Certainly no one is debating the decisive nature of Midway. And the Japanese really had no chance to win a war against the US. Economically the Japanese were at a huge disadvantage. consider only about 15 % or so of US military output went to the Pacific.
The US might have lost the war by being weak, losing its nerve, or having the american press or people turn on the conflict. Thank goodness previous american generations wern’t as comfortable as we currently are.
But really wars are not waged based on logic of having a chance, even those who may know they have no chance still will sometimes role the dice. You never know what might happen and sometimes you just have to fight.
Poland had no chance against Hitler but they refused to give in to his demands and they fought.
Czechoslovakia probably had a chance against Hitler but were sold out and did not fight.
The Confederacy had little chance of really beating the Union. Should have quit after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, should have quit after the fall of Atlanta and the reelection of Lincoln. But by then it was too late. And when the South attempted a peace conference in early 1865, Lincoln and his generals told them to pack sand.
The Romans at their height lost wars. The people beating them probably had no chance to win but win they did.
The continentals had little chance of really beating the British. - but they did
Iraq had little chance of beating the US. - in either war but fight both of them they did.
and on and on throughout history.
And once your in the war its real hard to make peace. The Japanese would never had looked for peace after one defeat. Heck it took them getting nuked twice and they still debated fighting on and even had a junior officer’s revolt to keep the war going.
Ok legion3, I see your point. You are right and also I am convinced that war is not a matter of logic or percentage. I have also exposed my point of view on this in my previous posts and my vision is similar to yours one.
Historical analysis have to take in account the facts for understanding how the things are really went and the possible alternatives. For a battle this means that the possible outcome should be weighed in respect of the possible effect on the course of the war.
Midway is important for the reason you are stating. A Japanese victory hardly had changed their economic inferiority but could have had a dangeroous moral impact on the USA. At Guadalcanal they coul not reach the same objective.
This question is created some great discussion.
I agree with you, a Japanese victory at midway would (probably) not have changed the inevitable outcome, might have prolonged it, and I don’t think that generation of Americans would have trimbled and lost heart.
Loss at GC would also not have done anything more than give Japan further breathing space but America’s untouchable economy would have eventually plowed under Japan.
Japan simply did not have either the economic resources or the military power to wage a long war, frankly neither did the Germans.
A good book to read is KAIGUN Strategy, Tactics and Technology of the IJN 1887-1941 by Evans and Peattie. Apart from the technical aspects of the IJN and its early victories over china and russia, the book goes into great detail of the war the Japanese planned to fight, hoped to fight but in the end was unable to fight do to the changing nature of the Pacific War and the modern economic face or war.
Both battles give examples of lessons not learned. When the Japs were clearing the Brits from Ceylon and the surrounding area the search pattern they used to find naval units proved flawed. Since the Japanese met their objectives due to weight of numbers they used the same search pattern at Midway. Stupid.
The Japanese had a habit of splitting naval forces with the thought of having them meet IN THE COMBAT ZONE. That worked exactly zero times when the tactic was discovered. So they approached Midway with a Landing Force and a Carrier Group. I’m going to go out on a limb to say if the Japs kept both groups as one the millions of additional rounds they could have thrown at the attacking American aircraft may have proved helpful.
The actions leading up to Leyte Gulf were the result the Japs learning nothing from Midway and other battles. They went into the Phillipines with three naval forces and these were handled one at a time. One force was mualed twice in fact. Of course with a little more resovle the Japanese could have turned Leyte into an American grave yard.
The Pacific war was filled with stories of needless sacrifice on the part of the Japanese service member. Guadalcanal showed the banzai charge to be a less than useful tool in modern warfare. Yet it happened over and over throughout the war. I can imagine some NCO or officer saying “Ammo’s low. Time to get shot. Let’s go gang! BANZAI!” Kiss my a$$ sarge. I’m going coconut hunting.
Even when the outcome was no longer in doubt the Japanese military leadership poured resources into Guadalcanal. This was the result of them not being able to accept being wrong. In the end that would prove to be the biggest mistake the Nipponese would make. It took entirely too much convincing to get them to admit being wrong.
The biggest contribution of both battles was no contribution at all for one side. The Japs learned nothing from their mistakes. Our boys used that to tactical, operational, and strategic advantage throughout the war.
Yes they were guilty of:
dividing their forces which weakens the effort ( poor use of economy of force)
overly ambitious elaborate planes basing too much enemy reaction on Japanese way of thinking ( not having a simple plan)
over representation of their own capabilities, and under appreciating the enemy resolve. ( Bushido Machismo)
doing too many things at once
poor security of intentions ( broken code, violations of communication, crappy feints/diversions-easy to see thru)
11HP20, I agree with you for Midway and Guadalcanal but I do not agree about Leyte Gulf.
IJN was largely inferior in that battle and still fought valiantly.
Ozawa, with a false AC forces, drew away the USA Carrier Task Forces, while Nishimura managed to draw the attention of the Battleships forces. In the critical phases of the battle Kurita with his battleships reached the amphibious force in the off the coast of Samar. Only the desperate courage of the escorsting ships saved the amphibious force from the sure destuction at the hand of the Yamato. Kurita thought he have to fought the 3rd fleet and retreated. The plan was good and complex but was excuted not perfectly and sincerely I think that even if perfectly executed IJN hardly had any possibility to won against USA fleet in October 1944.
I voted for Midway, but it is more a combination of Coral Sea and Midway in my view. A bit of background. In 1991, I spent several weeks with John Winton assisting him in researching his book on Ultra in the Pacific. We spent a lot of time looking through the declassified intercepts and intercept summaries. I have been studying the Solomon Islands campaign for 40 plus years, and in May of 2002, I spent 15 days in the Solomon Islands assisting Dr. Robert Ballard in his search for JFK’s PT-109. I was responsible for wreck identification, onboard historian, general technical reference person, and explosives and weapons expert. I have also assisted in identifying the wreckage of a Japanese carrier sunk at Midway that is on the bottom in 17,000 feet of water.
First, one of the more interesting intercepts they we read was one concerning the transfer of the surviving air crew from the Shokaku and Zuikaku to the carriers that were attacking the Aleutians. Basically, the Japanese by May of 1941 were short of trained carrier aircrew. The combination of losses at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians therefore crippled the Japanese to the point where they no longer could field qualified pilots to the surviving carriers.
Second, the Guadalcanal campaign and the advance up the Solomon Islands by the Allies subjected the Japanese to the devastating attrition that they could simply not afford. Losses there could not be replaced Japanese planning was heavily dependent on the decisive battle, with the enemy suffering massive losses while the Japanese were relatively unscathed, as occurred at the Battle of Tsushima. A campaign of attrition was the last thing that the Japanese planned for.
Third, the Japanese Army, after having the 23rd Infantry Division mangled by the Russians at Nomohan/Khalkin-Gol, had no desire whatsoever to engage the Russians again on anything like remotely even terms. Hence, they did not bother the Russians for the entire war. Russian merchant ships carrying supplies from the West Coast to Vladivostok sailed through the Sea of Japan up to the Russian declaration of war in 1945. The Japanese Army had limited knowledge of the US and Britain, and much of what they had was filtered through the Germans. The Japanese Army was calling the shots in starting the war, not the Navy. They needed resources, not Hawaii.
To Be Continued
Midway! When you lose FOUR of your FIRST line carriers…it becomes demoralizing. The Japanese offensive in the Pacific ended at Midway…they suddenly had to go on the defensive starting at Guadalcanal!
I’m surprised this post has found life.
I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.
Neither Midway nor Guadalcanal had any great impact on the war on a strategic scale.
If Japan went all in against Hawaii, and killed off every US ship and all the other US ships that was heading for Hawaii, then they might had a snowballs chance in hell to keep anything, and/or to avoid the US demand of total surrender.
The biggest error the Japanese did was that they did not understand the American mentality after they attacked Pearl Harbor.
@ABWorsham:
I’m surprised this post has found life.
I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.
I love this analogy, very fitting.
@ABWorsham:
I’m surprised this post has found life.
I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.
My man is a football fan and he puts this in such great terms…Absolutely perfect…
+2 karma to the ABW…
I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.
Fantastic analogy. +2
@RogertheShrubber:
@ABWorsham:
I’m surprised this post has found life.
I’ll sum up the two battles in football terms. Midway was the shocking interception that was returned for a touchdown, it stopped the Japanese momentum. Guadalcanal was the fifteen play drive for 98 yard that took 7 minutes off the clock for the U.S forces.
I love this analogy, very fitting.
I’m surprised Guadalcanal did not get more votes.
At the beginning of the war, which country had the largest navy? US, UK(counting navies of Canada, Australia, India, etc.), or Japan?
At the beginning of the war, which country had the largest navy? US, UK(counting navies of Canada, Australia, India, etc.), or Japan?
I beleive the Royal Navy was the largest, thats counting the huge older reserve fleet.
Midway without doubt.
The beginning of the end for the Imperial japanese navy.
