Most decisive battle of the Second World War


  • @LHoffman:

    @ABWorsham:

    You could make a point that the The Battle of Dunkirk was the most important battle.

    That was barely a battle. More like a disorganized retreat.

    Honestly… anyone can make the assertion that anything is ‘the most important battle’ … but I think we are getting away from the point of this thread at that point. We are talking about decisive, power swinging conflicts are we not? Not could have beens or if-this-then-this

    Actually the wording of this thread suggests that we are lloking for the most obvious winner of a battle… not necessarily the most tide-turning battle of the war. Though i believe we are all arguing over the most important battle.

    Decisive means “Settling an issue; producing a definite result.” Thus, the most decisive battle is the one that guaranteed the allied victory. In my mind, that is the invasion of Poland.

    If we’re looking at the battle with the most obvious winner, that would have to be the battle of Kiska


  • I agree with the Battle of Britain.

    If the battle of Britain had been lost then operation Sealion would have happened and there is little debate that the germans could have taken the island.

    North Africa would have fallen.

    Operation Barbarossa would have been delayed one or two more years, which is what the german generals originally wanted.

    America would take much longer to get into the war without the use and aid of British bases and forces, they would also probably focus much more on the european theatre leaving Japan more unopposed and also have to liberate britain before taking france.

    Therefore if we are talking single battles, the battle of britain was without a doubt the most Decisive.

  • '10

    i also agree the battle for britian was the beginning of the end for germany. not only didnt they take the uk, but then germany turns around and starts a war with russia, creating the old, 2 front war, which is very hard to win.  :-)


  • @Weezer:

    If the battle of Britain had been lost then operation Sealion would have happened and there is little debate that the germans could have taken the island.

    Look at the invasion of France in 1944, the Allies had 5,000 ships to pull off an invasion and bad weather seriously hurt the ability to supply that army. How do you think German barges would fair in a battle with the Royal Navy? Germany’s navy could do little more than harass Allied shipping. A large part of the German navy was sunk in Norway.

    Had the Germans been able to establish a beachhead, i believe it would have played out like Gallipoli or Anzio.


  • THE WAR WAS UNWINNABLE FROM THE START YOU DING DONGS


  • No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side

  • '10

    yeah, if germany never attacked russia, england woulda fell, hitler just didnt have the patience to wait england out and had 2 use all his pretty toys and the only target left for his tanks was russia. and germany still had a small chance to win even after they attacked russia, but lets face it, hitler wasnt a general and he made mistakes that say, rommel or other generals wouldnt have made.


  • @calvinhobbesliker:

    No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side

    Had the B.E.F been destroyed in France in 1940, the war would have been very near winning for the Axis.


  • @ABWorsham:

    @calvinhobbesliker:

    No, the axis could have won if Russia stayed on the axis side

    Had the B.E.F been destroyed in France in 1940, the war would have been very near winning for the Axis.

    Not true. In fact, most of those evacuated from Dunkirk were returned to France to continue the fight. Thus, their loss would not matter in an invasion of England, which was impossible anyway.


  • A little known fact that was Stalin had offered the Germans military support if the western allies had ever come close to destroying the germans. (this was before Hitler attacked the Soviet Union)

    Check out “world war two behind close doors” by Laurence rees


  • @The:

    A little known fact that was Stalin had offered the Germans military support if the western allies had ever come close to destroying the germans. (this was before Hitler attacked the Soviet Union)

    Check out “world war two behind close doors” by Laurence rees

    But suppose French and British troops were storming Berlin.  Would Stalin enter the war on Hitlers side at that point?  I doubt it.  If the allies were close to destroying the Germans, why would Stalin (despite any promises - and he wasn’t the type who would necessarily keep his word) unnecessarily enter a war on what could very well be the losing side?

    I have heard theories that the Germans attacked Russia because of a lack of any other option that could result in a victory.  Having “Fortress Europe” would provide Hitler with all the necessary resources imaginable.  And with only one front to defend would enable a concentration of the best forces where necessary.

    Not sure I agree as Stalin was giving Hitler anything he wanted before this, but strategically what other options did Hitler have for a victory?  Sealion was not going to happen.  Possibly a U-boat blockade, but that seems unlikely to work…possibly something in Africa, though even a victory here doesn’t seem to provide a decisive victory.  Possibly the Amerika bomber, but that was still in development and could eventually be copied and/or countered…


  • What i meant by ever cxame close was if Germany was struggling to get more troops also Stalin may of done this because he would be able to capture the rest of poland and territories under “the german sphere of influence” on his way to help and if they really were in that much trouble Stalin’s forces wouldn’t get there in time and so he would just get extra territories for free


  • So, Russian assistance under the assumption of a manpower draining trench warfare (like WWI).  Interesting…when I get more time I will have to look up your reference and read it.


  • Before deciding which battle best represents the turning point, it’s important to look at the strategic situation faced by the Axis (and in particular by Germany), starting in early 1939.

    It has been argued that Germany lost the war when it attacked Poland. However, various plans had been made or discussed in the mid-‘30s to get the Western democracies to join the Soviet Union in ganging up on Germany. Those plans fell through not because of any hesitation on the Western democracies’ part, but because Stalin regarded both Germany and the Western democracies as enemies. He wanted a long war between those two sides–a war that would bleed both sides dry. Then the Red Army would move in to pick up the pieces.

    In 1939, the combined British/French military production exceeded Germany’s; with plans underway to further expand the former source of military production. Moreover, Britain and France could draw upon the extensive resources of their colonies, and could import weapons from the United States; while Germany could do neither. Even before German tanks crossed the Polish border, Germany was in a position of strategic weakness, and had been largely isolated diplomatically by Western leaders who (in most cases) strongly preferred Soviet communism to Nazism. The French prime minister of the time–Daladier–had participated in a coalition government with the French communist party. FDR liked, looked up to, and wanted to form a long-term alliance with Joseph Stalin. Had Germany not invaded Poland, various Western politicians would have sought other pretexts for war with it. Had they failed, it’s very possible the Soviet Union would have invaded once Stalin had become convinced that his invasion would succeed, and that the hoped-for war between the Western democracies and Germany would not occur. Everything that happened from August of 1939 onward represented an ultimately unsuccessful attempt by Germany to escape that position of strategic weakness, and to secure itself against the dual threat of the Western democracies and the Red Army.

    In 1940, Germany produced 11,000 military aircraft, compared to 15,000 for Britain. The U.S. shipped large numbers of aircraft and aircraft engines to Britain. It had been agreed that, over the course of the next few years, the U.S. would expand its military aircraft production to a staggering 72,000 planes per year; with half being sent to Britain for use against Germany. Even though the U.S. was still technically at peace in 1940, its industrial strength was increasingly being brought to bear against Germany.

    In 1940, Hitler did not have the industrial capacity or access to raw materials or labor he required to match the Anglo-American war effort being waged against Germany. One of the reasons for his invasion of the Soviet Union was to acquire these things; thereby allowing him to match the Western democracies’ aircraft production over the long haul. Victory over the Soviet Union would also secure Germany’s eastern front before any serious invasion of its western front could be launched.

    However, Germany’s population in 1939 was 69 million; as compared to 169 million for the Soviets. That gave the Red Army a staggering advantage in manpower. Moreover, the Soviets’ military production exceeded that of Germany’s by a factor of between three and four for most major land categories in 1942. The Soviets also produced nearly twice as many military aircraft as Germany did that year. The overwhelming advantage the Soviets had in manpower, together with their equally overwhelming edge in military production, were why Germany could not hope to win a long war against the Soviets.

    It is also worth noting that Britain had imposed a food blockade on Germany, which created a severe food shortage. German occupation policy in the Soviet Union was harsh because its lack of available food meant it had no choice but to starve many millions of people. There just wasn’t food to feed everyone. People in conquered Soviet territories were among the millions starved. That meant that the Germans could not be seen as liberators, but were rather cast in the role of hostile invaders who must be resisted at all costs.

    In 1941, Japanese industrial capacity was only a tenth that of the U.S. The U.S. produced 48,000 military aircraft in 1942, compared to just 9,000 for Japan.

    The phrase “turning point” implies that there was some time in the war before which the Axis had the advantage, and after which the Allies had the edge. At least from a strategic perspective, there was no turning point in WWII. Germany was at a significant disadvantage before the war began, and that disadvantage remained throughout the war’s duration. It experienced some remarkable tactical victories during that time; particularly its conquest of France and the western parts of the Soviet Union. But those tactical victories were never enough to create strategic parity with the Allies. Nor could Japan’s early victories in the Pacific offset the U.S.'s massive advantage in industrial capacity.

    It could be pointed out that early in the war, the Axis had a brief window of tactical opportunity: a time for it to win victories before the overwhelming Allied strategic advantages could be fully brought to bear. On Germany’s western front, its string of such victories ended with the Battle of Britain. On its eastern front, they (mostly) ended with the battle of Moscow. And in the Pacific, Japan’s string of early victories ended at Midway.

    It would have been very difficult or impossible for Germany to have launched a serious invasion of Britain. It lacked the transport capacity and surface fleet to do so. Moreover, with Britain producing more and better aircraft than Germany in 1940, Germany’s window of opportunity to invade was clearly very brief. While a successful invasion of Britain would have been extremely beneficial to the Axis war effort, British victory in that battle was never in much doubt.

    The Battle of Moscow was similar. Germany lacked access to much oil. Therefore, its supply lines could not primarily rely on trucks. Instead, it would use coal-powered locomotives to carry supplies most of the way to where they were needed, and horses to transport them the rest of the way. The need for rail significantly slowed the German advance, so that Soviet rail lines could be converted to the German gauge, and so that the rails could be repaired or replaced. Germany had enough oil and military trucks to provide some motorized supply for its troops; and that helped speed the invasion of the Soviet Union. But by the Battle of Moscow, its fragile supply lines had been stretched to the limit. Its soldiers lacked the food, medical supplies, ammunition, and winter uniforms they required. Germany’s failure at the Battle of Moscow was a function of the strategic weakness it had experienced even before the war began. That battle also reflected the Soviets’ enormous manpower reserves and overall military strength.


  • Kurt,

    Very excellent analysis, and I agree.

    I would like to point out, however that possibilities for Germany other than that actually tried by the Nazis were possible.

    England’s weakness (same as her strength) lies in the sea.  Had Germany launched a sufficiently massive U-boat construction effort in time ( before countermeasures were developed), it might have been possible to starve England to the peace table.

    With Russia, more concentration on Moscow (or perhaps Stalingrad) at the (to be hoped temporary) expense of the other fronts to maximize the initial Nazi advantage at one strategic concentration of forces might have fragmented Russia for a victory there.

    Not that either of these would necessarily bring victory either…

    However, the fact that Nazi Germany did not put their economy on a war time basis until 1944 is perhaps their greatest reason for failing to win the war.  It is telling that Nazi armament production peaked in fall of 1944 despite the then constant bombing, loss of manpower, shortages of material, loss of conquered territory (and subsequent labor and materials to aid munitions production), etc.  Had Germany utilized their economy on a war basis earlier the outcome might have been different.  But then, there were political considerations Hitler had to contend with…

  • '10

    good post kurt,  if u have time u should submit more posts like this.


  • With the factions of the soviets, us,uk vs. germany,italy, and japan, the axis were doomed before day 1. Good analysis by Kurt.


  • I tend to disagree and for various reasons.

    First you assume the results of the war determine its course. The war could have played out many different ways.  Japan might have never attacked USA and just finished off China in another 10 years. Germany could have started her war in 1943 when German economists projected a better economic picture. Italy too was not ready for war early, but drew into conflict due to the quick succession of German military victory and a feeling in Europe that some form of peace was imminent with UK.

    If Hitler left the Czechoslovakia alone it stands to reason that Chamberlain would remain in power and he had an entirely different outlook for UK when compared to Churchill. Hitler could have been another Bismarck and slowly built up the German economy as it was pre-1914.

    The Soviets were building up to be true, but the economics according to Historian Mark Harrison showed they were not producing as well as Germany till late 1943, with a small advantage in 1940 of 417 to 387 in wartime GDP. The decline of Germany since 1943, was due to among other things the RESULT of the course of the war. In a peacetime setting Germany would have continued to enjoy an advantage over the Soviet Union ( as well as everybody else sake USA).

    The Soviets were building inferior plane and tank types and superior numbers does not equate with military victories. Looking as her fight with the Finns and the bulk of the 1941 campaign proved that point. The Germans had much better military doctrine than anybody in Europe and she could win any campaign of limited duration.

    A German campaign in the Soviet Union of limited duration was possible, but due to the compilation of numerous mistakes was not to be. Again the results of what happened cannot measure the truth of what could have been possible.

    Hitlers decision to become an enemy of Stalin was only one of many pitfalls that led to his decision to invade in 1941. Hitler and Stalin could have reached an accommodation of interests of which would have served both parties like carving up the British Empire, but to Hitler this was not to his liking as he admired the British people as the bulwark and ‘protector’ of civilization for many centuries. He would much rather see communism get destroyed. It didn’t have to go this way. IN Dec 1940 in talks with Molotov, the tone of this accommodation was clear: Stalin wanted Finland and had eyes on Besserabia. If the Soviets could have been inclined to get Persia and Iraq and agree to join the tripartite pact, both could have just made mincemeat out of UK colonial holdings and UK would be in no position to do anything.

    The lost year ( which i call June 1940- June 1941) was the perfect opportunity to peruse this strategy and weaken UK by other means. This was advocated by Admiral Raeder featuring a Mediterranean strategy to weaken UK by taking all her colonial supports.

    Sealion was not really possible unless it was planned more in advance, if Hitler prevented the Dunkirk episode and forced the British army into surrender, a landing in England in June 1940 would have been much easier. UK would not have any army or equipment to stop them, and the navy was scattered all over in various ports and dealing with Italy, which just entered the war. German airborne was the best trained and much of the operations initial attacks were airborne.

    The economic advantage over the axis was only realized once Japan attacked USA and Hitler DOW USA on 12/11/41, which was biggest mistake possible. Until that time the combined figures ( Harrison) showed a very close combined axis /allied ratio. adding USA basically doubled the ratio to 2:1.

    Economic considerations are not the determining factor in war. In the Great War, the Central Powers faced a similar Allied advantage and almost won twice. Only the result of military victories and strategies determines who might win. An economic explanation might work to account for a number of things, but then we should have lost the war with England during the revolutionary war.

  • Liaison TripleA '11 '10

    If only we could talk about the American Civil War on here… and what would have happend if the confederates won.

    The world would be a different place.

  • '10

    u ever see the movie,

    CSA: Confederate States of America
    (2004) PG-13

    its not that good but its something 2 watch if u r into this subject.

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