I had been a fan of efficient US effort towards Europe, as detailed in Caspian_Sub Policy Paper #2
US1 (42 IPC): build in EUS 3tra, 6inf (or even 3tra, 2inf, 3arty)
US2 (40 IPC): build in EUS 1tra, 4inf, 4tnk
US3 (38 IPC): build in EUS 1tra, 4inf, 2arty, 2tnk
Planes fly to Europe as well.
And even more, getting to 5+5 transports to Europe (35 IPC = 5 inf + 5 arty), once even 6+6 (adding some IPC in Europe). Building US planes instead of inf+arty and a little tanks is less effective.
But I found all this the most vulnerable to Japanese “coastal guerilla” as described above. Alaska may be only a staging point, but if US gets negligent then Japan may continue building a serious base (ftr’s landed in Alaska, further landing a ‘screen’ in WCA). All without committing really strong forces.
The real point is how US may prevent it with minimal sacrifice (IPC investment or delay to Europe).
Then yes, I found keeping one extra turn production’s investment (or 3/8 if using tanks) in building in WEU instead of EEU does protect nicely. Inf WEU > WCA > ECA, tanks WEU > ECA. Japan cannot win WCA, ALA is empty but swapping it may be pointless for Japan and so deterred.
Else keeping enough US defenders in both WCA and ALA may make the same Japanese landing threat “multiplied”. Keeping 6-7 inf in each ties up too much from the KGF effort.
What if as US I prefer to KGF with more inf+arty rather than less inf+tanks ? is the weakening of deeper counterattack potential vs Jap landings reason enough not to do that ?
More important - is there a cheaper US sufficient deterrence towards Japan ?