The USSR as an Axis Partner?

[Imperious Leader]

The victorious armies that defeated France just sat down on the job. His only commitment was bailing out Italy in Greece and sending a Panzer corps to Africa.

He was waiting on UK to surrender and they never did. One reason is that their still remained the Soviets and Churchill knew eventually Hitler would fight them and the British would have a real formidable ally. Hitler figured to avoid a direct invasion of UK and remove this potential ally. Of course, there are other reasons too but it was a strong motivation. Hitler viewed his time was running against him and he had to act quickly for a decision because among other things, The Americans would enter the stage.

[KurtGodel7]

@rjpeters70:

How are those mutually exclusive points?  Just because something is ridiculous (that the USSR needed to be destroyed as a ploy to bring the UK to the negotiating table, when the UK had stood alone against Hitler for over a year) doesn’t mean that a madman would not have seen a benefit to doing exactly that.  The first point is analytical about a specific operational course of action, the second point is about understanding Hitler’s belief. So how are those two points mutually exclusive?

I do note that you haven’t answered my basic question:  What was Hitler’s grand strategic goal for initiating World War II?  Or do you believe he was just making it up as he went along, and had no grand strategic goal?

No, I’m not going to “not reply” to threads that you post in.  Sorry.

You wrote:  you “don’t believe that Hitler considered in late 1940 the prospects of how to defeat England by removing the only remaining and potential major player.”  Um, no.  I write that the primary, motivating factor for Hitler invading Russia was based upon his long term desire to secure Lebensraum in the Eurasian plains, specifically the Western portions of the Soviet Union.

It is flat out weird to me that you discount Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum in the Soviet Union (and it seems to escape you that Hitler and his top Generals making an operational argument in favor of such an invasion in no way invalidates or undermines the broader underlying desire for Hitler to secure these areas for German expansion and settlement).  I mean, you ask for sources.  That is easy to do.

Here’s the opening paragraph from the BBC page on Lebensraum:  “Between 1921 and 1925 Adolf Hitler developed the belief that Germany required Lebensraum (‘living space’) in order to survive. The conviction that this living space could be gained only in the east, and specifically from Russia, formed the core of this idea, and shaped his policy after his take-over of power in Germany in 1933.”  Read the whole thing:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/hitler_lebensraum_01.shtml

Or, here:  “All of Hitler’s actions in Western Europe thus far, including the subjugation of France and the now-failed attack on Britain, were simply a prelude to achieving his principal goal as Führer, the acquisition of Lebensraum (Living Space) in the East. He had moved against the French, British and others in the West only as a necessary measure to secure Germany’s western border, thereby freeing him to attack in the East with full force.” http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/defeat/attack-russia.htm

Or, this, from the Holocaust Research Project:  “Adolf Hitler had decided to attack the Soviet Union as early as July 1940, directly after the victory over the French, and Allied Forces, but for once he listened to the objections of his Generals and decided to delay the invasion, due to concerns over the weather and the need to build up the Wehrmacht  and Luftwaffe forces.
Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union under the title of Barbarossa, named after Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, one of the heroes of German history, who at the close of the 12th century marched with his knights against the infidel in the Holy Land, was designed to give the German people “Lebensraum” – Living Space.”  http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/nazioccupation/sovietunion.html

Or, this, from the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington:  “The destruction of the Soviet Union by military force, the permanent elimination of the perceived Communist threat to Germany, and the seizure of prime land within Soviet borders for long-term German settlement had been a core policy of the Nazi movement since the 1920s. Adolf Hitler had always regarded the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, signed on August 23, 1939, as a temporary tactical maneuver. In July 1940, just weeks after the German conquest of France and the Low Countries, Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union within the following year. On December 18, 1940, he signed Directive 21 (code-named Operation “Barbarossa”), the first operational order for the invasion of the Soviet Union.”  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005164

I could go on and on and on.  Did Hitler and his generals provide an operational justification for invading Russia?  Sure.  Was it “necessary” to bring the UK to the peace table?  No (and in fact, was demonstrably ridiculous to achieve in actuality, as things played out).  Was the invasion of the Soviet Union so as to secure living space in the East a core tenant of Nazi ideology and the personal mission of Hitler for decades and the entire reason for initiating World War II?  Yes.

Look, if you don’t understand these things, you simply don’t understand World War II or German strategic objectives.

You are correct to assert that gaining Lebensraum was a central part of Hitler’s long-term strategic vision. The British food blockade against Germany (imposed in September of '39) lent an added sense of urgency to the Lebensraum question. Unless Germany could break the food blockade or seize additional farmland, Western Europe would have been beset with famine conditions as early as 1941. “We need to grab that Lebensraum sooner or later anyway,” the logic went, “so why not take it now to solve our food problems?”

However, most territory in the western Soviet Union ran at a food deficit. The exception was the Ukraine; but even that region didn’t run at as large a food surplus in the early '40s as it had back in the '20s. Capturing the western parts of the Soviet Union would make Germany’s overall food deficit worse. But it would allow Germany to transfer starvation out of Western Europe and into Soviet territory.

Another factor creating a sense of urgency was the Red Army’s abysmal performance in its invasion of Finland. If–as Hitler believed–war between Germany and the U.S.S.R. was inevitable, why not begin the war before the Soviet Union was ready? The fact that the German Army achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio against communist forces in the summer and fall of '41 confirms that the Soviet Union was not yet ready for war.

Unfortunately–at least from the German perspective–the Soviet Union was far more ready for war in '42 than '41. But suppose Germany’s territorial gains in '42 had equaled those achieved in '41. Hitler could then have negotiated peace with the Soviets; knowing that this new, smaller Soviet Union would represent a greatly diminished existential threat to Germany. Hitler would also have multiplied Germany’s oil supply via the Caucasus oilfields, and would have greatly increased his access to food and raw materials. Millions of Soviet POWs, and potentially tens of millions of captured Soviet citizens, would work in German-controlled weapons factories; producing the aircraft needed to defend German cities from the Anglo-American bomber offensive. They would also produce large numbers of u-boats. These u-boats would sink food shipments to the U.K. As the British people became increasingly discontent with their food situation, they would force their leaders to negotiate an end to the war.

You are correct to say that war against the Soviet Union was part of Hitler’s ideology. But a successful invasion of the Soviet Union also represented a potentially viable exit strategy. Given British politicians’ unwillingness to negotiate with Germany, Hitler didn’t have very many other viable exit strategies available to him. An Operation Sea Lion was impractical due to Germany’s naval weakness, its lack of transport capacity; and the fact that Anglo-American aircraft production greatly exceeded Germany’s. A similar argument could be made about any plan to invade across the Mediterranean. The only other option I can see would have been to add Turkey to the Axis, either via invasion, arm-twisting, or proffered territorial rewards. From there, German armies could have spread to Persia, Iraq, Trans-Jordan; and eventually the Suez Canal. The Germans could quite possibly have taken India and Egypt under this plan.

However, all of that would have taken at least one, and possibly as many as three, years to achieve. By that time the Soviet Union would have solved the problems which plagued the Red Army back in 1940. Also, the German Army would have suffered significant losses taking all that British territory. Hitler would have strongly preferred to negotiate peace with the British without having to go through all that.

[CWO Marc]

@KurtGodel7:

I don’t want to get involved in the disagreement between you and IL. But you asked a very good question at the end of your post. What was Hitler’s strategic vision for WWII? […] It was fairly obvious to most people–including Hitler–that the Western democracies simply weren’t interested in stopping Soviet expansionism.

It could also be argued that it was obvious to most people – including Hitler – that the western democracies weren’t interested in stopping Japanese and Italian and German expansionism either, or at least weren’t prepared to go to war over the issue until they finally did so in September 1939.  By that date, Japan had taken control of Manchuria and Jehol without getting into a serious war, then had launched a full-blown campaign to conquer China; Italy had conquered Ethiopia; and Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland and annexed Austria, the Sudentenland and eventually the rest of Czechoslovakia – all of it without firing a shot.  During this time, the western democracies did nothing to punish these countries except impose half-heatred economic sanctions and pass resolutions of condemnation at the League of Nations.  France and Britain even collaborated with Germany and Italy by selling out the Czechs at Munich.  I don’t recall France or Britain or the USSR punishing Germany and Italy for their combat role in the Spanish Civil War, nor am I aware of their participating in it on the Loyalist side to any extent approaching the involvement of Germany (e.g. the Kondor Legion) and Italy on the Nationalist side – though as I recall, the USSR did involve itself more than France and the UK.  It should also be noted that even when Britain and France did finally go to war after the invasion of Poland, they spent the first seven months of the war doing virtually nothing on land or in the air (the war at sea was a different matter) except dropping propaganda leaflets on the enemy and hoping that somebody in Germany would have the good sense to remove Hitler from power (or terminate him altogether).  France launched precisely one offensive against Germany during the entire Second World War, the “Saar Offensive”, which simply captured a few miles of territory on the enemy side of what was a virtually undefended German western border.  And France didn’t even bother staying there for very long.

As for Hitler’s overall strategic vision for the the Second World War, I think the adjective which best characterizes it would be “fickle”.  It changed over the years, at times giving the impression (rightly or wrongly) that he was blown impulsively this way and that way according to his mood of the moment.  Trying to figure out what truly motivated Hitler on any given subject is never straightworward, given the ways in which he would improvise, change his mind, contradict himself, break promises, lie, make temporary pacts of convenience, focus on tactical trivialities while losing sight of the strategic picture, and so forth.  Some parts of the picture are clearer than others.  The way he treated France at Compiègnes makes it obvious that he wanted to humiliate and punish that country for its victory in WWI.  It’s also clear from his words and policies and actions that, in a general sense, he wanted to reverse the outcome of the First World War (he took Germany’s defeat in WWI quite personallly, regarding it as the low point of his own life as well as that of the Fatherland) and tear up the Versailles Treaty, against which he had railed himself hoarse in countless speeches.

Regarding the USSR, Hitler was a mass of contradictions.  He’d spent much of his time from 1919 to 1933 denouncing the Bolsheviks, yet he also spent that time setting up a radicalism of the right that was intended to beat the radicals of left on their own ground.  He rose to power with the help of fascist streetfighting thugs (the SA) who were the Nazi counterparts of the communist streetfighting thugs of the Red Front.  He saw Stalin as a mortal enemy, yet admired his ruthlessness as a dictator.  He was impressed by the size of the Red Army as seen in parade newsreels, but persuaded itself that it was a hollow giant after seeing how poorly it performed in Finland.  He had had his eye on conquering the USSR for a long time (“destiny itself points the way there”), yet he signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin in August 1939 for the cynical purposes of securing his eastern flank while he dealt with France and Britain – even throwing in, for good measure, a secret protocol that dismembered Poland and divided the spoils between himself and the Russians.  In the fall of 1940, his dualistic approach towards the USSR reached the absurd high point (or low point) of seriously considering and negotiating the entry of the Soviet Union into the Axis while simultaneously ordering his generals to plan its invasion.  His bottom line in all of this ultimately appears to have been: he was prepared to make deals with the USSR, but only as long as he felt they were advantageous to him.

[KurtGodel7]

@CWO:

It could also be argued that it was obvious to most people – including Hitler – that the western democracies weren’t interested in stopping Japanese and Italian and German expansionism either, or at least weren’t prepared to go to war over the issue until they finally did so in September 1939.  By that date, Japan had taken control of Manchuria and Jehol without getting into a serious war, then had launched a full-blown campaign to conquer China; Italy had conquered Ethiopia; and Germany had remilitarized the Rhineland and annexed Austria, the Sudentenland and eventually the rest of Czechoslovakia – all of it without firing a shot.  During this time, the western democracies did nothing to punish these countries except impose half-heatred economic sanctions and pass resolutions of condemnation at the League of Nations.  France and Britain even collaborated with Germany and Italy by selling out the Czechs at Munich.  I don’t recall France or Britain or the USSR punishing Germany and Italy for their combat role in the Spanish Civil War, nor am I aware of their participating in it on the Loyalist side to any extent approaching the involvement of Germany (e.g. the Kondor Legion) and Italy on the Nationalist side – though as I recall, the USSR did involve itself more than France and the UK.  It should also be noted that even when Britain and France did finally go to war after the invasion of Poland, they spent the first seven months of the war doing virtually nothing on land or in the air (the war at sea was a different matter) except dropping propaganda leaflets on the enemy and hoping that somebody in Germany would have the good sense to remove Hitler from power (or terminate him altogether).  France launched precisely one offensive against Germany during the entire Second World War, the “Saar Offensive”, which simply captured a few miles of territory on the enemy side of what was a virtually undefended German western border.  And France didn’t even bother staying there for very long.

As for Hitler’s overall strategic vision for the the Second World War, I think the adjective which best characterizes it would be “fickle”.  It changed over the years, at times giving the impression (rightly or wrongly) that he was blown impulsively this way and that way according to his mood of the moment.  Trying to figure out what truly motivated Hitler on any given subject is never straightworward, given the ways in which he would improvise, change his mind, contradict himself, break promises, lie, make temporary pacts of convenience, focus on tactical trivialities while losing sight of the strategic picture, and so forth.  Some parts of the picture are clearer than others.  The way he treated France at Compi�gnes makes it obvious that he wanted to humiliate and punish that country for its victory in WWI.  It’s also clear from his words and policies and actions that, in a general sense, he wanted to reverse the outcome of the First World War (he took Germany’s defeat in WWI quite personallly, regarding it as the low point of his own life as well as that of the Fatherland) and tear up the Versailles Treaty, against which he had railed himself hoarse in countless speeches.

Regarding the USSR, Hitler was a mass of contradictions.  He’d spent much of his time from 1919 to 1933 denouncing the Bolsheviks, yet he also spent that time setting up a radicalism of the right that was intended to beat the radicals of left on their own ground.  He rose to power with the help of fascist streetfighting thugs (the SA) who were the Nazi counterparts of the communist streetfighting thugs of the Red Front.  He saw Stalin as a mortal enemy, yet admired his ruthlessness as a dictator.  He was impressed by the size of the Red Army as seen in parade newsreels, but persuaded itself that it was a hollow giant after seeing how poorly it performed in Finland.  He had had his eye on conquering the USSR for a long time (“destiny itself points the way there”), yet he signed a non-aggression pact with Stalin in August 1939 for the cynical purposes of securing his eastern flank while he dealt with France and Britain – even throwing in, for good measure, a secret protocol that dismembered Poland and divided the spoils between himself and the Russians.  In the fall of 1940, his dualistic approach towards the USSR reached the absurd high point (or low point) of seriously considering and negotiating the entry of the Soviet Union into the Axis while simultaneously ordering his generals to plan its invasion.  His bottom line in all of this ultimately appears to have been: he was prepared to make deals with the USSR, but only as long as he felt they were advantageous to him.

It could also be argued that it was obvious to most people – including Hitler – that
the western democracies weren’t interested in stopping Japanese and Italian and German
expansionism either, or at least weren’t prepared to go to war over the issue until
they finally did so in September 1939.

Granted, but the two situations were not parallel. When the Soviet Union was attempting to conquer Poland (in 1919 - 1920), a pro-Soviet British government chose to sell weapons to the Soviets but not the Poles. In 1935, France and Czechoslovakia each signed defensive alliances with the Soviet Union. Daladier had served as French prime minister from 1938 - 1940. Back in 1935, he’d been selected as Minister of War by the Popular Front government. 40% of the Popular Front government consisted of members of Daladier’s own Radical Party; another 40% were members of the French Section of the Workers’ International; and the remaining 20% were members of the French Communist Party. One of the reasons Daladier was chosen was because he embraced the kind of “anti-fascist” foreign policy the Soviet Union wanted Western democracies to adopt.

Overall, the Soviet Union had proved much more effective at influencing the behavior and policies of Western democracies than had Nazi Germany.

During this time, the western democracies did nothing to punish these countries except
impose half-hearted economic sanctions and pass resolutions of condemnation at the League of Nations.

There were reasons for this. Daladier would have loved nothing more than to go to war against Germany on any pretext. But he wanted at least one strong ally. At least for a while, Chamberlain had pursued Britain’s traditional foreign policy of promoting balance on the European mainland. Given that Germany was weaker than its Franco-Soviet enemy, balance in this case meant allowing Germany to strengthen itself by building up its military and seizing pro-Soviet neighbors like Czechoslovakia. However, Chamberlain felt he’d been humiliated at Munich. Avenging that humiliation became more important to him than promoting European balance–a fact which explains the policy he adopted toward Poland in 1939.

He’d spent much of his time from 1919 to 1933 denouncing the Bolsheviks, yet he
also spent that time setting up a radicalism of the right that was intended to beat
the radicals of left on their own ground.

Hitler couldn’t help but notice that the radical Left was extremely effective at seizing power; which is why he often adopted the same intolerance the far Left had employed. However, he strongly differed with the Left about how that power should be used once seized.

It’s also clear from his words and policies and actions that, in a general sense, he wanted to reverse the outcome of the First World War.

Agreed. For centuries, France had pursued an anti-German foreign policy. Versailles gave France the opportunity to achieve what it wanted: a Germany crippled economically, militarily, and diplomatically. To achieve this last objective, the French placed large sections of German territory under the hostile occupation of its neighbors. West Prussia under Polish occupation, the Sudetenland under Czech occupation, and the Rhineland under hostile French occupation. In 1920, Germany refused to allow French weapons to be shipped over German territory to Poland, because Polish occupation of West Prussia had formed a bone of contention between Germany and Poland. This kind of enmity between Germany and its neighbors was exactly the outcome French politicians had wanted when they set up the territorial divisions in the first place. In 1919, Allied politicians, led by France, envisioned a weak, divided, vulnerable Germany, encircled by hostile neighbors. For Hitler, reversing this outcome made sense both on an emotional and intellectual level.

In the fall of 1940, his dualistic approach towards the USSR reached the absurd high point
(or low point) of seriously considering and negotiating the entry of the Soviet Union into
the Axis while simultaneously ordering his generals to plan its invasion.

Diplomatic cynicism was the rule rather than the exception in the late '30s and early ‘40s. The Soviet Union had signed defensive alliances with Czechoslovakia and France; yet did nothing to defend either nation from Germany. The Soviet plan involved fostering war between the Germans and the Western democracies. The intention was for Germany and the Western democracies to bleed each other white while the Soviets stayed neutral. This would greatly reduce both groups’ ability to resist subsequent Soviet invasion.

In 1939, the French promised Poland that if Germany invaded, the French would launch a general offensive within 15 days of mobilization. Polish politicians naively believed French politicians’ promises, and responded by adopting an anti-German foreign policy. The reality was that French leaders wanted a defensive war against Germany, not an offensive war. But they didn’t bother mentioning that to their Polish allies. British and French politicians had industriously circulated the lie that they had adopted a pro-Polish foreign policy. In fact, they had adopted a highly anti-Polish foreign policy; by deliberately and cynically putting Poland in a false position in order to bring about the desired war with Germany.

[Imperious Leader]

Here is your argument:

Quote
The analysis that the USSR needed to be destroyed so as to deny the UK an ally is ridiculous

Then you write a typical flip flop:

Quote
Honestly, I never excluded that Hitler saw a benefit in securing his Eastern Flank and knocking out a potential UK ally.

Here are replies from primary sources which prove that wrong… ( including a speech from Hitler)

From General Von Bock:

“There are said to be contacts between Russia and America; a Russia-England link is therefore also likely. To wait for the outcome of such a development is dangerous. But if the Russians were eliminated, England would have no hope left of defeating us on the continent, especially since an effective intervention by America would be complicated by Japan, which would keep our rear free.”

From General Halder:

“Britains hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japans power in the Far East.”

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/turningeast.aspx

Hitlers intuition told him that Britains only hope would be a falling out between him and Stalin and time was on both the British and the Soviet sides. They would become stronger and their combined power would be too much for Germany to overcome. The time was now to take from Britain her last hope, the Soviet Union. As late as one week before the invasion of the USSR the Fuehrer spoke at the Reich Chancellery to his top generals.

Present was General Field-Marshall von Bock who writes:

�  “The more he had thought about the decision to attack Russia during the months, the more determined he became. Russia posed a grave threat to Germanys back and we now have to have our back free; as soon as she is cast down, England will have no ally left to win over the continent, and Germany can only be beaten on the continent. England will see all this, and it is to be assumed that it will then abandon the hopeless struggle. The Fuehrer hopes that this will come to pass in the first months after the end of the eastern operation”

“On the contrary. England will be all the less ready for peace, for it will be able to pin its hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.”

A speech from Hitler:

“The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention.”

Just like i said all along. Thanks. One of the points of Hitler’s decision to attack USSR in 1941 was among other things to deny a potential major ally on the European continent. The reasoning is rightfully or not that following a collapse of the Soviets, the British Empire would come to terms since no other player could help her.

And i asked you before to not reply to my posts.

I understand you see now that facts destroyed your argument yet again. I never said there were not other considerations, but the fact is what i posted is factual and supported unlike what you posted.

[Imperious Leader]

This bring my first post is factual.

Remember he invaded USSR as a means to defeat UK, because UK would not agree to terms. Instead, he should have thought about defeating UK by carving out her Empire with the help of Stalin. He went against this solid approach because he didn’t want to destroy her Historical position of safeguarding the balance between nations. He felt that in postwar world to keep UK strong would help his efforts in the future and felt an accommodation of his conquests could be arranged. So Hitler reasoned to destroy the only potential ally UK could have as a means to forcing them to surrender.

Now stop arguing against facts. It makes you look silly.

[Imperious Leader]

You wrote:  you “don’t believe that Hitler considered in late 1940 the prospects of how to defeat England by removing the only remaining and potential major player.”  Um, no.  I write that the primary, motivating factor for Hitler invading Russia was based upon his long term desire to secure Lebensraum in the Eurasian plains, specifically the Western portions of the Soviet Union.

Hitler considered many factors i didn’t not make a list or every consideration. I only made a post of some of these factors.

Remember he invaded USSR as a means to defeat UK, because UK would not agree to terms. Instead, he should have thought about defeating UK by carving out her Empire with the help of Stalin. He went against this solid approach because he didn’t want to destroy her Historical position of safeguarding the balance between nations. He felt that in postwar world to keep UK strong would help his efforts in the future and felt an accommodation of his conquests could be arranged. So Hitler reasoned to destroy the only potential ally UK could have as a means to forcing them to surrender.

This is factual and does not include every conceivable factor. It does not make it less correct to not mention other considerations for a decision. In History we learn that the reasons have traveled many roads for what transpires. it is a very common fact that Hitler didn’t want to destroy England completely but felt she could be bought to surrender if the only major power left in Europe was destroyed. Hitler also saw the need for the Ukraine and Oil centers so he can carry on the War. Nobody once denied that. Stop with your BS.

You just like to argue for fun except the facts are not in your favor. Again. It’s been fun however.

It is flat out weird to me that you discount Hitler’s desire for Lebensraum in the Soviet Union (and it seems to escape you that Hitler and his top Generals making an operational argument in favor of such an invasion in no way invalidates or undermines the broader underlying desire for Hitler to secure these areas for German expansion and settlement).  I mean, you ask for sources.  That is easy to do.

Support this, where did i “discount Lebensraum” You are truly ridiculous. Stop reading my posts and LOOK for crap to find fault with, then get burned by supported facts after you ask for them. That is exactly what happened here.

[Imperious Leader]

Regarding the USSR, Hitler was a mass of contradictions.

Yes right. If he was somebody who only took passages out of a 20 year old book for every decision as the other chap writes, he would have never made an alliance with his enemy. Everything he did was based on the circumstances of what would prove advantages at the time. He would easily go against what was in Mein Kampf if the current situation dictated. There were a number of ideas for the national economy that were never undertaken…because they would not have worked. A true Socialist program advocated by some people who were latter murdered because it made the party look too different than what people could in the election.

[General Veers]

Japan fought with the allies, but did not have much of an income to work with since the UK still held indochina and the DEI. However it did have east access to begin landings in Siberia or help fortify china. Looking back it is a bizarre setup since it assumes a truce between Japan and china. If this were recreated with global 1940, you could still have Japan be an ally but have china join the axis, especially since Germany was developing ties with the nationalist government and helped train troops. They could argue the US had betrayed them and promise direct support against Japan.

[ossel]

@Yavid:

about 15 years ago I played a game of World at War and seeing as in that game there was nothing stopping me (russia) from doing it. I decided to let the Axis bribe me into joining the Axis. Oh that was a fun game. Next game we played the Allies were sure to make sure I had there backs

I had a game of Revised when I was in college where the Russian player was that guy in every group of friends that nobody likes…Anyway, the other Allied players were not exactly coming to the aid of Mother Russia, and he was getting annoyed (Stalin-style).

Me, being the German player, made a proposition that he join the Axis since the Allies were being so rude to him. We quickly hashed out the territorial ownerships, and proceeded to completely thrash the US and UK. Totally not allowed under the rules, but it made for one of the more memorable games I’ve ever played.

[CWO Marc]

@ossel:

We quickly hashed out the territorial ownerships, and proceeded to completely thrash the US and UK.

Carving up the world like that is great fun.  To quote one of Frank Capra’s “Why We Fight” wartime information films: “There you have it gents – all they left us was Shangri-la.  And they’d claim that too if they knew where it was.”

[Imperious Leader]

Look IL–your belief that individual leaders’ intentions can be “proven” as “fact” (through speeches no less!) just shows that you fundamentally don’t understand historical analysis.

The intentions listed in my posts are factual and are not exclusive of every consideration. But to flip flop on a basic understanding of some of the influences behind basic decisions which are common and known by anybody with cursory knowledge of these events really shows on you. I provided tons of primary sources and you have provided nothing to disprove what i posted. You asked for sources and when confronted with the very words from these men, you harp on credentials, Hitler was a liar, only you know the truth. What BS.  For somebody to quote Mein Kampf for facts, then totally discount the same man’s words in one of his most important speeches is really something. A book he writes 20 years earlier which could not possibly have accounted for the events of late 1940 is a huge stretch. Hitler had many reasons for doing Barbarossa and one of them was to diminish the British resolve to carry the war if the only remaining major power was defeated. And yes he had other reasons but that was not what my post was about. What you have is a very shallow knowledge of anything before 1950 and find yourself trying to bite off more than you can chew. Then you get caught with facts and quickly argue about other things and try to make new arguments for me to avoid the painful indignation of failure. I think you must have failed in Forensic debate and use the internet to create arguments out of thin air. Try another-

No historian says “I can PROVE that Caesar’s intentions were this, just look at this letter he wrote.”  Historians provide hypotheses and the offer reasons, primary sources, etc., that support or deny those hypotheses, but to say that one can “prove” as “fact” an historical personage’s intentions is ridiculous.

You know little about History, not even the theroys of how to assess History. What i stated has been written by many sources. Nothing you provide discounts that.

If it were possible to prove something as fact as nebulous as a person’s intentions, then why do we still debate the worthiness of any historical figure, such as Wilson (did he or did he not want to be an American dictator?), Germanicus (had he been Imperator, would he have attempted to restore the Roman Republic, as Graves intimates?), or Lenin (was his marketization reforms before he died real, or were they simply a short term tactical ploy?)?

Some ideas, theories and hypotheses gain traction and possibly acceptance as years go by, but you’ve now said several times that speech X or speech Y “prove” that an argument is “fact” or even settled (as though generals or politicians never have secondary intentions that may undercut what they are trying to say for general consumption).

More Blah Blah Blah. Let me put you on point:

Here is your argument:

Quote
The analysis that the USSR needed to be destroyed so as to deny the UK an ally is ridiculous

Then you write a typical flip flop:

Quote
Honestly, I never excluded that Hitler saw a benefit in securing his Eastern Flank and knocking out a potential UK ally.

Here are replies from primary sources which prove that wrong… ( including a speech from Hitler)

From General Von Bock:

“There are said to be contacts between Russia and America; a Russia-England link is therefore also likely. To wait for the outcome of such a development is dangerous. But if the Russians were eliminated, England would have no hope left of defeating us on the continent, especially since an effective intervention by America would be complicated by Japan, which would keep our rear free.”

From General Halder:

“Britains hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture, America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japans power in the Far East.”

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/articles/turningeast.aspx

Hitlers intuition told him that Britains only hope would be a falling out between him and Stalin and time was on both the British and the Soviet sides. They would become stronger and their combined power would be too much for Germany to overcome. The time was now to take from Britain her last hope, the Soviet Union. As late as one week before the invasion of the USSR the Fuehrer spoke at the Reich Chancellery to his top generals.

Present was General Field-Marshall von Bock who writes:

�  “The more he had thought about the decision to attack Russia during the months, the more determined he became. Russia posed a grave threat to Germanys back and we now have to have our back free; as soon as she is cast down, England will have no ally left to win over the continent, and Germany can only be beaten on the continent. England will see all this, and it is to be assumed that it will then abandon the hopeless struggle. The Fuehrer hopes that this will come to pass in the first months after the end of the eastern operation”

“On the contrary. England will be all the less ready for peace, for it will be able to pin its hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.”

A speech from Hitler:

“The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention.”

Just like i said all along. Thanks. One of the points of Hitler’s decision to attack USSR in 1941 was among other things to deny a potential major ally on the European continent. The reasoning is rightfully or not that following a collapse of the Soviets, the British Empire would come to terms since no other player could help her.

This, again, is another reason why I don’t believe you truly understand the craft of history and that you lie about your educational background.  I just expect more from someone who went to Stanford.

And as far as the name calling and saying that I follow you around and look for “crap” with which to find fault:  Look, you’re the only one (so far as I can tell) who has a problem with me on these boards (to the point where you repeatedly suggested that I beat my infant child and preschooler, which as I’m sure you remember is one of the reasons that you were stripped of your status as board liaison).  The same cannot be said of you (I can’t tell you how many emails I’ve gotten from people offering support to me and voicing their frustration with how you present yourself.  Most recently, as a “twat”).

Let me call the Whambulance… If you don’t address the facts and swing for the clouds with empty knowledge, you fail. They are diversions that entertain me and others here. I don’t bring up anything here except proving my post is accurate. It is you that keeps bringing up nothing related and showing how you can’t stick to any fact pattern and make arguments about History by bringing up spankings,PM’s, Moderator…anything but a real argument. I’m sorry you have a tough life, just don’t take it out on these boards. They are for sane people.

When i hear this i know you lost the debate a long time ago. :-o  Just stick to Modern Warfare/ Geopolitical Science of current times.

[Yavid]

@rjpeters70:

@ossel:

@Yavid:

about 15 years ago I played a game of World at War and seeing as in that game there was nothing stopping me (russia) from doing it. I decided to let the Axis bribe me into joining the Axis. Oh that was a fun game. Next game we played the Allies were sure to make sure I had there backs

I had a game of Revised when I was in college where the Russian player was that guy in every group of friends that nobody likes…Anyway, the other Allied players were not exactly coming to the aid of Mother Russia, and he was getting annoyed (Stalin-style).

Me, being the German player, made a proposition that he join the Axis since the Allies were being so rude to him. We quickly hashed out the territorial ownerships, and proceeded to completely thrash the US and UK. Totally not allowed under the rules, but it made for one of the more memorable games I’ve ever played.

Those can be fun games.

Those I think are the funnest games because the Allies have no idea how to handle it. The Axis have no idea how to take advantage of it. The game plays out so completely different.

[Imperious Leader]

If you stick to spankings and Stanford and avoid anything remotely posted in terms of an argument, it makes what your saying look like a weak syntax of problems. Try to do better next time.