Hello,
I LOVE the new 1940 games, and of course Global is the greatest game ever made… BUT…
I find that the USSR and Japan go to war way to often and most of the time on the FIRST turn! This game more than any other AAA game was designed to have a Historical flavor… to give players the same problems and challenges that the powers of the time faced, and allow them to make the choices. I think the default rules for the Russo-Japanese Non-aggression Pact are rather weak and there is no incentive to these two powers not going to war early.
Is there a fix? I started this thread so we could all work on some ideas to make this work better. I would like to give the two powers more reason to think hard on starting a conflict in the East.
Let me know what you think…
My old rule was:
Japan cannot attack USSR until an Allied capital has fallen
USSR cannot attack Japan until an Axis capital (or perhaps specifically Berlin) has fallen
But bear in mind this was intended for use in a summer 1942 scenario, when the NAP was in force, unlike 1940.
I dislike artificial penalties, such as the invaded power magically generating free infantry.
For 1940, I think that USSR would never deliberately go to war with both the European Axis and Japan. Similarly, Japan would never attack the Western Powers or the USSR while at war with the other.
Implementing this is more difficult, however.
I had considered the rule that:
Neither Russia nor Japan can start a war with one enemy (counting G/I and UK/F/USA each as one enemy) while at war with the other. The intention was to recreate the historical “double-bind” where both R & J were at war elsewhere and therefore neither could start a war between them until the active opponent was defeated. The flaw is that the Allies can decide to send a single Russian infantry over the Manchurian border and thereby guarantee that Japan CANNOT attack UK/USA until Moscow has fallen…
Flashman….your rule is good, you are just being too strict.
Consider this.
If Japan or Russia declares war on the other, the declaring power then may not declare war on any other power untill its 6th turn.
The doubble blind holds. Because to break the pact would mean Germany need not fear Russian intervention untill turn 6 instead of the normal turn 4. Likewise if Japan declares war on Russia, the US/UK need not fear Japanese attacks untill the 6th turn.
However flashman…these issues are merely temporal, and not strategic (though i I know strategy is an abstraction in a game of A&A’s scale)
The carrot and stick approach that NOs have put into the game realy incentivizes players…it could be used to deincentivize braking the pact.
Either
a) while you are breaking the pact you collect no NO bonuses (Because breaking the pact went against the realistic National Objectives of both Japan and the USSR, no bonus production would accumulate because of both the contradiction in policy, and the extra funding required to fight a war that was avoided by both powers)
b) a -5 NO if a power breaks the terms of the Non-Agression Pact, which are as follows
Japan agrees to not attack or occupy original Soviet Territory
The USSR agrees to not attack or occupy original Japanese Territory, or occupy Chinese Territory
The -5 NO is enforced untill the terms of the pact are restored.
What about adding that each power can not collect income from each others territories? They can hold the territory and the IPC value is deducted BUT they do not collect it?
This can reflect the cost of fighting in these theaters for each power ie: Long logistics for Russia, Winter weather for Japan.
Would this make it less appealing to either side to start the war?
Stalin was quite happy to attack Japan once Germany had been crushed. I still think the key is that neither power can choose to be at war with 2 major enemies at the same time.
The example of the single Russian infantry given above does of course block the USSR from attacking G/I, but this is a small disincentive given the huge advantage of stopping Japan attacking the Western Allies.
Perhaps, instead, each may only ever declare war on one main enemy. So in this example Japan’s options would be unaffected, and the Soviets would be losing the initiative against Germany. So the double-bind would only come into effect if Japan attacked the WA AND Russia attacked G/I.
I think an infatry congo line could have helped stabalize that theatre alot more for the USSR.
Much like in 50th, etc. an INF in each territory on the way to the Far East, so that the USSR can shuffle a guy all the way over each turn….instead of the dead men walking over there now.
Japan can just hit the Russians there hard, confident that no other USSR INF are within 6 turns of Amur.
A congo line could have always meant a speed bump would be over there
Looking at the board set-up in my bunker yesterday I just thought of this:
What if Japan and USSR did not collect any IPCs for territories they captured?
I am very sad that this has not been resolved. I know it is just a game but I am a History nut. There must be a fix!!
Looking at the board set-up in my bunker yesterday I just thought of this:
What if Japan and USSR did not collect any IPCs for territories they captured?
I am very sad that this has not been resolved. I know it is just a game but I am a History nut. There must be a fix!!
That helps the allies more. Japan usually makes 50-70 midgame, now it’ll make 26. Russia usually doesn’t capture much territory anyway
Soviets can’t attack unless Berlin falls
Japan can’t attack unless India falls and X number of VC are under its control.
Historical.
also, the Soviets must maintain a garrison of X forces till turn 3, if they move any part of it sooner than turn 3 the Japanese player can attack early if they roll a die:
Turn 1 on 4-6 Japan may invade
Turn 2 on 5-6 japan may invade
Turn 3 on 6 Japan may invade
After turn 4 and latter– can’t invade unless Berlin falls.
The idea is a bluff action of the Soviet player ‘gambling’ that his withdraw of these needed forces to save Moscow might be a good move or depending on the aggressive Japanese player a major mistake, just is it was presented top Stalin in Late 1941 when his trusted advisers and spies told him not to worry and Japan had other intentions. The decision will rest on how much the Japanese player sorts out his plans because such an attack must be prepared.
Lastly, sub out the Soviet garrison of 18 Infantry.It has no relevance to Zhukov’s actual forces. They may now just buy 54 IPC worth of forces and place them in the off map “soviet far east box”… these units are kept hidden from all players. When the time comes as the Soviet players choosing and can consist of only air and land, they may just bring them to the map to any of those border regions.
So the 54 ipcs of units can’t be used to defend the far east
So yes they can, if the japanese perform specific goals or if the Soviets play the gamble and withdraw to defend Moscow and Japan rolls the dice and gets the roll.
The Soviet player always has the option to leave them till turn 4, which does not require or allow japan to attack, or gamble that they are prepared to do that and in that case the 54 IPC force immediately appears to defend.
Once Russia moves it, all players will see what it was. You might even buy all bombers and bring them six spaces and ready for the battles against Germany.
@Imperious:
Soviets can’t attack unless Berlin falls
Japan can’t attack unless India falls
I like this one!
If we consider my proposed Four-Power version (for 1940) then it becomes much more instinctive. Since the two are no longer railroaded into joining opposing alliances, they may simply decide not to get involved with each other, since Japan has little to gain by invading Siberia, and the USSR may be too wary of the German threat to take the risk of a two-front war with Japan so distant from Russian production facilities.
Of course they may both decide to join the Axis in a Grand coalition against the Capitalists.
If we further specify that a power may not leave an alliance once it has joined it (which it does on being at War with a common enemy power) then why throw away political freedom of action when there is relatively little material to gain for either side?
In Global, it’s the unhistorical assumption that the Soviets will join the Allies, and that Japan will attack the West, that creates the political anomaly.
Two players should be free to negotiate a verbal agreement similar to the Ribentropp-Molotov Pact specifying spheres of influence, but of course this can never be binding.
If two powers do have a common enemy they must fight to the destruction of that enemy before their alliance can be broken. For example if the USA and USSR are closing in on Germany the American player may demand that the Soviets attack Japan before Berlin falls in order to forestall a possible Cold War conflict, at least until Japan is finished.
Minefields:
When a nation declares war along the “Entrenched” Russian/Japanese border, during the combat move phase any land unit entering enemy territories by land or sea are subject to a minefield roll of a 2 or less.( think “aaGun” ). In addition, no power may declare war along this border unless they conduct a “major offensive” combat move involving 4 or more land units. In addition, opposing units defend at a 4 or less during the first round of combat. All minefields are cleared during the collect income phase of the aggressive power.
Its an abstract house rule designed to discourage an early DOW. I have no idea or consideration for historical accuracy here.
This gives Russia the advantage of stacking along the border to prevent a Japanese incursion, and by not declaring war, they effectively place a wall of 18 “4’s” protected by a “radar aagun” that hits land units. Without enough land unit fodder, Japan would lose many air units breaching this barrier.
It does less to stop Russia from making the DOW other then the opportunity cost of defending with a massed force. It would at least force them to commit 4 or more land units to attack Korea.
League of Nations:
Political costs for a DOW along the Russian/Japanese border result in world outrage against the aggressor nation.
If Russia conducts a DOW against Japan, the U.S. will remain neutral 1 additional turn and will not interfere with Japanese aggression against UK and ANZAC in the Pacific since they are the “victim” nation. Fear of Communism fuels American pacifism and ties Roosevelt’s hands. The Japanese Ambassador exposes a (faked) “Caucasian” treaty between Russia, UK, and ANZAC dealing with the suppression and division of Japanese assets/territories.
If Japan conducts a DOW against Russia, the U.S. will remain neutral 1 less turn and they become a “friendly” power with the pacific allies, permitting the landing of US units on allied territories and providing sea units for a common defense until a formal DOW occurs between the US and Japan. These land and sea units upon meeting with allied forces/fleets change flags (I.E. swap US vessels/units with UK,China,USSR or ANZAC pieces) to maintain “neutrality”.
