Lee certainly did not conceive it as such. He had 3 good and fresh brigades left on Day3 and 2 hardly engaged the day before. He wanted and sensed(wrongly) that victory was in his grasp. He had attacked both flanks with some success, but not the centre. He expected it weakened and saw it as the most logical next move. It was an attack on a narrow front, probably more because of the paucity of attackers and got narrower as casualties mounted. There was near parity in numbers, but the defenders were entrenched and backed by artillery. The mile they had to walk was not out of choice and made the task harder, although proving a great spectacle and probably did awe the defenders. Lee may have hoped his army’s vaunted aggression would break those people; it was desperation and this was not Virginia.
I Have to agree this was not the tactic described.
The infantry assault was preceded by a massive artillery bombardment that was meant to soften up the Union defense and silence its artillery,
Interesting Worsham… Sounds like the confederates were using those modern tactics! They just failed…
The infantry assault was preceded by a massive artillery bombardment that was meant to soften up the Union defense and silence its artillery,
Interesting Worsham… Sounds like the confederates were using those modern tactics! They just failed…
Just needed to get away from the advancing in rows where they were easy mass targets.
Hi Cromwell. Hoped you would post. Thanks for that. Wanted to say Lee planned an echelon attack, but was unsure if I remembered right. Also thought I remembered something about the artillery barrage being short. Was Longstreet conserving some ammo for what he thought would be a Union counterattack? And you would have relieved him too, wow?
Good question. Before I answer, I would like to know the answer to one question. Do you mean the attack as planned or as implemented?
I wasn’t aware of the discrepancy between the plan and the implementation, so my question didn’t take that factor into account. I guess this amounts to saying that it referred to the attack as implemented, since that’s all I knew about. I was vaguely aware, however, that Longstreet’s role on the third day has been seen as controversial, the argument on one side being that he doomed the attack to failure by his delays and the argument on the other side being that he considered Lee’s decision to attack the centre to be a colossal blunder against which he argued forcefully but which Lee still ordered him to carry out. But anyway, the aspect I was wondering about was the validity (or not) of drawing a parallel between that attack and the concept of human wave attacks in general and Japanese banzai charges in particular.
Since human wave attacks weren’t, as far as I know, a named and consciously-defined doctrine at the time of the US Civil War, it’s in a way anachronistic to refer to Pickett’s Charge as such. The method and the results in both cases nevertheless do bear a certain resemblance. One difference I can see, however, is the far greater imbalance of forces (and hence the more extreme nature of the tactic) that characterized banzai charges. At Saipan, for instance, the Japanese who charged the US Marine lines were out of ammunition and had little more than fixed bayonets at their disposal, while the Marines were armed with machine guns and flame throwers. The firepower discrepancy during the third day’s attack at Gettysburg was much less lopsided. And I guess another fundamental difference was in the motivational aspect. The Japanese at Saipan had exhausted their resources and their only options were to surrender, to die in their positions without resisting, or to die on the offensive in a banzai charge (as hopeless as that offensive might be). Lee had more options than that (including the option of disengaging and retreating), and furthermore he and his men didn’t have the added burden of operating under the “death before dishonour” philosophy of the Bushido code.
Here is what Col. Long, General Lee’s military secretary, said of the Charge: “The attack of Pickett’s division on the 3rd has been more criticized and less understood, than any other part of the Gettysburg drama.” He continued, “the attack was not made as designed.” I encourage others to read what Long said of July 3rd. I just gave you two small snippets.
Thanks for the info about Armistead Lindsay Long. Is this the document to which you refer? :
http://www.gdg.org/Research/SHSP/shlong.html
Letter from General A. L. Long, Military Secretary to General R. E. Lee.
Charlottesville, Va., April, 1877.
The index page – http://www.gdg.org/Research/SHSP/shsp.html – has quite a few other articles on the subject of Gettysburg by various people.
Enjoyed reading that. Thank you both for bringing it to my attention.
Not coordinating and allocating Pickett to command two divisions from another corps is a major error by Longstreet. I agree with you there(sadly because of past service). He let petty jealousies(Lee’s favouring Virginians) and stubbornness over a disagreement in major invasion policy obscure his better judgement. Saddens me.
Rather than sack him, as you believe he should have, he sent him West. It was certainly the right policy. The West needed big names, but with substance: not Bory, for example.
Chickamauga is probably one of my favourite battles.
And what ifs.
Longstreet, not Bragg.
I would love to venture that far west, but think my 1st visit(whenever that will be) will be Virginia, as it is closer. Am sure I could spend 3 weeks looking at sites.
Have just picked up “Last Chance…”
Posting here again has made me want to read more about the subject.
I enjoyed it and it has caused me to reevaluate my opinion of Lee.
Have now elevated him above genius for his thinking how best to win the war and see how he envisaged the South’s only real chance for victory. I always thought him wrong to refuse to go West when asked, but see how necessary he was in the plan of things.
You know I hold the Western defeats dear and wish a Bragg replacement had been found earlier, only acknowledge now it could not be Lee.
My search for the answer goes on.
I know the whole Confederate heirachy( and modern military thinking)would have baulked at the idea of promoting someone two ranks(and not West Point), but how would the army have fared with Cleburne at the helm?
I know it is not a credible choice as he had two immediate superiors in the army(though Hardee refused) as well as two unused Full Generals outside of it.
I would like to read about Hardee and fathom why he could not see himself in the role. He did have the Army’s confidence. He is also another reason Cleburne could never have had the Army, having always been his superior.
