The Japanese Imperial Army
The Japanese army of the time was built along German lines, and had larger infantry formation then their western European counter-parts. High in moral, well trained and cared for, and exceptionally well led at all levels of command, the Imprial army was a forced to be reckoned with. Their war with Russia had taught them many lessons. First of which was the importance in artillery. Imperial army leaders became aware of it importance during the Russo-Japanese war, and purchased 2 massive 240mm mortars from Germany to help their assaults. They also learned the futility of frontal assaults and adopted tactics of siege, and night attacks, which reduces casualties. The Japanese could also concentratre its forces more so then their europeans counter-parts, whos main focus was their own backyard.
The Allied powers in the far east were spread thin. Britian had only 1 Battalion of light infantry in Hong Kong at the time, with a further 2 or 3,000 men more in Malaya and Singapore, half of which were low moral sepoys of the Indian army who munitied in 1915, to reinforce them. The French had about 2,500 men spread out around their Indo-China holdings, most of them being positioned in the southern part of the territory. The Russians had the largest land force consisting of around 6,000 men formed in 2 army corps. One was positioned in Chita, on the western edge of Manchuria, it was 3,000 men strong and was made up of 3 Cossack regiments. The second was in the maritime province bordering eastern Manchuria and Korea. It was made up of a Dragoon regiment, 1 full and 1 half strenght cossack regiments and 1 battalion of Mountian Artillery. The Japanese army could deploy between 400 to 500,000 men with a further 200 to 300,000 that could be called upon as re-inforcments to replace losses.
The Imperial Japanese Navy
The Japanese navy of the day was a highly effective and very modern force, having only been created with in the last 20 years, with most of its ships being buitl with in the last 10. It consisted of 2 Deradnoughts, 1 modern and 2 2nd class battlecruisers, 10 pre-dreadnought battleships, 8 armoured cruisers, 15 protected cruisers, 6 light cruisers, around 50 destroyers, 12 submarines, numerous smaller costal and torpedo ships, and an aircraft and seaplane carrier. Most of these ships had been originaly built in European shipyards, only being constructed in Japan later. However, by 1910 only 20% of the parts needed to build these ships were comming from Europeans. The Japanese stratgey of “copy, improve, innovate” ment that by 1914 there was nearly no difference in the quality of ships comming from Japanese shipyards, as those comming from British ones. The battles against the Russians had taught the Japanese commanders the value of big gun ships, and most of the ships designed and built after this period reflect this. The battle of tsushima taught them the value of keeping their fleet concentrated and coordinated. The Japanese fleet was also the first in the world to use wireless telegraphy helping giving them an edge in intership communications and coordinations.
The greatest advantage for the Japanese fleet was that their European counter-parts were scattered and small in number, concentrating most of thie ships in European waters. The allied forces arrayed against them were small and would have been no match for a combined Japanese fleet. They were, for the most part, a mix of cruisers of various qualities, light, armoured, and protected, along with destroyers and other smaller vessles. The British pacific squadron had the largest ship on the allied side, with a battle cruiser stationed, I believe along with the few other escorting ships, in Singapore.
Japans opening strike on this force would see this, the only real allied force capable of stoping the Japanese, sunk rapidly with most likely limited Japanese losses. Also this combined fleet, re-inforced and working in conjunction with the German pacific squadron, would seek out any other large concentrations of allied warships and sink them. This would cause the Allied command in Europe, espically the British, to have to send more ships to protect its holdings and its commerical shipping, which would be at the central powers mercy in the pacific.
Japanese Industry
Japanese Industry of the day was still in its early life. The had developed rapidly and were of the more modern and effiecnt industries. The one thing that really hampered Japanese industry was its total lack of raw materials. However, with China brought into the fold, so to speak, in this scenario, Japan would have access to a large untaped resource . Moreover, China’s industry was so small and backwards that, for the most part, Japan could exploit and take what it needed, with out it really being missed by the Chinese. In exchange for this access, Japan could have traded arms and munitions, manufactured goods, industrial equipemnt and other things to China. Under the guise of helping the Chinese, Japan could have set up numerious large firms as joint “Sino-Japanese” enterprizes to further gain access to Chinese resources. Japan was far more adaptable to circumstances then then they were in the 30’s, and perhapse the political leadership of the day could have found a better way then the infamous “21 Demands” to work with China.
Also, in 1914, America and the Netherlands were neutural and could have been potential trading partners. The Dutch east indies were rich in all sorts of raw materials and the Dutch could have done a brisk bussiness with the Japanese, espically after their initial attack.
Ameirca is, of course, the wild card. Though not willing to or wanting anything to do with the European war, America had been jockying with Japan for position in the pacific since the 19th century. American politicians and army commanders would have been made very nervious by a Japanese attack on the Allies, but would have been hampered enough by lack of popular will to go to war. Also, by bringing China under their wing, and apperaring as though they were trying to help China get back on their feet, would have strenghted Japans position in the eyes of the American home front. For some odd reason, Americans seemed to have a soft spot for China around this time, and it would continue until the communist take over in 1949. As if they felt bad for China being forced to ceede so much to the Europeans, yet blind to the fact that their goverment was doing pretty much the same thing. So, a Japanese attack would worry and scare some Americans, espically the top military, political, and financial leaders, your average American might see it as Japan trying to help their “brother asian” neighbor, get out from under the heel of the Europeans, and would score a major propaganda victory.
Very few of the actions in the Pacific affected the war overall. The only use of the German colonies that Japan attacked was to serve as coaling ports, and they were seldom used for that as it was. Even on the side of the Allies Japan didn’t devote their entire military to the war effort, as most of the other powers did. Had Japan joined the Central Powers, the most they likely would have done would be to disrupt British Southeast Asian trade, which may have encouraged Britain to deploy a battle squadron to the region but would not have had a major effect on the the war.
On a side note, though, if Japan did join the Central Powers, the alliance would have to re-name itself (as they would no longer only be Central European powers).
Very few of the actions in the Pacific affected the war overall. The only use of the German colonies that Japan attacked was to serve as coaling ports, and they were seldom used for that as it was. Even on the side of the Allies Japan didn’t devote their entire military to the war effort, as most of the other powers did. Had Japan joined the Central Powers, the most they likely would have done would be to disrupt British Southeast Asian trade, which may have encouraged Britain to deploy a battle squadron to the region but would not have had a major effect on the the war.
Im still looking up the exact numbers, but Japan would be able to concentrate their whole army and fleet against the Allies, espically the British. This means that a simple battle squadron, which would consist of a battlecruiser or 2 pre-dreadnaught battleships, backed by 5-7 cruisers or varying types (armoured, protected, or light) and a destroyer screen or 6 to 10 ships. This would not be enough to stop a combined Japanese fleet which had 2 dreadnaughts 3 battlecruisers and 10 pre-dreadnaught battleships along over a dozen cruisers or varying types and over 50 escorts. This was a full fleet of modern ships and would have taken a similarly sized fleet or, more likely, larger to take it down. Also, the Japanese could have reinforced the German east asian squadron of 2 heavy crusiers and 4 light crusiers to add to their numbers.
Also, The Imperial Army was no slouch either. Having learned several lessons from their war with Russia, mainly the value of concentrated artillery and the futility of frontal assaults. Had Major-General Mitsuomi Kamio 23,000 men of the 18th division been sent against the single light infantry batallion, the Duke of Cornwalls Light Infantry Batallions 600 or so men, in Hong Kong instead of the Germans in Qingdao we would probably seen a Japanese capture of the colony.
Japan had no better chance of a Pacific empire than WWI. As long as they could keep the U.S out of the war while taking territoies.
If Japan had joined the Central Powers in 1914, then if it had attacked Russia, this might have had some political (destabilizing) effect on Russia, and might have led to them exiting the way earlier.
Other than that it’s hard to see Japan having that much of an impact. It might have distracted a good proportion of the Allied navies and colonial forces that would fight in places like Dard and Egypt.
The best chance of a decisive impact would be inflicting humiliating defeats on Russia in Siberia, combined with Germany changing its strategy and putting more pressure on Russia. If these 2 factors combine to force Russia to sue for peace, then that could change the outcome of the war.
But there’s also the possibility that Japan entering the war on the side of Germany might have motivated the USA to enter the war earlier, and that would nullify the Central advantage.
Somehow, I dont think that the US population would have wanted involvement weather Japan had backed the Central powers or not. The main thing is getting Britian to commit more naval forces to the pacific theater, causing the naval balance in Europe to shift to give the Germans an advantage.
Had the Japanese forced Britain to secure India and the Far East with ships, the Germans may have been able to used their elite cruiser force on British shipping in the North Atlantic. Or even possibly a few battle-cruisers- had the Kaiser had courage to do so.
Another intresting thought. Could a Japanese involvment in the central powers caused a bigger shift in Europe. Italy was still neutral, and had originaly been part of the central powers. Perhapse Japanese involvment and a few stunning early victories, like taking Hong Kong and destroying a few European powers east asian squadrons, could have brought the Italians in on the Centeral side. Granted, Italian preformance in the war was pretty poor, and I wouldnt expect them to do much. However it would have been another front for the allies to have to send troops to. A front the central powers wouldnt have needed to send forces to, and it would have ment another fleet in the Med for the allies to deal with.Also, Italian involvment would have ment that the British would have had to fight on 2 fronts in Egypt. I dont know qutie what the Italians had, but either way it would have stretched the British more.
