.

**1942.2 Option: US supported starting Chinese territories are not considered “Western” for the rule as stated above. Soviet units may end their turn in Chinese territories, but American units (including those in China) still cannot end their turn in starting Russian territories. So the movement across the border of Western China is one way, from Russia to US supported China, but not the other way around.

Purpose: To prevent gamey and ahistorical unit movements by teammates. For example, by the US/British in Soviet starting territories, by the Soviets in British starting territories, by the Japanese in European Axis starting Territories etc. Restricts aircraft transits in particular, to prevent the worst abuses. Likely creates some balance issues by sides.
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=39465.0

I’m not sure anything short of this, will ever give us a way to develop a proper balance on the center, or a proper incentive for a dual theater war, and present a game that actually looks like WW2.

Everything we’ve seen OOB (from the NAP, to Russian NOs etc) has all been half-measures. I’m thinking we need to go all the way, or it will always be gamey as all hell, with fighter transits and can-openers and propping up teammates along one dimension/theater while totally ignoring the other theater.

No idea what might be possible in tripleA, or if anyone would have the energy to create/test the game under such conditions. The idea is admittedly pretty sweeping, but I honestly can’t think of a simpler way to go with it.

If this rule was the bedrock, then it would be possible to actually build a balanced set up that didn’t totally rely on such gamey and ahistorical distortions.

I prefer self-imposed sound strategy rather than special rules.
G40, at least bring NO IPCs to Russia when no Allies on its TTys.

[Black_Elk]

I believe a set up change with starting bases may work for Global. But the effect will not be enough to overcome the overriding incentive for Japan to Center crush.

For 1942.2 the island situation is even more intractable. I still believe the only incentive that will work here is to give the islands an IPC value, under the Income and Progress Credit scheme. But again, it won’t be enough to stop the center crush.

To me the center crush is a special kind of problem. The incentive there for Axis is not really economic. Rather Japan goes there to remove the Russians from play, eliminate the Allied turn order advantage, and converge with Germany.

I don’t think there is much we can do to pull Japan away from this strategy, other than giving them a viable alternative target that does moreorless exactly the same thing. ANZAC might have worked as a springboard for something like this in G40 (the way India is a springboard for a center crush), but Anzac doesn’t threaten Germany at all, and there is no chance of convergence with the European Axis team in Australia, because it’s isolated in the middle of the Ocean. North America is the only viable Alternative target in my view, since America threatens Germany, and this region provides an area for convergence (albeit across the water, but still).

What I’m saying is that in G40 Anzac could only ever have served as a stepping stone along the way, but to get the Japanese off Moscow the endgoal would still need to be North America, since Invasion USA is the only play that would give you all 3 things that the Center Crush does…

1. expands Axis production while weakening a main rival.
2. provides the chance to eliminate that rival from play, and upset the turn order advantage of the Allied opponent.
3. allows the possibility to eventually converge with Germany along a united front.

In 1942.2 Anzac doesn’t even exist as a separate nation, and it’s economic/production output is very low, so it doesn’t really work as any kind of springboard or draw OOB.

Japan needs a way to get into North America. I think this would benefit the gameplay, and be more satisfying  historically (or at least as satisfying for an alternate history as the Center Crush is.) Invasion USA, it’s always the Axis players dream hehe. To do that Japan needs 2 things… Income from the island territories that are along the route into N. America, and a credible threat against W. US Production (ie. A way to get Japanese production closer to the continental US.)

In 1942.2 this would I think require that the factory be given +2 bonus, and built anywhere, including valueless islands. Conceived as an abstract land base. Maybe just +2 for the purposes of spawning infantry, but they need something to match the US in hitpoints.

In G40 it probably requires that the minor factory (or some extra land base outpost type unit) provide a similar option to expand production anywhere on the map. Again, so that Japan has at least some way to spawn hitpoints closer to North American target territories.

Or you go M3 with transports.
Or all these ideas at the same time.

Then Japan would have a real alternative to the Center crush, a strategy that would have the same kind of impact as taking Moscow and putting Russia out of play.

@Baron:

If anyone is working the zero-IPCs case Islands this post from CWO Marc provide an interesting historical bakcground start-up:

I have to put this post in it because it is also related to the actual topic:
@CWO:

Many of the island territories in the Central Pacific which Japan and the US fought to control were little more than coral atolls, volcanic formations or overgrown sandheaps, many of them small in size and some of them barely above water at high tide.  They had few (or no) natural resources, little (or no) arable land, few (or no) indigenous inhabitants, and no industries; the military bases located there had to be supplied from outside with virtually everything they used.  They were for most practical purposes 100% consumers and 0% producers.

The value which these islands had wasn’t as industrial production facilities or as sources of income or of goods or of raw materials.  Their value was to serve as airbases (and in the case of suitable anchorages like Truk as naval bases) which allowed the domination of the airspace and ocean around them, and to serve as the jumping-off point from which to capture the next island group down the line. So if the rules provide no incentive to capture and hold these territories, the historically realistic solution isn’t to give them an IPC value.  The solution is to create a house rule through which possession of an island gives some sort of bonus to a player who uses the island to attack enemy forces around it or as a springboard for an island-hopping advance.

@CWO:

As promised, here’s a summary of the information I was able to find about the zero-IPC islands on the Pacific 1940 map.  The sources I consulted weren’t as detailed as I’d hoped, so the summaries below are basically an estimate of what the general situation was for each island group.  Some of these assessments could be off the mark, so if anyone has access to better data please feel free to correct whatever errors exist or to provide supplementary information.

Aleutian Islands
Important naval base(s)? No, just a US naval station (pre-war and onward) at Dutch Harbor whose facilities were very limited.
Important air base(s)? To some degree.  Several US forward airbases were established (pre-war and onward), with larger bases like Elmendorf in Alaska proper.  The Aleutians have very poor flying weather.

Caroline Islands
Important naval base(s)?  Yes.  Truk was a major Japanese naval base, pre-war and onward.  The Japanese did not make significant use of Ulithi Atoll, but after the American capture of the Carolines the US developed Ulithi into a major forward naval base that was used in the last year of WWII.  
Important air base(s)?  Yes, as an adjunct to the naval bases.

Dutch New Guinea
Important naval base(s)?  To some degree.   Hollandia had a good anchorage which both the Japanese and (from 1944 onward) the US used to some extent, but its facilities were minimal.
Important air base(s)?  To some degree.  Various airfields were built by the Japanese after their occupation began, and were used by the US from 1944 onward.  There was an airstrip at Hollandia.

Fiji
Important naval base(s)?  No, but there was a good harbour at Suva.  
Important air base(s)?  No, just a UK wartime airstrip built after 1941.

Note: The Ellice Islands, geographically located about halfway between Fiji and the Gilbert Islands but not appearing on the Pacific 1940 map, were used as naval and air bases by the US in WWII.  In particular, there seems to have been an important airbase on Funafuti Atoll.

Gilbert Islands
Important naval base(s)?  No.  Port facilities at Tarawa were almost nonexistent.  
Important air base(s)?  To some degree.  An airstrip was built by the Japanese on Tarawa in 1942; it was taken over by the US in late 1943.  The nearby Phoenix Islands, under joint US/UK control, had a number of airstrips established on them during WWII, for instance on Enderbury Island and Canton Island.

Guam
Important naval base(s)?  No.  At the beginning of WWII it only had a small harbour with few facilities, though there were some good anchorages here and there, notably at Apra.  Captured by Japan in December 1941; recaptured by the US in August 1944.
Important air base(s)?  To some degree.

Johnston Island
Important naval base(s)?  No, served only as US sub refueling base.  It had no port and no decent anchorge.
Important air base(s)?  Yes, US, existed pre-war and grew in wartime.

Line Islands
Important naval base(s)?  No.
Important air base(s)?  To some degree.  There was a US naval air station on Palmyra Atoll, pre-war and onward.  Palmyra was well positioned to control part of the airspace lying directly on the U.S.-to-Australia route.  Nearby Christmas Island also had some US airfields.

Marianas
Important naval base(s)?  No.  Tinian lacked a proper port.  
Important air base(s)?  Yes.  It had a Japanese pre-war base.  Tinian was captured by the US in mid-1944 and was developed by them into a massive airbase.  Fleets of B-29s operating from Tinian bombed Japan extensively; the two A-bomb missions took off from there.

Marshall Islands
Important naval base(s)?  Yes.  Japanese naval and air bases of various sizes were established there in the late 1930s, notably at Kwajalein, Majuro, Eniwetok and Bikini, but the Japanese did not develop them to the extent that they could have.  After the capture of the Marshalls by the Americans in January 1944, the US Navy used Majuro as a major forward naval base.  
Important air base(s)?  Yes.

Midway
Important naval base(s)?  No, except as a US submarine base.
Important air base(s)?  Yes, US, existed pre-war and grew in wartime.

New Britain
Important naval base(s)?  Yes.  Rabaul, which has an excellent harbour, was the largest Japanese base in New Guinea during the 1942-1945 occupation.
Important air base(s)?  Yes.

New Guinea
Important naval base(s)?  To some degree.  Allied-controlled Port Moresby apparently had limited use as a port, but the town itself and the bases around it were important Allied staging areas.
Important air base(s)?  Yes, several, established both by Japan and the Allies (who controlled different parts of the island) during the war.

New Hebrides
Important naval base(s)?  To some degree.  Espiritu Santo only had a small port and a small airfield, but it saw a lot of use by the Allies during the war.  Nearby Free French-controlled New Caledonia (which is not part of the New Hebrides, but is located nearby to the southwest) was an important Allied forward base in the early stages of the war; it had a small pre-war French naval and air base, good anchorages in the area and a small port at Noumea.  The Santa Cruz Islands, northwest of Espiritu Santo, were not used by the Allies despite their advantageous position because the local strain of malaria was too virulent.
Important air base(s)?  To some degree.

Palau Island
Important naval base(s)?  No.  Peleliu had no port facilities.
Important air base(s)?  No.  There was a Japanese airfield on Peleliu, though apparently not an extensive one.  The US captured Palau in late 1944, but made little subsequent use of it to support its operations in the western Pacific.

Samoa (American Samoa and New Zealand Samoa Mandate)
Important naval base(s)?  No, just a minor US naval station that existed (pre-war and onward) at Tutuila; harbour traffic increased for the first half of the war but decreased thereafter.   The principal port of American Samoa, Apia, only had limited facilities.  
Important air base(s)?  Yes. US Tafuna Airfield (in American Samoa) existed pre-war and grew in wartime. The US built Faleolo Airfield (in New Zealand Samoa Mandate) in 1942; it was used by US.  There was a decent airfield at Apia.

Solomon Islands
Important naval base(s)?  Yes.  Little or nothing exietd pre-war, but the US and Japan both established several naval bases in the area from 1942 onward.
Important air base(s)?  Yes.  Little or nothing existed pre-war, but the US and Japan both established a large number of airfields in the area from 1942 onward, Henderson Field on Guadalcanal being perhaps the most famous one.

Wake Island
Important naval base(s)?  No.  It had no anchorage.
Important air base(s)?  No, just a airfield useful for reconnaissance planes and Marine garrison aircraft. Captured by the Japanese in 1941; surrendered in September 1945.

@SS:

This is what I have so far.

AIRBASES             NAVAL

Caroline            Caroline
            Midway        Dutch New Guinea
          New Guinea       New Zealand
           Okinawa           Philippines ( west side only )
           Formosa            Singapore
            Malta                   Java
                                     Gibraltra

@Baron:

I’m still wondering about creating a different game dynamics for Japan against USA.
What motivate Germany toward Moscow is clearly a lot of IPCs, even Africa is a kind of diversion and fool’s gold.
It cuts a few IPCs from UK into Germany’s purse. But, it cost a lot of units.

In 1942.2, you need more incentive to conquer islands and Crush San Francisco.
San Francisco rule needs to be well named.
It needs deterrent to not do Japan CCrush and incentive to go JSF Invasion.

A) Deterrent to JCC
1-If you make Sinkiang and Szechwan impassable toward Russia (like Sahara or Mongolia) for both ground and air units.
It forces Japan to go north or south or both. Which is still (M3) not too difficult via India. It just take more land units to put North or South coming from Asian IC. It also makes Kwantung IC very far from Moscow. FrenchIndoChina appears better starting place.

2- I once proposed a Non-Agression Pact bonus for Japan only, with a bonus to Moscow if Japan broke it.
Maybe this can be a start to create a different dynamics, leaving Germany to is fight while US being much absorb by Japan in PTO. For example, giving 5 IPCs to Japan (1 DD or 1 StB) while Moscow received 0 IPCs can be an incentive to not break NAP.
But, if Japan breaks it, Moscow received immediately 15 IPCs (1 Fg+ 1 StB) and 5 IPCs each round while Japan none.

Number are indicative, of course.

1. Moscow can fight a one dimensional war with increase income from Soviet Far East to Evenki TTy not taken by Japan.
2. Japan gets enough money to fight war against USA: 35 vs 42.
3. If all japanese zero islands worth 1 IPC, it rise to 41 vs 42.
4. USA will be dragged down to not let Japan keep PTO Islands.
   And try to increase his income faster.

B. Incentive toward San Francisco

Japan need to fight for PTO Islands and get some reward.
All zero PTO island should received some values or even a simple 3 IPCs when conquered and zero after might help.
This bonus may include all islands and Australia, too.

Another trick is any zero island taken from Japan cut 2 IPCs from Japan income.

Midway, Hawaii, Mexico and Alaska may simply get +2 IPCs.
So USA, after first turn would rise to 50 IPCs. (Or on set-up.)
IDK, but need to find a way to make it worth the cost of naval war.

We need to find a few older ideas about this in the House rule thread and put it into Master list.

Barney added this option into G40. IDK how far it works. But, at least, it is a starter for incentive.

If we want that Japan fight toward USA instead of Center Crush, it needs some kind of incentive as SS stated:
@SS:

What I mean is like you said have some islands worth more or all so it would be worth fighting for these islands due to the increased value of territories. Midway 3 icp’s, Solomans island 3 icp’s for samples and then have it where certain land territories are worth more where there is back and forth fighting. Like some land territories between Germany and Russia increased values.

[baron Münchhausen]

Under a 5 IPCs NAP, if it requires that many rounds to get 5 IPCs from Russia invasion, it becomes a better strategy to turn westward or southward. It also indirectly help Germany because USA will not repel Japan without a massive investment.

So JSFI becomes like a third scenario:
Germany vs Russia & UK.
Japan vs USA & UK.

KJF seems to me:
Germany vs Russia.
Japan vs UK, USA, Russia

KGF is usually: 
Germany vs Russia, UK & USA
Japan vs UK (India) & Russia

This NAP can still be broken and reverse to standard situation but Russia will get a few more IPCs which might balanced things out.

We should not underestimate StBs bombing.
M3 is a part, DD C5 as blocker can be useful, Carrier to use Fgs as escort can play a part.
4-5 StBs can make life difficult to USA.
M3 TP may make easier invasion from Japan since you can reach Australia, India, Alaska, WUSA, Hawaii. A one turn assault is now possible, making for a grab on an IPC island.
Income and Progress Credit, I like this concept.

If Australia (Anzac) is granted 3 ICs and 3 IPCs values each, it gives 6 additional IPCs (2 Infs, 1 Subs) to UK, which would need to fight back IJN, anyway.
And USA will not let Japan grow monster while attempting to fight Germany.
And is easier for USA to cut a few IPCs capturing Islands.

With M3, I’m not sure it will be so necessary to built ICs on Islands. At least Hawaii would need one. And if it increase to 3 IPCs, it would provides interesting points to reach before invading SF.
And to produce a few additional Infs.
The weak point would be TPs upload and download SZs.
Needing more Escorting vessels.
Islands maybe seen as a previous step to get reenforcement once first invasion started.

[Black_Elk]

So we are basically in agreement then, that a viable Invasion USA should be the goal?

This is the main point where these Pacific tweaks tend to break down, because one half of the players seem to prefer a situation where only the US has a real incentive to attack beyond the islands, and Japan just kind of gets screwed.
:-D

I think Invasion USA is an unlikely outcome given the history, but no more so than the Center Crush.

If the game allows/encourages the one, it should at least allow for the other.

If you want to make it possible for Japan to actually invade North America, as I do, then I think it becomes a lot clearer what sort of rules need to be changed/included to make that work on either map, whether 1942.2 or Global.

Japan needs a way to expand income and production vs North America, in the same way that they can vs the Center.

The Allies need a way to counter this threat, that doesn’t just devolve into a complete KJF as the only option.

It needs to be balanced such that Japan’s choice of target can pivot. For example if Invasion USA becomes too daunting, then perhaps they redirect from the southern hemisphere Australia, to S. Africa, India (or even South America in G40). Similarly they might redirect from the Northern Hemisphere Alaska/Canada, to the front with Russia.

On the European side, Germany should have a similar choice to make, and one that can also pivot. Either vs UK/North America or Russia.

Then you have an alternative to the Center crush, but one which still allows for the center crush too. It just makes this a choice for the Axis team, but it should be a choice that allows for feints, and redirects. Not a total lock down.

Right now the game is framed in terms of Allied strategy, KGF vs KJF.

I’m suggesting that it should basically be the same type of thing but on the Axis side instead.
Invasion USA vs Center Crush.

Then the Allied response would develop more organically in reaction to the Axis players decision. This would I think be more interesting than the current situation, where there is basically 1 play pattern on the Axis side and 2 play patterns on the Allied side.

Here you have 2 viable play patterns for the Axis side, so the Axis could shape the game strategically, instead of just tactically along a single expected trajectory that is pretty much always the same.

[Black_Elk]

Also, I have a simplified WarBonds/Lend-Lease scheme that might work well under the conditions described above in 1942.2 or Global.

At the end of each game round each of the primary nations rolls 1d6 to determine their bonus IPCs for that round. Bonus income can then be either given to a teammate (lend-lease) or preserved for yourself (warbonds.) The income is distributed as desired among the teammates, and added to starting incomes for the following round.

This allows players to send “material aid” to their teammate, but not necessarily in the form of units. The distribution can change each round, allowing teams to magnify the advantage for one player, or another, or distribute it evenly, depending on the needs of the War scenario that is developing.

The total amount of cash that can be used in this way is restricted to the d6 rolls, so it’s not overly distorting, and allows a similar dynamic for both teams (so not entirely one sided.)

For a game round tracker and high economy game you could make the bonus progressive.
Round 1 = 1d6+1
Round 2 = 1d6+2
Round 3= 1d6+3
Round 7= 1d6+7
Etc.

The side that preserves their own teammates or knocks off an enemy teammate is rewarded with the economic advantage over time. So the incentive for Axis to eliminate one player sooner rather than later, is clear. But it also means that staying in the fight for longer, gives you a better chance to influence the ultimate outcome, by throwing money around, or receiving aid. So all players, even the ones getting bludgeoned, have a reason to stick around.

It gives both sides a way to prop up the weak link on their team. For example UK/US aid to Russia would allow the Soviets to build up their own forces at the center. Or if one of the Axis players is getting triple teamed, the stronger player can send them aid to offset this.

More money enters play, but I think that actually encourages unit attrition and early resolution over time. Part of the reason to play is to fight epic battles, and more money might equal more rolls, but I don’t see that as time wasted. I think players are more likely to make bold buys and bold attacks when the extra money is on top of regular income. Because then it feels like a real bonus. You can be greedy and keep it for yourself, or try to coordinate resources with the team. But it’s still not the whole purse we’re talking about, just what is awarded by the rolls. So it’s necessarily limited to a fairly manageable amount per round.

5x d6 means anywhere from 5 to 30 total ipcs might enter play in a given round of 1942.2, with an average somewhere in the middle (still favoring allies), which is a pretty nice swing. I think it’s small enough not to upend the other dynamics, but signicant enough to still have an impact. It’s flexible in that it allows for focused economic strategies that can adapt to the individual game situation. Provides some fun decision making on the team, but limits this more to the end of each round (when the teams decide what to do with their bonuses), instead of every single turn.

In Global you could do the same but include Anzac and Italy for 7 xd6 per round.
That’s a swing from 7 to 42 ipcs, averaging in the 20s per game round. Again not too insane under the global economy, but likely enough to make for some interesting strategies.

It means you can shift the money where it’s needed in another way, instead of just moving combat units.

Russia needs another fighter? Then Allies can pool resources and send them the cash required. Russia doesn’t need anything anymore, but UK or USA does? Then give it to UK, or US. Same deal on the Axis side. Maybe ANZAC just needs a little bit more money to make that big buy? Then the Allies can make it happen hehe. The roll is always positive for all nations, no one is losing out completely, at least everyone can end the round in higher spirits. It might make for early concession or prolong the game, depending on the results of the rolls, and what players choose to do with them. Maybe in a game that is questionable, the Allies Roll triple 6s, and the Axis snake eyes. The losing side might decide to bow out at that point. But the opposite might also occur. It invloves some luck, but the averages here are still predictable. I think in spirit it would be a bit like a tech roll, but somewhat less nail biting and one sided. Each round would end with something for all players.

It would work well combined with the Team Coordination restrictions for units/starting territories, by providing an alternative method to assist the team directly via Economic Coordination at the end of each game round.
http://www.axisandallies.org/forums/index.php?topic=39465.0

[baron Münchhausen]

You found an interesting concept.
And it can be adjustable according to playtests.
For example, it may remains D6 for every power.
D6 to all four but Russia which can received:
+1 per round cumulative figuring is increasing rate of production.

Also, as a side note, if we find that bombing is too much damage, we can give to all, or just Russia, and/or Germany Industrial Tech. That way, it cost .5 per point of damage.

It is another way to circumvent bomber issue.
Russian much increase wartime production can be simulated that way.

And 1D6, +1 increasing each round is keeping the jackpot high, maybe too high.
But it allows to play on each player selfishness, to share, better, to give or not to give: this is the question.
Feeling a bit more about Allies cooperation issues.
Not too much money is better.
However, I agree increasing +1 per round gives an urgency for Axis to get economic advantage.

But D6 per Power brings just the money needed to make thing interesting.
Avg Allies 10 to share, Axis 7 to share.

[baron Münchhausen]

@Black_Elk:

So we are basically in agreement then, that a viable Invasion USA should be the goal?

This is the main point where these Pacific tweaks tend to break down, because one half of the players seem to prefer a situation where only the US has a real incentive to attack beyond the islands, and Japan just kind of gets screwed.
:-D

I think Invasion USA is an unlikely outcome given the history, but no more so than the Center Crush.

If the game allows/encourages the one, it should at least allow for the other.

If you want to make it possible for Japan to actually invade North America, as I do, then I think it becomes a lot clearer what sort of rules need to be changed/included to make that work on either map, whether 1942.2 or Global.

Japan needs a way to expand income and production vs North America, in the same way that they can vs the Center.

The Allies need a way to counter this threat, that doesn’t just devolve into a complete KJF as the only option.

It needs to be balanced such that Japan’s choice of target can pivot. For example if Invasion USA becomes too daunting, then perhaps they redirect from the southern hemisphere Australia, to S. Africa, India (or even South America in G40). Similarly they might redirect from the Northern Hemisphere Alaska/Canada, to the front with Russia.

On the European side, Germany should have a similar choice to make, and one that can also pivot. Either vs UK/North America or Russia.

Then you have an alternative to the Center crush, but one which still allows for the center crush too. It just makes this a choice for the Axis team, but it should be a choice that allows for feints, and redirects. Not a total lock down.

Right now the game is framed in terms of Allied strategy, KGF vs KJF.

I’m suggesting that it should basically be the same type of thing but on the Axis side instead.
Invasion USA vs Center Crush.

Then the Allied response would develop more organically in reaction to the Axis players decision. This would I think be more interesting than the current situation, where there is basically 1 play pattern on the Axis side and 2 play patterns on the Allied side.

Here you have 2 viable play patterns for the Axis side, so the Axis could shape the game strategically, instead of just tactically along a single expected trajectory that is pretty much always the same.

The most historical for Japan is Pacific invasion.
Australia should be interesting for Japan and a menace too.
Letting India or Australia growing should not be an option.
An IC on WAust, EAust and NZ with a rise in values or simply IC+2 units (allowing) up to three should be considered.
I rather prefer that each TTy worth 2or 3 IPCs, to increase UK ability to response somehow.
6 or 9 IPCs in far South of Pac, might be more interesting and not invading it allows to build units which can take care of money islands, which Japan don’t want.

If both G and J have enough trouble on their side, they won’t try to fly toward the other.
But Russia is an issue for Allies if we don’t want that Allies be part of.
Maybe the rule to not enter Russia is to be tested eventually to balance Russia weak economy.
The 3 D6 pool for Lend-lease is interesting.
If you add a NAP for Japan, it may increase Russian economy to hold against Germany.

[LHoffman]

Apologies in advance, this is going to be long.

@Black_Elk:

I believe a set up change with starting bases may work for Global. But the effect will not be enough to overcome the overriding incentive for Japan to Center crush.

For 1942.2 the island situation is even more intractable. I still believe the only incentive that will work here is to give the islands an IPC value, under the Income and Progress Credit scheme. But again, it won’t be enough to stop the center crush.

Okay so correct me if I am wrong, but the JCC is simply the now default Japan strategy of focusing on China and/or India with the primary intent to join up with Germany to take down the USSR? Basically a continental Asia focus.

Assuming this is correct, I don’t see why it is a problem. Sure it is considered the only effective path to victory and therefore used every, single game, but I don’t think you can help that without skewing physical and historical motivations considerably. The overall configuration you are proposing appears artificially engineered to create an effect that fits a perception rather than reality. What you are looking for is a novelty to gameplay rather than a solution to an existing problem.

@Black_Elk:

To me the center crush is a special kind of problem. The incentive there for Axis is not really economic. Rather Japan goes there to remove the Russians from play, eliminate the Allied turn order advantage, and converge with Germany.

Actually, it is economic in the sense that there is more money to be had in Asia than in the Pacific. There are 36 IPCs to be gained in taking China, Indochina region, India, Northeast Soviet territories and Soviet territories bordering China and Moscow. This doesn’t even include Manchuria and the other Chinese territories that Japan begins the game with. In the Pacific, your total possible haul (including Alaska, islands already under Japanese control, all of ANZAC and the DEI) is 32 IPCs. Granted, this could be achieved in about 2 or 3 turns with concerted effort, whereas all of the money in Asia takes a bit longer to obtain fully. However, JCC is always accomplished with taking at least 15 IPCs from that Pacific total (DEI). So it isn’t as though both avenues are mutually exclusive; Japan can go both Center Crush and Pacific to one degree or another.

Yet going JCC is both economic and strategic. Ultimately, the game is won by taking out the enemy, not amassing money. Money is critical, but it is a means to an end. You have to balance gaining money with complex strategic considerations such as blocking enemies, attacking targets of opportunity, managing your timetable of objectives, supporting your allies, solidifying positions, increasing range of motion, etc… Japan moving farther into the Pacific allows for few of these considerations because, as you point out below, there are no allies to support and generally no one to oppose you. Unless the United States decides to fight Japan in the Pacific, you aren’t accomplishing anything of worth to move the game towards its final conclusion. Even if the US fights Japan in the Pacific, the best you have done is distract them from Germany rather than move to take physical objectives that can end the war. Japan can control almost half the world and be an economic power, but if Germany can’t crack Moscow, the game is over. Japan’s success is revealed to have been pointless. I have seen it multiple times, as I am sure you all have, albeit with less team-oriented players.

@Black_Elk:

I don’t think there is much we can do to pull Japan away from this strategy, other than giving them a viable alternative target that does moreorless exactly the same thing. ANZAC might have worked as a springboard for something like this in G40 (the way India is a springboard for a center crush), but Anzac doesn’t threaten Germany at all, and there is no chance of convergence with the European Axis team in Australia, because it’s isolated in the middle of the Ocean. North America is the only viable Alternative target in my view, since America threatens Germany, and this region provides an area for convergence (albeit across the water, but still).

What I’m saying is that in G40 Anzac could only ever have served as a stepping stone along the way, but to get the Japanese off Moscow the endgoal would still need to be North America, since Invasion USA is the only play that would give you all 3 things that the Center Crush does…

1. expands Axis production while weakening a main rival.
2. provides the chance to eliminate that rival from play, and upset the turn order advantage of the Allied opponent.
3. allows the possibility to eventually converge with Germany along a united front.

My next assumption is that giving Japan an easier or more enticing route to attacking the Western US is simply to make the game a little less ‘the same’ every time it is played; increase the novelty factor by expanding viable choices.

Okay, I get that for sure. And I am all for doing that if it works within the game, but in this case I don’t think it does. For one, it already is an option for Japan to throw everything they have against the US. Nothing prevents that. Smart people don’t do it because of the economic vs strategic considerations I mentioned above. There is little money to gain, the path to getting there is long, expensive & inefficient, attacking the Western US is a high risk gamble, re-tooling your forces if you fail is nearly impossible and you don’t really help Germany out in an active fashion.

That said, I don’t quite see how a Japan KAF (Kill America First) strategy as you suggest really does the (3) things you list above:

1. expands Axis production while weakening a main rival. - Kinda… OOB there is less economic incentive than going JCC. If you factor in 10 IPC for taking the Western US, then you are looking at an equivalent amount, but to me that is counting your chickens before they hatch. The only way you weaken the USA is if you take Western US. All the time and money you spend up until that occurs doesn’t actually weaken the US, it only shifts their focus. Should Japan fail to take Western US, it becomes a Midway scenario where it is instead Japan that has been significantly weakened, because they (theoretically) would have lost many units which are difficult to replace. More than that, they have wasted time, which is worse.

Now, if you revise islands to have IPC values or increase islands like Hawaii… the expanded production changes more in your favor, but that doesn’t necessarily mean you have weakened the US, or that it will be significantly easier to do so.

2. provides the chance to eliminate that rival from play, and upset the turn order advantage of the Allied opponent. - This is a very optimistic possibility. Geography is completely against Japan here. They have to cross the Pacific with a very sizable force which, as many like to point out, the USA will see coming and be able to prepare. Then they have to hope that what units they bring are sufficient to take the Western US on the first attempt. Should they take it, their theoretically weakened force will have to expend at least another whole turn before they are within reach of the US Capital, by which time it should be flush with defensive units.

Taking the Western US is by no means impossible, even without modified IPC islands. However, taking it with enough overwhelming force to hold it and then continue to fight far from resupply is another matter.

Distracting the US from Germany can do something to upset the effective turn order, such that Germany may suffer less pressure from the US, but it will not eliminate it. And moreover, that disruption will likely be temporary. I also think it will be offset in that India will be able grow large and push units into the Stalingrad area to combat German advances. This is not at all helpful for Germany.

3. allows the possibility to eventually converge with Germany along a united front. - This one I don’t quite understand. Where would Japan and Germany meet up if Japan is going across the Pacific to the US? I assume they would have to meet in Washington DC? But if the game gets to that point Germany would have already defeated Britain (on its own) and at least held the USSR at bay. The link up isn’t important at that point because the game is over.

@Black_Elk:

Japan needs a way to get into North America.

Why? I assume you mean you want to provide them an easier way, because they do already have a way. It’s a hard way and that’s why it isn’t very plausible. Plausibility and historical reality discussion continued below.

@Black_Elk:

I think this would benefit the gameplay, and be more satisfying �historically (or at least as satisfying for an alternate history as the Center Crush is.)

@Black_Elk:

I think Invasion USA is an unlikely outcome given the history, but no more so than the Center Crush.

Japan crossing the Pacific and taking San Francisco is a fantasy and from the Axis perspective it would be highly satisfying. However, it has no basis in history.

Japan’s main concerns in the Second World War were as follows:

• Create an Asia-Pacific Empire ruled by Japan. This wasn’t just anti-western imperialism and “Asia for Asians” as Japanese propaganda asserted at teh beginning of the war. Leading up to war in China and the Pacific, Japanese leaders wanted very much to be like the Western Imperial powers and modeled their ambitions on that. They were not racists who hated Westerners and wanted to “liberate” Asian countries; they admired the West and wanted to replace Western Imperial subjugation with their own form, which was even worse.

• Create a bulwark against Soviet Communism in Asia and eventually fight the Soviets. Japan detested and feared Soviet Communism on a fundamental political and spiritual level. The Communist philosophy went against everything that the Japanese Empire was to stand for: Japanese primacy in Asia, racial superiority, imperial ambitions and, very importantly, the social-political-spiritual essence of Japan, the kokutai. The kokutai was embodied in the Emperor himself, but ultimately went beyond even him.

Given those two considerations, Japan pursuing a JCC strategy in Axis & Allies, every time, is completely historically accurate. Anything they do beyond that should be a riff on the main goals: to take China/Asia and then defeat the USSR. Japan began war with China in the early and mid 1930s. They became militarily and politically bogged down by 1940 and required more resources to continue the war effort there. The only reason Japan attacked the Western Powers (USA, UK, Dutch, French) was to obtain more resources to continue the war in China. While the IJN briefly considered exploring plans for an invasion of Hawaii, this never proceeded beyond a wargame stage. The Japanese military didn’t have near the logistical ability to take Hawaii, let alone begin an invasion of the United States. Not to mention doing so would have purely been a means to an end: get the US to cease hostilities so Japan could refocus on their real enemies… Not so Japan could then springboard to the West Coast. The political motivation for that ambition was not present, nor was the laughable actual capability to do so.

You could argue that given the size, population and effort involved in China, Japanese victory there was almost just as implausible, and you would be correct. Japan simply didn’t have the logistic or industrial capacity to conquer all of China and then hope to fight the massive Soviets across the mountains and frigid vastness of north central Asia. Utterly implausible. However, while they might not have dreamed about getting all the way to Moscow, fighting the USSR and utterly eliminating them as a threat was the number two goal of the Japanese military and political leaders. This counts for a tremendous amount when you are considering making the path to fight the USA and/or Britain equally as appealing (militarily, economically or otherwise) as fighting China and the USSR. It simply was not and never would have been.

[LHoffman]

@Black_Elk:

Invasion USA, it’s always the Axis players dream hehe.

That’s why HBG made Amerika!  :-D

@Black_Elk:

To do that Japan needs 2 things… Income from the island territories that are along the route into N. America, and a credible threat against W. US Production (ie. A way to get Japanese production closer to the continental US.)

In 1942.2 this would I think require that the factory be given +2 bonus, and built anywhere, including valueless islands. Conceived as an abstract land base. Maybe just +2 for the purposes of spawning infantry, but they need something to match the US in hitpoints.

In G40 it probably requires that the minor factory (or some extra land base outpost type unit) provide a similar option to expand production anywhere on the map. Again, so that Japan has at least some way to spawn hitpoints closer to North American target territories.

Or you go M3 with transports.
Or all these ideas at the same time.

Then Japan would have a real alternative to the Center crush, a strategy that would have the same kind of impact as taking Moscow and putting Russia out of play.

@Black_Elk:

So we are basically in agreement then, that a viable Invasion USA should be the goal?

This is the main point where these Pacific tweaks tend to break down, because one half of the players seem to prefer a situation where only the US has a real incentive to attack beyond the islands, and Japan just kind of gets screwed.
:-D

I think Invasion USA is an unlikely outcome given the history, but no more so than the Center Crush.

If the game allows/encourages the one, it should at least allow for the other.

It seems like you are inventing this problem to introduce a new path in gameplay, rather than trying to fix an existing fault. This would be the opposite of what my impression of San Francisco Rules has been up to this point. Because the game promotes one path for Japan but not another is not reasoned justification that another past should also be opened up. Again, that path already exists, it just isn’t optimal. This reasoning is equivalent to saying that Germany taking Africa and Britain, while ignoring USSR, should be just as economically and strategically viable as focusing on the Eastern Front exclusively. That doesn’t make any sense, why do both routes need to be equivalent? IMO they aren’t because they physically cannot be. The map of the A&A world reflects reality in that different territories have different values and not all strategic considerations are the same in every area of the world. This creates well-worn paths of least resistance; it is inevitable. Unless you re-engineered the board to make all directions equally viable, there is still going to be a ‘best way’ that is found out under the scheme you are proposing.

The Axis know their objectives and have the initiative. They can do basically anything within the mechanics of the game to achieve their objectives (defeat the Allies). It is due to the immutable geography of the world that a KRF (Kill Russia First) strategy is the safest and easiest strategy for the Axis. I don’t think that is something you can change without distorting the land on the globe, the location of its resources or cherry picking the abilities of certain units.

@Black_Elk:

If you want to make it possible for Japan to actually invade North America, as I do, then I think it becomes a lot clearer what sort of rules need to be changed/included to make that work on either map, whether 1942.2 or Global.

Japan needs a way to expand income and production vs North America, in the same way that they can vs the Center.

The Allies need a way to counter this threat, that doesn’t just devolve into a complete KJF as the only option.

It needs to be balanced such that Japan’s choice of target can pivot. For example if Invasion USA becomes too daunting, then perhaps they redirect from the southern hemisphere Australia, to S. Africa, India (or even South America in G40). Similarly they might redirect from the Northern Hemisphere Alaska/Canada, to the front with Russia.

On the European side, Germany should have a similar choice to make, and one that can also pivot. Either vs UK/North America or Russia.

Then you have an alternative to the Center crush, but one which still allows for the center crush too. It just makes this a choice for the Axis team, but it should be a choice that allows for feints, and redirects. Not a total lock down.

Right now the game is framed in terms of Allied strategy, KGF vs KJF.

I’m suggesting that it should basically be the same type of thing but on the Axis side instead.
Invasion USA vs Center Crush.

Then the Allied response would develop more organically in reaction to the Axis players decision. This would I think be more interesting than the current situation, where there is basically 1 play pattern on the Axis side and 2 play patterns on the Allied side.

Here you have 2 viable play patterns for the Axis side, so the Axis could shape the game strategically, instead of just tactically along a single expected trajectory that is pretty much always the same.

You are talking about changing the fundamental dynamics of the game and taking it farther away from its historical basis. It becomes less about WWII and more like a world conquering game set in the 1940s.

However, building on a point I made above about Japan taking Hawaii… If you really wanted to make the Pacific more of a battle ground (forget Japan invading the US), the best bet would probably be to alter victory conditions as they relate to Hawaii. Make Hawaii far more important politically. Such that if Japan takes Hawaii and holds it for a turn, the US automatically quits the war against Japan. Or something similar to that.

This would reflect history in a much more realistic fashion and brings a Pacific battleground into consideration every single game. US public and political opinion during the war would have seriously reconsidered war against Japan if Japan was to have taken such a close and important territory as Hawaii. Japan initially hoped that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be enough to dissuade the US, but that didn’t work. Physically taking Hawaii may have pushed that over the top and caused the US to sign a treaty. We will never know and I would research it more to see if that is plausible, but from what I do know that may be a darn good compromise. It makes holding Hawaii critically important to the United States and to the Allies overall. Japan could still ignore Hawaii and continue on as usual, but why wouldn’t they want to at least threaten it if it can knock a major player out of the war against them? It could even be made that if Japan takes Hawaii, they suffer an economic penalty such that they cannot spend all 80 IPCs against Germany either. Hawaii probably should probably be made harder for Japan to take in this case, or at least prevent them from doing so on their first attack.

[CWO Marc]

@LHoffman:

This would reflect history in a much more realistic fashion and brings a Pacific battleground into consideration every single game. US public and political opinion during the war would have seriously reconsidered war against Japan if Japan was to have taken such a close and important territory as Hawaii. Japan initially hoped that the attack on Pearl Harbor would be enough to dissuade the US, but that didn’t work. Physically taking Hawaii may have pushed that over the top and caused the US to sign a treaty. We will never know and I would research it more to see if that is plausible, but from what I do know that may be a darn good compromise. It makes holding Hawaii critically important to the United States and to the Allies overall. Japan could still ignore Hawaii and continue on as usual, but why wouldn’t they want to at least threaten it if it can knock a major player out of the war against them? It could even be made that if Japan takes Hawaii, they suffer an economic penalty such that they cannot spend all 80 IPCs against Germany either. Hawaii probably should probably be made harder for Japan to take in this case, or at least prevent them from doing so on their first attack.

Here are a couple of thoughts about the Hawaii thing (in terms of the historical context, not in terms of the potential game angle).

A Japanese invasion and conquest of Midway was theoretically quite achievable (though in practice the Japanese operation aiming to do so failed disastrously) because the Midway island group is small and because in 1942 was essentially uninhabited except for the US military garrison there.  A Japanese invasion and conquest of Hawaii would have been in an entirely different league, in view of the fact that the Hawaiian Islands are a much larger island group (both in terms of square footage and in terms of the number of islands), had a large population, and had a considerable military infrastructure.

Conquering and occupying Hawaii, would only have been half the problem because Japan – assuming it conquered and occupied the Hawaiian Islands, something that would have required large invasion and occupation forces – would then have had to hold Hawaii over the medium to long term in order for the invasion to have been worthwhile in the first place.  In practice, this would have meant three things: keeping the occupation forces supplied, fortifying the islands in anticipation of an American counter-invasion, and fighting off the counter-invasion when it occured.  This would have been, to put it mildly, awkward.  For starters, Hawaii is roughly twice as far from Japan as it is from the continental United States, which gives the US the same advantage on the eastern side of the Pacific that Japan had when it invaded the territories (like the Philippines) that are on the western side of the Pacific.  Japan, moreover, was (relative to the United States) less industrialized, oil-poor, and superficial in its attitude towards (and its capacity for) naval logistics.  Just look at how much trouble Japan had hauling home the oil it took from the Dutch East Indies, or how badly it kept some of its island garrisons supplied during WWII, even when they were much closer to home than Hawaii.

As for the notion that losing Hawaii would have caused the US to hoist a white flag and sit down at the table with Japan to negotiate a peace treaty, I tend to think that the opposite would have happened.  The US was collectively outraged when Pearl Harbor was attacked and responded by throwing itself and all of its national resources into WWII; losing the Hawaiian Islands – assuming Japan could pull off such a feat – would probably have outraged the US a lot more, and increased the American resolve to fight rather than deflating it.  The biggest factor playing in favour of the US was time: the US mainland was never at risk of conquest, so the US could take whatever time it needed to build up its forces in order to defeat Japan.  And given the magnitude of America’s industrial resources, it was able in just a few short years to out-build and “out-logistic” Japan on a colossal scale.  (There’s a scene in the movie Midway in which one of Yamamoto’s officers says that if Japan can destroy the American carrier fleet at Midway, the US will be “compelled to sue for peace.”  The critical question that should have been asked by another officer at that meeting should have been: “Compelled by what?”)

[LHoffman]

@CWO:

Here are a couple of thoughts about the Hawaii thing (in terms of the historical context, not in terms of the potential game angle).

A Japanese invasion and conquest of Midway was theoretically quite achievable (though in practice the Japanese operation aiming to do so failed disastrously) because the Midway island group is small and because in 1942 was essentially uninhabited except for the US military garrison there.  A Japanese invasion and conquest of Hawaii would have been in an entirely different league, in view of the fact that the Hawaiian Islands are a much larger island group (both in terms of square footage and in terms of the number of islands), had a large population, and had a considerable military infrastructure.

Conquering and occupying Hawaii, would only have been half the problem because Japan – assuming it conquered and occupied the Hawaiian Islands, something that would have required large invasion and occupation forces – would then have had to hold Hawaii over the medium to long term in order for the invasion to have been worthwhile in the first place.  In practice, this would have meant three things: keeping the occupation forces supplied, fortifying the islands in anticipation of an American counter-invasion, and fighting off the counter-invasion when it occured.  This would have been, to put it mildly, awkward.  For starters, Hawaii is roughly twice as far from Japan as it is from the continental United States, which gives the US the same advantage on the eastern side of the Pacific that Japan had when it invaded the territories (like the Philippines) that are on the western side of the Pacific.  Japan, moreover, was (relative to the United States) less industrialized, oil-poor, and superficial in its attitude towards (and its capacity for) naval logistics.  Just look at how much trouble Japan had hauling home the oil it took from the Dutch East Indies, or how badly it kept some of its island garrisons supplied during WWII, even when they were much closer to home than Hawaii.

As for the notion that losing Hawaii would have caused the US to hoist a white flag and sit down at the table with Japan to negotiate a peace treaty, I tend to think that the opposite would have happened.  The US was collectively outraged when Pearl Harbor was attacked and responded by throwing itself and all of its national resources into WWII; losing the Hawaiian Islands – assuming Japan could pull off such a feat – would probably have outraged the US a lot more, and increased the American resolve to fight rather than deflating it.  The biggest factor playing in favour of the US was time: the US mainland was never at risk of conquest, so the US could take whatever time it needed to build up its forces in order to defeat Japan.  And given the magnitude of America’s industrial resources, it was able in just a few short years to out-build and “out-logistic” Japan on a colossal scale.  (There’s a scene in the movie Midway in which one of Yamamoto’s officers says that if Japan can destroy the American carrier fleet at Midway, the US will be “compelled to sue for peace.”  The critical question that should have been asked by another officer at that meeting should have been: “Compelled by what?”)

I actually agree with this, but I have read in multiple accounts that had Japan taken Hawaii either very early in the war or after a protracted conflict, then US public opinion could have swayed a decision to stop fighting Japan and focus on Germany. I can’t support that right now, but it is nagging in the back of my mind.

It is worth noting that both the US military and the American public significantly overestimated Japanese ability to actually conduct such an operation, at least at the start of the war. I think in large part that could just be attributed to paranoia stimulated by fear and shock, but there were multiple contingencies  brought up about Japanese invasion of Hawaii or even attacks on the West Coast. You mentioned Midway… in it there is a scene where Nimitz is debating with his staff about where to deploy the carriers for the battle: either aggressively to counter-attack the believed assault or conservatively in between Hawaii and California in case the Japanese didn’t do what was expected (it was stated by James Coburn’s character that Washington advised this as the “smart play”). I am not entirely sure how much of that was ginned up for dramatic effect, but I do think it is representative of the concerns at the time, when Japan was still powerful. In hindsight, it is easy to see that the threat to both Hawaii and the US was overblown, but at the time there were many unknowns and the threat was perceived as very real. I think that should factor into a house rule of this nature.

[CWO Marc]

@LHoffman:

I am not entirely sure how much of that was ginned up for dramatic effect, but I do think it is representative of the concerns at the time, when Japan was still powerful. In hindsight, it is easy to see that the threat to both Hawaii and the US was overblown, but at the time there were many unknowns and the threat was perceived as very real. I think that should factor into a house rule of this nature.

Fair enough.  But on a lighter (though related note), I thought about this subject when I saw the scene in the Star Trek TNG episode Reunification in which Sela explains the Romulan Empire’s master plan to conquer the planet Vulcan.  Three disguised ships will approach Vulcan and beam down Romulan troops, who will take the Vulcans by surprise and put the planet under new management.  Sela says that any attempted Federation counterattack will be futile because by the time it occurs the Romulans will be “well entrenched” (or words to that effect), and the Federation will have no choice but to consent to the reunification of Vulcan with the Romulan Empire.  I remember thinking: a Hollywood scriptwriter would have been laughed out of town if he’d proposed a WWII non-comedy scenario in which Japan sends three disguised ships to San Francisco, lands troops, takes over the city, entrenches them, and then tells Washington that it has no choice but to allow Japan to declare San Francisco a colony of the Japanese Empire.

[Argothair]

Ha! Love the Star Trek analogy, CWO Marc. I’m sympathetic to all of the opinions on this page. I agree with Black Elk that it’s artificial and ultimately ineffective to try to “bribe” Japan away from the center crush with cash incentives or non-aggression pacts, and I absolutely agree that the Axis should have (at least) two major strategic options. But like CWO March and LHoffman say, a Japanese invasion of the US mainland in the 1940s would have been not just unlikely, but absurd. Kill America First doesn’t really work as the #2 Axis game plan.

I think the solution is to make the #2 Axis game plan be “Kill Britain First.” In the OOB setup, kill Britain First is a wild gambit. Germany might manage to capture London early in the game, but there aren’t any serious strategies that involve the Axis holding London against a competent opponent. That’s probably as it should be, since if the Axis could take and hold London right off the bat, the game would be broken. But for variety’s sake, there still needs to be some way that the Axis can defeat the British Empire without taking Moscow! It is not at all absurd to think that Germany, Italy, and Japan, working together, might have been able to break the economy of the British Empire and force it out of the war.

So the trick is to meaningfully distinguish “Kill Britain First” from a general “Center Crush.” Part of the problem is that India and Egypt are hanging out right in the center of the board, and those are two of Britain’s most important territories, so Japan will wind up attacking India and Egypt regardless of whether it’s trying to crush Britain or crush Moscow. So, fully conquering India needs to be a detour that takes Japan off the fastest route to the center, rather than part of the fastest route to the center. This could be done by creating a territory of “South India” with a factory and the victory city of Bombay – if you’re just blitzing to the center, you want to go Burma -> East India -> West India -> Persia -> Iraq -> Trans-Jordan -> Egypt. If instead you’re actually trying to cripple the British Empire, you want to go Burma -> East India -> South India, and then you might pivot to South Africa and/or ANZAC. Other measures you could take along these lines include:

1. Don’t put a victory city in Cairo – it’s worth 2 IPCs, and it’s strategically placed; that’s enough to keep it adequately contested.
2. Do put a victory city in Capetown and in Sydney. Make South Africa and Sydney worth at least 4 IPCs each.
3. Don’t put a victory city or factory in West India or East India.
4. Add another sea zone to the Arabian Sea, so that India isn’t right next door to Egypt by sea.
5. Remove sea zones from the southern Indian Ocean, so that India, sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Australia are all within one move of each other.
6. Give Britain and Japan big national objectives that hinge on whether Britain can keep the commonwealth together, e.g., 10 IPCs for Britain if Britain controls at least 4 of Vancouver, Bombay, Capetown, Sydney, and Auckland; 10 IPCs for Japan if Japan controls at least 3 of Vancouver, Bombay, Capetown, Sydney, and Auckland.
7. Don’t give Italy national objectives that heavily rely on Egypt – it’s fine to reward the Axis for gaining access to oil reserves, but they need to have the option of getting their oil from Baku or Persia or Sudan, instead of being forced to take Cairo.

As a side note, I think you can and should make it somewhat harder for the US to defend its Pacific coast, e.g., by breaking the coastline up into two or even three separate territories – I would like to see separate territories of Alaska, Yukon, British Columbia, Oregon, California, and Mexico all within one turn’s movement of an appropriate Japanese naval base, e.g., the Caroline Islands. But that doesn’t mean that Japan is supposed to be able to take and hold any of those territories; it just means that if the US loses control of the eastern Pacific sea zones, then the Allies have to spend non-trivial bucks to buy infantry to defend several different territories, or else risk a Japanese commando raid that could potentially turn a profit for Japan.

[Black_Elk]

Well at least it got the band back together.
:-D

To be sure, I knew there would not be agreement about this.

You are talking about changing the fundamental dynamics of the game and taking it farther away from its historical basis. It becomes less about WWII and more like a world conquering game set in the 1940s.

Basically, sure.
:evil:

But I’ll readily admit, I think that’s what A&A already is, and the reason many people play it is not so much to satisfy a desire to re-live history per se, but rather to play out exactly those sort of wild fantasy world-conquering nightmare scenarios. You know the sort that were presented in the propaganda reels, that would probably make a more grounded historical realist pull their hair out, but which nevertheless make for an interesting game narrative.

The promise of the game is that you can take control and reshape world history. It’s pretty brazen in that regard, and relies heavily on a suspension of disbelief, whether we’re talking about a 1940 or 1942 start date.

We’ve discussed at length the improbablity or outright impossibility of Japan doing several things in reality, which occur as a matter of course in the OOB game. My thought there is that, if Japan can sack Moscow in game and people just shrug, then its at least as reasonable to allow them a North American campaign isn’t it? Of course I’m not unhinged enough to suggest that this was a likely outcome in WW2, I’m just trying to be equitable. If the game allows for one historical delusion, and is basically built around it, why not the other?

I just think back to Classic, if people were content with a game where the spectre of Axis world domination was dismissed outright on historical realism grounds, then you wouldn’t have seen a bid process invented to restore exactly that.

In part we can put this issue on Larry for not really giving the Japanese a way to win initially that didn’t involve total domination. The German play certainly feels a bit more realistic. More recently we were given the VC win as a structure to work with. But it still feels grafted on top of the game, rather than as a foundation for it. Probably because that’s exactly the way it was introduced, as an add on to an existing game without changing much in the gameplay, rather than as the basis for all the gameplay mechanics.

Probably my invasion USA push was a stretch here, the argument in its favor is maybe too hyperbolic, since it assumes the acceptance of some historical curves that are already pretty crazy in the OOB game.
:-D

Perhaps as Argothair suggests, KBF is an easier way to go for a secondary alternative to the Center crush. But I still think we’re missing out a bit on some fun potential gameplay, by putting invasion USA totally off the table for Japan.

[CWO Marc]

@Black_Elk:

But I’ll readily admit, I think that’s what A&A already is, and the reason many people play it is not so much to satisfy a desire to re-live history per se, but rather to play out exactly those sort of wild fantasy world-conquering nightmare scenarios. You know the sort that were presented in the propaganda reels, that would probably make a more grounded historical realist pull their hair out, but which nevertheless make for an interesting game narrative.

The kind of thing shown in the two pictures below from the first of Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” films.  The accompanying narration said, “There you have it, gents: all they left us was Shangri-La.  And they’d claim that too if they knew where it was.”

[baron Münchhausen]

@CWO:

@Black_Elk:

But I’ll readily admit, I think that’s what A&A already is, and the reason many people play it is not so much to satisfy a desire to re-live history per se, but rather to play out exactly those sort of wild fantasy world-conquering nightmare scenarios. You know the sort that were presented in the propaganda reels, that would probably make a more grounded historical realist pull their hair out, but which nevertheless make for an interesting game narrative.

The kind of thing shown in the two pictures below from the first of Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” films.  The accompanying narration said, “There you have it, gents: all they left us was Shangri-La.  And they’d claim that too if they knew where it was.”

Some Yamamoto’s adversaries within IJN had make believe he said this one:

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House.
Read more at: https://www.brainyquote.com/search_results.html?q=Yamamoto+

[baron Münchhausen]

I also read a long time ago about the 30 IPCs US War-time boost from Pacific, it was necessary because some japan’s player found a way to make a gambit raid over San Francisco on J2 or J3.
In fact, it was a kind of an incredible Japanese Sea-Lion.
It was allowed to Germany on UK, but a game broken for Japan.

Is there any way to make it possible.
@Argothair, if Transport and Cruiser are allowed M3-4 from Naval Base, you totally increase troop mobility in game.
And maybe make this San Francisco invasion more feasible.
I cannot talk about KAF because it seems totally bad playing as USA to loose Washington to Japan.
And historically not very acceptable objective.

But, a USA conditional surrender might occurs if Japan grabs San Francisco 2 complete rounds in a row.

The best Japan could hope in WWII was a peace treaty leaving Japan doing as he wishes in Asia.
If San Francisco is firmly held, you can see it as USA is making peace treaty in exchange of recovering Western US.
Because half the country being traumatized by japanese invasion, the people of USA making pressure to find an agreement with Japan.
And Japan then get what he wanted.

That would make a plausible scenario IMO.

So this one below can be tried out someway then:

Japan needs a way to get into North America. I think this would benefit the gameplay, and be more satisfying  historically (or at least as satisfying for an alternate history as the Center Crush is.) Invasion USA, it’s always the Axis players dream hehe. To do that Japan needs 2 things… Income from the island territories that are along the route into N. America, and a credible threat against W. US Production (ie. A way to get Japanese production closer to the continental US.)

In 1942.2 this would I think require that the factory be given +2 bonus, and built anywhere, including valueless islands. Conceived as an abstract land base. Maybe just +2 for the purposes of spawning infantry, but they need something to match the US in hitpoints.

In G40 it probably requires that the minor factory (or some extra land base outpost type unit) provide a similar option to expand production anywhere on the map. Again, so that Japan has at least some way to spawn hitpoints closer to North American target territories.

Or you go M3 with transports.
Or all these ideas at the same time.

Then Japan would have a real alternative to the Center crush, a strategy that would have the same kind of impact as taking Moscow and putting Russia out of play.

[Black_Elk]

@CWO:

@Black_Elk:

But I’ll readily admit, I think that’s what A&A already is, and the reason many people play it is not so much to satisfy a desire to re-live history per se, but rather to play out exactly those sort of wild fantasy world-conquering nightmare scenarios. You know the sort that were presented in the propaganda reels, that would probably make a more grounded historical realist pull their hair out, but which nevertheless make for an interesting game narrative.

The kind of thing shown in the two pictures below from the first of Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” films.  The accompanying narration said, “There you have it, gents: all they left us was Shangri-La.  And they’d claim that too if they knew where it was.”

Haha yeah, I guess that’s where I was going with it.
:-D

I suppose as a thought experiment, we could imagine how WW2 might have looked, if the American response to initial Japanese aggression played out as it often does in the actual game… Like “Screw Hawaii! Lets recall the Pacific fleet and send it through the Panama canal. Close all the shipyards on the west coast, we’re going to go 100% Atlantic and make no effort to deal with Japan at all until Berlin is ours!”

It’s laughable, but this is how things go in most A&A games. If the IJN was totally uncontested in the Pacific, either by the USN or the Royal Navy, then they probably would have had a lot more options.

I take all L. Hoffmans points to heart. I know this invasion USA suggestion is kind of ridiculous, but then again, it’s kind of a ridiculous game. I love it, but I still know what I’m in for when I play.

If I say Japan needs a way into North America, I’m mainly talking about under these sort of all-or-nothing KGF conditions. It doesn’t need to be a shoe-in every game, just possible. Essentially as a deterrent against the kind of magnified KGF play by the US that we often see, and as an enticement to the dual theater war. Something similar should be possible if the US totally ignores Germany in favor of a KJF. In such situations Germany should have a more realistic option on London, or even North America itself. If Japan goes after America full force, and the Allies respond in kind, the Pacific should stalemate, but then Russia should be stronger to do something in Europe. If Russia throws in on the Pacific too, for a full KJF, then Germany should be stronger to do something vs UK.

Right now the seesaw of pacific power is weighted in such a way, that one kid can jump off and run to the other side of the playground while the other just stays aloft, defying gravity and whatnot.
:-D

Perhaps I’m conflating the G40 experience a bit too much with 1942.2, and the other previous editions, but it does seem to come up quite a bit in A&A. I agree that the G40 play pattern is somewhat more satisfying than what we see on the smaller board, but it still feels rather one dimensional on Japan’s part.