Narvik wrote:
Now you claim that Poland started WW II ?
Poland was an expansionistic military dictatorship. Prior to the outbreak of WWII, it had already engaged in several territorial annexations. (Including helping itself to a slice of Czechoslovakia in 1938.) Polish leaders wanted to help themselves to some German territory as well: notably East Prussia and part of Silesia. Their desire to do that was an important contributing factor in the start of the war.
But I do not feel that Poland’s raw desire for expansionism was the primary factor in the outbreak of hostilities. The primary factor was the pro-Soviet foreign policies consistently embraced by every major democracy prior to 1948. During the 1930s, it was widely believed that there would be war between Germany on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and the Western democracies on the other. Western democratic leaders–especially Daladier and FDR–were very eager to see exactly this kind of war.
Daladier wanted war between France and Germany. However, he did not want to go it alone. He wanted at least one major ally: Britain, or the United States, or the Soviet Union. He wasn’t all that picky which. FDR wanted to go to war against Germany as well. But at least initially, he was unable to persuade Congress or the American people that war was necessary. Making the case for war was difficult, given that the American people realized we’d gone into WWI based on a pack of Allied lies. For example, Germany was not guilty of killing millions of Belgians during WWI, despite Allied claims to the contrary.
If during the '30s Western democratic leaders were willing to carve up Germany with the Soviet Union, why didn’t Stalin want to go along with those plans? The answer is that Stalin wanted to conquer both Germany and the Western European democracies. A war in which everyone ganged up on Germany would (from Stalin’s perspective) have been too easy for the Western democracies, and would have left them in too strong a position. Therefore Stalin declined Western democratic invitations to carve up Germany, while using communist influence to promote “anti-fascism” and warmongering in Western democracies.
After the fall of France, Stalin’s plan was to invade Germany. By destroying the German Army only, Stalin would have taken control not just of Germany itself, but of France as well. He would have sold the Soviet invasion of France as a “liberation” from hostile German occupation. However, Germany invaded the Soviet Union at least a month before Stalin’s preparations to invade Germany were complete. The German attack took Stalin completely by surprise. Germany achieved a 10:1 exchange ratio during Operation Barbarossa. (As opposed to the 3:1 exchange ratio it normally achieved against Soviet forces.)
Even though Stalin declined to participate in a preemptive Allied effort to carve up Germany, Soviet and Western democratic influence in Eastern Europe was such that, during the ‘30s, most Eastern European nations had adopted anti-German foreign policies. Both Poland and other Eastern European nations wanted to be on what they felt would be the winning side in the impending conflict between Germany, the Soviet Union, and the Soviets’ allies.
The stated long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest. Prior to 1948, the major Western democracies were useless in preventing Soviet expansion. In 1919 - '21, for example, no major Western democracy came to Poland’s aid when the Soviets went to war to annex it. Only the efforts of the Polish military (and the fact the Soviet Union was still in a state of civil war against the czarists) prevented Poland from becoming the newest Soviet socialist republic. The Soviets had achieved far greater penetration of Western democratic political processes (and influence over Western democracies) during the '30s and early '40s than had been the case during the Polish-Soviet War. The Western democracies were less likely to intervene against Soviet expansion during the '30s or early '40s than they’d been back in 1920, when they did nothing at all to prevent the U.S.S.R. from annexing Poland.
All of which reinforced Hitler’s conviction that peace and security for Germany could only be achieved by conquering the Soviet Union itself. Such a conquest would be difficult, given the fact that Stalin and the Western democracies had successfully persuaded most Eastern European nations to adopt anti-German foreign policies. Hitler used a carrot and stick policy to convert those Eastern European nations into German allies. Czechoslovakia had signed a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in 1935. It was therefore annexed in 1938–a none-too-subtle message to any other Eastern European nation which might think of allying with Stalin against Hitler. Poland abruptly adopted an anti-German foreign policy in 1939 (mostly in response to false French promises about a general offensive against Germany).
In 1941, Italy invaded Greece. The Greeks fought off the Italian invasion. But they were careful not to provoke Germany. They didn’t attempt to conquer much Italian land, and they did not invite Britain to reinforce Greek positions. Germany therefore remained neutral in that conflict. However, the Greek government which demonstrated this restraint was voted out of office by a different, more aggressive Greek government. The replacement Greek government invited the British in; and took a more aggressive approach about conquering Italian territory. Germany therefore invaded Greece (and destroyed the pro-Soviet government which had arisen in Yugoslavia) as the final touches on its pre-Barbarossa efforts. With the fall of Greece and Yugoslavia, all of the nations between Germany and the Soviet Union were either allied with Germany or neutral in Germany’s favor. By that point, it was recognized that any Eastern European nation which engaged in bad (i.e., pro-Soviet) behavior would be very quickly punished by Germany. Ridding Eastern Europe of Soviet influence was an obvious prelude to the invasion of the Soviet Union itself.