@Mallery29:
The only reason they didn’t have all of Korea is because we had the other end
Because we had secured that in agreements with the Soviets before they joined the war in the Pacific, though I don’t see what that has to do with Soviets naval logistical capabilities?
@Mallery29:
if the bombs failed to operate or failed to convince the Japanese to surrender, the Russians would have made significant gains and had time to send some support that way to aide in the invasion.
IF the bombs failed, and that’s a pretty big if, but what gains could the Soviets have made outside of taking the rest of Korea? What support could they have sent? You can’t conjure institutionalized naval amphibious doctrine and logistical support over night. It took the US years of brutal bloody fighting in the early years of the Pacific war to perfect it by the time of Okinawa, and it still wasn’t perfect at that time.
@Mallery29:
And the attacks began a full week before the surrender, so if they didn’t fight, it wasn’t due to that….and a lot of the Japanese probably didn’t surrender, they were outflanked, outmanned, outgunned, outsmarted by the Russians in Manchuria…in addition, they probably didn’t have cliffs to throw themselves off of (seen the suicide cliffs in Guam, Saipan, and Okinawa).
I don’t know what any of that is supposed to be about? Is this in reference to the comments I made about the garrison of Kuril Islands just giving up when the Soviets attacked? The Soviets didn’t “attack” the Kuril’s until Aug 28th and at that point the signing of the formal surrender was only four days away. The Japanese commander was aware of this and rather then put the surrender cabinet in an awkward position during this sensitive time he was under strict orders to surrender to the occupying Soviet forces. None of the above statement applies to this specific situation.