@CWO:
@Red:
A German general (addressing the Americans): “One of our tanks is worth ten of yours. Unfortunately, you always have eleven.”
Wasn’t the exchange rate more like one for three or less?�Â
As I recall, the exchange ratio in Sherman / Panther engagements was about 4-to-1. The Sherman, for all of its defects, was a good tank from an automotive point of view (a result of its Detroit auto industry origins), so Shermans often tried to use their superior mobility and superior numbers to scoot behind German tanks and hit their weaker rear armour. One of the Panther’s supposed advantages – its high velocity main gun – sometimes worked against it: the barrel was so long that it was tricky to train the turret on forested ground.
I might add that US tank warfare doctrine relied upon tank destroyers to supplement their tanks significantly. The early war theory that medium tanks like the Sherman would support infantry and coordinate with the TDs to combat enemy armor.
The Sherman was a good tank and with a heavier gun earlier in the war might have been even better when combined with the number of them built.
Moving back toward the topic of historical accuracy in terms of technological strengths: it is useful to break things into eras as well. And there are various other aspects to consider.
Some examples are:
1. The IJN’s torpedoes were far superior to allied torpedoes, with much greater range/speed IIRC. This was a key consideration in surface combat as the IJN cruisers participated in naval torpedo attack as well as the destroyers. This was an integral part of IJN battle plans.
2. The USN’s torpedoes had defective detonators for the first year or more (I did a thread on this some time ago, think it got moved to house rules.) The fish also ran at the wrong depth (location of the sensor tap was poorly chosen.) Very few of the early war USN submarine-fired torpedoes actually detonated or detonated at the intended location. This wasn’t the fault of the sub-captains, many of the shots were textbook perfect. Things changed when the torpedoes were fixed.
3. Early in the war the IJN’s training and preparation for night action gave them a tremendous advantage, esp. coupled with a superb torpedo.
4. Midway through the Pacific war Allied radar flipped the night time advantage back to the Allies. It only got worse for Japan as the war went on.
5. The Italian navy lacked functional radar early in the war (maybe throughout?) and this brought about the doom of a number of Italian vessels in night actions.
6. The US and UK had a good training pipeline for replacing pilot losses, as well as minimizing their actual combat losses. The USSR and Japan tended to use light aircraft that were good dogfighters, but not able to take much punishment. Often the Japanese pilots weren’t even wearing/using parachutes early in the war. The Japanese soon ran short of trained pilots and had no system in place to train the number of required replacements.
7. The USSR had negligible strategic bombing capability and little reason to develop it since it was engaged in a struggle of survival deep within its own borders. On the other hand, the Russians had perhaps the best ground attack aircraft of the war in the form of the IL-2.
I notice tactical bombers were not in the discussion, but these are tricky to quantify since the range or roles was so wide.
When it comes to comparitive tech for aircraft I would rank Japan at the same level as the Allies at the start of the Pacific War. They had many weaknesses, but they also had strengths such as range and elite pilots. Japan’s aircraft tech did not advance rapidly enough.
@Red:
Moving back toward the topic of historical accuracy in terms of technological strengths: it is useful to break things into eras as well. And there are various other aspects to consider.
Yes, those are good points you mention. The early-war torpedo contrast between the IJN and the USN could not have been more dramatic, with the USN having a large percentage of duds and the IJN having the best heavyweight torpedo in the world, the oxygen-fuelled Long Lance.
A supplemental point related to item 6 of your list is that the Japanese had a fairly cavalier attitude towards rescuing downed pilots, in contrast with the Americans who devoted a lot of effort to search-and-rescue operations. The USN recognized that this was not only good for morale, but also that it was a good investment to recover trained pilots and send them back into combat.
@Red:
Moving back toward the topic of historical accuracy in terms of technological strengths: it is useful to break things into eras as well. And there are various other aspects to consider.
Some examples are:
1. The IJN’s torpedoes were far superior to allied torpedoes, with much greater range/speed IIRC. This was a key consideration in surface combat as the IJN cruisers participated in naval torpedo attack as well as the destroyers. This was an integral part of IJN battle plans.
2. The USN’s torpedoes had defective detonators for the first year or more (I did a thread on this some time ago, think it got moved to house rules.) The fish also ran at the wrong depth (location of the sensor tap was poorly chosen.) Very few of the early war USN submarine-fired torpedoes actually detonated or detonated at the intended location. This wasn’t the fault of the sub-captains, many of the shots were textbook perfect. Things changed when the torpedoes were fixed.
3. Early in the war the IJN’s training and preparation for night action gave them a tremendous advantage, esp. coupled with a superb torpedo.
4. Midway through the Pacific war Allied radar flipped the night time advantage back to the Allies. It only got worse for Japan as the war went on.
5. The Italian navy lacked functional radar early in the war (maybe throughout?) and this brought about the doom of a number of Italian vessels in night actions.
6. The US and UK had a good training pipeline for replacing pilot losses, as well as minimizing their actual combat losses. The USSR and Japan tended to use light aircraft that were good dogfighters, but not able to take much punishment. Often the Japanese pilots weren’t even wearing/using parachutes early in the war. The Japanese soon ran short of trained pilots and had no system in place to train the number of required replacements.
7. The USSR had negligible strategic bombing capability and little reason to develop it since it was engaged in a struggle of survival deep within its own borders. On the other hand, the Russians had perhaps the best ground attack aircraft of the war in the form of the IL-2.I notice tactical bombers were not in the discussion, but these are tricky to quantify since the range or roles was so wide.
When it comes to comparitive tech for aircraft I would rank Japan at the same level as the Allies at the start of the Pacific War. They had many weaknesses, but they also had strengths such as range and elite pilots. Japan’s aircraft tech did not advance rapidly enough.
Good post, and very informative.
The IL 2 was ridiculously difficult to shoot down because of all that armor. However, its ordinance load was light; also because of the armor. To take all this into account, the Soviets’ starting dive bomber design will have more hit points than other nations’, but a lower land combat value.
On another matter, people from the 1700s would often extol the virtues of bows and arrows over gunfire. A Native American brave could fire several arrows in the time it took to reload a musket just once. The arrows were quiet; as opposed to the noisy bang which revealed the presence of the gunner. The big cloud of smoke would help his enemies localize him further. An archer in a forest could reammunition with locally available materials. Muskets were useless if the gun power got wet. In many ways the bow and arrow was a superior weapon to early guns; at least against unarmored targets.
But if a 1700s era gun is your starting point, you can gradually improve on it. Rifle the barrel to increase range. Put bullet + gunpowder together in the same jacket to reduce reload time. Eventually, you’ll have machine guns and assault rifles; whereas the other guy will still be using bows and arrows. At that point, the outcome will be decided.
In 1941, Japanese planes were in many ways better than their American counterparts. They were faster and longer ranged. But American planes has things Japanese planes lacked: self-sealing fuel tanks, armor, etc. I’d argue that the American planes represented early versions of a new style of plane design; whereas Japanese planes were very good aircraft using that older style. If, from '41 - '44, American aircraft technology seemed to advance faster than Japan’s, it was because the Japanese aircraft of '41 represented a much worse starting point for technological advancement than did American aircraft. Not as extreme as the guns versus bow and arrow example to be sure, but still a significant difference.
I’d also like to address the subject of tanks. My rules set recognizes four categories of tanks:
Light tanks (15 tons). Examples include the tanks the Germans used in '39; as well as the tanks the Italians and Japanese used thought the war.
Medium tanks (25 tons). Examples include the Sherman, the T-34, etc.
Battle tanks (50 tons). Examples include the Panther, the Tiger 1, and the Pershing.
Heavy tanks (75 tons). Examples include the Tiger 2 and the E-75.
Nations with low levels of tank technology will only be able to build light tanks. As they continue to research, their light tanks will get more advanced. Then they’ll gain the ability to build more expensive medium tanks, but won’t yet have the tech to take full advantage of the medium tank chassis. As their tank tech continues to advance, it will eventually be in their interest to switch to a medium tank design. Later they’ll want to move to battle tanks, assuming the game lasts that long. The final step in this process is migration to heavy tanks; a step most nations are unlikely to ever reach.
Most of the time, nations will be best off picking some less than maximum tank chassis–such as medium tanks–and doing only enough research to max out that chassis. That approach will free up EUs to use on other technologies, or on industrialization.
Ben Franklin at one point advocated arming the Continental Army’s troops with the bow and arrow for the exact reasons you cited.
Even the USN’s F4F and thier pilots were able to adapt through technique and exploiting some of the weaknesses of the Zero. One strategy was to charge directly toward the Zero with heavy bursts exploiting the more fragile design of the Zero. Another was the “weave” where two fighters would weave thier flight path to force the Japanese pilot to choose one aircraft or the other. One would run while the other chased.
Good post!
Ben Franklin at one point advocated arming the Continental Army’s troops with the bow and arrow for the exact reasons you cited.
Even the USN’s F4F and thier pilots were able to adapt through technique and exploiting some of the weaknesses of the Zero. One strategy was to charge directly toward the Zero with heavy bursts exploiting the more fragile design of the Zero. Another was the “weave” where two fighters would weave thier flight path to force the Japanese pilot to choose one aircraft or the other. One would run while the other chased.
Good post!
Thanks. And I agree with your meta-message. Namely, that military personnel can use good tactics to exploit the advantages of their equipment while capitalizing on the disadvantages of their enemies’ equipment. Your description of American pilots’ early war tactics is a good example of that.
I’d like to turn the subject back to tanks. To max out the heavy tank design, you’d need 130 design points. (That is, you’d need to research tanks level 130.) Suppose China were to try to do that. China starts out with tanks tech level 0. It has three home cities, which means it gets 3 EUs a turn. It is poor in tank research. A decision to spend 3 EUs a turn on tank research will cause its tank tech to go up by 2 points a turn. At that rate, it would take 65 turns of throwing all its EUs into tank research for China to be able to max out heavy tanks. This is probably not a realistic goal for the Chinese player to have. On the other hand, once China gets to tanks level 10 (5 turns of research), it could build light tanks. With an additional three turns of research, its light tanks could be maxed out.
On the other hand, Germany is excellent at tank research; which means that each time it spends 3 EUs on tank research, its tanks tech goes up by 7. Once Germany researches Wunderwaffen tech, then instead of spending 3 EUs for one block of research, it will spend 5 EUs on two blocks. In terms of tanks research, that means that instead of spending 3 EUs per turn to go up by 7 design points per turn, it would spend 5 EUs per turn to go up by 14 design points per turn. Germany starts at tanks level 20; so it would only need 8 turns to research fully maxed-out heavy tanks. This is an achievable goal.
The other nations in the game are somewhere between those two extremes. With the possible exception of Japan, maxed out medium tanks represents an achievable goal for each nation in this game. Britain is good at tanks research; which means that each instance of tanks research causes its tanks tech level to increase by 4 points. It would take Britain 13 turns to research the tech needed for fully maxed out battle tanks. This goal is achievable assuming a longer game, and assuming a British player grimly determined to pour EUs into tank research each and every turn. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. might be better served contenting themselves with medium tanks; exactly as those two nations did in the real war.
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses. Historically, even very successful attacks severely depleted these forces. Examples would be heavy losses in Poland and France as well as pilot/aircraft losses in several of the major early war IJN/USN encounters.
Aircraft were particularly prone to heavy attrition just operating. And they were easy to target in suprise attacks at the outbreak of war. But since the game allows them to be chosen last they don’t attrit. Plus they can be held away from the front. This is why the USSR’s air force is almost completely absent in the initial placement.
Personally, this forum has become a bit to educational for me :|
Anyways, i LOVE overly complex board war games. Means there’s less for me to complain about.
The only thing i can add here is to make a list of all the things i would like to see.
Supply routes (via trucks, trains, etc) (as well as different types of supply, bullets/food etc)
Technology (Infantry, Artillery, Tanks, Theory, Industry, Air, Naval etc)
Attrition stack penalty (massive armies controlled by a single general were pretty damn unwieldy in WWII)
Generals/commanders
Theaters
Resources of all sorts (oil, materials, man power)
Terrain
Structures of all sorts (oil refinery, Heavy industries, Cities, fortifications, Coastal battery’s)
Lots of units (and some way of making playing to purchase 30 different units instead of 30 Infantry)
Territory of equal size (or hexes), Its really annoying that its faster to get from Japan to Moscow than from Paris. Its also annoying that getting to the same location, is sometimes faster by going around than directly towards it.
That’s about it, except for 2 thing.
The biggest problem about starting a powerful, in-depth game like this early means you can NEVER have a historical game. You can have a historical starting setup. You can encourage players to do historical things. But there’s nothing you can do to FORCE them to do this.
And it get worse, If you force every nation to side with the side they were on historically, then its historic. Yes.
But then it ruins the fact that your trying to make a complicated, in-depth game. A good game would allow (no matter how unlikely) ANYTHING to happen. (Cough America joins the Axis Cough)
@Red:
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses. Historically, even very successful attacks severely depleted these forces. Examples would be heavy losses in Poland and France as well as pilot/aircraft losses in several of the major early war IJN/USN encounters.
Aircraft were particularly prone to heavy attrition just operating. And they were easy to target in suprise attacks at the outbreak of war. But since the game allows them to be chosen last they don’t attrit. Plus they can be held away from the front. This is why the USSR’s air force is almost completely absent in the initial placement.
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses.
They do in my rules set! 8-) Every round of ground or naval combat begins with the dogfight phase. In the dogfight phase, all units present fire at their air combat values. Any hits you receive must be applied to air units. Once you have applied a single anti-air hit to one of your air units, you must apply additional hits to that same unit until it’s dead, or until combat ends. (The same is true if you apply an anti-land hit to one of your land units, an anti-naval hit to one of your ships, or an anti-sub hit to one of your submarines.)
There are other ways aircraft can be destroyed as well. In strategic bombing raids, there is one round of dogfight phase, followed by strategic bombers attacking their targets using their strategic bombing values. Strategic bombing raids do permanent damage. For every ten points of damage a production facility experiences in a strategic bombing raid, it is reduced by one level. While nations receive some money from territory income, most of their late game production will come from production facilities. A sufficiently powerful strategic bombing offensive can destroy all those facilities; as well as the underlying cities in which they would exist. The correct defense against a strategic bombing offensive is to build air superiority planes; such as piston fighters or jet fighters.
There is a second way of defending oneself from strategic bombing raids: airfield attacks. To initiate an airfield attack, send your planes to a space with enemy aircraft, and declare an airfield attack. There will be two rounds of dogfight phase. Any of your planes which survived that dogfight may launch one attack against enemy aircraft, using their land combat values.
@Red:
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses. […] Aircraft were particularly prone to heavy attrition just operating.
Yes, and tanks have attrition problems too when they do a lot of long-distance marching. Ideally, long- and medium-range tank movement (menaing at the strategic and operational scales) is done by ship (if applicable) and by rail, with tanks moving on their own over short (tactical-scale) ranges. Tanks and othe tracked vehicles are high-maintenance beasts, and the further they travel on their own the more they’ll start breaking down. It’s the concept of “mean time between failures”, but in this case with distance rather than time being the variable.
@rjpeters70:
But, would their kill rate have been higher had they been trained to use bows and arrows? Similar range and accuracy (or better, if you knew what you were doing with them), but far quicker to load (around 5 seconds).Â
The “if you knew what you were doing” point you mention is important because experience needs to be considered. The English longbow is a good illustrative example: it took a lot of training and strength to use it at its maximum potential. If I recall correctly, some of the skeletons recoved from the Mary Rose were identifiable as longbowmen because the sideways-twisted stance used by archers when firing affected their spines over the course of their careers.
Another historical instance of technological imbalance was the introduction of firearms in Shogun-era Japan. Samurai who learned their craft – the handling of swords and of bows – over a lifetime found themselves being shot down by musket-equiped armies consisting of ordinary peasants who could been trained in relatively little time to use the newfangled firearms. The samurai class eventually contrived to take control of – and eliminate – the firearms trade in order to save themselves from: a) battlefield obsolescence, and b) the humiliation of being killed by their social inferiors.
@rjpeters70:
Fair points, but if you’re firing from a fixed position that offers concealment, and are trying to kill masses of forces moving hundreds of yards over open terrain, wouldn’t you want to get off several volleys before they hit the walls?
In that sense, wave after wave of mass arrows might have done the trick.
Note: I’m not offering that warfare itself should have stuck with bows and arrows until the advent of the repeating rifle. I’m wondering about a specific battle.
If we’re talking spacifics though a musket would be easier to fire from concealment. The stance one would need to take to launch thier arrow with skill and effectiveness would expose them considerably toenemy fire. One can stay lower behind a wall, rampart, or window while reloading and firing a musket.
An archer must be in an in an exposed stance to launch thier arrow accurately and achieve range.
Consider the differece of firing an arrow vs.a musket through an arrow loop. An archer had to stand several feet back from the arrow-loop and was firing somewhat blind through a narrow slot in a wall. One could fire a musket while looking directly through an opening in the wall because the barrel could be exposed through the opening or extend over battlements and still offer concealment to the operator.
With all that said, firing arrows in volleys over the walls at a steep angle in mass formations would provide a rapid rain of arrows at shorter range as Mexican formations approached the walls. So I guess a combination of skilled archers and marksmen might have changed the outcome of the Battle of the Alamo.
@rjpeters70:
Interesting point about going for lower level of technologies, where feasible.Â
Take the battle of the Alamo: For 13 days, the Mexican army laid siege to a fortification held by 180 odd men. Both sides used muskets, which took 30 - 120 seconds to load. Both sides had artillery. But, the land around the Alamo was largely flat plains (with the exception of the creek three hundred yards to the west of the Alamo).Â
Now, the Mexican army had to rush across open fields to approach the walls of the Alamo, and the Texan forces used muskets and artillery against them, getting a high kill rate. But, would their kill rate have been higher had they been trained to use bows and arrows? Similar range and accuracy (or better, if you knew what you were doing with them), but far quicker to load (around 5 seconds).Â
Could the Texans conceivably have won the Alamo, had they used bows and arrows against the Mexicans?
I doubt it took the Alamo’s defenders even 30 seconds to reload. They were familiar with firearms and knew an assault was coming. The smoothbores loaded somewhat more rapidly than Civil War muzzle loading rifles and when I’ve timed re-enactors they typically could load and fire about 3 times a minute. Against massed attack there is little aim involved. Another factor is that the defenders appear to have had more than a single firearm apiece. So during the initial rush, they would have gotten a “free shot” on average.
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses.
They do in my rules set! 8-) Every round of ground or naval combat begins with the dogfight phase. In the dogfight phase, all units present fire at their air combat values. Any hits you receive must be applied to air units. Once you have applied a single anti-air hit to one of your air units, you must apply additional hits to that same unit until it’s dead, or until combat ends. (The same is true if you apply an anti-land hit to one of your land units, an anti-naval hit to one of your ships, or an anti-sub hit to one of your submarines.)
There are other ways aircraft can be destroyed as well. In strategic bombing raids, there is one round of dogfight phase, followed by strategic bombers attacking their targets using their strategic bombing values. Strategic bombing raids do permanent damage. For every ten points of damage a production facility experiences in a strategic bombing raid, it is reduced by one level. While nations receive some money from territory income, most of their late game production will come from production facilities. A sufficiently powerful strategic bombing offensive can destroy all those facilities; as well as the underlying cities in which they would exist. The correct defense against a strategic bombing offensive is to build air superiority planes; such as piston fighters or jet fighters.
There is a second way of defending oneself from strategic bombing raids: airfield attacks. To initiate an airfield attack, send your planes to a space with enemy aircraft, and declare an airfield attack. There will be two rounds of dogfight phase. Any of your planes which survived that dogfight may launch one attack against enemy aircraft, using their land combat values.
I like the idea of an air battle first compared to standard combat. It wasn’t clear to me if this was a single round of combat with SBR values for the air attacks, single round with standard air combat values, or multiple rounds with regular air combat values.
I’m in favor of limiting this to a single round since air supremacy is often variable rather than absolute and we don’t want excessive attrition of air units either. Even in a single round, if one is heavily outnumbered in the air, absolute air supremacy will probably be the result for the enemy.
SBR and airfield attacks have some merit as well. One of the weaker components of Global is that it lacks waves of SBR attacks against major IC’s of Axis powers.
Another thing to think about is “suprise” air attack against aircraft only on the first round of a DOW. This would allow Russia to have many fighters and such that are devastated on the ground. Ditto for the U.S. in Hawaii. Might even allow it to be targeting naval or even specific ships with a single round of combat… In either case, the strike would be targeted and only defended against by the units targeted rather than ground/scrambles, etc. Then if there is planned combat in the zone, that would commence including surviving AC from both sides.
Another way of doing the surprise combat might be similar to AA or a single round of subs, allowing only hits on specific values like one or 2 and no response if hit. This could make Barbarossa and Pearl very interesting…and with historic numbers of target aircraft there as well…rather than depleted as in global.
@Red:
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses. Historically, even very successful attacks severely depleted these forces. Examples would be heavy losses in Poland and France as well as pilot/aircraft losses in several of the major early war IJN/USN encounters.Â
Aircraft were particularly prone to heavy attrition just operating. And they were easy to target in suprise attacks at the outbreak of war. But since the game allows them to be chosen last they don’t attrit. Plus they can be held away from the front. This is why the USSR’s air force is almost completely absent in the initial placement.
Perhaps the greatest A&A gameplay weakness is that tanks and aircraft don’t take attrition losses.
They do in my rules set! 8-) Every round of ground or naval combat begins with the dogfight phase. In the dogfight phase, all units present fire at their air combat values. Any hits you receive must be applied to air units. Once you have applied a single anti-air hit to one of your air units, you must apply additional hits to that same unit until it’s dead, or until combat ends. (The same is true if you apply an anti-land hit to one of your land units, an anti-naval hit to one of your ships, or an anti-sub hit to one of your submarines.)
There are other ways aircraft can be destroyed as well. In strategic bombing raids, there is one round of dogfight phase, followed by strategic bombers attacking their targets using their strategic bombing values. Strategic bombing raids do permanent damage. For every ten points of damage a production facility experiences in a strategic bombing raid, it is reduced by one level. While nations receive some money from territory income, most of their late game production will come from production facilities. A sufficiently powerful strategic bombing offensive can destroy all those facilities; as well as the underlying cities in which they would exist. The correct defense against a strategic bombing offensive is to build air superiority planes; such as piston fighters or jet fighters.
There is a second way of defending oneself from strategic bombing raids: airfield attacks. To initiate an airfield attack, send your planes to a space with enemy aircraft, and declare an airfield attack. There will be two rounds of dogfight phase. Any of your planes which survived that dogfight may launch one attack against enemy aircraft, using their land combat values.
Interesting. At one time I had an idea for a variant of A&A where unit placement was at the start of your turn and the purchase phase was at the end. The units purchased were considered “in production” and set aside until placement at the beginning of the next turn. While the units are in production the enemy can strategic bomb them before they even get deployed.
By doing this the intention was to make strategic bombing more important and more costly. The other difference was that interceptors defended at full combat value and escorts attacked at full combat value for one round. I have never play-tested this so it might be a game breaker. It seems kind of fun to me though.
