Increasing action in PTO: The Case against 0 ipc territories (Pacific Islands)

Thanks.

@toblerone77:

“Well you’re excellent work there has driven up recruitment! I’m drumming up every available ship in the PTO to give you guys some help”

We all know this didn’t actually happen.

It didn’t happen.  The US was drafting most (if not all) of its military personnel by that point of the war, not calling for volunteers.  In fact the age of conscription had even (in which year I can’t recall) been dropped from 21 to 18.  The government had the Selective Service Act (or whatever it was called) at its disposal and it didn’t need propaganda campaigns to meet its enlistment requirements with volunteers.  The main use of propaganda in the US during the war was actually to encourage civilians to: a) work harder in the factories; b) complain less about shortages and rationing; and c) report suspicious people or activities to the authorities.

@toblerone77:

I think a good solution would be assigning each island a “prestige” or “propaganda” value. Such as a newly captured island in the PTO awards the conquering nation a set amount of unit placement for capturing it. Example the US captures Okinawa. The US during it’s placement phase may place “x” amount of units there for that turn. For it’s propaganda value a die roll is also awarded 1D6 is rolled for each island captured and IPC are rewarded to reflect a warbonds drive during the collect income phase. Both of these bonuses would be a one time deal. Example:Okinawa is recaptured by the Japanese they will recieve the same bonus as the US did.

By that same “prestige / propaganda” rationale, however, it could be argued that a nation which loses an island would suffer an IPC penalty (the country would earn fewer IPCs than its territorial holdings add up to) to reflect a drop in industrial output on the home front due to worker morale being adversely affected by the bad news.  If good news gives the affected player a bonus, then bad news should cost the affected player a penalty. The system can’t simply work in one direction.

@CWO:

If good news gives the affected player a bonus, then bad news should cost the affected player a penalty.

This is why the original idea should be explored. The number one reason is simplicity. (The last thing this game needs is another chart.)

You simply make all the islands worth “1” IPC. True, there are no resources on most islands, but there is a morale value. Also consider less shipping losses by keeping the enemy away from home islands. Japan wanted those remote islands as a defensive ring to enhance their own security. Higher morale would logically = higher production. Workers will likely produce a higher number of units of higher quality if they know their cause is not lost. (perhaps only slightly, which would be represented by the low “1” value of each territory.)

I personally do not like NOs - to me they just overcomplicate the game and put focus on things outside the game itself. I like being able to just count up how many IPCs I get by looking at what I control on the map, and get on with the fun stuff.

A few posts back it was mentioned these islands have no value because they have no resources or what not, which is true yes. But they have a value that is hard to see unless you look closely. That being, the sense of security for a power that controls, and knows it controls an entire string of islands. A large part of the pacific war was trying to find out who even controlled what islands. After Pearl Harbor, the Japanese sent a second reconnaissance/attack force and were using the French Frigate Shoals as a staging ground. This botched attack revealed to the Americans that the Japanese had been using the area as a rendezvous point and the Americans occupied it later in the year. The point comes when you combine this with the fact that Allied shipping had to be wary of Japanese air units finding them and attacking them or relaying their positions as forces drew nearer to Japan itself. Control of all the atolls and islands and what not gave your forces an advantage in that they could operate without the fear of being spotted by Japanese air power because you have denied to them the ability to operate in the area. Later in the war, this became less of an issue as Japan couldn’t fuel or operate the necessary network of observation planes to keep up that sort of a net, and island hopping became the US strategy. It was no longer critical to control every pile of sand that stuck out of the water because the Japanese simply didn’t have the resources to use them as observation posts.

So my point is, the value you are getting from the enemy NOT having islands to land on is that your forces in the rear areas can steam at full speed, and fuel doesn’t need to be wasted escorting them with convoys. Now in the game, the limits of air units movements represents this to a degree. But only for units we can actually touch. In reality, there are all sorts of things happening in the game that aren’t being represented with plastic pieces. Supplies are moving to your fleets at sea, while raw materials are moving back to your factories from far flung possessions. So the idea of awarding IPCs for control of worthless islands is not far fetched. We already have this happen with the Japanese NO for control of Guam, Midway, Wake, Gilberts and Solomons.

If you really want to stimulate combat over islands then we need to change that NO, and likely add a new US NO to do the same.
What I had proposed ages ago went something like this:

Japan (replaces Guam, etc. bonus)
1. Collect 5 IPCs per turn if Japan controls any 8 Pacific islands that have no IPC value.
Theme: Strategic outer defense perimeter.

United States
1. Collect 5 IPCs per turn if the United States controls any 8 Pacific islands that have no IPC value.
Theme: Islands considered to be vital strategic forward bases.

The US starts with 6 qualifying islands (Guam, Wake, Midway, Johnston, Line, Aleutians)
Japan starts with 5 qualifying islands (Paulau, Marianas, Carolines, Marshalls, Hainan)
Japan can take US islands, or UK or ANZAC islands to boost their number, but the US can only liberate it’s own, or take them from Japan. This leads to a cat and mouse game chasing each other around the pacific, which is what you guys are after right?

@oztea:

So my point is, the value you are getting from the enemy NOT having islands to land on is that your forces in the rear areas can steam at full speed, and fuel doesn’t need to be wasted escorting them with convoys. Now in the game, the limits of air units movements represents this to a degree. But only for units we can actually touch. In reality, there are all sorts of things happening in the game that aren’t being represented with plastic pieces. Supplies are moving to your fleets at sea, while raw materials are moving back to your factories from far flung possessions. So the idea of awarding IPCs for control of worthless islands is not far fetched. We already have this happen with the Japanese NO for control of Guam, Midway, Wake, Gilberts and Solomons.

Yes, these are good points.  Control of contiguous areas of oceanic space (and of the airspace above it) affects operational efficiency, which has economic implications, so it’s justifiable for this to be translated into IPCs to a modest degree even when the spaces contain islands with zero IPC value.

You could even take the concept one step further and extend it to contiguous oceanic spaces which contain no islands at all.  The area I’ve marked in red on the attached map shows the contiguous areas of oceanic territory “controlled” by Japan at the start of the game, as defined by its outer perimeter of island possessions.  Note that it includes some islands with an IPC value (like Iwo Jima), some islands with no IPC value (like the Marianas) and some sea zones with no islands at all (like SZ 18).  This area could serve as a baseline.  Each sea zone in the area could be marked (for the sake of visual convenience) with some sort of baseline marker – let’s say a white poker chip.  The baseline by itself would have no IPC adjustment value.  The IPC bonuses (and/or penalties) would come from gains or losses to the baseline.

Every SZ gain by Japan beyond the baseline would translate into an IPC bonus for Japan.  (These gains could be marked with red poker chips for easy indentification.)  This IPC adjustment would include SZs added to Japanese territory as a side-effect of an overall territorial advance.  For example, a Japanese capture of Midway (in SZ 25) would have the side-effect of bringing SZ 24 into the Japanese perimeter, so the capture of that one island would translate into a gain of 2 SZs instead of just one.

Likewise, US advances into Japanese baseline territory (marked by blue poker chips) would translate into IPC bonuses for the Americans.  There could be an additional bonus for the US (or an IPC penalty for Japan) if the US manages to pinch off and isolate parts of the Japanese territory; for example, if the US captures Okinawa while still holding Guam and the Philippines, the Japanese sea zones around Formosa and Hainan would be considered cut off from the rest of Japan’s oceanic territories.

neat idea, but sounds complicated.

@CWO:

@toblerone77:

“Well you’re excellent work there has driven up recruitment! I’m drumming up every available ship in the PTO to give you guys some help”

We all know this didn’t actually happen.

It didn’t happen.  The US was drafting most (if not all) of its military personnel by that point of the war, not calling for volunteers.  In fact the age of conscription had even (in which year I can’t recall) been dropped from 21 to 18.  The government had the Selective Service Act (or whatever it was called) at its disposal and it didn’t need propaganda campaigns to meet its enlistment requirements with volunteers.  The main use of propaganda in the US during the war was actually to encourage civilians to: a) work harder in the factories; b) complain less about shortages and rationing; and c) report suspicious people or activities to the authorities.

Yes you are correct. Most people toward the end of the war were absolutely sick of it and it was getting harder to “sell” the war. I would say directly after Pearl Harbor the “propaganda/prestige” models would fit better.

The problem is trying to model much of this stuff in the game.

@CWO:

@toblerone77:

I think a good solution would be assigning each island a “prestige” or “propaganda” value. Such as a newly captured island in the PTO awards the conquering nation a set amount of unit placement for capturing it. Example the US captures Okinawa. The US during it’s placement phase may place “x” amount of units there for that turn. For it’s propaganda value a die roll is also awarded 1D6 is rolled for each island captured and IPC are rewarded to reflect a warbonds drive during the collect income phase. Both of these bonuses would be a one time deal. Example:Okinawa is recaptured by the Japanese they will recieve the same bonus as the US did.

By that same “prestige / propaganda” rationale, however, it could be argued that a nation which loses an island would suffer an IPC penalty (the country would earn fewer IPCs than its territorial holdings add up to) to reflect a drop in industrial output on the home front due to worker morale being adversely affected by the bad news.  If good news gives the affected player a bonus, then bad news should cost the affected player a penalty. The system can’t simply work in one direction.

You’re right again here too. We tried earlier in the thread to limit a bonus in the PTO once per capture recapture.

My personal disagreement with IPC values is the actual root concept of what IPCs and territory values actually represent. My take is that the concept of IPCs representing “x-million production hours” was artistic license rather than a hard fact. Essentially is was just artwork for the money in the game.

Secondly, if we take a nations entire IPC value as representative of it’s production capability a territory worth 1 IPC contributes to the economy yet cannot have an industrial complex due to its value? That by that particular logic brings into question as to why then can a territroy worth 3 IPCs produce units worth more than three IPCs?  Also why would we combine all territory values under these factors?

I think Global has done the best job of making this make more sense with major and minor ICs. I do howere think it leave some to be desired.

@oztea:

So my point is, the value you are getting from the enemy NOT having islands to land on is that your forces in the rear areas can steam at full speed, and fuel doesn’t need to be wasted escorting them with convoys. Now in the game, the limits of air units movements represents this to a degree. But only for units we can actually touch. In reality, there are all sorts of things happening in the game that aren’t being represented with plastic pieces. Supplies are moving to your fleets at sea, while raw materials are moving back to your factories from far flung possessions. So the idea of awarding IPCs for control of worthless islands is not far fetched. We already have this happen with the Japanese NO for control of Guam, Midway, Wake, Gilberts and Solomons.

Absolutely agree here!

@oztea:

What I had proposed ages ago went something like this:

Japan (replaces Guam, etc. bonus)
1. Collect 5 IPCs per turn if Japan controls any 8 Pacific islands that have no IPC value.
Theme: Strategic outer defense perimeter.
United States
1. Collect 5 IPCs per turn if the United States controls any 8 Pacific islands that have no IPC value.
Theme: Islands considered to be vital strategic forward bases.

The problem with this NO idea is, under certain circumstances, when you lose just one island, you would lose 5 IPCs. Also, as either country, you would have to take, what, 4 islands before you get any income at all?

A simpler, more accurate, and more incremental income system is to just put 1 IPC on each island. Then if you take one, your income goes up just one, and so forth. And it’s all right there on the map to see.

@Baron:

Why not just using this mechanics: paying 2 IPCs from the looser to the winner, instead?

I personally don’t care for that idea, the main reason is it is an exception to all the rest of the rules of taking territories. In order for this game to be learnable and enjoyable, the rules should be consistent with as few exceptions as possible.

The second reason is that it goes against the general reasoning that Oztea brought up. The islands should be worth something because of morale and shipping reasons.

1. Morale - if an island is lost on Japan’s perimeter, the citizens would feel bad about it EVERY turn the island was in enemy hands. Not just the first turn.
2. Shipping - islands taken from your defensive perimeter would result in enemy forward bases and thus better recon for directing submarine attacks, etc.  This would continue to damage your economy EVERY turn, not just the first.

@Der:

The second reason is that it goes against the general reasoning that Oztea brought up. The islands should be worth something because of morale and shipping reasons.

The concept of having islands be worth IPCs because of shipping efficiencies is pretty solid, as I mentioned in an earlier post, but I’m dubious about the whole “morale value = IPCs” concept for a couple of reasons.  First: the strategic bombing campaigns against Britain, Germany and Japan showed that populations in wartime can “keep calm and carry on” to a remarkable degree even when their own homes and family members are being blown to bits by enemy bombers, and that wartime industries can keep functioning as a result.  If wartime populations remained resilient (and industrially productive) in the face of having their towns demolished and/or incinerated, I doubt that their productivity would have been seriously dented just from reading bad news in the papers.  Second: there’s no guarantee that wartime citizens would even have learned that a particular island territory had been lost to the enemy – especially in dictatorships like Germany and Japan, where the media was tightly controlled.  Japan in particular was notorious for suppressing bad news; as an example, survivors of the sinking of the Yamato were put into detention when they returned to Japan to prevent them from talking.  Even in the US and Britain, which were democratic states with a free press, the government sometimes filtered bad news to some degree: delaying its release, providing few details on security grounds, putting a positive spin on events and so forth.  Wartime governments of all stripes are always happy to play up their successes (to the point sometimes of exaggerating or inventing them, such as when Japan portrayed Midway as a great victory for the IJN), but they’re understandably reluctant to discuss their failures.

Good reasoning on the morale subject CWO Marc. But even if the morale issue were totally thrown out, there is still the economic issue of sea lanes. Owning more islands would result in a greater network of protection and less shipping losses, while losing islands would bring the enemy closer, resulting in more shipping losses.

@Der:

Good reasoning on the morale subject CWO Marc. But even if the morale issue were totally thrown out, there is still the economic issue of sea lanes. Owning more islands would result in a greater network of protection and less shipping losses, while losing islands would bring the enemy closer, resulting in more shipping losses.Â

Yes, as I mentioned in my posts #28 and #35, I agree that the economic/logistical aspects of sea lane control provide a reasonable justification for assigning IPC values to the sea zones that surround islands.

Well you guys all know my tendency to notch up the “wild west” factor. In almost every house game me and my brother play we assign any 0 value territory at least 1 IPC. That’s just me/us I guess.