Japan had no interest in invading Africa, they knew that UK had that on lockdown and they didn’t have the resources to do it. I am 100% sure that Japanese High Command would of double down on invading Australia over that. The idea behind controlling Indian ocean was to do two jobs. First: Close Burma Road since the Chinese were getting heavy equipment from the US. People forget the bulk of the IJA was in China and China was always the end goal for Japan. Two: Cutting the Persian trade route was more of a request from Germany. People forget that the Battle of Madagascar was the only battle during WWII that had both Germany and Japan in the same battle.
Operation: Sealion
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Speaking about the war from about July 1943 and onward American victories were due by having more material to work with and better logistics. I think Germany had superior mechanized doctrine and some better equipment but it was scare and no air power to protect it. Of course when Germany was in control of the war they were better in almost every respect. That slipped away completely after 1943.
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Obergruppenfuhr, I do not recall saying anything about Patton, or his drive to the Rhine. For that, I would recommend that you read the US Army history, Logistic Support of the Armies, vol. 1, which covers the invasion of Europe, breakout, and drive to the Rhine.
Although this may shock you, I was a US Army Quartermaster, i.e. supply, officer, and one of those odd individuals that enjoy studying logistics. One of the major reasons for the failure of Barbarosa was the breakdown of the logisitcs supply flow from Germany to the front, and Rommel’s failure in North Africa was directly related to a failure to understand logistics. I would recommend that you read Supplying War, by Martin Van Creveld, to get a better understanding of the problems involved. If you wish, I would be more than happy to post extended quotes from the book. They would not reflect well on the German High Command at all. As for the comment “The most brilliant Generals in History have been involved in the highest, most meticulous degree in every aspect of their soldiers well being and strategies. Logistics wins wars. Look up what “logistics” means in the dictionary.” I fully agree that logistics win wars. The Germans lost both WW1 and WW2. The German General Staff in WW2 clearly would not quaiify as the most brilliant in history.
Rommel was a brilliand tactician, questionable as a strategist, and hopeless when it came to logistics. He was repeatedly told NOT TO ADVANCE beyond the Gulf of Sirte, where he could be adequately supplied. Advancing further east compounded supplying him immensely. Driving all the way to El Alamein was utter insanity from a logistical standpoint. He simply could not be supported with the resources available from Italy and Germany. Rommel refused to accept that. He lost.
As for the comment that the Germans has the 2nd best logistics system after the US, I would beg to differ with that. After the US, the British had the best supply system, with the Germans a distant third. As for the Japanese, they were hopeless when it came to supply. I do not regard the Japanese General Staff and army high command as even competent amateurs in WW2 when it comes to the area of logistics.
The following is a quote of a dispatch from General Sato, commander of the Japanese 31st Infantry Division following the collapse of the Imphal Offensive in 1944: “The tactical ability of the Fifthteenth Army staff lies below that of cadets.” That sums it up very neatly with respect to Japan.
As for Mussolini’s desire for an African Empire, he had that already in Libya and Ethiopia, and large numbers of Italian colonists were in Libya prior to WW2. The Cyrenaiaca Plateau is actually capable of considerable agricultural production. The problem was that the British were devastatingly successful with their 1940 desert offensive, and if they had driven to Tripoli, as they could have had not troops been diverted to Greece, and if they had the time to build up their supply lines, the events of 1943 with Mussolini being forced from power would have occurred a couple of years earlier. With North Africa cleared of Italian troops, the British would have been in far better shape to reinforce the Far East, and in much better position to try to persuade French North Africa to side with De Gualle. Hitler was forced to send German troops to bolster the Italians. Malta resupply would have been far easier, with the convoys coming from Alexandria. Malta as a bomber base would have been very much a problem to the Italians, far more than it was. The number of troops deployed under Rommel would not have made a major difference in the outcome of Barbarosa.
I have no doubt whatsoever that this will be highly offensive to some people in the forum. However, if you differ, I would ask that you supply your sources to support your arguments. I am more than happy to post mine.
Imperious Leader, I would agree with your statement up to a point. The war slipped away from Germany in 1942, with the invasion of North Africa and the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. After May of 1943, with the defeat of the German submarine force, the only question was how long with Germany hold out. Also, it would be helpful if everyone remembered that the Atomic Bomb was intended to be used on Germany, with the primary targets the synthetic oil plants and the Ruhr industrial area. The Rumanian oil fields were lost to Germany in August of 1944, with the advance of the Russians into the Balkans.
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Obergruppenfuhr, I do not recall saying anything about Patton, or his drive to the Rhine. For that, I would recommend that you read the US Army history, Logistic Support of the Armies, vol. 1, which covers the invasion of Europe, breakout, and drive to the Rhine.
Although this may shock you, I was a US Army Quartermaster, i.e. supply, officer, and one of those odd individuals that enjoy studying logistics. One of the major reasons for the failure of Barbarosa was the breakdown of the logisitcs supply flow from Germany to the front, and Rommel’s failure in North Africa was directly related to a failure to understand logistics. I would recommend that you read Supplying War, by Martin Van Creveld, to get a better understanding of the problems involved. If you wish, I would be more than happy to post extended quotes from the book. They would not reflect well on the German High Command at all. As for the comment “The most brilliant Generals in History have been involved in the highest, most meticulous degree in every aspect of their soldiers well being and strategies. Logistics wins wars. Look up what “logistics” means in the dictionary.” I fully agree that logistics win wars. The Germans lost both WW1 and WW2. The German General Staff in WW2 clearly would not quaiify as the most brilliant in history.
Rommel was a brilliand tactician, questionable as a strategist, and hopeless when it came to logistics. He was repeatedly told NOT TO ADVANCE beyond the Gulf of Sirte, where he could be adequately supplied. Advancing further east compounded supplying him immensely. Driving all the way to El Alamein was utter insanity from a logistical standpoint. He simply could not be supported with the resources available from Italy and Germany. Rommel refused to accept that. He lost.
As for the comment that the Germans has the 2nd best logistics system after the US, I would beg to differ with that. After the US, the British had the best supply system, with the Germans a distant third. As for the Japanese, they were hopeless when it came to supply. I do not regard the Japanese General Staff and army high command as even competent amateurs in WW2 when it comes to the area of logistics.
The following is a quote of a dispatch from General Sato, commander of the Japanese 31st Infantry Division following the collapse of the Imphal Offensive in 1944: “The tactical ability of the Fifthteenth Army staff lies below that of cadets.” That sums it up very neatly with respect to Japan.
As for Mussolini’s desire for an African Empire, he had that already in Libya and Ethiopia, and large numbers of Italian colonists were in Libya prior to WW2. The Cyrenaiaca Plateau is actually capable of considerable agricultural production. The problem was that the British were devastatingly successful with their 1940 desert offensive, and if they had driven to Tripoli, as they could have had not troops been diverted to Greece, and if they had the time to build up their supply lines, the events of 1943 with Mussolini being forced from power would have occurred a couple of years earlier. With North Africa cleared of Italian troops, the British would have been in far better shape to reinforce the Far East, and in much better position to try to persuade French North Africa to side with De Gualle. Hitler was forced to send German troops to bolster the Italians. Malta resupply would have been far easier, with the convoys coming from Alexandria. Malta as a bomber base would have been very much a problem to the Italians, far more than it was. The number of troops deployed under Rommel would not have made a major difference in the outcome of Barbarosa.
I have no doubt whatsoever that this will be highly offensive to some people in the forum. However, if you differ, I would ask that you supply your sources to support your arguments. I am more than happy to post mine.
Imperious Leader, I would agree with your statement up to a point. The war slipped away from Germany in 1942, with the invasion of North Africa and the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. After May of 1943, with the defeat of the German submarine force, the only question was how long with Germany hold out. Also, it would be helpful if everyone remembered that the Atomic Bomb was intended to be used on Germany, with the primary targets the synthetic oil plants and the Ruhr industrial area. The Rumanian oil fields were lost to Germany in August of 1944, with the advance of the Russians into the Balkans.
You continually bring the entire world into this question of “logistics” to prove your point with a hundred sources much like a far left liberal debates. Quote all the variables you want. My statement was that Germany had “Some of the most brilliant strategists in all of Europe.” Europe. Not the whole world. Not Japan. Not the US. That was my point. I could site at least 6 different offcers ranking from Obergruppenfuhrer and up that were absolutely brilliant in the german military. Pride was their downfall. They DID lose for reasons I’ve discussed at length in the Leningrad poll in the Minatures discussion forum, and for reasons you’ve discussed. It started from the very first mistakes made after the death of Walter Weaver. I’m not offended at all by your participation and have a great deal of respect for anyone that has or is serving our country. So if you read my quote, there is nothing to argue there. Brining in any other nation has nothing to do with my quote regarding “Strategists in Europe”.
Your list of fun facts is amusing but I know for a fact at least one or two of them is not true. It’s 3am and I’m too tired to go get the sources on your “in bombing range of new york” theory and from my SS archives. “In theory.” If hitler could have done any significant damage to New York, he would have in his rage just like he did to England after the first bombs fell on Berlin causing no real serious damage. Appropriate retaliation against civilian populations opposing The Reich was ALWAYS “worth it” to Hitler. No matter how stupid the outcome. Look at Leningrad. He besieged the city just out of spite when they could have taken it.
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I will concede that the Germans had some of the best tacticians in Europe, when it came to fighting a battle. When it came to strategy, the Germans had no real concept of sea power, totally overestimated their own capabilities, especially with respect to the USSR, never really resolved within the General Staff the best strategy to use in attacking Russia, never really got Rommel under control, assumed that because the only conceivable invasion area in France to them was the Pas de Calais, that the Allies would attack the same area, allowed their painfully built up forces in late 1944 to be squandered in the Battle of the Bulge, rather than committed to resist the Russians. Considering the Bulge, the German General Staff were totally astonished that Patton was able to shift the axis of attack for the 3rd Army from east to north in 3 days, instead of the 3 weeks that they thought it would take. They assessment was based on how long it would take THEM to shift an axis of attack. Arrogance does not normally produce good results.
I have not the foggiest idea of what you mean by my posting of attacking New York. I did not post in that at all. My postings in that area involved Unit 731 of the Japanese Army. My own view of an aerial attack by Germany on New York is that Hitler might order it, but it would not be carried out. Even if it did, the likelyhood of the aircraft surviving long enough to drop is a bit small. The US did maintain a full air defense network here, just in case. If somehow, it did make it here and drop a limited number of bombs, I would rather not think of the consequences for German cities. The pressure from the American public to use every means of utterly destroying the German cities by the use of any and every weapon, including chemical agents, would have been very hard to withstand. If the attack occurred prior to the November of 1944 Presidential election, I am not sure that Roosevelt would have been able to hold off, or even be willing to do so.
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Lets not forget that a large part of the German Army still relied on animals for tranportation of supplies.
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Very well put Timeover51. I appreciate the wealth of knowledge you bring to these discussions.
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When it came to strategy, the Germans had no real concept of sea power
I find this to be rather funny when it was the HMS Hood that was sunk in 7 minutes when it encountered the Bismark; and it was the Graf Spee that was scuttled not sunk by enemy action after fighting off/destroying 3 British cruisers off Montevideo when Uruguay forced them to either set sail or be impounded. Not to mention things like the US tasking the USS Washington (North Carolina Class Battleship) with convoy defense in the early years of the war due to the U-Boat et.al. threat.
The Germans had a good solid view of naval power, they just did not have enough time to reach levels of parity with the Allies before Hitler ordered the offensives to begin. And even when the German Navy sailed into battle when they were massively outnumbered in 1939, it STILL took 3 years for the Allies to achieve Naval superiority in their own back yard (the Atlantic Ocean).
For those who question the above, let me recommend the Military Channel’s “Top 10” programs, which puts the German Pocket Battleships and the Bismark Class Battleships in the Top 10 for surface ships (Deutschland Class Pocket Battleship #9, Bismark Class Battleship #7), and the Type VII U-Boat as #1 all time for submarines.
http://military.discovery.com/convergence/topten/topten.html
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Yes Admiral Raeder was an astute commander, perhaps equal to Yamamoto. He only had what resources and command structure he was alloted and used his position to get Hitler to change his mind on rare occasions. Unfortunately the effort for the Kreigsmarine was stymied by Hitlers own narrow knowledge of the capabilities of his navy and fat Goerings inability to support the U-boats with proper reconnaissance or the navy with some control of his Luftwaffe due to inter-service rivalry between Raeder/Donitz and Goering.
The Germans were not ready for war until 1944-46 when the planned Z fleet would be available to contest the British.
The Germans used their navy better than any other considering the amount of forces they had, but it was Hitler that ruined its potential.
The only aspect of the German military was was underutilized was its Luftwaffe. Fat Goering failed in nearly every aspect even when he had superior odds against the enemy.
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I wonder what effect would the German Navy in World War 2 have if it’s size has been similar to the Kaiser’s Navy?
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If that was the case Sealion would not require air superiority. The Luftwaffe just ties up the RAF and the navy protects the transports. British cant do anything except risk her navy at large with disaster
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@ABWorsham:
I wonder what effect would the German Navy in World War 2 have if it’s size has been similar to the Kaiser’s Navy?
In order to reach the size of the Kaiser’s Navy, it would have needed to break the terms of the Treaty of Versailles much earlier than it did, which would have resulted in WW2 starting sometime in the early 1930s, long before it could have built up to any significant degree. The pocket battleships/armoured ships were built to get around the term of the Treaty of Versailles, but were in theory in compliance. The French in the late 1920s and early 1930s were looking for a reason to land on Germany, but were restrained by the British. Germany building another High Seas Fleet would have made Britain ready to invade Germany as well. The result would have been a British and French invasion of Germany sometime around 1931 or so. No Hitler, no Nazis, early WW2. You need to understand that the Germans had to first build the industrial base to produce heavy armor plate, large caliber guns, and heavy gun turrets before building ships like the Scharnhortz and Bismarck. Also, the Bismarck used enough steel for 2,000 Mark IV tanks. You have a finite amount of steel. What do you build if you are Germany?
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I’ll take the 2,000 Mark IV’s.
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Id take more subs at the start of the war like Raeder argued. It would have really put british in the bind.
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The 300 u-boats that Raeder wanted to make war on England would have shocked the English into submission by 1941.
Speaking of the Battle of the Atlantic, this weekend I found my copy of Iron Coffins by Herbert Werner. I caught myself an hour later having to put it down. Great book!
Have any of you read the book The German Raider: Atlantis? It’s my all time favorite book.
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If the Germans had started building that many U-boats earlier, assuming that they violated the Treaty of Versailles earlier, British rearmament starts earlier, and WW2 starts in 1938 over Czechoslovakia, not Poland, if not earlier. You gentlemen act as if the Western powers would make no response to German actions. READ THE TERMS OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES. Hitler took an enormous gamble breaking them. It takes time to build up your industrial base. It takes time to train aircrew, tank crewmen, and submarine crew. Time to allocate who gets the steel production first, who gets the engine production, who gets the armor plate production.
I went through all of this when I tried to run a full-scale WW2 naval campaign. The Axis players wanted to build anything that they wanted, while not allowing any response from the Allied players. If the Axis starts building earlier, there is no 1936 London Naval Treaty limiting the size and gun caliber of the new battleships to 35,000 tons and 14 inch guns. No treaty means that the British go straight to the Lion-class, and do not build ANY KGV. The 1940 Vinson Act mandating a Two-Ocean Navy moves up to 1938, at the latest. The US heads for the Iowa-class rather than the South Dakota class, and the Montanas start building in 1940, and become available in 1943. Armament buildups do not occur in a vacuum. One sides actions result in the other sides reaction.
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Great point timerover51. How fast could Germany have built a navy by 1945? What size would this navy been?
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http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/zplan/index.html
According to this plan, the German Kriegsmarine should have grown to about 800 units, consisting of 13 battleships and battlecruisers, 4 aircraft carriers, 15 Panzerschiffe, 23 cruisers and 22 so called “Spähkreuzer” which were basically large destroyers. In addition to this many smaller vessels should have been build.
Those ships should have been build between 1939 and 1946, in this time, the personal of the Kriegsmarine should have been enlarged to 201.000 men and over 33 billion Reichsmark should have spend for building the new units.
This project never got reality. Its very questionable that the German industry would have had the resources for such a construction program and that the other European Nations would stood still and not react to this program. The realization of the Z-Plan started on January 29th, 1939. Two H-Class battleships were laid down, three months later Germany quit the the fleet treaty with England and the dream “No more war against Britain” was gone.
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How would a 1945 European war been different? That’s a interesting question.
Since many weapons were developed during the war based on reaction i have no idea. The Tiger and Panther tanks were a response to the T-34. Would Germany start a 1945 war with Mark IV as the main battle tank?
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Well the truth is Germany was accelerating FASTER than any other nation in terms of military technology. Eventually by waiting these would bear fruit. The naval treaty requirements of the London treaty and Versailles were already broken by Germany years earlier with those pocket battleships and the allies had no clue.
However, the industrial rebuilding of the Soviet economy and the slower English economy was slowly pulling away from Germany in some areas. The large Soviet population was viewed correctly by Hitler as an unstoppable inertia of men and material of the communist military complex may have proven an unassailable wall to breach by the whermacht.
So Hitler took his leap of faith in this period of History and plunged the world in his war of annihilation. It was a calculated risk to be sure, but it was entirely possible given the structure of blitzkrieg and her military capabilities that her European foes could be vanquished in quick victories, but Hitler didn’t set up Stalin for a quick campaign and that was only what Germany could afford so they failed. Its like buying a home with a mortgage you can no longer afford to pay and eventually losing everything.
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The London Treaty was signed in 1930, and the French refused to sign it based on the German Pocket Battleships, building the Dunkerque and Strasburg in reply, and beginning design work on the Richelieu-class ships. The all-forward armament of the French ships was based on the assumption that any engagement with the pocket battleships would rapidly turn into a running chase, so maximum forward firepower was desired. So much for the Allies having no clue. The British figured that in the Hood, Renown, and Repulse, plus carrier hunting groups that they had a counter already. Italy refused to sign because the French refused to sign, therefore making much of the treaty meaningless, except for the US and UK. Japan started breaking the terms of the treaty almost immediately, which took a while for the US and UK to realize.
As for Germany accelerating FASTER than anyone else, that would be highly dependent on the area. When it came to radar, the Germans were behind in some respects, and rapidly got far behind with their inability to produce microwave radar. They never got remotely close to a proximity fuze, despite the desparate need for one. Atomic research was years away from getting to even a test reactor. Their highest grade of aircraft fuel was 92 octane, making the carrying of water-alcohol and nitrous oxide supplemental fuels for the performance boost the Allies got from having 100/130 and 115/145 octane fuel. Bomber development pretty much stopped with the death of General Weaver, while British and US heavy bomber development accelerated. Yes, the ME-262 did see combat, with an engine that required a complete overhaul after 15 to 25 hours of use. That does tend to limit how many you can produce. The early jet engines of the Allies had an overhaul requirement of 185 hours, and it steadily improved from there.
Their tanks were good, but the Panther, Tiger, and Tiger II were mechanically unreliable, and in the case of the Tigers, badly underpowered. The US made the conscious decision to push production of the Sherman because of the need for overseas shipment, which limited US development. The British Centurion and the US Pershing clearly brought the Allies up to par with the Germans.
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