Nov24th 1863: Confederate hopes dashed in Tennessee.

Today, the 24th November, in 1863 the Chatanooga campaign was drawing to a close. It was to prove a reversal of Confederate hopes as the newly appointed Western Commander, U.S Grant won a victory from nothing.
On the 19th and 20th September the Confederates had won a bloody(second to Gettysburg in casualty losses) victory in NW Georgia. General William Rosecrans’ Union Army of the Cumberland was routed and only saved by General George Thomas’ rallying them. Since that date the Union army had been besieged in nearby Chatanooga, TN.
This respite was well used by the Union forces as reinforcements were drawn in from East and West: 20000 from Vicksburg and 15000 from the Army of the Potomac. The siege was soon lifted and the Chickamauga  victors now found themselves outnumbered, despite holding strong high ground overlooking Chatanooga. Bragg, the Southern commander of the Army of Tennessee compounded matters by sacking 3 generals and sending, probably his best asset, General James Longstreet and his two NVA Divisions on a fruitless Knoxville adventure.
On the 24th the Confederates’ left flank was pushed back at a small battle: Lookout Mountain,  later known as the Battle above the Clouds. Won by General Hooker(former commander of The Army of the Potomac and loser to General Lee at Chancellorsville in May) it enabled  his victorious Divisions to partake in  further attacks from a strong position and undid a major part of the Southern defences.
Tomorrow Grant would launch a major attack against Bragg and the Western theatre would be changed forever as 1863 changed to 1864.

Afraid so. I am not a fan. When he was replaced it was too late.
Missionary Ridge led to Atlanta then, as we know, the sea at Savannah and the great, aggressive attacking Army of Tennessee soon wasted and battered beyond recognition.

As usual my interest has been piqued by studying for this post and I think I will read: The Shipwreck of their Hopes, by Peter Cozzens. Came as a trilogy and I never read this third book.
I am deep into Tunisia in 43 at the moment, so can’t do both subjects.
Blame El Alamein’s anniversary and the Torch landings for that!

The 25th November was the day Grant planned for Sherman’s 4 Divisions, 24000 men, to get on Bragg’s right flank after breaking through Tunnel Hill. It should have happened too, but Sherman dallied and when he attacked he only used a small portion of his available force. The Condederate right flank was held by the army’s best general, Patrick R. Cleburne and his men, with help from rushed reinforcements,  easily repulsed Sherman.
To aid Sherman, Grant,  commanding the Union armies, ordered General Thomas in the centre to seize the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge. Due to confusion over where to stop some attacking units kept on going. For some it was better to advance than stay where they were as Confederate artillery and small arms fire was so heavy. Equally, some confederate units were unaware of which were expected to pull out and so others retreated too.
An impregnable position was taken frontally,  despite both opposing commanders thinking it impossible.
The retreat of the Confederate forces was covered by none other than the indomitable Cleburne. Bragg, the  unloved Confederate commander was rightly and finally removed from command.
Unfortunately, the men would not get the commander they deserved and instead this fine Western army was wasted away fighting miles behind the front lines late in 1864, while Sherman won the war in the West.

Firstly, by following up a victory. Missionary Ridge came about because Bragg did not hound the Army of the Cumberland after the hard won battle of Chickamauga. (This was a common error on both sides.) When the North realised Chatanooga’s importance,they reinforced it from East and West, whilst Bragg sent away two Divisions. Holding in those Tennessee  mountains over Winter would surely have meant Atlanta would not have been lost and we know the fall of Atlanta was a major plus for the reelection of Lincoln.
Peryville, the first real encounter since Shiloh, saw Bragg attack an army more than twice his size, at first winning convincingly, but without the numbers to exploit his early gains. If the Confederates had not split their forces on entering Kentucky,  we could have seen the destruction of the major Union force.  The mistake was not realising Buell’s army was the real target, not the Capital of Kentucky.
Maybe we could as far back as Shiloh for more reasons, but for the moment I am out of space!

JoJo. I am a cautious and careful player, so I would not like to criticise him for caring. He took the back seat at Manassas when he should have pulled rank on Old Bory. That could be excused, but that early war decision set him up to further abuse of rank later on and disrespect, especially by Davis. I am not too sure of the Fair Oaks battle and forget his next posting after his wounding. Was it Jackson, MS? Unfortunately, there he again did not take proper command and control of a worsening situation. Pemberton was his subordinate a d he should have ordered him out of Vicksburg to attack Grant in rear at Champion’s Hill. Indecision. Not a good commander’s trait.
Yet when the war was as good as lost, his engineering skills were best shown in the defensive lines he made. He just needed to spring some bait and seriously damage Sherman’s army, as Lee could well do. If he had not been facing a master tactician who heavilyoutnumbered him, his lot might have been better.
I also think his attending Sherman’s funeral hatless at 80 something shows he was the honourable gentleman only the South could produce.

Worsham, you are a tease with these questions, pricking my vanity.
If I had been Davis I would have appointed myself!
You know he had hoped to be nominated General of all Mississippi troops?
It is a bugger when your friends and peers vote you President!
The Confederacy’s problem was politics and it fed on the aristocrat roots of its existence. It was not a meritocracy and it suffered for it.
Two names: Cleburne and Forrest. Not inherited  money and not West Point. Two men who had the respect of their subordinates and in Cleburne’s case, his corps commmander’s too. These Westerners(and remember the North’s war winners were from Ohio), learnt war the hard way and could make the difference. The Southern  long established heirachy  barred such men from prominent positions to its detriment.
AS Johnston. I run out of room to type…

I told Cromwell I wanted to delve deep and discover my opinion on AS Johnston.
He remains an enigma and will for a while as I have so much to read on othet subjects before I can research him in detail. I will.
Like JoJo you have to go on his first assignment. He messed up. Shiloh was a late reaction to the loss of the two forts. He was the Western commander and because of his Southern upbringing and therefore, forelock pulling, respect of men of power(wealth) refused to sack incompetent men. The forts were held by political appointees, unworthy of the men they commanded. Despite lacking modern firearms, the Donelson garrison broke Grant’s siege and made an escape route. They were ordered back to the fort by an idiotic ommander.
Johnston has to be held accountable for his subordinates’ bad decisions: he allowed them to remain in important posts. Donelson was the start of the rot.
Shiloh and its planning, by Johnston, cannot make up for this shortfall.

Hi Barney. Concentration and going after the enemy’s main theatre army eventually won it for the North, you are right.

I think Wood asked for the order to move to be repeated twice. I am no sure he could have done more. Was one of the most fortuitous moments in the South’s war. They certainly had their fair share of unlucky ones.
You might be right about Lee. Not that he would have gone West.
I have read a lot about Shiloh and it is a mess of a battle, like most ones fought in wooded horrible terrain, where cohesion and orders easily go astray and where it is often easier to send units  headlong at the enemy(especially green ones)rather than try and manoeuvre for the flank.

The worst part of the plan was to have each Corps behind each other rather than side by side.
None of the 6 higher commanders really had a clue that day. It was one Regiment attacking one at a time, getting exhausted, then replaced by another.
Those who realised what was happening, were not heeded(Forrest in particular).
On the Union side, Lew Wallace couldn’t even find the battle!
It was not the sort of battle to show off the South’s attacking prowess, but was to prove a training ground for many.

Thank you. I am jealous of you Americans for the well kept recent Battlefields you have (and in which I am so interested). You must be so happy your children have an interest too.
I have seen English ones, but being much older they are not so  well marked or preserved. As for the European WW2 ones, seems an age since I last went now!