The Allies didn’t have “a” plan to wage the Battle of the Atlantic, and neither did the Germans. The Battle of the Atlantic was a complex battle of attrition on a gigantic scale which lasted all the way from September 1939 to May 1945, and it was characterized by constant changes of plans and tactics and weaponry on both sides as it progressed, with each side trying to overcome every new enemy development with a suitable counter-development. The campaign see-sawed several times, with one side or the other gaining the advantage at various points; some methods of waging the campaign became ineffectual as time progressed, but were highly effective in earlier stages and therefore were entirely correct to use at those points.
WWII–-75th ANNIVERSARY POLLS--#17 DECEMBER 1940
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Operation Compass was the first big Allied military operation of the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943) during World War II. British and other Commonwealth forces attacked Italian forces in western Egypt and Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya, from December 1940 to February 1941, with great success. The Western Desert Force (Lieutenant-General Sir Richard O’Connor) with about 30,000 men, advanced from Mersa Matruh in Egypt on a five-day raid against the Italian positions of the 10th Army (Marshal Rodolfo Graziani), which had about 150,000 men in fortified posts around Sidi Barrani and in Cyrenaica.
The 10th Army was swiftly defeated and the British prolonged the operation, to pursue the remnants of the 10th Army to Beda Fomm and El Agheila on the Gulf of Sirte. The British took 138,000 Italian and Libyan prisoners, hundreds of tanks and over 1,000 guns and aircraft for a loss of 1,900 men killed and wounded, about 10 percent of their infantry. The British were unable to continue beyond El Agheila, due to broken-down and worn out vehicles and the diversion beginning in March 1941, of the best-equipped units to the Greek Campaign in Operation Lustre.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Compass
Operation Compass, IMO, was one of the most successful military strategies of the entire war. Italy was pretty much overrun during this maneuver as they were practically put out of business in North Africa. After getting their A$$es kicked, the Italians asked Big Brother (Germany), for help. My question for this month is this:
Did Italy have any chance of surviving this Allied master-plan, and if you guys can go over the history of Compass, what would you guys have done if you were Marshall Rodolfo Graziani? -
An old military lesson says, a hundred soldiers with no food is a hundred dead soldiers. Italy experienced something similar in this desert. They had no trucks, no supplies, no food and were spread out in several small garrisons. The Italians were sitting ducks, and the Mechanized UK unit could pick them down one by one. Compared to an A&A game, its like you got a huge tank stack that swallow up space by space, each defended by one infantry only. Yes, your enemy have more men than you, and if they were all in a huge stack you would get problems, but luckily you can take them one by one. On top of that, the average and casual Italian at this point had a very low morale, since they by now knew that Italy would loose, even if the Axis won the war. As long as Germany was on the winning side, the Italians believed they would become slaves after the war. Logical, most of the Italians looked at British victory as their only hope for a decent life after the war. Its kind of like 3 million Russians surrendered in the first week after the German attack, because they had no hope in Stalin.
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Solid reasoning, Narvik. I voted maybe, based on the pure lopsided numbers, alone. While the Italian morale, supply chain, etc. was very low, in a different dice roll, maybe they would be able to hold the defense against the outnumbered Brits. There is the point that, even though the soldiers, themselves, have no faith in the leadership, they might still fight for each man beside them.
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Narvik’s analysis may well be right - I am not well informed enough to know.
However, hindsight can be very misleading. Before success was in the bag, did Wavell and O’Connor believe that the 150,000 Italians had no chance against 30,00 Brits? I doubt it. Wavell himself wrote prior to commencement of the Operation:
“I do not entertain extravagant hopes of this operation but I do wish to make certain that if a big opportunity occurs we are prepared morally, mentally and administratively to use it to the fullest.”
And didn’t someone say that military operations never go according to plan? :-D
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@Private:
And didn’t someone say that military operations never go according to plan? :-D
My favourite formulation of that old military axiom is: “No battle plan ever survives the first moment of contact with the enemy.”
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Sounds like my A&A experience Marc! :-D
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Had the attack occurred after the Italians had attack and damaged the Royal Navy the attack may have had some reasonable chance. The Italian Navy needed to support the Army in supplies to have any chance.
With no Aircraft Carriers perhaps a midget submarines and frog men operations in Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandra to take out British capital ships.
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Narvik wrote:
On top of that, the average and casual Italian at this point had a very low morale, since they by now knew that Italy would loose, even if the Axis won the war.
That statement rings false. Germany did not have plans to enslave Italy after the war. In his writings, Hitler pointed out that if a nation wants allies, it must establish a reputation for treating its allies well. It was a logical conclusion for the leader of any nation, and I have seen no evidence to suggest Hitler had deviated from that logic.
I agree Italian morale was low. There were several reasons for that.
- Mussolini seized power through military means. His views were not necessarily representative of those of most Italians.
- Mussolini did not build a strong relationship with the Italian people after seizing office. He had no reason to rely on the Italian people to stick with him through thick and thin.
- Most Italians did not believe in Mussolini’s dream of a revived Roman Empire, and thought his foreign adventures were rather pointless.
- Italy was unprepared for war. It lacked a strong military culture and strong military traditions. Its army was not afforded the weapons which would have been necessary to destroy Britain’s Matilda tanks. Its military leadership was lacking. It’s hard to maintain high morale when it’s obvious that your opponent has a much better sense of what he’s doing than your own military has of what it’s doing.
Note that all four problems existed before Hitler came to power in Germany. It’s not as though Mussolini’s Italy had a great military tradition, which then collapsed once Hitler and Mussolini became allies. On the contrary: Italy’s military tradition and military preparedness were greatly lacking both before and after Hitler and Mussolini became allies.
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