@Epiphany:
@ABWorsham:
@MrMalachiCrunch:
I read somewhere (linked to from here I believe) that even if the entire Pacific fleet had been wiped out by mid 1942 it would have set the US back about 6-12 months only.
Had the entire U.S fleet been destroyed the U.S would have taken the offensive in late 43-44.
I agree. The US was supposedly able to pump out carriers at the rate of one every six months. I have heard three months. (This might have been light carriers though rather than fleet carriers.) However they would have needed five or six to feel comfortable sailing off to meet the Japanese fleet. Also, when you have lost catastrophically, you tend to want to over-compensate before trying again, so the US might have wanted seven or eight carriers. And if the Japanese had won, with no losses, you’d think they would have considered trying to bottle the US up against the West Coast rather than just sail away and hope the US simply gives up and leaves them alone. If they had at least tried to hit Panama and damage the canal and struck shipyards on the West Coast, I could see late 1943 or even 1944 being the start of a new, major offensive.
And, the Japanese might have built a couple of more for themselves too. Of course Japan might have been stupid and built a bunch of Yamato’s instead. Hitler didn’t start building Me-262’s when he first had the chance. Nobody went all out when Sikorski showed off his helicopter. So it is no guarantee that just because you win, you suddenly gain great wisdom and make all the right choices in the future. But if the subject is “What if?” and you want to give a side the best possible chance, then Japan wins, bottles up the West Coast production, starts sending I-400’s to hit Panama, puts more subs in the Pacific and concentrates on bulking up its carrier fleet. I still think the best they could hope for was buying time. I really don’t see the US giving in and agreeing to terms. But Japan could hope. Maybe… if the US built a new fleet and lost that too.
You’ve made good points about America’s production advantage over Japan; as well as about how nations do not always choose the right production priorities.
The story of the jet is an interesting one. In 1940 Goering slashed the number of engineers allocated to Germany’s jet development effort.
A few years later, Germany had developed a guided air-to-surface missile. It used a test version of this guided missile to destroy a British warship in the Mediterranean. Goering lied to Hitler about this, and told him the British had jammed the missile’s guidance. He said the British ship had had to be destroyed by more normal means instead. Goering’s reason for this was his belief that Hitler was too fascinated with new technology, and needed to be steered toward tried and proven weapons instead.
Despite Goering’s interference, Germany managed to begin producing small numbers of jet aircraft late in the war. There were two versions of jets, both based on the Me 262 airframe. One was an air superiority fighter; the other was a fighter bomber.
Had the air superiority fighter been produced in large numbers, it could have defended German cities from massive Allied bombing raids. It could also have blunted the Allied air supremacy which existed over the (future) battlefields of France. Further, German air superiority on its eastern front was gradually slipping away. The air superiority Me 262 variant could have reversed that.
On the other hand, there was the fighter-bomber version of the Me 262. A plane like this could deliver a payload to its target, and safely return, without the Allies being able to do a whole lot to stop it. (Except to attack it as it tried to take off or land.) As the Allied fleet headed to the Normandy beaches, large numbers of Me 262 fighter bombers could, had they existed, taken a significant bite out of that fleet. Each time that fleet shuttled back and forth between Normandy and Britain (necessary to supply the troops and add reinforcements), the Me 262 fighter-bombers would have taken another bite. Eventually, the Allies would have had no choice but to evacuate the invading forces.
Of the two variants of the Me 262, Hitler favored the fighter-bomber over the air superiority fighter. Some have blamed his preference for interfering with the production of the air superiority variant. But it’s not clear how much, if any, delay his involvement actually caused. The truth is that Germany desperately needed large numbers of both variants of the Me 262, but was not in a position to produce significant quantities of either. The overwhelming majority of its aircraft production continued to consist of piston-driven aircraft.
