Narvik wrote,
Bottom line is that Germany started two world wars, for no rational reason other than just for fun.
You seem like a good guy. I assume you’re telling the truth to the best of your ability. However, the above represents Allied propaganda; and is not connected to reality. I say that as someone who myself passionately repeated Allied lies–at least until I learned better.
WWI began as a conflict between Austria and Serbia. A member of Austrian nobility had been assassinated. Serbia was subjected to Austrian anger over that assassination, due in large part to its past track record of harboring anti-Austrian terrorists. Serbia refused some of the demands Austria made upon it. Russia supported Serbia’s position, with France quietly and behind the scenes egging Russia on. Note that all this happened before Germany took a position on these matters.
der Kaizer started a world war because he wanted to rule and suppress the whole world
The above statement is Allied propaganda, with no basis in reality. This particular Allied claim does not merit acknowledgement, let alone a detailed rebuttal. I once believed such things myself. It was only after doing a lot of research that I realized how many Allied lies I’d swallowed; or how little actual interest the Allied leaders had in any sort of morality. (Despite their frequent, loud protestations to the contrary.)
No German was starving in 1939 neither, yet der Fuhrer (new name same wrapping) started a
world war for the second time, just because he wanted to rule and suppress the whole world.
During the Weimar Republic, most Germans experienced what one historian referred to as “prolonged and insatiable hunger” due to the brutal economic conditions imposed on Germany by the Versailles Treaty. It was only by breaking free of that sadistic treaty that Hitler was able to spare the German people from additional hunger.
He even wrote a book about it so there would be no doubt.
I’ve read that book–twice–and found nothing in it to justify either the Allied big lie that Hitler wanted to rule the world, or the Allied big lie that Hitler had formulated plans to kill the Jews even before he took office. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote about his desire to conquer the Soviet Union–or at least the portion of the Soviet Union west of the Urals. That conquest would protect Germany and Europe from the evil of communism, and would give Germany the same position of strength with respect to Europe that the United States had relative to North America. As Hitler pointed out, no one had ever succeeded in imposing a Versailles Treaty on the United States. He wanted to make sure no one could ever again do so with respect to Germany.
One of Hitler’s reasons for going to war was described in John Toland’s book Adolf Hitler. Toland’s book was favorably reviewed by the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Newsweek, Library Journal, and a number of other major media publications.
[A.I.] Berndt [a German government official] thought the reported number of German nationals killed by Poles too small and simply added a nought. At first Hitler refused to believe such a figure but, when Berndt replied that it may have been somewhat exaggerated but something monstrous must have happened to give rise to such stories, Hitler shouted ‘They’ll pay for this! Now no one will stop me from teaching these fellows a lesson they’ll never forget! I will not have my Germans butchered like cattle!’ At this point the Fuhrer went to the phone and, in Berndt’s presence, ordered Keitel to issue ‘Directive No. 1 for the Conduct of the War.’ [pp. 566 - 567].
Also from Toland’s book:
Lipski never asked to see Hitler’s sixteen-point proposal . . . He was following his orders ‘not to enter into any concrete negotiations.’ The Poles were apparently so confident they could whip the Germans (with help from their allies) that they were not interested in discussing Hitler’s offer. [p. 567]
In 1939, France had promised Poland that, if Germany attacked, France would launch a major offensive within 15 days of mobilization. That claim was an outright lie.
In his post-war diaries general Edmund Ironside, the chief of Imperial General Staff commented on French promises “The French had lied to the Poles in saying they are going to attack. There is no idea of it”.[24] The French initiated full mobilization and began the limited Saar Offensive on 7 September but halted short of the German defensive lines and then withdrew to their own defences around 13 September. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed by dispatch marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions were in contact with the enemy, and that French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The Polish military envoy to France, general Stanisław Burhardt-Bukacki, upon receiving the text of the message sent by Gamelin, alerted marshal Śmigły: “I received the message by general Gamelin. Please don’t believe a single word in the dispatch”.[23] The following day, the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland, General Louis Faury, informed the Polish Chief of Staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz, that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line.
Back when the Polish were ignoring German peace proposals and killing Germans–albeit only one tenth as many Germans as Berndt had reported to Hitler–they’d expected France to honor its promise to launch a general offensive against Germany within 15 days of mobilization. Combined, France and Poland had at least as many infantry, tanks, and artillery as Germany. A general French offensive would have forced Germany to allocate the bulk of its military assets to its Western front; thereby turning a short war into a long war. In a long war, the Western democracies’ industrial advantages over Germany would have made Allied victory nearly inevitable; and Poland would have been on the victors’ side of the peace table.
Polish leaders wanted to expand westward.
[In 1941], an office of the Polish Government in Exile wrote to warn Władysław Sikorski that if the [Atlantic] Charter was implemented with regards to national self-determination, it would make the desired Polish annexation of Danzig, East Prussia and parts of German Silesia impossible, which led the Poles to approach Britain asking for a flexible interpretation of the Charter.[25]