WW2 Article: Advanced German Technology

[Zhukov_2011]

Yes, yes, spare us the awful history lesson. Some of us have books on our shelves, too. Your arguments are familiar and are a frequent subject of debate, but when it comes down to it, we know that two wrongs don’t make a right. Despite a picture you and others paint of a desperate Germany with no other option for national survival than war (you even through poor Poland under the bus), Germany started that war on its own and fortunately was not able to finish it. This whole diatribe, though presenting some facts, does so in such a skewed and ridiculous manner that continuing it would be laughable.

“Nor was [the liberal West’s supposed pro-communism leanings] based on concern for avoiding future mass murders, as demonstrated by the fact that, in 1938, both Chamberlain and Daladier rejected Hitler’s offer to relocate Germany’s Jewish population to some remote British or French colony. (Hitler personally favored French Madagascar, but indicated he wasn’t picky.)”

By your line of reasoning, then, the Western democracies are just as much to blame for the Holocaust as Germany when they refused to accommodate an exodus of Jewish refugees from Germany? You won’t find many who will share those kind of views. Much of the rest of your post is similar revisionist gibberish. I would be careful who you share those thoughts with. In any case, morality in the time of war is way off topic and leads to some very diverse opinions, I am sorry I brought it up.

Your last couple of paragraphs kind of got us back full circle anyways. You keep saying, however, the Germans could have influenced the war’s outcome if they had those weapons sooner, but again, almost all were in such a state of infancy as to still be years and years away, even for the U.S. who suffered no destruction of its homeland and possessed the best scientists in the world.

[Zhukov_2011]

To help steer this interesting topic in the right direction, let’s assume Germany was able to upgrade its fighter squadrons with Me-262As by as soon as late 1942, early 1943. This was a crucial and extremely bloody period for the Allied Bomber Commands, with losses on some raids reaching ten or more percent. Without fighter escorts (the drop tank-equipped P-51 still many months away) the bombers would have been easy prey to the new German jet. The bomber effort was already on the brink of collapse, so a determined resistance by numerous and skilled Schawlbe squadrons could have cleared the skies over Europe.

But then what? The effect of the Allied bombing campaign during the war is soaked in controversy and many believe it had little effect. Considering Germany production reached its peak during nonstop night and day bombing, the argument carries some weight.
The jet was designed to combat heavy bombers, how would it have fared in an air-superiority role - that is, the ability to suppress enemy fighters and air defenses to a point where your forces dictate the battlefield? The Me-262 would have had to fulfill the fighter-bomber and air-defense-suppression roles unless the Germans continued to field older models since no jet bomber was even close to operational.

How do you think the jet would have performed in Russia, where enemy strategic bomber forces were negligible? The Red Air Force was able to quickly outnumber the Luftwaffe in fighters and tactical bombers, including some models that were better than any of the German prop-planes.
How do you think the Me-262s would have been used, en masse, on the Eastern front, and to what effect?

[CWO Marc]

@Zhukov_2011:

Not a huge hockey fan myself

Actually, neither am I…and I live in Montreal, where hockey almost has the status of a religion.

[KurtGodel7]

@Zhukov_2011:

Yes, yes, spare us the awful history lesson. Some of us have books on our shelves, too. Your arguments are familiar and are a frequent subject of debate, but when it comes down to it, we know that two wrongs don’t make a right. Despite a picture you and others paint of a desperate Germany with no other option for national survival than war (you even through poor Poland under the bus), Germany started that war on its own and fortunately was not able to finish it. This whole diatribe, though presenting some facts, does so in such a skewed and ridiculous manner that continuing it would be laughable.

“Nor was [the liberal West’s supposed pro-communism leanings] based on concern for avoiding future mass murders, as demonstrated by the fact that, in 1938, both Chamberlain and Daladier rejected Hitler’s offer to relocate Germany’s Jewish population to some remote British or French colony. (Hitler personally favored French Madagascar, but indicated he wasn’t picky.)”

By your line of reasoning, then, the Western democracies are just as much to blame for the Holocaust as Germany when they refused to accommodate an exodus of Jewish refugees from Germany? You won’t find many who will share those kind of views. Much of the rest of your post is similar revisionist gibberish. I would be careful who you share those thoughts with. In any case, morality in the time of war is way off topic and leads to some very diverse opinions, I am sorry I brought it up.

Your last couple of paragraphs kind of got us back full circle anyways. You keep saying, however, the Germans could have influenced the war’s outcome if they had those weapons sooner, but again, almost all were in such a state of infancy as to still be years and years away, even for the U.S. who suffered no destruction of its homeland and possessed the best scientists in the world.

I would like to correct some of the inaccuracies in the above post. The pro-communist leanings of leaders like FDR, of many in the American media and other nations’ media, and of a number of politicians in France–were not merely “supposed.” They are a matter of historical record.

As far as the blame for the Holocaust goes: I feel that any government which deliberately sets about creating starvation among enemy civilian populations during a time of war deserves the blame for whatever deaths its starvation policies created. The Allied food blockade meant that Germany could not feed everyone within its borders: some people would die. However, the policy of singling out Jews was unjust and cruel enough that the Nazi government also deserves considerable blame.

But while the Nazi government was clearly to blame for the way it had singled out the Jewish population, most people would expect a Nazi-like government to respond to starvation by starving Jews before Gentiles. The fact that the British and American governments chose to create starvation in Germany, while at the same time the British government blocked Jews from entering its colonies both before and during the war, means that neither the British nor American governments should be regarded as knights in shining armor by the Jewish community. Allied governments did not act the way you’d expect people concerned about protecting Jewish lives to act. Their actions forced the German government to starve or otherwise exterminate millions of people–it lacked the food to do otherwise–with it being left up to the Nazis to decide which people would be eliminated. While this kind of policy was very helpful to Allied propagandists–who proceeded to portray the Nazis as the worst mass murderers in human history–Allied food policy was an act of mass murder directed against the people living inside Germany’s borders. Hardest-hit were the people the Allied governments (hypocritically) claimed to care about the most: the Jews, the Poles, etc.

Mainstream history books are almost consistently written from the Allied perspective. As such, they are not neutral or even-handed in their presentation of information. Hitler and Nazism are generally blamed for the millions of starvation-related deaths which occurred inside Germany’s borders during the war. The question of whether Germany had the food with which to feed the people in question is neglected entirely.

Similarly, the subject of France’s false promises to Poland is generally ignored; with Polish foreign policy generally portrayed as being the product of Polish stupidity and Polish gallantry. Neither the Polish nor their leaders were stupid; though perhaps Poland’s leaders deserve to be called naive for having believed the promises of France’s politicians.

Once the pro-Allied perspective is abandoned, and a more neutral perspective adopted, the actions of many of WWII’s participants begin to seem far more rational. In 1939, the Polish refused to return Polish-occupied German lands to Germany not because they believed their moderately sized, under-equipped army could defeat Germany’s larger, better-armed army, but because saw that, on paper, the combined French-Polish force was stronger than its German counterpart. They knew that in a long war, nations with the industrial strength of Britain and France (plus their colonies) would have a crushing advantage over Germany. However, because France broke its promise to Poland to launch a general invasion of Poland, the strength of the French Army was largely irrelevant to Poland’s fate.

Similarly, Hitler’s conquests in Europe were not (as has sometimes been suggested) because he’d gone insane, or because he wanted to conquer the world, or any of the other explanations Allied propagandists generally provide. Instead, his decision to conquer was based on an awareness of Germany’s economic, military, and diplomatic weakness, and his desire to rectify that weakness by making Germany too strong to be conquered either by the Soviets or by the Western democracies. The long-term goal of German foreign policy was therefore the conquest of the Soviet Union. Such a conquest would eliminate one of the two strongest of Germany’s potential enemies, would end the horror of communism, would gain for Germany the food supplies necessary to survive another WWI-style Anglo-French food blockade, and would provide Germany with the raw materials, industrial capacity, and labor force necessary to hold its own in any would-be war with the Western democracies.

It is false to assert that Hitler wanted such a war. (Not that you have made such an assertion.) After the fall of Poland, Hitler offered Britain and France a peace treaty. Both nations refused. After France fell, Hitler offered Britain a peace treaty, which Churchill refused.

[KurtGodel7]

@Zhukov_2011:

To help steer this interesting topic in the right direction, let’s assume Germany was able to upgrade its fighter squadrons with Me-262As by as soon as late 1942, early 1943. This was a crucial and extremely bloody period for the Allied Bomber Commands, with losses on some raids reaching ten or more percent. Without fighter escorts (the drop tank-equipped P-51 still many months away) the bombers would have been easy prey to the new German jet. The bomber effort was already on the brink of collapse, so a determined resistance by numerous and skilled Schawlbe squadrons could have cleared the skies over Europe.

But then what? The effect of the Allied bombing campaign during the war is soaked in controversy and many believe it had little effect. Considering Germany production reached its peak during nonstop night and day bombing, the argument carries some weight.
The jet was designed to combat heavy bombers, how would it have fared in an air-superiority role - that is, the ability to suppress enemy fighters and air defenses to a point where your forces dictate the battlefield? The Me-262 would have had to fulfill the fighter-bomber and air-defense-suppression roles unless the Germans continued to field older models since no jet bomber was even close to operational.

How do you think the jet would have performed in Russia, where enemy strategic bomber forces were negligible? The Red Air Force was able to quickly outnumber the Luftwaffe in fighters and tactical bombers, including some models that were better than any of the German prop-planes.
How do you think the Me-262s would have been used, en masse, on the Eastern front, and to what effect?

I agree that the widespread introduction of the Me 262 in late '42 or early '43 could likely have caused the cancellation of (at very least) the U.S. daytime bombing raids. I also agree that, even if the Me 262 had been able to protect Germany against both day and night raids, that alone would not have materially altered the outcome of the war.

However, the Me 262 was a good enough anti-bomber aircraft that, even when the Americans had developed the ability to send Mustangs deep into Germany, it would still have been almost impossible for the Americans to resume daylight raids. (At least, presuming the Me 262s were fielded in large quantities.)

You are correct to assert that Germany needed to significantly improve its fortunes on its Eastern front for it to alter the course of the war. Possibly a modified version of the Me 262–ideally with the addition of dive brakes–could have had a major influence on the air war over Germany’s eastern front. Possibly, a better option would have been the Horten Ho 229–it was slightly faster than an Me 262, had a much longer range, carried twice the bomb payload, and had dive brakes. As you say, Germany needed a dogfighter and a fighter-bomber on this Eastern front. Regardless of which of the two jet designs was used, the objective should have been to destroy enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground. During the postwar era, jet aircraft proved far superior to piston aircraft in the dogfighting role. Whether the German jet designs in question were good enough to attain that superiority, or whether further modification would have been necessary, is not something I claim to know.

But for the sake of argument let’s suppose that Germany could have used the Me 262 or some other jet design to attain air superiority or even air supremacy over its Eastern front. Its piston aircraft could then have dive bombed Soviet troops. This, alone, would not have been enough to alter the fate of Germany’s Eastern front. The Soviet advantage in available infantry, and in tanks and artillery, was simply too overwhelming for German air power, alone, to be able to counter it. Other additions to Germany’s arsenal would also have been necessary. As I hinted at in my earlier post, Germany would have needed more production, earlier. If it had achieved its 1944 level of production back in 1942, and if it had had access to weapons like the assault rifle, the longer-ranged versions of the Panzerfaust, and if it had created something like the planned E-series tanks, the combination of these factors, along with the aforementioned air superiority provided by its jets, might have been enough to tip the balance in its favor. Germany didn’t necessarily have to have all its super-weapons–for example the Type XXI U-boats could have waited until later–but it would have needed at least some of them in '42. (Plus that production increase.)

Large numbers of German jets would have had another advantage: they would have made it difficult or impossible for the Allies to conduct D-Day style invasions. In places where the Allies had already gained a foothold–such as Italy in 1943–German jets could have made it difficult or impossible to effectively supply said troops. Jets could provide significant protection to Germany’s southern and western flank against the Western democracies, even while its army pushed eastward into the Soviet Union. Germany’s long-term strategy for victory would have involved conquering everything in the Soviet Union west of the Urals; then making peace with the rest of the Soviet Union. At that point its army would have faced only one threat: the threat of the Western democracies.

The next step in this process might have involved a decision to adequately fund the German nuclear program. A successful nuclear program requires a significant investment of industrial capacity to enrich uranium or plutonium. I have read that during WWII, the U.S. used more industrial capacity on uranium and plutonium enrichment than it did on making tanks. The massive amount of industrial capacity needed, in combination with the long-term nature of the program, was why Germany’s nuclear program was not adequately funded. (Germany’s plan involved conquering the Soviet Union in '41 and '42, not '45.) But a victory over the Soviet Union would afford German leaders the luxury of being able to adopt longer-term, large-scale projects. It would have taken several years between the adequate funding of a nuclear program and the first German nuclear bomb. But once they had that bomb, they could have used their Aggregate Series rockets to deliver the nuclear payload anywhere in the world. (Assuming, of course, that von Braun continued to make steady progress during the late '40s.) The existence of German nuclear bombs + German ICBMs could have forced the Western democracies to the negotiating table, perhaps in 1950. Presumably, the two sides would agree to stop fighting, and to retain the borders as they were. Germany would be in control over most of Europe, while Britain would retain its colonies in Africa, India, and the Middle East.

[Lazarus]

So the Allies were to blame for the ‘starvation’ of the Jews?
This is insane. The Jews did not ‘starve to death’ they were murdered.
I presume the German attempt to starve the UK by sinking its food supplies is going to be expained away as all Churchill’s fault as well!
This is pro-German propaganda at its worst and  the arguments used are the staple of the Nazi apologists.

[KurtGodel7]

@Lazarus:

So the Allies were to blame for the ‘starvation’ of the Jews?
This is insane. The Jews did not ‘starve to death’ they were murdered.
I presume the German attempt to starve the UK by sinking its food supplies is going to be expained away as all Churchill’s fault as well!
This is pro-German propaganda at its worst and  the arguments used are the staple of the Nazi apologists.

For an explanation of Germany’ food situation and food policy (not to mention the interrelationships between its economic, military, and diplomatic policies), I suggest Adam Tooze’s excellent work, The Wages of Destruction. The Times (London) called this book “A magnificent demonstration of the explanatory power of economic history.” The Financial Times called the book, “Masterful . . . Tooze has added his name to the roll call of top-class scholars of Nazism.” Below are quotes from that book:

pp. 418-419

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After 1939 the supply of food in Western Europe was no less constrained than the supply of coal. . . . Grain imports in the late 1930s had run at the rate of more than 7 million tons per annum mostly from Argentina and Canada. These sources of supply were closed off by the British blockade. . . . By the summer of 1940, Germany was facing a Europe-wide agricultural crisis. . . . By 1941 there were already signs of mounting discontent due to the inadequate food supply. In Belgium and France, the official ration allocated to ‘normal consumers’ of as little as 1,300 calories per day, was an open invitation to resort to the black market.

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p 539

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When the order to ship large numbers of Eastern European workers to Germany was first given, Backe protested vigorously. The 400,000 Soviet prisoners of war already in Germany were more than he could provide for. Goering had spoken casually of feeding the Eastern workers on cats and horse-meat. Backe had consulted the statistics and reported glumly that there were not enough cats to provide a ration for the Eastern workers and horse-meat was already being used to supplement the rations of the German population. If the Russians were to be given meat, they would have to be supplied at the expense of the German population.

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p 541

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Backe was in an impossible position. The Fuehrer had demanded more workers. Gauleiter Sauckel was dedicated to delivering them. Hitler and Sauckel now demanded that the workers be fed, which was clearly a necessity if they were to be productive. And yet, given the level of grain stocks, Backe was unable to meet this demand. What was called for was a reduction in consumption, not additional provisions for millions of new workers. The seriousness of the situation became apparent in the spring of 1942 when the Food Ministry announced cuts to the food rations of the German population. Given the regime’s mortal fear of damaging morale, the ration cuts of April 1942 are incontrovertible evidence that the food crisis was real. Lowering the rations was a political step of the first order, which Backe would never had suggested if the food situation had not absolutely required it. . . . When the reduction in the civilian ration was announced it produced a response which justified every anxiety on the part of the Nazi leadership. . . . Studies by nutritional experts added to the regime’s concerns.

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p 542

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Entire groups were to be excluded from the food supply, most notably the Jews. As Goebbels noted in his diary, the new regime would be based on the principle that before Germany starved ‘it would be the turn of a number of other peoples.’

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p 544 - 545

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[German-occupied Poland was] an agricultural deficit territory. In the first year of the German occupation, Backe and Governor General Frank had agreed on food imports from the Reich that were sufficient to give food to those Poles working for the Germans. The majority of the Polish population was left to fend for themselves. The result was an epidemic of malnutrition and outright starvation, particularly among the Jewish population confined to the ghettos. Faced with Germany’s food shortage in 1942, Backe went much further. He now demanded that the Governor General should reverse the flow. Rather than receive food supplements from Germany, the General Government [of Poland] was to make sizable food deliveries. . . . Backe predicated his demands on the elimination of Polish Jews from the food chain. . . . Eliminating the Jews would . . . reduce the number of people that needed feeding.

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p 549

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By the end of August 1942, this extraordinary series of measures spread a palpable mood of relief throughout Berlin. Backe, Himmler, and Goering had staved off a disastrous downward spiral in the food supply. . . . Total European deliveries of grain [into Germany] doubled from 2 million tons per annum to more than 5 million tons in the harvest year of 1942-3. . . . Comparing 1940-41 and 1942-3, the total deliveries of grain, meat, and fats provided by France and the occupied territory of the Soviet Union increased from 3.5 million tons to 8.78 million tons (measured in grain equivalents). . . . Of those deliveries that did enter the Reich [as opposed to being consumed in the field by the Wehrmacht], the General Government [of German-occupied Poland] supplied an astonishing 51 percent of German rye imports, 66 percent of oats and 52 percent of German potato imports. This was directly at the expense of the local population. Thanks to a remarkably good harvest in the General Government, rations were not cut off completely as Frank had anticipated in August 1942. But they remained at pitiful levels until after the harvest of 1943. . . . It is clear that if the harvest of the General Government had not been as good as it turned out to be in 1942, then millions of non-Jewish Poles would have been condemned to starve the following spring. However, in the summer of 1942 it was the concerted extermination of Polish Jewry that provided the most immediate and fail-safe means of freeing up food for delivery to Germany.

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[MrMalachiCrunch]

So Germany started the War and would have known about the food supply issue as that is what caused Germany to capitulate in WW I.  So unless the allies both fought Germany and fed Germany, any starvation deaths are the fault of the Allies is what I gather is the premise here.  Rather faulty logic.

If I break into your house and hold your family at gunpoint, and during this home invasion, your kid sneezes and scares me and I shoot the kid to death…… Blaming the kid for scaring me and causing his own death will not go very far in court as a defense.  Nor will blaming the winning side for the deaths caused by the actions of the losing side.

[KurtGodel7]

@MrMalachiCrunch:

So Germany started the War and would have known about the food supply issue as that is what caused Germany to capitulate in WW I.  So unless the allies both fought Germany and fed Germany, any starvation deaths are the fault of the Allies is what I gather is the premise here.  Rather faulty logic.

If I break into your house and hold your family at gunpoint, and during this home invasion, your kid sneezes and scares me and I shoot the kid to death…… Blaming the kid for scaring me and causing his own death will not go very far in court as a defense.  Nor will blaming the winning side for the deaths caused by the actions of the losing side.

During medieval times, it was common for an army to besiege a castle. People inside the castle would slowly die of disease and starvation: both soldiers and civilians alike.

During WWI, and again during WWII, Britain and its allies chose to treat Germany like a large castle. Germany was prevented from importing food. Neutral nations, such as Spain, were only permitted to import enough food to feed their own people.

On page 168, Tooze writes the following:

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Though famine had been banished from Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century, in large part due to Europe’s ability to tap huge new sources of overseas supply, World War I had forced the question of food supply back onto the agenda of European politics. The British and French blockade, though it failed to produce outright famine, did succeed in producing an epidemic of chronic malnutrition in Germany and Austria that was widely blamed for killing at least 600,000 people.

---

Britain had used food as a weapon against the German and Austrian civilian populations during WWI, and could reasonably be expected to do so again during WWII. The effects of the WWII blockade were more severe than the WWI blockade’s, because population sizes had grown.

After Poland and France fell, Hitler tried negotiating peace with Britain, and was genuinely surprised when the British politicians refused to negotiate. Negotiations for a peace treaty were his plan for solving Germany’s food problems, but that plan did not work.

Nor was food the only problem with which Germany had to contend. Back in the late '20s, Stalin had launched a program intended to industrialize and subsequently militarize the Soviet Union. Moreover, the stated long-term goal of Soviet foreign policy was world conquest.

Major Western democracies had little or no interest in slowing or halting Soviet expansionism. In 1919, Poland and the Soviet Union found themselves at war. By 1920, Poland was on the verge of outright annexation by the Soviets. The United States was isolationist and did nothing. Britain happened to have a pro-Soviet government at the time, and sent weapons to the Soviets, but not to the Polish. France, oddly enough, proved the most useful to Poland, and sent some military advisers. These advisers were helpful in improving the organization of the new Polish Army; but their strategic advice (dig trenches and re-fight WWI) was less sound. The Polish military ultimately won a major victory outside Warsaw by emphasizing mobility and encirclements–the same general tactics which would later prove themselves in the subsequent land war between Germany and the Soviet Union. This offense-oriented approach was the opposite of what the French advisers had suggested. The Polish military victory paved the way for a peace treaty that was reasonably favorable to Poland. (The Soviets were still in a state of civil war against the Russian nationalists, which also helped.) Poland’s victory was achieved, and its independence retained, despite the fact that none of its “allies” sent soldiers to help, or made the same “leave Poland alone or else!” threats towards the Soviet Union that they would later make toward Germany.

During the time between 1920 and 1940, the major Western democracies did not become more anti-Soviet, or more willing to resist Soviet expansionism. On the contrary: FDR liked and admired Stalin, employed several Soviet agents in his own administration, and envisioned a long-term alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as the basis for world peace. France and Czechoslovakia formed defensive alliances with the Soviet Union in 1935. Daladier, the prime minister of France in 1938 - 1940, had previously allied himself with the French Communist Party in a coalition government–a government in which he personally served as the Minister of War. (Daladier’s entire party–the Radical Party–had formed part of this Popular Front coalition government.)

Suppose Germany had remained within the confines envisioned by the Western democracies; with only a moderate amount of military spending. Sooner or later, the Soviet Union would have gotten around to gobbling up the nations of Eastern Europe. The Western democracies would have done nothing, just as they did nothing or almost nothing to help Poland in 1920. Then the Soviet Union could have (and likely, eventually would have) invaded Germany. The Western democracies would also have been neutral in a war like that. Politicians like Daladier and FDR would have favored a Soviet victory. The Soviet Union would have won that war because of its overwhelming advantage in manpower, available infantry, industrial capacity, and access to raw materials. After Germany had fallen, it would have been subjected to the same cruel repression and mass murder as was the rest of the Soviet Union.

Germany’s diplomatic and military policy was formulated largely to avoid that. The above fear was perfectly legitimate and reasonable, both because of the Soviets’ expansionism, and because of the major Western democracies’ consistent lack of interest in seriously opposing that expansionism. It was not until 1948 that major Western democracies seriously opposed further Soviet expansion, and by then it was too late for Germany. In the meantime, Hitler based his foreign policy on the assumption that Germany had to become strong enough to resist a Soviet invasion without help from any major Western democracy. No element of any major Western democracy’s diplomatic or foreign policy during the '20s, '30s, or early '40s remotely suggests that assumption was faulty.

[Lazarus]

I don’t see many starving Germans in 1945.
I note they kept their own civilians fed at the expense of the French, Poles, Dutch etc.
The very fact the stole food from others to feed their own makes them responsible for all the deaths that followed.
Starting a war and then crying that it is all the attacked nations fault is  just silly. I suppose next we will get the standard excuse that the invasion of Russia was to pre-empt a great barbarian attack on Europe
‘Blonde  knights on panzers’ holding back the Soviet hordes and saving Western civilisation from ……yuk, pass the sick-bag.

Have I accidently joined Stormfront?

Please stop treating this thread  as if you were some great teacher putting me ‘right’ on wartime Germany.
I have a personal libray in the several thousands and have been reading this stuff for over 40 years.
No more  lectures.

[Lazarus]

Who made a pact with the Soviets that divided up Poland between them?
Seems odd that old Adolf supped with the man he saw as the devil.
Please save the sob story for the millions who died  just  so you could play with you little plastic Tiger tanks

[Pvt.Ryan]

I believe our point under this massive amount of typed letters is that both sides commited acts of atrocity during the war and that its better it never happened. Of course the people who lived in those days wished it never happened yet we’re here discussing it over the internet.

[KurtGodel7]

@Lazarus:

I don’t see many starving Germans in 1945.
I note they kept their own civilians fed at the expense of the French, Poles, Dutch etc.
The very fact the stole food from others to feed their own makes them responsible for all the deaths that followed.
Starting a war and then crying that it is all the attacked nations fault is  just silly. I suppose next we will get the standard excuse that the invasion of Russia was to pre-empt a great barbarian attack on Europe
‘Blonde  knights on panzers’ holding back the Soviet hordes and saving Western civilisation from ……yuk, pass the sick-bag.

Have I accidently joined Stormfront?

Please stop treating this thread  as if you were some great teacher putting me ‘right’ on wartime Germany.
I have a personal libray in the several thousands and have been reading this stuff for over 40 years.
No more  lectures.

You seem to think some “excuse” was necessary for Germany to go to war against the Soviet Union. I find that point of view difficult to understand. Consider the magnitude of the Red Terror

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I handled hundreds of signals to all parts of the Soviet Union which were couched in the following form:

“To N.K.V.D., Frunze. You are charged with the task of exterminating 10,000 enemies of the people. Report results by signal.–Yezhov.”

And in due course the reply would come back:

“In reply to yours of such-and-such date, the following enemies of the Soviet people have been shot.”

----Former Soviet Spy-Chief Vladimir Petrov

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In order to meet a 10,000 extermination quota (as described above) a local Soviet leader would often gather up whichever people were closest to hand, or who seemed different than normal, or those who had visited a local office to inquire about the whereabouts of their disappeared family members. While Stalin certainly recognized the randomness of giving local leaders extermination quotas, he also felt that some enemies of communism, or of him personally, were likely to be destroyed along with all the everyday people being murdered. It is also worth noting that Stalin ruled largely by terror, so he felt it necessary to inflict acts of terror to retain and solidify his power.

The above words describe what the Soviet government did to its own citizens during a time of “peace.” Below is a summary of some of the Soviet Union’s war crimes during WWII:

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During World War II, a series of mass executions were committed by the Soviet NKVD against prisoners in Eastern Europe, primarily Poland, the Baltic states, Romania, Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union as the Red Army withdrew after the German invasion in 1941 (see Operation Barbarossa). . . . There were numerous reports of war crimes committed by Soviet armed forces, against captured German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe soldiers from the very beginning of the war, documented in thousands of files of the The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945, an office established in September 1939 to investigate violations of the Hague and Geneva conventions by Germany’s enemies. . . . The NKVD also summarily executed over 20,000 Polish military officer prisoners in April-May1940. . . .

More than 300,000 citizens of Estonia, almost a third of the population at the time, were affected by deportation, arrests, execution and other acts of repression.[21] As a result of the Soviet takeover, Estonia permanently lost at least 200,000 people or 20% of its population to repressions, exodus, and war.[citation needed] . . .

In all, over 200,000 people suffered from Soviet repressions in Latvia, of which some 60% were deported to the Soviet GULAG in Siberia and the Far-East. . . .

It is estimated that Lithuania lost almost 780,000 citizens as a result of Soviet occupation, of which around 440,000 were war refugees. . . .

In September 1939, the Red Army invaded eastern Poland and occupied it in accordance with the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Later, the Soviets forcefully occupied the Baltic States and parts of Romania, including Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, as well. . . . Soviet policy in all of these areas was harsh towards the people under its control, showing strong elements of ethnic cleansing. . . . Torture was used on a wide scale in various prisons, especially those in small towns. Prisoners were scalded with boiling water in Bobrka; in Przemyslany, people had their noses, ears, and fingers cut off and eyes put out; in Czortkow, female inmates had their breasts cut off; and in Drohobycz, victims were bound together with barbed wire. Similar atrocities occurred in Sambor, Stanislawow, Stryj, and Zloczow.[30] According to historian Jan T. Gross:

“We cannot escape the conclusion: Soviet state security organs tortured their prisoners not only to extract confessions but also to put them to death. Not that the NKVD had sadists in its ranks who had run amok; rather, this was a wide and systematic procedure.”[30]

During the years 1939–41, nearly 1.5 million inhabitants of the Soviet-controlled areas of former eastern Poland were deported, of whom 63.1% were Poles or other nationalities and 7.4% were Jews. Only a small number of these deportees survived the war.[31] . . .

In Poland, Nazi atrocities ended by late 1944, but they were replaced by Soviet oppression with the advance of Soviet forces. Soviet soldiers often engaged in plunder, rape, and other crimes against the Poles, causing the population to fear and hate the Soviet regime.[33][34][35][36]

Soldiers of Poland’s Home Army (Armia Krajowa) were persecuted, sometimes imprisoned and, in many cases, executed following staged trials. . . .

Between 1941-1944, Soviet partisan units conducted raids into Finnish territory and attacked civilian targets such as villages. In November 2006, photographs showing atrocities were declassified by the Finnish authorities. These include images of slain women and children.[38][39][40] . . .

[German] civilians were run over by tanks, shot, or otherwise murdered. Women and young girls were raped and left to die (as is explored firsthand in Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Prussian Nights).[48][49][50] In addition, fighter bombers of the Soviet air force penetrated far behind the front lines and often attacked columns of evacuees.[48][49] . . .

The Red Army’s violence against the local German population during the occupation of eastern Germany often led to incidents like that in Demmin, a small city conquered by the Soviets in the spring of 1945. Despite its surrender, nearly 900 civilians committed suicide, fueled by instances of pillaging, rape, and executions.[citation needed]

Although mass executions of civilians by the Red Army were seldom publicly reported, there is a known incident in Treuenbrietzen, where at least 88 male inhabitants were rounded up and shot on May 1, 1945. The incident took place after a victory celebration at which numerous girls from Treuenbrietzen were raped and a Red Army lieutenant-colonel was shot by an unknown assailant. Some sources claim as many as 1,000 civilians may have been executed during the incident.[notes 1][51][52] . . .

Following the Red Army’s capture of Berlin in 1945, one of the largest incidents of mass rape took place. Soviet troops raped German women and girls as young as 8 years old. Estimates of the total number of victims range from tens of thousands to two million.[55] . . .

During the siege of Budapest, an estimated 50,000 women and girls were raped[59][60]:348–350,[notes 2] though estimates vary from 5,000 to 200,000.[61]:129 Hungarian girls were kidnapped and taken to Red Army quarters, where they were imprisoned, repeatedly raped, and sometimes murdered.[62]:70–71 . . .

Although the Red Army crossed only a very small part of Yugoslavia in 1944, its activities there caused great concern for the Yugoslav communist partisans, who feared that the rapes and plundering by their Soviet allies would weaken their standing with the population.[64] . . .

700,000 Soviet Russian troops occupied Manchuria, in China, and looted the entire region of valuable materials and industrial equipment. Soviet Russian Red Army troops looted and terrorized the people of Mukden in Manchuria, China. A foreigner witnessed Soviet Russian troops, formerly stationed in Berlin, who were allowed by the Soviet military to go at the city “for three days of rape and pillage”. Most of Mukden was gone. Then convict soldiers were then used to replace them, it was testified that they “stole everything in sight, broke up bathtubs and toilets with hammers, pulled electric light wiring out of the plaster, built fires on the floor and either burned down the house or at least a big hole in the floor, and in general behaved completely like savages”.[65]

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The Soviet government was evil, sick, twisted, and sadistic. Unfortunately, the administrations of FDR, Truman, and Churchill directly aided the Soviet Union in its acts of mass murder.

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One of the conclusions of the Yalta Conference was that the western Allies would return all Soviet citizens who found themselves in their zones to the Soviet Union. . . .

On March 31, 1945, Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt concluded the final form of their plans in a secret codicil to the agreement. Outlining the plan to forcibly return the refugees to the Soviet Union, this codicil was kept secret from the US and British people for over fifty years.[2] . . .

The refugee columns fleeing the Soviet-occupied eastern Europe numbered millions of people. They included many anti-communists of several categories, assorted civilians, both from the Soviet Union and from Yugoslavia, and fascist collaborationists from eastern Slavic and other countries. . . .

Often prisoners were summarily executed by receiving Communist authorities, sometimes within earshot of the British. One of the killings at the hand of the Yugoslav Partisans is known as the Bleiburg massacre. The majority were not killed in this incident, however, but were instead sent to prison camps, and avoided the gulags.[2] . . .

Tolstoy described the scene of Americans returning to the internment camp after having delivered a shipment of people to the Russians. “The Americans returned to Plattling visibly shamefaced. Before their departure from the rendezvous in the forest, many had seen rows of bodies already hanging from the branches of nearby trees.”[10]. . .

Some critics[who?] addressing the subject have claimed that Operation Keelhaul, if it happened today, would currently be classified a crime of war punishable under international law because of the summary executions which took place as the consequences of turning over military prisoners, and because of the alleged murder and rape of refugee women and children from anti-communist eastern European, Russian and Cossack families.[citation needed]

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[Lazarus]

Typical far-right paranoi.
I had an uncle who died when visiting Russia. Perhaps we could add him as a ‘commie’ victim?
The site you linked is nothing more than a ‘Hitler -was not so-bad’ rant
and no country was as openly  muderous as Germany under Hitler.

[221B Baker Street]

@KurtGodel7:

@Zhukov_2011:

To help steer this interesting topic in the right direction, let’s assume Germany was able to upgrade its fighter squadrons with Me-262As by as soon as late 1942, early 1943. This was a crucial and extremely bloody period for the Allied Bomber Commands, with losses on some raids reaching ten or more percent. Without fighter escorts (the drop tank-equipped P-51 still many months away) the bombers would have been easy prey to the new German jet. The bomber effort was already on the brink of collapse, so a determined resistance by numerous and skilled Schawlbe squadrons could have cleared the skies over Europe.

But then what? The effect of the Allied bombing campaign during the war is soaked in controversy and many believe it had little effect. Considering Germany production reached its peak during nonstop night and day bombing, the argument carries some weight.
The jet was designed to combat heavy bombers, how would it have fared in an air-superiority role - that is, the ability to suppress enemy fighters and air defenses to a point where your forces dictate the battlefield? The Me-262 would have had to fulfill the fighter-bomber and air-defense-suppression roles unless the Germans continued to field older models since no jet bomber was even close to operational.

How do you think the jet would have performed in Russia, where enemy strategic bomber forces were negligible? The Red Air Force was able to quickly outnumber the Luftwaffe in fighters and tactical bombers, including some models that were better than any of the German prop-planes.
How do you think the Me-262s would have been used, en masse, on the Eastern front, and to what effect?

I agree that the widespread introduction of the Me 262 in late '42 or early '43 could likely have caused the cancellation of (at very least) the U.S. daytime bombing raids. I also agree that, even if the Me 262 had been able to protect Germany against both day and night raids, that alone would not have materially altered the outcome of the war.

However, the Me 262 was a good enough anti-bomber aircraft that, even when the Americans had developed the ability to send Mustangs deep into Germany, it would still have been almost impossible for the Americans to resume daylight raids. (At least, presuming the Me 262s were fielded in large quantities.)

You are correct to assert that Germany needed to significantly improve its fortunes on its Eastern front for it to alter the course of the war. Possibly a modified version of the Me 262–ideally with the addition of dive brakes–could have had a major influence on the air war over Germany’s eastern front. Possibly, a better option would have been the Horten Ho 229–it was slightly faster than an Me 262, had a much longer range, carried twice the bomb payload, and had dive brakes. As you say, Germany needed a dogfighter and a fighter-bomber on this Eastern front. Regardless of which of the two jet designs was used, the objective should have been to destroy enemy aircraft both in the air and on the ground. During the postwar era, jet aircraft proved far superior to piston aircraft in the dogfighting role. Whether the German jet designs in question were good enough to attain that superiority, or whether further modification would have been necessary, is not something I claim to know.

But for the sake of argument let’s suppose that Germany could have used the Me 262 or some other jet design to attain air superiority or even air supremacy over its Eastern front. Its piston aircraft could then have dive bombed Soviet troops. This, alone, would not have been enough to alter the fate of Germany’s Eastern front. The Soviet advantage in available infantry, and in tanks and artillery, was simply too overwhelming for German air power, alone, to be able to counter it. Other additions to Germany’s arsenal would also have been necessary. As I hinted at in my earlier post, Germany would have needed more production, earlier. If it had achieved its 1944 level of production back in 1942, and if it had had access to weapons like the assault rifle, the longer-ranged versions of the Panzerfaust, and if it had created something like the planned E-series tanks, the combination of these factors, along with the aforementioned air superiority provided by its jets, might have been enough to tip the balance in its favor. Germany didn’t necessarily have to have all its super-weapons–for example the Type XXI U-boats could have waited until later–but it would have needed at least some of them in '42. (Plus that production increase.)

Large numbers of German jets would have had another advantage: they would have made it difficult or impossible for the Allies to conduct D-Day style invasions. In places where the Allies had already gained a foothold–such as Italy in 1943–German jets could have made it difficult or impossible to effectively supply said troops. Jets could provide significant protection to Germany’s southern and western flank against the Western democracies, even while its army pushed eastward into the Soviet Union. Germany’s long-term strategy for victory would have involved conquering everything in the Soviet Union west of the Urals; then making peace with the rest of the Soviet Union. At that point its army would have faced only one threat: the threat of the Western democracies.

The next step in this process might have involved a decision to adequately fund the German nuclear program. A successful nuclear program requires a significant investment of industrial capacity to enrich uranium or plutonium. I have read that during WWII, the U.S. used more industrial capacity on uranium and plutonium enrichment than it did on making tanks. The massive amount of industrial capacity needed, in combination with the long-term nature of the program, was why Germany’s nuclear program was not adequately funded. (Germany’s plan involved conquering the Soviet Union in '41 and '42, not '45.) But a victory over the Soviet Union would afford German leaders the luxury of being able to adopt longer-term, large-scale projects. It would have taken several years between the adequate funding of a nuclear program and the first German nuclear bomb. But once they had that bomb, they could have used their Aggregate Series rockets to deliver the nuclear payload anywhere in the world. (Assuming, of course, that von Braun continued to make steady progress during the late '40s.) The existence of German nuclear bombs + German ICBMs could have forced the Western democracies to the negotiating table, perhaps in 1950. Presumably, the two sides would agree to stop fighting, and to retain the borders as they were. Germany would be in control over most of Europe, while Britain would retain its colonies in Africa, India, and the Middle East.

I would like to consider the question, “then what” a bit further.  Supposing Germany miraculously can produce the large numbers of ME262 (or better the Horton HO-229) necessary to regain control of the skies, there are still serious questions regarding the Axis war capabilities.

1. Could Germany supply necessary fuel for the planes to resume flights of this magnitude?  I doubt it, their airforce was grounded as much by lack of fuel as by lack of planes; in the early part of the war they were fueled from the Soviet supplies and the oil stockpiles in the conquered territories.  Germany produced very little oil (from Romania primarily) and was able to make an inferior fuel from the coal that was available.  I doubt Germany could have done much more than it did from the fuel standpoint.

2. Could Germany have supplied necessary parts for repair and maintenance of these planes?  One often overlooked fact is that while German production increased until nearly the end of the war, this was in part accomplished by a severe lack of spare parts.  Usually, repairs in the latter part of the war were made by cannibalizing otherwise perfectly usable units.

Additionally, it should not be forgotten that the engines for the ME262 needed a complete rebuild after only 10 hours of flight time.   This was because Germany lacked access to metals such as chromium and vanadium which would have allowed more durable parts and was forced to use ordinary steel rather than a superior alloy.  A large fleet of ME262s would have required a supply of engine parts for rebuild perhaps even an order of magnitude larger than than production of the planes themselves due to this limitation.

3. Could Germany have produced sufficient trained pilots that could take full advantage of the superior aspects of their jets?  Certainly, the state-promoted interest in gliders during the 1930’s provided a large base upon which to build.  However, adequate training of the pilots would still have required a significant amount of flight time; further exasperating points 1 and 2 above.

4. How long before the UK/US caught up with the German jets?  This would inevitably happen, if for no other reason than the ability to reverse-engineer planes in their possession (whether by crashes, defections, special operations, espionage, etc.).  It is always much easier to catch up than to lead; and especially so for the allies who had vastly superior resources at their disposal.  Even without this, there remained possible countermeasures available to them.  For example, night bombing raids were still quite feasible.  Proper use of radar would guide the bombers to wherever the ME-262 had landed and allow clear views of the airfield and buildings even in poor weather, probably destroying at least their airfields (if not the planes, pilots, and support equipment themselves) during the darkness.

5. Would the German air superiority really translate into meaningful support on the Eastern front in 1942/43?  There was little industrial production worthwhile to bomb within range of even the best German bombers (unless of course the Amerika bomber were built).  The soviet tanks would have been readily defeated, but by then the German army was already shattered and forced into a long retreat west well before the majority of the Russian tanks arrived anyway…instead of tanks mowing down the Germans, perhaps it would have been waves of bazooka wielding infantry which would not be as cost effective to bomb?

6. As already noted, the Allied bombing raids were of questionable value anyway.  What if their suspension led to these resources being devoted instead to a more effective military tool?  Suppose instead of building multiple large bombers during 1942-43, the Americans upgrade the P-80 with copied German jets instead?  Do the bombing raids begin again in 1944-45 with bombers now protected by Allied copies of the HO-229?

7. Nuclear capability potential.  With the US having at least a five year head start in the area, I think it more likely the US/UK would have developed a deployment method for their bombs well before the Germans would have developed atomic weapons.  It is, IMO, much easier to recreate the Amerika bomber or V-2 (or other suitable delivery method) on the technological base the US had than to build the manhattan project on the base Germany had.  It is debatable if vonBraun matched Dr. Goddards work regarding stabalization and control despite having the resources of the German nation at his disposal, the Americans only needed to scale up Dr. Goddards rockets.  Especially as the German nuclear technological base was considerably less qualified than the US and flawed to begin with…for example the Germans were only considering the use of heavy water (of which there was simply not enough in all Europe anyway) for the neutron modulators, not the better graphite.

As such, it is my opinion that earlier development of the ME-262 and/or HO-229 would have helped the German cause, but introduction of such in large numbers, even at a date of late 1942 wouldn’t have changed the overall outcome.

[KurtGodel7]

@221B:

I would like to consider the question, “then what” a bit further.  Supposing Germany miraculously can produce the large numbers of ME262 (or better the Horton HO-229) necessary to regain control of the skies, there are still serious questions regarding the Axis war capabilities.

1. Could Germany supply necessary fuel for the planes to resume flights?  I doubt it, their airforce was grounded as much by lack of fuel as by lack of planes; the early part of the war fueled from the Soviet supplies and the oil stockpiles in the conquered territories.  Germany produced very little oil (from Romania primarily) and was able to make an inferior fuel from the coal that was available.  I doubt Germany could have done much more than it did.

2. Could Germany have supplied necessary parts for repair and maintenance of these planes?  One often overlooked fact is that while German production increased until nearly the end of the war, this was in part accomplished by a severe lack of spare parts.  Usually, repairs in the latter part of the war were made by cannibalizing other units.

Additionally, it should not be forgotten that the engines for the ME262 needed a complete rebuild after only 10 hours of flight time.   This was because Germany lacked access to metals such as chromium and vanadium which would have allowed more durable parts.  A large fleet of ME262s would have required a supply of engine parts for rebuild perhaps even an order of magnitude larger than than production of the planes themselves.

3. Could Germany have produced sufficient trained pilots that could take full advantage of the superior aspects of their jets?  Certainly, the state-promoted interest in gliders during the 1930’s provided a large base upon which to build.  However, training of the pilots would have required a significant amount of flight time; further exasperating points 1 and 2 above.

4. How long before the UK/US caught up with the German jets?  This would inevitably happen, if for no other reason than the ability to reverse-engineer planes in their possession (whether by crashes, defections, special operations, espionage, etc.).  It is always much easier to catch up than to lead; and especially so for the allies who had vastly superior resources at their disposal.

5. Would the German air superiority really translate into meaningful support on the Eastern front in 1942/43?  There was little worthwhile to bomb within range of even the best German bombers (unless of course the Amerika bomber were built).  The soviet tanks would have been readily defeated, but by then the German army was already shattered and forced into a long retreat west well before the majority of the Russian tanks arrived anyway…instead of tanks mowing down the Germans, perhaps it would have been waves of bazooka wielding infantry which would not be as cost effective to bomb?

6. As already noted, the Allied bombing raids were of questionable value anyway.  What if their suspension led to these resources being devoted instead to a more effective military tool?  Suppose instead of building multiple large bombers during 1942-43, the Americans upgrade the P-80 with copied German jets instead?  Do the bombing raids begin again in 1944-45 with bombers now protected by Allied copies of the HO-229?

7. Nuclear capability potential.  With the US having at least a five year headstart in the area, I think it more likely the US/UK would have developed a deployment method for their bombs well before the Germans would have developed atomic weapons.  It is, IMO, much easier to recreate the Amerika bomber or V-2 (or other suitable delivery method) on the technological base the US had than to build the manhattan project on the base Germany had.  Especially as the German technological base was considerably less qualified than the US and flawed to begin with…for example the Germans were only considering the use of heavy water (of which there was simply not enough in all Europe anyway) for the neutron modulators, not the better graphite.

As such, it is my opinion that earlier development of the ME-262 and/or HO-229 would have helped the German cause, but introduction of such in large numbers, even at a date of late 1942 wouldn’t have changed the overall outcome.

You’ve raised a number of good points, and have substantially contributed to this discussion. Thanks!

I’ll address those points in order.

1. The problem of lack of fuel. Jets required a type of fuel which was somewhat less difficult to obtain/less scarce than the fuel needed for piston-driven aircraft. Also, Germany’s fuel shortage was worse in '44 than in '42. Partly this was because it had fewer aircraft in '42, and partly because some Allied bombing raids in '43 and '44 were targeted against oil refineries. Also, the objective of the German summer offensive in '42 was to capture the Caucasus oil fields. Had that objective been achieved, Germany’s fuel-related problems would have been solved. Therefore, a complete solution of problem 1) depends on whether Germany could gain and hold its summer of '42 objectives. (Which in the real war it could not.)

2. The problem of repair/maintenance of planes and the short lives of jet engines. As you pointed out, the latter problem occurred because of a lack of access to the raw materials required to build good jet engines. I know that one of the objectives of invading the Soviet Union was to attain access to strategically important raw materials. There are large deposits of chromium in Kazakhstan, and smaller deposits in Finland. Vanadium deposits exist in Russia; mostly in the eastern part. South Africa also has large deposits of chromium and vanadium. The problem of a lack of raw materials could be solved through more conquest. Or, Germany could simply endure the penalties of a lack of good raw materials; with those penalties becoming less severe the more Soviet and other territory it conquered.

The problem of spare parts would be significantly easier to solve: simply produce somewhat fewer planes, and use the freed-up industrial capacity to produce more spare parts.

3. The problem of a lack of sufficiently trained jet pilots. As you pointed out, solving this requires fuel (for training flights), which relates back to problem 1)

4. The problem of the Allies catching up with German jets, and the unsustainable nature of a technologically-based qualitative advantage. I agree this is a very serious obstacle to any would-be Axis victory scenario. Germany would probably have a several year window between one of its jets crashing on British soil and the emergence of lookalike British and American jets. It would need to use that window to significantly improve its existing jets, thereby retaining a significant qualitative edge over the Allies. It would also be advisable for Germany to limit the number of jet flights over British soil. (It is less certain whether the Soviets would turn over any captured German jets to the British and Americans.)

5. Whether the German jets would have readily translated into meaningful support for the Soviet front in 1942 - '43. I think the key thing to remember here is that air superiority would not just provide the chance for German jets to attack Soviet ground targets. They’d also (in this scenario) eliminate most Soviet aircraft from the skies, thus enabling German piston-driven aircraft to do more damage. Worthwhile targets would include Soviet tanks (of which there were many in '42 and '43), Soviet artillery, and even Soviet infantry. As you pointed out, it wouldn’t necessarily make great economic sense to drop large bombs on those infantry. But they could be strafed from the air instead. At the battle of Kursk, the Soviets had nearly twice as many tanks, and 2.5 times as many guns and mortars, as did the Germans. Air superiority, combined with large numbers of aircraft, could have helped whittle down the Soviet numerical advantage in those two categories.

That said, I agree that the Germans would have needed more than just that to overcome their bad fortunes on the Eastern front in '42 and '43. That’s why I mentioned the need for things like assault rifles and the E-series tanks in my earlier post.

6. What if the suspension of Allied bombing raids led the Allies to devote those resources to a more militarily effective tool? You mentioned the possibility of the resumption of bombing raids later in the war, after the Allies had copied German jets and had deployed a large air fleet consisting of them. The key question here, as I see it, is how long Germany would have been able to retain its (hypothetical) air superiority against the Western Allies. That air superiority would create safety for its cities, and would protect it from Allied amphibious assaults. But once that air superiority had been lost, both methods of Allied attack would almost immediately begin to create severe problems. Therefore, this ties into problem 4).

7. The five year American head start in nuclear weapons development. And the possibility that the Allies would develop a nuclear deployment method which did not require air superiority.

You may have a point about this as well. It’s often possible to solve problems by throwing time and money at them. The German nuclear research effort had only a small fraction of the funding, and a small fraction of the personnel (including scientists and engineers) which had been allocated to the American effort. An Axis victory scenario involving nuclear weapons would probably require that the German nuclear program receive the same number of scientists and engineers with which the American effort had been provided, even before the Soviet Union had been defeated. Freeing up large amounts of industrial capacity for uranium or plutonium enrichment would have been more difficult, at least while Germany was still at war with the Soviets.

That being said, the development of ICBMs is a non-trivial task; and Germany was very far ahead of the U.S. in that area. If the U.S. lacked ICBMs, Germany would have been able to defend itself from American nuclear attacks by attaining air superiority. (Assuming, of course, that Germany was in a position to attain air superiority.) Thus, German air superiority could buy time either for its nuclear research effort to bear fruits, or for it to find some other way to force Western democratic politicians to agree to peace.

To sum things up, most of the problems you listed could be solved, or at least largely mitigated, if Germany managed to do three things:

1. Attain '44 levels of production in '42.
2. Attain and maintain air superiority against both the Western democracies and the Soviets.
3. Attain large-scale victories on the Soviet front in '42 and '43.

Achieving 1) and 2) would significantly contribute to 3). It is also worth noting that nearly 1 million citizens of the Soviet Union fought on Germany’s side during WWII. Had Germany shown a greater level of political sensitivity and awareness in its dealings with citizens of the Soviet Union, that number might have been significantly increased. Also, Germany produced about 3.5 times as many tanks in '44 as it had in '42. Roughly a quarter of its '44 production total consisted of Panthers and Tigers, as compared to almost none for '42. Getting '44 levels of production in '42 would have multiplied the number of German tanks and artillery units available for use against the Soviets.

[Lazarus]

Germany had  3000 tanks in service by April 1943 (+ 800 Stug) rising to 3900 (+1,500 Stug)by July.
The max. she ever had in service was 4,800 in June 1944(+ 3,300 stug). Figures sunk as low as 3,400 (+ 1,700 Stug) in Aug 1944. By Jan 1945 the max was 4,250 (+ 4,000 stug).

[221B Baker Street]

KurtGodel7, very good post, thank you.

I’m still not convinced however, I’ll reply to a few of your points below further:

1. Germany desperately needed the Russian oil by 1943 (as well as Russian grain which I will discuss further below).  That they failed to take the Caucasus during this time was their last realistic chance at victory, IMO.  However, had they taken the oil wells, but with the Russians destroying them in the process as was quite likely, would the Germans be able to restore the flow of oil in sufficient time? It might take months, even years to rebuild the necessary infrastructure in the best of circumstances, let alone during a brutal war.  The German industry was already hard pressed to supply the necessary armaments and did not have a great deal of experience with oil industry in the first place.  I think they would not have been able to do this.

2. The same idea goes for the chromium, vanadium, etc., though this would be less difficult for the Germans to accomplish (or mitigate as you also suggest) than the oil problem.

3. While Germany might have been able to supply an equivalent amount of money, material and engineers to work on their atomic program, there simply were much fewer top nuclear physicists in all Europe than existed in the US.  Consequently, it would have probably cost more and taken longer than the US program for this reason alone.  I have no doubt they could have eventually done it, but I don’t see how they develop nuclear weapons before the allies developed a delivery system that could get through their defenses.

The German V-2 was a technological marvel, but other than size, no more advanced than the rockets being built by Dr. Goddard.  After the war, when Dr. Goddard was able to examine a captured V-2, he was convinced the Germans had stolen his work.  And the Germans might have because most of his designs were on file in the US patent office, available for public viewing (which the Germans did prior to the war).  I think had the Americans wanted to (and Dr. Goddard certainly did) they could have built a superior rocket in a couple months and have it mass-produced in six.  As the A-bombs designs at that time were quite heavy, it might have taken longer than that to build a nuclear capable rocket…but how much longer?

Alternatively, the Allies could have either copied the German jets to enable a delivery system, or devise other means (boats/submarines? special ops?) to deliver these weapons.

In addition, I consider the German attack on Russia to be about food as well as oil  The Ukraine was the breadbasket of Europe, and helped the Germans tremendously in 1943.  But food was scarce in 1944 and onward.  Partly this was due to Russian recovery of territory.  But it was also because the Ukraine was normally not sufficient by itself to feed Germany (the year of the capture of Ukraine by the Germans was one of the best years for Ukrainian agriculture as the weather was nearly perfect).  Of course, the poor treatment of the Ukrainians by the Germans did not lend itself to helping this problem either. In order to assure itself of adequate food, I think the Caucasus (the next logical food source) was needed.