@knp7765:
Yeah, Admiral Kimmel really got screwed I think. He basically got saddled with the blame for the Pearl Harbor attack on account of our forces not being prepared enough for an attack. At least for the naval part of it. There was another guy, an Army General (can’t remember his name) who got stuck with the blame for our airfields that got pasted. It was a horrible tragedy for the US Armed Services and those two guys ended up taking the fall for all of it.
The view expressed by Gordon Prange on this subject in his book At Dawn We Slept is that the blame for the Pearl Harbor debacle runs all the way through the U.S. chain of command – and thus that, while it’s not correct to saddle Admiral Kimmel and his Army counterpart, General Walter C. Short, with the responsibility for the whole thing, it is correct to hold them responsible for the mistakes they personally contributed.
To give just one example from many, there’s the issue of how Kimmel and Short handled aerial reconnaissance (or lack thereof) around the Hawaiian Islands. A couple of their officers presented them with a reconnaissance plan which would have provided comprehensive coverage of the sea areas from which potentially hostile Japanese ships might approach. The plan required far more planes than the U.S. had in Hawaii, so Kimmel and Short rejected it. Prange argues that even though Kimmel and Short didn’t have the resources to provide comprehensive reconnaissance, they did have the resources (including planes which, while not ideal, could have been put to use) to provide at least some reconnaissance. By not using them at all, they reduced to zero the chances that an incoming Japanese fleet might be spotted, and thus failed to do their manifest duty.
Another fundamental mistake – which could have been corrected by allocating just a few men and a few telephones to the task – was failing to institute a system to keep proper tabs on the military air traffic over Hawaii. The incoming Japanese planes were spotted on radar, but the report was disregarded by the lieutenent to whom the radar contact was reported because he assumed that the operators had spotted an expected flight of B-17s coming in from the mainland. The fact that there were hundreds of incoming planes – which would have been a huge danger signal, since only about ten B-17s were expected – wasn’t reported. Had proper protocols been in place to positively identify incoming air traffic, this critical mistake would never have happened.