German Navy Air Program

@ABWorsham:

Donitz said in a metting with Hitler, “The historians will describe  World War 2 in different ways, according to their nationality. On one point, however, they will be unanimous. in the 20th Century - that the aeroplane - the German Navy fought without airborne infomation and without its own air force, as if the aeroplane did not exist. and they will be unable to explain it.”

The massive material advantage of the Royal Navy would of likely stifled any real chance of German carriers to reak havoc in the Atlantic. The threat of a German aircraft carrier in the Atlantic wold of likely illicited a response similar to that of what the Bismarck, Graf Spee and other major German navy capital ships did.

Had the Germans had for example a similar amount of aircraft carriers to the Japanese in late 1941 say 4 fleet carriers at the start of the war I have no doubt that the Royal Navy would of used the threat of German Navy airpower to justify a massive expansion in the number of Royal Navy fleet carriers to the point where it would likely outnumber any German force two to one (if not more knowing the Royal Navy’s tendencies for overkill).

In the long run a German commitment to carrier airpower would of only strengthened the position of the Royal Navy throughout the world. German resources would of ultimately been wasted just like they were in the long run on their other capital ships such as the Tirpitz or Prinz Eugen which constantly needed to protected from RAF bombing raids.

However if the Germans dedicated their naval shipbuilding from the late 1930’s entirely on Uboats they could of knocked Britain out of the war quite quickly. To think of all the steel, manpower and money that went on the German surface raiders like Bismarck and then apply that to U-Boat production the Germans could of perhaps had over 150 Uboats by the time the Battle of the Atlantic truly began after the fall of France and the German navy acquired port facilites in Western France.

At the beginning of the Battle of the Atlantic Doenitz only had access to 60 Uboats, if one imagines German Uboats numbering 200-300 (perhaps more) they could of cut Britain’s maritime lifeline leaving them at the German’s mercy because of lack of food and other essential supplies.

My apologies for going somewhat off topic :-)

@ABWorsham:

Had the Germans Navy used bombers and fighters to escort U-Boats and help U-boats locate prey, British tonnage losses could have been much greater.

Germany did indeed use aircraft quite effectively (but in inadequate numbers) for reconnaissance purposes – specifically the FW-200 Condor.  I’m doubtful about the U-boat escort concept, however, for a number of reasons.

First, there would have been a huge imbalance between the endurance (hours as opposed to weeks) and operational range of the planes compared to the U-boats.

Second, during the first half of the war, U-boats were at their most successful when they conducted surface attacks at night, a time at which aircraft would have been largely useless.  Operating on the surface at night allowed U-boats to move at full speed if required (U-boats were quite slow underwater) while still remaining largely invisible (until the arrival of centimetric radar later in the war made visual detection a less critical factor).

Third, having escort aircraft accompany U-boats would be a dead giveaway – visible from a great distance – to Allied ships that there was a sub in the area, thus further compromising the U-boat’s primary advantage, which is the ability to conceal itself.

Fourth, arranging a rendezvous between a U-boat and an escort aircraft would have involved a lot of radio communication, which would have given Allied crytographers even more information with which to pinpoint U-boat positions.  (The radio traffic between Doenitz’s HQ and his U-boats was already proving very valuable to the Allies.)

Fifth, one has to remember the purpose of U-boat escort aircraft would presumably have been to defend the subs by attacking enemy escort ships, which would have been a much tougher proposition than the role which Allied escort aircraft had in defending convoys from subs.  Although Allied propaganda tried to convince the public that the mission of such aircraft was to destroy U-boats (which some did indeed do successfully), their most useful function was to scare U-boats into submerging.  Submerged U-boats move more slowly than on the surface and use up more fuel, so this reduces their operational endurance.  Submerged U-boats (again, despite what’s shown in films like Action in the North Atlantic) also have a tougher time lining themselves up for a torpedo shot than on the surface because of the speed differential between them and the target.  Driving U-boats underwater was easy for Allied escort planes: basically, all they had to do was show up, without even necessarily dropping any weapons.

@ABWorsham:

Carrier planes were not what i had in mind when posting this topic. I was thinking more of shore based aircraft. Planes that were under command of the German Navy for scouting and attack.

In February 22, 1940, Luftwaffa Stukas attacked two German destroyers, Leberecht Maass and Max Schultz, resulting in one sinking by german bombs and the other trying to escape into a minefield and sinking.

Had the Germans Navy used bombers and fighters to escort U-Boats and help U-boats locate prey, British tonnage losses could have been much greater.

Why did the Lufftwaffe attack their own destroyers?

Goering’s boost: “everything that fly’s belongs to me” this is the major source of the problem. Inter-service rivalry was catastrophic to getting the needed changes done. Goering would not let his power diminish to booster Karl Donetz.