@SubmersedElk:
I’ve been seeing a lot of “move the eastern Russian infantry to Moscow” recommendations, but many times when I see someone do that they end up being used to fend off Japan on Russia’s backside instead of reinforcing Moscow against Germany.
Some consider stacking Amur on R1 but that just seems to invite Japan to wipe them out conveniently.
What I’ve been doing recently is stacking them on Bury in R1 then moving them to Amur in R2 when Japan moves south and can no longer conveniently kill them off (or later, if Japan can counter). I do this in conjunction with a R1 DOW on Japan and moving some mobile units to southwest China to help in the contest for Yunnan. This pins a dozen Japanese units in defense of Manchuria/Korea which appears to make a world of difference in the sustainability of UKPac/China/ANZAC in the south.
US keeps enough fleet at Hawaii to keep the Japanese navy from moving too much navy towards India. Heavy inf/art buys by Russia and mid-round fighter support from UK and ANZAC keep Moscow from falling in this scenario.
My question is: why not keep those INF in the east to pressure Japan every game? Why do the long march east and take them out of the game for five, six rounds of play when they could be useful all that time - especially early on when Allies need every counter threat they can muster?
March the Russians back to Moscow and fill the void with US ground units / aircraft.
The US is better equipped to flood that side of Russia with real offensive units while Japan is busy in the South Pacific and India.
It creates the same effect for Japan to deal with while the Russians benefit from those units racing home before the Germans attack Moscow.
If Japan is loathe to open its northern border to the Mongolian hoards because it has nothing in the north to address them, stage the US units in Amur and harass both Korea and Manchuria.
If China knows the US is going with this strategy, a great boon to the US and a giant thorn for Japan will be China eventually giving up trying to reclaim the Burma Road and saving the IPC to dump 6-10 units in Northern China once the US opens up Manchuria.
Anything less than Japanese IC’s on both Korea and Kiangsu probably means Japan faces losing the northern coastal provinces and much of northern China until India has been settled and potentially long after it depending on how costly it was to get in the first place.
It also means Japan has to decide if trying to take ANZAC with any remaining forces is plausible or if it has to return to the Sea of Japan to try to break the US siege, get reinforcements and decide if Hawaii is viable at this point.
Fastest sailing from India’s fall to the Sea of Japan is three turns. As I’ve seen India typically fall on J4, that means the earliest you can expect the remnants of the starting IJN back is probably J7. Thats a lot of time for the US if it was a J1 DOW.
If Hawaii is not viable, the US just bought ANZAC multiple turns to continue building and maybe even steal a DEI or two depending on what Japan decides is the best choice of multiple bad ones.
Of course, this is a 100% KJF strategy for the US - completely ignoring Europe on the assumption that Russia plays turtle and the UK funnels all possible resources into FTR to deter / delay the eventual German attack on Moscow.
There comes a point where the Russians are prime for a counter attack, out of Moscow and you should play cat and mouse as the US with the IJN until you see the outcome of that battle.