Obergruppenfuhr, I do not recall saying anything about Patton, or his drive to the Rhine. For that, I would recommend that you read the US Army history, Logistic Support of the Armies, vol. 1, which covers the invasion of Europe, breakout, and drive to the Rhine.
Although this may shock you, I was a US Army Quartermaster, i.e. supply, officer, and one of those odd individuals that enjoy studying logistics. One of the major reasons for the failure of Barbarosa was the breakdown of the logisitcs supply flow from Germany to the front, and Rommel’s failure in North Africa was directly related to a failure to understand logistics. I would recommend that you read Supplying War, by Martin Van Creveld, to get a better understanding of the problems involved. If you wish, I would be more than happy to post extended quotes from the book. They would not reflect well on the German High Command at all. As for the comment “The most brilliant Generals in History have been involved in the highest, most meticulous degree in every aspect of their soldiers well being and strategies. Logistics wins wars. Look up what “logistics” means in the dictionary.” I fully agree that logistics win wars. The Germans lost both WW1 and WW2. The German General Staff in WW2 clearly would not quaiify as the most brilliant in history.
Rommel was a brilliand tactician, questionable as a strategist, and hopeless when it came to logistics. He was repeatedly told NOT TO ADVANCE beyond the Gulf of Sirte, where he could be adequately supplied. Advancing further east compounded supplying him immensely. Driving all the way to El Alamein was utter insanity from a logistical standpoint. He simply could not be supported with the resources available from Italy and Germany. Rommel refused to accept that. He lost.
As for the comment that the Germans has the 2nd best logistics system after the US, I would beg to differ with that. After the US, the British had the best supply system, with the Germans a distant third. As for the Japanese, they were hopeless when it came to supply. I do not regard the Japanese General Staff and army high command as even competent amateurs in WW2 when it comes to the area of logistics.
The following is a quote of a dispatch from General Sato, commander of the Japanese 31st Infantry Division following the collapse of the Imphal Offensive in 1944: “The tactical ability of the Fifthteenth Army staff lies below that of cadets.” That sums it up very neatly with respect to Japan.
As for Mussolini’s desire for an African Empire, he had that already in Libya and Ethiopia, and large numbers of Italian colonists were in Libya prior to WW2. The Cyrenaiaca Plateau is actually capable of considerable agricultural production. The problem was that the British were devastatingly successful with their 1940 desert offensive, and if they had driven to Tripoli, as they could have had not troops been diverted to Greece, and if they had the time to build up their supply lines, the events of 1943 with Mussolini being forced from power would have occurred a couple of years earlier. With North Africa cleared of Italian troops, the British would have been in far better shape to reinforce the Far East, and in much better position to try to persuade French North Africa to side with De Gualle. Hitler was forced to send German troops to bolster the Italians. Malta resupply would have been far easier, with the convoys coming from Alexandria. Malta as a bomber base would have been very much a problem to the Italians, far more than it was. The number of troops deployed under Rommel would not have made a major difference in the outcome of Barbarosa.
I have no doubt whatsoever that this will be highly offensive to some people in the forum. However, if you differ, I would ask that you supply your sources to support your arguments. I am more than happy to post mine.
Imperious Leader, I would agree with your statement up to a point. The war slipped away from Germany in 1942, with the invasion of North Africa and the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. After May of 1943, with the defeat of the German submarine force, the only question was how long with Germany hold out. Also, it would be helpful if everyone remembered that the Atomic Bomb was intended to be used on Germany, with the primary targets the synthetic oil plants and the Ruhr industrial area. The Rumanian oil fields were lost to Germany in August of 1944, with the advance of the Russians into the Balkans.