Most over-rated WWII Leader

MacArthur was by far the most overrated commander on the allied side. He was a man more interested with getting his name in the papers and with political maneuvering then the lives of the men under his command. I think the Philippines campaign is the best example of this. The campaign cost the US around 62,000 casualties that were totally avoidable, but we had to fight there as MacArthur had promised that “He would return” or some such nonsense. MacArthur pitched a fit when Nimitz put forward the idea of by-passing the islands as part of the overall island hopping campaign, and move to capture Taiwan instead. Given that part of this campaign saw the battle of Leyte gulf, which was so close to a Japanese victory, and would have had disastrous consequences of the continued American offensive in the Pacific, one wonders if it was really worth the risk. B-29’s could reach the Japanese mainland from Saipan, and capturing Taiwan would have allowed the allies to strangle all Japanese south of that position including those on the Philippines. It was all done to appease MacArthur’s pride.

On a side note, about Patton, I think it should be noted that all accounts from the Germans say he was “the best” or “most feared” but then say for an allied General. To me that smacks more then a little of a condescending refrain. It’s almost like the Germans are saying, "out of all the wheelchair bound retards with sticks we have to fight, the one with the slightly pointyer stick, ie Patton, is more worrisome to fight then the rest, if for no other reason then he might try to stand up and fall over poking himself in the eye in the process.

@Clyde85:

On a side note, about Patton, I think it should be noted that all accounts from the Germans say he was “the best” or “most feared” but then say for an allied General.

Would you mind sharing the source of that information? As you can see in older posts on this topic, there’s been quite a bit of discussion a few years ago about how the Germans rated Allied generals, notably Patton and Montgomery. In the end, nobody came up with a reliable original source.

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Without being able to quote a source, and just going off my own knowledge and opinions of the subject, I think that the Germans didn’t necessarily think Patton was the “best” general because of his military accomplishments.
The Germans saw him as the most like their generals - aggressive, quick-thinking, no nonsense - and the Nazis tended to think of themselves as superior to everyone, including militarily. 
Since they were the best, and Patton was the most like them, therefore Patton must be the best Allied general.

BTW, my money is on Dugout Douglas MacArthur being the most overrated. It was all about MacArthur.
Saying, “I shall return,” instead of we or us, strong-arming Roosevelt into attacking the Philippines and costing thousands of lives not only there but on islands like Peleliu because they had to be taken to cover his flank.
And even though the Philippines would have been lost anyway, he made very few good moves in defending it.
Even when he returned it was more about him returning than about the fighting.

He took a giant gamble at Inchon, and though it paid off, it led him to thinking he was the only one who knew better.

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Thank you. I don’t have any of those books, so when the issue came up earlier, we only had information that was available from various internet resources.

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Good post! :) Elsewhere, I’ve read that Montgomery would attack only when he had overwhelming numeric superiority. Superior generalship can be used to compensate for numerical parity, or even numerical inferiority. To my knowledge, Montgomery never displayed superior generalship in that way.

Admittedly, the Allies typically had overwhelming numerical superiority, especially after 1941. This meant Allied generals had relatively few opportunities to show what they could do in an even fight. But my sense is that Montgomery’s advances tended to be slow, plodding, unimaginative, and therefore more expensive in terms of Allied soldiers’ lives lost. Fast advances, such as Germany’s blitzkrieg or Patton’s attacks, tend to allow any given military objective to be achieved for a much smaller cost to one’s own soldiers.

You’ve pointed out that Montgomery made basic mistakes during Operation Goodwood. This reinforces my impression that Montgomery was a less capable, less imaginative, and less insightful general than Patton. A lack of deep insight and caution can often go together. Someone who does not deeply understand a situation cannot understand its risks or how to avoid them; and therefore seeks to minimize all risk. On the other hand, someone with deep insight may realize that something which on the surface had seemed risky is actually relatively safe–if done correctly. It’s a difference between an 80 year old woman driving 10 MPH below the speed limit, and a race car driver traveling at a very high speed. Something which would be sheer suicide for a below-average quality driver is within the acceptable risk tolerance of the race car driver. His skill greatly reduces the risk associated with his high speed. By the same token, Guderian, von Mannstein, or Patton could undertake rapid advances more safely than could Montgomery.

@KurtGodel7:

Elsewhere, I’ve read that Montgomery would attack only when he had overwhelming numeric superiority.

Where have you read this? Was that opinion offered by an authoritative source? Were those situations in which it would indeed have been a better course to attack without that overwhelming numeric superiority?

@KurtGodel7:

But my sense is that Montgomery’s advances tended to be slow, plodding, unimaginative, and therefore more expensive in terms of Allied soldiers’ lives lost. Fast advances, such as Germany’s blitzkrieg or Patton’s attacks, tend to allow any given military objective to be achieved for a much smaller cost to one’s own soldiers.

@KurtGodel7:

By the same token, Guderian, von Mannstein, or Patton could undertake rapid advances more safely than could Montgomery.

Are comparative statistics about the number of casualties and the measure of success in operations of roughly comparable scope conducted by these respective generals, available?

The usual lies and distortion peddled by those who can never forgive the fact Monty saw off the golden boy Rommel (twice) and in 12 weeks  planned and executed the complete destruction of the German Army in France.
Anyone wishing to find the facts about the  claims the German’s 'feared ’ Patton should get Yeid’s new book.

http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Patton-George-Through-Enemies/dp/0760341281/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

Review here

http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/106656

It  demolished the claim that Patton’s reputation  was responsible for keeping German  troops away fron the beachead.

The claim Monty suffered dispropotionate casualties when fighting the German is a pure invention.

Listen to the boss……

Never far from the front lines

Test

The usual lies and distortion peddled by those who can never forgive the fact Monty saw off the golden boy Rommel (twice) and in 12 weeks  planned and executed the complete destruction of the German Army in France.
Anyone wishing to find the facts about the  claims the German’s 'feared ’ Patton should get Yeid’s new book.

http://www.amazon.com/Fighting-Patton-George-Through-Enemies/dp/0760341281/ref=cm_cr_pr_product_top

Review here

http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/106656

It  demolished the claim that Patton’s reputation  was responsible for keeping German  troops away fron the beachead.

The claim Monty suffered dispropotionate casualties when fighting the German is a pure invention.

I didn’t say anything about the Germans fearing Patton, but that the Germans regarded him as the most competent Allied armoured warfare General, and that after the break out from Normandy several German Generals and members of the General staff tired to keep close track of his 3rd army’s movement.

Also, have you ever heard of Operation Goodwood? You should read up on it some time because the casualties were extremely disproportional. British amroured strength was between 1,100 ad 1,300 while the Germans only had about 375. British losses are estimated around 400 tanks knocked out or destroyed while the Germans only lost around 80-90 tanks, which seems disproportional to me. British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captutred, so that could be considered more of an even exchange I guess).

@Clyde85:

I didn’t say anything about the Germans fearing Patton, but that the Germans regarded him as the most competent Allied armoured warfare General, and that after the break out from Normandy several German Generals and members of the General staff tired to keep close track of his 3rd army’s movement.

If you read the linked review I gave you then you could see that this claim is not correct.
However if you would like to continue down this road do you have the names/quotes of the ‘several German Generals and members of the General staff’

@Clyde85:

British infantry supporting the operation suffered 4,000 casualties where as the Germans suffered only 2,000 (though by the end of the operation 2,500 Germans had also be captutred, so that could be considered more of an even exchange I guess).

   16th LW FD alone lost 3600 men in July, the bulk of which were suffered during Goodwood. Indeed the Division was effectively destroyed on July 18th. In addition intelligence reports note that over 2800 German POW’s were taken (not 2500) Your German figures seem to be a bit too low but  balanced reporting has never been a factor when Goodwood is discussed.
German figures for Goodwood are not listed seperately but we know that for 12-20 July they lost 6500 men. I leave it to others to try and chip away at the total to find a figure that best suits their preconceptions.

POW totals for the UK are 325 so the Germans surrendered at a rate 9 times greater. Though some use the tank loss figures to ‘prove’ the Germans ‘won’ they never want to compare the POW totals. I wonder why?

Actually the POW comparison proves Clyde’s position.

The German units, even the SS ones, weren’t exactly fully comprised of experienced men between 22 and 40.

Everyone knew Germany was losing, and thus, many of thier conscripts just wanted to surrender.  So number for number, you would actually have to reduce consideration of the equitable strength of the German Forces, which was probably a hodge podge of whatever they had left.

In all likely hood these troops surrendered freely, as opposed to being captured.  And lets not talk about supplies, weapons, food, or discipline comparisons.

Thus in reality, the British SHOULD have had much superior results.  Especially considering the mostly had supremacy of the air.

@Lazarus:

If you read the linked review I gave you then you could see that this claim is not correct.
However if you would like to continue down this road do you have the names/quotes of the ‘several German Generals and members of the General staff’

If you read my post from earlier you’ll see where I mentioned this but if you can’t then here you go

@Clyde85:

I’ve based my comments on those I have read in the memoirs of Lt. Colonel Hans Van Luck in “Panzer Commander” and from Maj Gen. F.W. Von Mellenthins’ “Panzer Battles”. Both made comments to the effect of Patton being one of the best allied generals with regard to his application of armored formations in combat. Von Mellenthin having fought against Patton in Alsace-Lorraine region of France remarked that He, his immediate superior, General Balck, and the army group Commander von Rundstedt were very wary of the movements of Patton and his 3rd army as they knew he had true understanding of armoured warfare. Though von Mellenthin goes on to say that Patton’s 3rd army’s habit of including “leg” infantry was a poor choice and hampered him from greater operational success, and the GI’s were rather poor soliders, but Patton still managed to make the most out of it.

In the other instance Von Luck faced off against Montgomery in operation “Goodwood” during the break out from Normandy and made mention of a number of rather obvious and simple mistakes Monty made during the operation. For instance he commented that British tanks would move with out any infantry support, or infantry moving without armoured support, would make it very easy for the Germans to deploy effective counter-measures and inflict great casualties on Monty’s forces.

They are, I feel, the best contemporary (of that time) sources for the feeling of German officers about two of the key allied commanders. If you want I can go back into both books and cite specifics passages.

Also, I think your figures are off for Goodwood, and I think you may be including other operation such as Epsom, Martlet, Chanrwood, and Windsor which were the precursors to operation Goodwood that were carried out in June and July.

I assure you that I do not confuse Epsom (26 June) with Goodwood (18 July) and German losses from 10th July can not possibly include Epsom losses.
I could ask you how you managed to get 2000 German losses for Goodwood. I have never seen a credible source that manages to isolate Goodwood casualties and wonder where you got it.

If you want more senior comments on Monty try this:

The Other Side Of The Hill
page 355

_In a reference to the Allied commanders, Rundstedt said:
“Montgomery and Patton were the two best that I met. FieldMarshal
Montgomery was very systematic.” He added: “That
is all right if you have sufficient forces, and sufficient time.”
Blumentritt made a similar comment. After paying tribute to
the speed of Patton drive, he added: “Field-Marshal Montgomery
was the one general who never suffered a reverse. He
moved like this”-Blumentritt took a series of very deliberate
and short steps, putting his foot down heavily each time.
Giving his impression of the different qualities of the British
and American troops, Blumentritt said: "The Americans attacked
with zest, and had a keen sense of mobile action, but when
they came under heavy artillery fire they usualJy fell back-even
after they had made a successful penetration. By contrast, once
the British had got their teeth in, and had been in a position
for twenty-four hours, it proved almost impossible to shift them.
To counter-attack the British always cost us very heavy losses.

I had many opportunities to observe this interesting difference
in the autumn of 1944, when the right half of my corps faced
the British, and the left half the American."……

Blumentritt considered that the Allied offensive had been too
widely and evenly spread. He was particularly critical of the
attack towards Metz,[MY EDIT: check who attacked Metz] pointing out that the forces available to
defend this sector along the Moselle were better relatively than
elsewhere. "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The
Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast, a
swerve northward in the direction of Luxembourg and Bitburg
would have met with great success and caused the collapse of
the right flank of our 7th Army. By such a flank move to the
north the entire 7th Army could have been cut off before it
could retreat behind the Rhine. Thus the bulk of the defeated
German Army would have been wiped out west of the Rhine.

._

Have you seen the comments on Von Luck in  the Daglish  book ‘Over The Battlefield:  Operation Goodwood’? His views were echoed by Dunphie. In short they opine that Luck greatly overestimates his effect on Goodwood and despite intensive research Daglish  has been unable to locate the oft mentioned ‘88’ gun position he says he  took over and thus stopped the British advance. Daglish had the recce photos taken of the area von Luck says the guns were sited and found no trace of them. The opinion on Luck is that he has(over the years) used information gathered long after the events to ‘refresh’ his memory of the days events .

“Re: Most over-rated WWII Leader”

Stalin wins.  Cult of personality much?
Like, you’re talking about over-rated.  Until Kruschev pissed all over the parade, Stalin was supposed to fart flowers and s**t rainbows.

Apart from that, Churchhill got lucky.  If you discount Stalin because he’s not over-rated any more on account of crash of personality cult, then gotta be him.

For military, uhm.  IMO most that have decent reps that are actual reputations, decent.  If I had to choose, probably General MacArthur or Yamamoto.  The criteria isn’t “who was a schmoe”, it’s “who is most over-rated”.

@Herr:

Where have you read this? Was that opinion offered by an authoritative source? Were those situations in which it would indeed have been a better course to attack without that overwhelming numeric superiority?

Are comparative statistics about the number of casualties and the measure of success in operations of roughly comparable scope conducted by these respective generals, available?

Yours are reasonable questions. It’s unfortunate that no one in this discussion has offered answers to the kinds of questions you’re asking. The closest has been Clyde, whose posts and information about Operation Goodwood have been very informative. I also think the quote you provided from Ryan’s book was helpful to the discussion.

While I don’t have time right now to dig up the answers you seem to want, I’d like to contribute something else to the discussion instead. It’s a quote from Target: Patton by Robert Wilcox. Take it for what it’s worth.

[Patton] had done things militarily thought impossible. Just a year before, he had quickly turned the huge and unwieldy Third Army 90 degrees north from its easterly drive through France in snow and bitter cold to help save outnumbered and besieged U.S. paratroopers at Bastogne, Belgium. When he had proposed the rescue, his contemporaries said it could not be done. But he had been preparing it for days. His drive across France and Germany was itself one of the most brilliant feats of the European War, and it broke the back of the Nazis’ last major offensive–the Battle of the Bulge in Ardennes Forest. . . .

The press . . . often criticized him, especially towards the end of the war. Largely unrecognized by most of the news writers was the fact that he used his trademark swift, relentless, and crushing attacks–what they generally deemed as brutal and uncaring–to save lives by enabling victory to be more quickly attained. Hesitation, he preached, was a soldier’s worst enemy. A commander had to act swiftly and decisively to take advantage of fleeting, critical opportunities in battle. But his enemies, many of whom had never served and probably thanked God for it, thought him devoid of compassion–ad if that were a requisite for fighting–and a warmonger. He did love war but, as most warriors do, he loved it as a crucible, a test of his prowess and courage and, in his own peculiar religious way, a fulfillment of his destiny. But he was fully mindful of war’s horrors and pointed them out often.

His rivalry with British Field Marshall Bernhard Montgomery, who outranked him but whom he regarded as timid and indecisive, was a volatile story that had gotten him public attention, good and bad. . . .

He had raged at his superiors’ decisions to repeatedly halt his advances, most notably at Falaise where he could have killed thousands of Germans who escaped through a narrow pocket and returned to fight at the Battle of the Bulge; at the German border, where he could have crossed early and, he believed, shortened the war and saved American lives; and at the conclusion of the European conflict, just months before, when his pleas to go deeper into Eastern Europe and beat the Russians to crucial objectives, especially Berlin, had been sternly rejected. Fearing he might advance in spite of their orders not to, Eisenhower and General Omar Bradley, Patton’s immediate superior, several times cut off his gas supply. . . .

[Patton] was not insubordinate as he was unfairly characterized. Commanders were usually given discretion in the field and most of his unauthorized actions had resulted in success–the ultimate measure of a commander’s worth. Nevertheless, the same commanders–Eisenhower and Bradley–whose faulty orders he ignored had no shame in reaping the credit. For the most part, Patton was unfailingly loyal and professional and obeyed orders even when he bitterly disagreed. A former jeep driver for him, Francis J. Sanza, remembers Patton’s eyes tearing up because he was so angry when he was denied permission to go to Berlin. But he obeyed, however reluctantly. . . .

While Eisenhower and Bradley had been rapidly promoted, riding the victories [Patton] had mostly provided, [Patton’s] promotion was slow in coming.

pp. 2 - 6

This would be the same Patton who had the brilliant plan of attacking Metz  frontaly and ‘on the run’ and who suffered huge casualties when it went wrong. Lorraine  proved that when he faced German troops in prepared positions  he had no great military skill and no plan other than try and kick in the front door.
The same Patton who sacraficed the lives of his men to try and rescue a relative from a POW Camp?
The reason he was ‘stopped’ from  trying to close the Falaise gap was because his own commanders recognised that if he was foolish enough to dash across the neck of the pocket he would  have been  trampled to death by the retreating Germans. He was stopped to save him from  a humiliating defeat. Bradley said he prefered a  solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise.
That is how much confidence his superiors had in his ability!

Patton could not have done the job the Eisenhower did as Supreme Allied commander, but he knew how to make use of his mobile advantage, close air support, and logistics in the aftermath of the Contentin Peninsula breakout and later his rapid shift in axis of advance helped save the battle of the bulge. The 101st’s heroic stand would have been wasted had they been relying on someone like Montgomery to save them. He had his deficiencies, but he was the type of aggressive cowboy that the American army needed in it’s arsenal.

IMO, the two biggest overrated leaders would be Gen Montgomery and Gen MacArthur. Montgomery was decent on defense, but he sucked wholeheartedly when trying to mount an attack. God forbid his troops advance without tea time when their paratroop brethren were getting shellacked. He was mostly the product of the English need for a national hero with all the setbacks they faced early in the war. MacArthur was a pompous windbag who invented his own intelligence to suit his version of what was going on, got us involved with China during the Korean war despite repeated warnings to stay away from the Yalu river from both the Chinese and his own higher ups, cost us a large portion of our pre-war ‘modern’ aircraft on the ground, forsook prewar planning by stockpiling needed supplies near the beaches and then decided too late that wasn’t a good move and didn’t get them transported back to his lines in time, and generally devoted most of his energies into self-serving PR.

@Lazarus:

This would be the same Patton who had the brilliant plan of attacking Metz frontaly and ‘on the run’ and who suffered huge casualties when it went wrong. Lorraine proved that when he faced German troops in prepared positions he had no great military skill and no plan other than try and kick in the front door.
The same Patton who sacraficed the lives of his men to try and rescue a relative from a POW Camp?
The reason he was ‘stopped’ from trying to close the Falaise gap was because his own commanders recognised that if he was foolish enough to dash across the neck of the pocket he would have been trampled to death by the retreating Germans. He was stopped to save him from a humiliating defeat. Bradley said he prefered a solid shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Falaise.
That is how much confidence his superiors had in his ability!

The Metz attack was Patton’s only real major failure in what had otherwise been a string of major successes.

You have presented several opinions as though they were facts. You do not know if Patton’s motive in liberating the POW camp was to save his son-and-law only, or if he also wanted to free the other Americans and Allied personnel present. Further, you stated as fact that, had Patton attacked the Falaise gap, “he would have been trampled to death by the retreating Germans.” We know that Bradley and Eisenhower expressed the view that this would have happened. But I have seen nothing to suggest that Bradley or Eisenhower were Patton’s equals as generals. When there is a difference of opinion, we should not (as you have done) assume that Bradley and Eisenhower were right, and Patton wrong.

To take a somewhat similar example: as Guderian’s panzers were advancing across France in an effort to cut off the Allied force in Northwestern France and the low countries, the German generals became nervous about a possible counterattack, and ordered a halt. They were even, for a time, able to talk Hitler into agreeing to this more cautious approach. Guderian managed to talk someone senior to him into giving him permission for a “reconnaissance in force.” A reconnaissance which Guderian then proceeded to execute–with the emphasis here being on force. Guderian’s willingness to defy or creatively interpret his orders directly led to the conquest of France. Nothing I’ve read suggests that Eisenhower or Bradley were any more competent than the German generals who had ordered Guderian to halt. I have seen the opposite view expressed: that the German generals tended to be superior to their Allied counterparts.

On page 5, Wilcox mentioned one instance in which Patton had ignored Eisenhower’s orders.

But as he was often at odds with his superiors’ plans, he sometimes conveniently found ways to disregard their orders. For instance, on May 1, 1945, he went ahead and captured Trier, Germany, even though Eisenhower, thinking Patton did not have enough divisions to do so, had told him to stay put. Upon being called on the action, he signaled Ike, “What do you want me to do? Give it back?”